A few days have passed since the parliamentary elections held in Armenia on June 7, but the traditional congratulatory message to the “Civil Agreement” party and Nikol Pashinyan himself has not yet been heard from the Kremlin. This is despite the fact that, according to preliminary data, Pashinyan’s political force received almost half of the votes (49.81%), although the Armenian opposition, politicians, and public figures do not accept the results of the elections, they talk about administrative resources, unequal election campaign and other violations.

The Armenian domestic political discourse on this topic is a separate topic of analysis, referring to Russia’s positioning, let’s note that this marked silence of Moscow, combined with tough economic impulses, becomes the most eloquent indicator of the current crisis of Armenian-Russian relations.

Commenting on the results of the Armenian elections, the press secretary of the Russian President, Dmitry Peskov, tried to make it clear that Moscow will not be in a hurry. He mentioned that the Kremlin will wait for the final and official results of the elections to be summarized by the Central Electoral Commission, after which only appropriate announcements will be made. Maria Zakharova, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, adopted a similar expectant and restrained tone, referring to the “unclear moments” in the electoral process and the legal stage of the appeal of the results by the opposition blocs (“Strong Armenia” and “Armenia”). However, in addition to this, on June 8, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a rather harsh statement about the elections, talking about repressions, pressures on opponents, etc.

However, Russia’s waiting for official CEC data is not just a legal tact. This is a political position. Moscow shows that it does not accept the victory of the current administration in Yerevan as an absolute and unconditional reality, and that the new level of relations still needs to be “earned” at the negotiation table.

Along with the diplomatic pause, Moscow switched to practical “whip” tactics. On June 11-12, Russia applied new, rather painful trade restrictions to Armenia. From June 12, “Rosselkhoznadzor” restricts the import of all quarantine products originating and delivered from Armenia, as well as the transit through the territory of Russia to EAEU member states. This is a classic Russian tool used in politically tense situations. Thus, Moscow reminds Yerevan of the true extent of economic dependence at the very moment when Pashinyan is trying to strengthen his domestic political legitimacy.

Yerevan seems to perfectly understand the seriousness of the situation and is trying to soften the atmosphere. Today, June 12, Nikol Pashinyan sent a congratulatory message to Vladimir Putin on the occasion of Russia Day. In the text of the message, “readiness for an open and constructive dialogue based on mutual respect for sovereignty and state interests” was emphasized. And on June 11, Pashinyan openly stated that if there is an invitation from Russia, he is ready to go to Russia to meet Vladimir Putin. He also reminded that during his phone conversation with Putin on June 1 (his birthday), there was already a preliminary arrangement for such a meeting.

In similar crisis stages, the president of the Russian Federation has a clear behavioral model. he uses time as a means of political pressure. The Russian side is forced to remain in uncertainty, to experience economic and political discomfort, so that at the time of the meeting, the negotiation positions of the other side are as weak as possible.

Geopolitical logic suggests that events will develop in the following scenario. after June 14, when the RA CEC will publish the final data of the elections and the first wave of appeals will end, perhaps the Russian president will call Pashinyan. As the procedure in such cases implies, during that call, the official congratulation (which will be on record) will be formulated and there will be an invitation to Moscow. That meeting in Moscow will not be easy for the Armenian side. It will be a meeting to clarify “red lines” and report. Putin, again, as in similar cases, can put several key issues on the negotiation table, the main of which is the limitation of the foreign political vector, clarification of the choice of “EU or EAEU”. It is difficult to say how the Armenian side will behave, by what mechanism it will try to reach an agreement with the Russian side, but judging by the post-election rhetoric of the RA authorities, there is a desire to reach an agreement.

However, it is important to note that Nikol Pashinyan will go to Moscow with the vote he received in the elections, according to experts, with weakened legitimacy and economically besieged. In the Kremlin, he is expected to have a pragmatic but forceful dialogue, within the framework of which the agreement will imply a certain price. And what that price will be for Armenia or maybe for Russia, perhaps it will become clear already after that possible meeting.

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