Month: April 2026

In the 20th century Beirut stood alongside them. 

The Armenian presence in the Middle East is neither
incidental nor recent. As a neighboring region, it became a natural refuge
especially in the aftermath of the Armenian Genocide. Cities like Cairo,
Baghdad, Damascus, and Aleppo have had notable Armenian communities, some of
which remain to this day. Yet Beirut occupied a singular place among them. It
became the center of post-genocide Armenian diasporan life.

Why Beirut? What conditions allowed this relatively small
country to assume such outsized importance in Armenian history? Drawing on
insights from Ara Sanjian, Associate Professor of History and Director of the
Armenian Research Center at the University of Michigan-Dearborn, and himself a
Lebanese Armenian, this article will explore how that status was forged, how
the local Armenian community navigated Lebanon’s turbulent history, and what
its experience reveals for Armenians today.

Unlike other countries, Lebanon did not historically host a
large Armenian community. There is evidence of Armenians living there in the
18th and 19th centuries, but their numbers were too small to be historically
significant. Armenians began settling in Lebanon in large numbers only in the
post-genocide period, arriving mainly from Cilicia.

Semi-independence

The territory of present-day Lebanon, like much of the
Middle East, was part of the Ottoman Empire. What distinguished it from
surrounding regions was its predominantly Christian Arab population, mainly of
the Maronite denomination.

In 1860, war broke out between the Maronites and the Druze.
To protect the local Christian population, European powers intervened, with
France even deploying troops to restore order.

The sectarian violence, coupled with strong European
pressure, prompted the Ottomans to reorganize the region into several
administrative units with different legal statuses. The most distinctive among
them was the Mutasarrifate of Mount Lebanon.

Mount Lebanon functioned as a self-governing autonomous
district within the empire. It had a Christian majority and was ruled by a
mutasarrif (governor) appointed from outside the province. By statute, the
governor had to be a non-local Christian, a system designed to reduce sectarian
tensions and ensure European confidence in local governance after the
Maronite–Druze conflict.

Notably, both the first and the last mutasarrifs before the
outbreak of World War I were Armenian Catholics. Garabet Artin Davoudian (Davud
Pasha) served as governor from 1861 to 1868, and Ohannes Koyoumdjian (Ohannes
Pasha) held the position from 1912 to 1915.

Around the same time, Armenians in Cilicia began their
struggle for autonomy. Uprisings took place in the 1860s and again in the
1880s, eventually resulting in the de facto independence of Zeitun. Unlike
Mount Lebanon, however, this autonomy was never recognized de jure
internationally or by the Ottoman authorities. The Ottomans only regained full
control over Zeitun and the surrounding areas during World War I.

World War I

The First World War proved catastrophic for Lebanon’s
Christian population. Although no major battles were fought in the region, the
war years brought severe repression under Ottoman rule. Authority fell to the
infamous Jamal Pasha, one of the empire’s leading officials and a central
figure in wartime repression.

Mount Lebanon was placed under martial law, accompanied by
censorship and mass arrests. The most devastating consequence was the Great
Famine of 1915–1918, largely the result of deliberate wartime policies. Ottoman
authorities requisitioned food supplies for the army, restricted the movement
of grain from Syria into Mount Lebanon, and imposed controls that, combined
with an Allied naval blockade, cut the region off from essential imports.

The consequences were catastrophic. An estimated 200,000
people died during the famine, roughly one third of Mount Lebanon’s population
at the time. Mass emigration further reduced the population, leaving the region
profoundly transformed by the end of the war.

The Armenian Genocide was taking place at the same time.

The French Mandate

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, France
took control of Lebanon. For the local Maronite Christian community, which had
faced political and economic pressure under Ottoman rule, France’s arrival was
largely perceived as a liberation and a continuation of long-standing ties with
Europe, rather than as a foreign occupation.

