Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan Move to Institutionalize the Middle Corridor

Executive Summary:

• Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are accelerating cooperation on the Middle Corridor to enhance regional connectivity. Kazakhstani Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov announced at the April 2 Organization of Turkic States meeting that the two countries intend to sign an intergovernmental agreement on the project.
• Growing instability in Iran and constraints on traditional routes have increased the corridor’s regional importance, facilitating rising cargo volumes and positioning it as a reliable alternative linking the People’s Republic of China, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus to Europe.
• The corridor’s institutionalization—supported by regional platforms and international financing—reflects a broader geopolitical shift, enabling participating states to diversify trade dependencies, enhance economic resilience, and reshape Eurasian connectivity and power dynamics.

On April 2, Kazakhstani Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov announced at a meeting of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in Baku that Kazakhstan intends to sign an intergovernmental agreement with Azerbaijan on the Middle Corridor. He emphasized that the initiative has become particularly relevant amid escalating geopolitical tensions and ongoing disruptions to global logistics. He stated, “The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route is considered one of the most reliable and secure transit corridors. With the growing institutional status of the Middle Corridor, we intend to sign the corresponding intergovernmental agreement with Azerbaijan this year.” Bektenov also revealed Astana’s intention to jointly develop the U.S.-backed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), also known in Azerbaijan as the Zangezur Corridor, emphasizing its importance for enhancing regional integration and connectivity (Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, April 2). 

On April 8, the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani foreign ministers reaffirmed the strategic importance of the Middle Corridor during a meeting in Baku. Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and Yermek Kosherbayev underscored that the route is becoming increasingly important for boosting freight traffic between Asia and Europe. The discussions also reflected the broader expansion of bilateral cooperation, which now covers multiple sectors, including transport, energy, trade, and technology. Both sides emphasized that deeper coordination on connectivity projects, especially the Middle Corridor, is a key priority amid ongoing geopolitical tensions and shifting regional trade patterns (Kazakhstani Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Trend News Agency, April 8).

The ongoing tensions involving Iran—which continue to disrupt traditional transit routes across the Persian Gulf and broader Middle Eastern logistics networks—highlight the increasingly important role these developments play in regional transit. As instability threatens supply chain reliability through Iran-linked corridors, the Middle Corridor—stretching from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and into the South Caucasus toward Europe—emerges as a strategically viable alternative (see EDM, March 31). In 2025, container traffic along the Middle Corridor reached 42,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU), marking a 15 percent year-on-year increase of approximately 5,500 TEU compared to 2024, according to data from Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (Trend News Agency, March 11; see EDM, April 28).

The Middle Corridor bypasses Iran and relies on a more complex, multi-step logistics system. These include road and rail links to Caspian ports such as Aktau and Kuryk in Kazakhstan, where cargo is transferred for maritime transport. It also includes shipping across the Caspian Sea, which requires stable schedules and sufficient port capacity. It also depends on smooth transit through Azerbaijan’s and Georgia’s ports and railways toward Türkiye and Europe. This roughly 6,500-kilometer (approximately 4,000-mile) multimodal supply network offers an important alternative. It requires strong intergovernmental coordination, solid institutional mechanisms among core members, advanced infrastructure, and stable political conditions to function efficiently (Baku Dialogues, Fall 2022).

The institutionalization of the Middle Corridor reinforces Azerbaijan’s role as a critical transit hub bridging Central Asia and Europe, while enabling Kazakhstan to diversify its export routes beyond both Russia and Iran. This dual diversification is particularly crucial in the current environment, where sanctions risks, regional instability, and chokepoint vulnerabilities are reshaping trade flows. As noted by Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, “For this region, this is an opportunity within this crisis.” He further stated, “The Middle Corridor is now the only route left standing, the only viable path in terms of trade and transport” (Deutsche Welle, March 25).

In October 2025, during the second meeting of the Azerbaijan–Kazakhstan Supreme Interstate Council held in Astana, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev advanced their cooperation on the Middle Corridor. They committed to a series of agreements and joint initiatives to strengthen regional connectivity. The two sides signed 16 agreements covering transport, logistics, energy, and digital development, reflecting a coordinated effort to deepen connectivity across the Caspian basin (President of Azerbaijan, October 21, 2025; APA Group, October 22, 2025).

The C6 platform, which brings together Azerbaijan and five Central Asian states, supports Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan’s joint initiatives to coordinate the development of the Middle Corridor (see EDM, January 21, 28). This format improves intergovernmental cooperation between Baku and Astana, facilitates joint infrastructure development, and strengthens the corridor’s role as a key intercontinental transit channel between Central Asia and Europe (The Times of Central Asia, November 17, 2025). The two countries have long been proactively collaborating and securing intergovernmental agreements on cross-border transportation corridors within the framework of the OTS (see EDM, June 26, 2025).

Alongside their joint efforts, Baku and Astana are cooperating closely with major international financial institutions to develop intra- and interregional logistics infrastructure. In November 2025, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) expressed its support for Azerbaijan’s development priorities, which aim to transform the country into a regional hub for connectivity, trade, and energy. ADB President Masato Kanda announced that the bank plans to invest up to $2.5 billion to support these objectives through the new Country Partnership Strategy (2025–2029) (ADB, November 15, 2025). ADB recently committed about $5.4 billion in funding for 2026–2029 to support Kazakhstan’s development goals. As part of this, a loan agreement of about $377 million was signed for the Saryagash Bypass Project. This project aims to improve Kazakhstan’s trade and transport connections in the region (ADB, March 2).

The war involving Iran and the resulting disruptions to global energy supplies have also accelerated bilateral cooperation in the South Caucasus, especially between Azerbaijan and Georgia. On April 6 in Tbilisi, Aliyev and Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze highlighted the need to expand the Middle Corridor, presenting it as a practical alternative that could reduce dependence on vulnerable routes, such as the Strait of Hormuz (Euro News, April 7). As instability in the Persian Gulf affects traditional export routes and energy flows, both countries are positioning themselves as key transit hubs linking Asia and Europe. Georgia’s ability to serve as a large-scale transit hub, however, is in question because its ports are currently unable to handle large container volumes and may not be able to scale quickly. Georgia’s operational Black Sea ports have limited deep-water capacity, and the long-planned Anklia Deep Sea Port has faced years of investment issues and other setbacks, though its active construction phase reportedly commenced in late April (Xinhua, April 25). 

The South Caucasus has regained strategic relevance as a viable overland route connecting Central Asia to Europe. Emerging regional projects such as the TRIPP highlight a growing effort to bypass both Iran and Russia while enhancing east–west connectivity. The 43-kilometer (25-mile) transit corridor is designed to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave via southern Armenia, forming a critical link in the broader Middle Corridor initiative. It offers a shorter and potentially more secure transit route for goods, energy, and critical minerals. The corridor also carries clear geopolitical implications. It not only reshapes regional trade dynamics but also alters the strategic balance by reducing dependence on traditional transit chains and introducing new actors into Eurasian connectivity (see EDM, July 23, 2025).

The growing institutionalization of the Middle Corridor reflects a broader shift in Eurasian connectivity driven by geopolitical fragmentation and supply chain insecurity. As traditional routes through Iran and Russia become increasingly constrained, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are positioning the corridor not only as an alternative transit route but as a strategic framework for regional integration and economic resilience. Beyond its immediate logistical function, the corridor is gradually emerging as a geopolitical instrument that reshapes regional power dynamics and trade alignments. It enables participating states to diversify external dependencies, strengthen economic sovereignty, and integrate more closely into transcontinental supply chains across Eurasia.