Moscow Concerned About Armenia’s Wavering EAEU Membership

Foreign Policy Publication  Eurasia Daily Monitor  Armenia 

06.16.2026

Luke Rodeheffer

Moscow Concerned About Armenia’s Wavering EAEU Membership

Executive Summary:

• The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is continuing to pursue free trade across member-states, but Armenia’s membership is in doubt following the Armenian Prime Minister’s pro-Western Civil Contract party’s victory in the country’s June 7 parliamentary elections.
• Trade volume among member states remains low for a free trade bloc, and the economic effects of Armenia’s potential exit would likely be negligible for the EAEU as a whole.
• Moscow’s and other member states’ responses to the possibility of Armenia leaving the bloc have highlighted that the EAEU is as much a political project as an economic one.

The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the governing body of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), held a meeting in Astana on May 26–28 (24.kz, May 28). [1] The topics of discussion included how to leverage artificial intelligence to accelerate trade movement and digitize the trade bloc’s economies. The latest changes unveiled by the trade bloc include a digitized system for the transit of goods across the free trade zone (Orda.kz, May 28). The results of Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections, however, undermined this news. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s pro-Western Civil Contract party won the parliamentary elections, meaning Armenia will likely continue pursuing negotiations for rapprochement with the European Union, and discussions about possibly leaving the EAEU remain on the table (see EDM, June 5). The country’s parliament approved legislation initiating the EU accession process in March 2025 and continues to cooperate with the bloc (see EDM, May 11). Russian President Vladimir Putin has pushed for a referendum in Armenia to decide decisively between the EAEU and the European Union (RITM Eurasia, June 5).

The chairman of Russia’s Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, stated that if Armenia exits the EAEU, “the cost of gas will increase by a factor of four, the remittance payments that are worth $4 billion/year will be radically reduced” before threatening to halt the import of goods from Armenia into Russia (Interfax, June 2). He further noted that such punitive measures were imposed on Ukraine following Kyiv’s decision to pursue rapprochement with the European Union (Telegram/@vv_volodin; RTVI, June 2).

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk announced that Russia and other EAEU member states were studying ways to end Armenia’s membership in the trade bloc (Interfax, June 4). He also threatened further actions to block Armenian imports in the name of “protecting the Russian market.” Import bans on a variety of different Armenian exports, from alcohol to mineral water and vegetables, have already been introduced (Rosbalt, June 2; see EDM, June 5).

Russian media has trumpeted that the volume of trade between EAEU member states reached a record of nearly $100 billion in 2025. This number, however, is a small fraction of the bloc’s total combined gross-domestic product (GDP) of $3 trillion (TKS.RU, April 10). This is far lower than the levels of intra-EU trade, which reached 61.8 percent in 2024 (European Parliament, October 12, 2024). 

Beyond facilitating commodity corridors across the post-Soviet space, the EAEU has struggled to develop industrial cooperation among its member blocs, as a recent event between Kyrgyz and Belarusian business leaders demonstrated. Despite Belarus’s expertise in agricultural machinery and free trade among EAEU member states, very few manufactured goods are purchased in Kyrgyzstan due to competition from the People’s Republic of China (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 3). Armenia’s trade volume with the EAEU was $1.41 billion in the first quarter of 2026, a decline of 15.6 percent, while its volume with the European Union was $763.2 million, an increase of 54.3 percent (Novosti Armenia, May 29). Kazakhstan’s business press has noted that trade between Kazakhstan and Armenia is very low, so any effect of Armenia’s exit would be negligible for the country’s economy. Trade volume between the two states was only 0.3 percent of Kazakhstan’s total trade with other EAEU members in the first quarter of 2026 (InBusiness.kz, June 8). Kyrgyzstan’s business press also noted similar trends of very low trade volumes with Armenia (Economist.kg, June 4).

Kazakhstani economist Meruert Makhmutova, from the country’s Public Policy Research Center, stated that the EAEU has played a key role in Russia’s ability to subvert Western sanctions. The bloc may repeat the fate of the Soviet Union, however, if Russia’s economy deteriorates because of its war against Ukraine and drags the rest of the member states with it. Kazakhstan, which was instrumental in the creation of the free trade zone, may be the last to leave it (Exclusive.kz, May 26). She also noted that the trade zone has enabled Russian businesses to compete in Kazakhstani state tenders, but has made it much more difficult for Kazakhstani firms to access Russian tenders. Her criticisms echo those that have been leveled at the bloc by Central Asian economists and business leaders in the past, particularly in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (see EDM, March 4, 2024).

Deputy Belarusian Prime Minister Natalya Petkevich admitted in a press conference that “the situation with Armenia and Moldova demonstrates that we need new levers for the union to function comprehensively” (NewsAM, May 31). The language Petkevich chose is revealing, as the term lever is often used in the sense of control. The response to Armenia’s wavering in EAEU membership has revealed the extent to which the trade bloc remains as much a political project as a trade bloc. Russia has struggled to attract other post-Soviet states into the bloc, notably Uzbekistan, the most populous country in Central Asia, whose parliament rejected membership for the time being in October 2024 (see EDM, February 26, 2025). The EAEU remains a key element of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy vision, and Moscow will likely take the idea that the bloc is not only not expanding but potentially contracting as a serious blow to the country’s prestige.