Pashinyan Uses EU Summit to Garner Support Ahead of June Elections

Politics & Society Publication  Eurasia Daily Monitor  Armenia

05.11.2026 Philip Purifoy

Executive Summary:

• On May 4 and 5, Armenia hosted the 8th European Political Community (EPC) Summit and the first-ever EU–Armenia bilateral summit, bringing nearly 40 leaders to Yerevan for the largest international gathering in the country’s history.
• The summit demonstrated that closer relations with Europe are increasingly becoming part of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s domestic political strategy ahead of Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections.
• Armenian opposition groups criticized the summit for prioritizing support for Pashinyan and regional normalization over Nagorno-Karabakh-related concerns, highlighting deep domestic divisions over Armenia’s foreign policy direction and relations with Europe. 

On May 4 and 5, Armenia hosted the 8th European Political Community (EPC) Summit and the first bilateral EU–Armenia summit. Armenia is the first country in the South Caucasus to host the summit since it began in 2022. The event marked the largest such international gathering in Yerevan, drawing nearly 40 European leaders. The summit was another clear sign that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government is reorienting its foreign policy toward deeper integration with Europe after years of deteriorating relations with Moscow (see EDM, March 25, April 22). The summit highlighted Armenia’s growing effort to build ties with Europe. It allowed Pashinyan to frame European integration as part of his domestic political platform ahead of Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections. 

The summit comes amid the expansion of ties between the European Union and Armenia. The European Union announced the Resilience and Growth Plan for Armenia in 2024, worth 270 million euros ($318 million) (European Union, 2024). The plan remains in place but has not been expanded. In December 2025, Brussels and Yerevan adopted the EU–Armenia Strategic Agenda, which advanced cooperation on visa liberalization and institutional reforms (see EDM, April 22). On March 17, the European Union announced that it would deploy a Hybrid Rapid Response Team to counter foreign malign influence ahead of Armenia’s June elections at Yerevan’s request. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas stated that the European Union would “not leave Armenia to face foreign interference alone,” likely a reference to potential Russian influence (Azatutyun, March 17). 

The summit demonstrated Brussels’ willingness to deepen cooperation with Armenia while continuing to avoid making security guarantees. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa pledged deeper cooperation with Armenia in transportation, energy, cybersecurity, democratic governance, and digital connectivity (OC Media, May 6). Armenia and the European Union also signed a new connectivity partnership focused on infrastructure development and economic integration (European Commission, May 5). The press release about the partnership mentions that the Armenian Armed Forces received initial deliveries of EU assistance under the European Peace Facility, worth 30 million euros ($35 million) (European Commission, May 5). While Brussels continues to make agreements that position Armenia as an EU strategic partner in the South Caucasus, EU officials appear to remain wary of creating expectations of accession or security guarantees. 

Armenian membership in the European Union remains a remote prospect. In 2025, Pashinyan’s government enacted a law declaring the “start of the process of Armenia’s accession to the European Union” (OC Media, January 9, 2025; see EDM, January 28, 2025). During the EPC summit, Pashinyan remarked that he would be glad if Armenia were to join the European Union (Prime Minister of Armenia, May 5). No EU member state or institution, however, has officially voiced support for Armenian membership (Azatutyun, May 5).

France emerged as Pashinyan’s most prominent backer during the summit. French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit, conducted as a state visit alongside the EPC summit, included the signing of a bilateral strategic partnership (Prime Minister of Armenia, May 5). The partnership will expand an already existing defense relationship with France, which has previously provided Armenia with CAESAR self-propelled howitzers and Bastion armored personnel carriers (see EDM, November 11, 2023, April 22; Azatutyun, December 4, 2023). Macron endorsed Pashinyan ahead of the parliamentary elections, framing his support as a “decision to defend Europe,” drawing comparisons to his 2024 backing of Moldovan President Maia Sandu, a pro-EU, anti-Russian influence candidate at the time (Armenpress, May 5).

Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party has increasingly incorporated European integration into its political platform ahead of the June 7 parliamentary elections. The party’s 2026 platform replaces earlier language describing relations with Russia as a “strategic alliance” with a “balanced and balancing” foreign policy approach. The platform also emphasizes continued reforms aimed at meeting EU standards (CivilNet, April 6). This shift signals that Civil Contract is seeking to make European alignment a defining electoral position, framing the election as a choice between continuing Armenia’s Western trajectory and its normalization process with its neighbors, primarily Azerbaijan and Türkiye.

Pashinyan’s polarizing political stance on Armenia’s security is central to his election campaign and broader debates over Armenia’s post-2023 foreign policy (see EDM, May 21, 2025; CivilNet, April 4). His rhetoric increasingly portrays Civil Contract’s hold on power as necessary to preserve Armenia’s sovereignty, stability, and fragile peace process with Azerbaijan. Pashinyan increasingly promotes Armenia’s broadly internationally recognized borders, which do not include Nagorno-Karabakh, drawing criticism from opposition leaders, church officials, and ethnically Armenian refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh (see EDM, July 10, 2025; OC-Media, April 2). Pashinyan frames opposition parties as “parties of war” and warns that if Civil Contract does not secure a constitutional majority in the elections, there will be a “catastrophic war” in the fall (Azatutyun, March 19; JAM-News, March 25). He pushes Civil Contract as defenders of Armenian security and stresses the need for Armenians to “stop dreaming of a bigger homeland,” and promotes moving forward with peace with Azerbaijan (Armenpress, May 8). 

Hosting dozens of European leaders in Yerevan allows Pashinyan to portray Armenia as internationally relevant after years marked by military defeat and domestic instability. Polling conducted by the Armenian Election Study showed Pashinyan’s approval rating rising from 36 percent in February to 49 percent in May, suggesting that the government’s emphasis on stabilization and diplomacy with Europe is resonating with portions of the electorate (EVN Report, May 6). 

The EPC’s limited attention to Nagorno-Karabakh-related issues drew criticism from opposition groups. Armenian civil society groups signed a joint appeal urging European leaders to address the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh and support the right of return for Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians under international guarantees (Kavkaz Uzel, May 3). Metakse Hakobyan—a member of the Artsakh National Assembly, which served as the ethnic Armenian legislature in Nagorno-Karabakh before Azerbaijan’s 2023 takeover of the region—denounced the summit as direct “interference in Armenia’s internal political life disguised in the language of diplomacy” (Panorama.am, May 5). Opposition groups argued that the EPC’s ignoring of Nagorno-Karabakh could undermine Armenian trust in European institutions and accused European officials of prioritizing regional normalization and support for Pashinyan over humanitarian concerns. EU Ambassador to Armenia Vassilis Maragos rejected accusations of political interference, saying that the European Union is not taking sides and supports democratic institutions rather than specific candidates (Civilnet, April 23). 

Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian–Armenian billionaire currently under house arrest who founded and leads the opposition Strong Armenia party, has said that Armenia would face serious economic consequences if relations with Russia continue deteriorating. Karapetyan argues that Armenia’s leadership is pursuing risky geopolitical policies without adequately considering the country’s economic vulnerabilities (Panorama.am, May 2). He has also criticized what he describes as the government’s unrealistic approach toward European integration, arguing that “no one is waiting for us in Europe” and warning that Armenia should abandon closer integration with the European Union if it damages the country’s regional balance (Arminfo, May 7). Strong Armenia recently polled at 10 percent, the second most popular party behind Civil Contract (EVN Report, May 6).

Former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan and his Armenia Alliance party also criticized the summit process. It accused the Armenian government of using European political support for domestic electoral purposes rather than advancing relations with the European Union in a meaningful way. The party argued that statements from European officials during the summit gave the appearance of support for the Armenian government’s “manipulative actions” ahead of the elections (Kavkaz Uzel, May 5). 

The EPC summit highlighted Armenia’s deepening political engagement with Europe and positioned Pashinyan as the driver of this trend ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections in June. Brussels, however, continues to approach Armenia cautiously. EU officials support reform and the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan but remain reluctant to offer Armenia membership guarantees or major security commitments. Pashinyan presents European integration as part of Armenia’s future, while opposition groups argue that Civil Contract is using Europe for legitimacy with voters while receiving few concrete guarantees in return. This divide will likely be a significant factor in the results of Armenia’s June parliamentary elections.

—