The new state was proclaimed in 1920 under the name of
Greater Lebanon. It included Mount Lebanon along with key coastal cities and
surrounding regions, extending beyond the traditional boundaries of the
Mutasarrifate. In the following years, mandate authorities consolidated borders
that largely correspond to those of present-day Lebanon, laying the foundation
for the modern Lebanese state.

At the same time, another French postwar colonial project
failed. In 1918, France also took control of Cilicia, along with Lebanon and
Syria. The prospect of an Armenian state under French protection briefly seemed
realistic. The Armenian Legion was established, and the early years seemed
promising.

However, by 1921, after Lebanon’s borders had already been
defined, France abandoned the Cilician project to normalize relations with the
newly emerging Turkish Republic under Mustafa Kemal.

As a result, Armenians who had remained following the
genocide, were forced to leave Cilicia, the last remaining historically
Armenian region within the former Ottoman Empire, and became refugees in
Lebanon.

For Armenians, the place to which they fled could be seen as
a reflection of the unrealized Cilician project that had just been abandoned.

It can be argued that the historical trajectories of Lebanon
and Cilician Armenia bear striking similarities. On the surface, both were
Christian-majority Mediterranean societies situated among predominantly Muslim
regions, both endured mass violence, and both experienced French rule during
the turbulent postwar period.

However, the outcomes diverged significantly. In Lebanon,
internal tensions led to internationally recognized autonomy even under Ottoman
rule. Although the famine was devastating, it did not result in large-scale
displacement of the population. The French Mandate ultimately laid the groundwork
for future independence.

By contrast, the vision of an autonomous or independent
Cilicia collapsed entirely.

As the dream of an independent Cilicia faded, Armenians
began relocating to what could be seen as its closest historical counterpart:
the state of Lebanon, a slightly luckier twin.

Not Solely Through the Church

In 1921, following the genocide in Cilicia, Armenians began
moving to Lebanon en masse. Additional waves of migration followed throughout
the 1920s.

The Great Famine during the First World War had a
devastating impact, particularly on the Maronite Christian population. As a
result, the arrival of other Christian groups was largely welcomed because it
helped restore the demographic balance. The absence of Armenian–Maronite
clashes in Beirut and its surrounding areas at the time help substantiate this.
Moreover, the French colonial administration did not oppose the influx of
Armenians, as its mandate was partly legitimized by its role as a protector of
Christian communities in the region.

In 1921, the Bolsheviks occupied the First Republic of
Armenia. After the February Uprising failed, the last ARF-Dashnak government,
led by the republic’s final Prime Minister, Simon Vratsyan, relocated to
Beirut.

The combination of Cilician refugees and Armenian political
elites helped form a distinct diaspora in Lebanon.

So what, exactly, was different?

In other Middle Eastern countries with Muslim majorities,
Armenians were largely compelled to unite around the Church to preserve their
identity. In Lebanon, however, the risk of losing that identity was
significantly lower.

This does not diminish the role of the Church in Armenian
life. The Armenian Catholicosate of the Great House of Cilicia is based in
Antelias, and Lebanon is also home to the largest Armenian Catholic community.
As will be discussed later, religion continues to play an important role in
shaping the Armenian diaspora within the framework of Lebanon’s political
system.

At the same time, however, the Church (and culture more
broadly) was not the community’s only source of unity.

Three major Armenian political parties operate in Lebanon:
the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), the Hunchak Party, and the
Ramgavar Party. The Hunchaks lean left, with a largely social-democratic agenda,
while the Ramgavars occupy a more liberal, centrist position.

At the center of Lebanese-Armenian political life, however,
stands the ARF, commonly known as Dashnaktsutyun. Any conversation about
Armenians in Lebanon is incomplete without it.

The party’s record has often faced criticism, particularly
as its actions in independent Armenia continue to raise questions.
Nevertheless, in Lebanon, the ARF has played a crucial role in shaping communal
and political life.

Its ideological positioning is, in many ways, paradoxical.
Despite its red flag, socialist origins, and membership in the Socialist
International, the ARF is not typically perceived as a left-wing party. In
practice, it operates as a right-wing nationalist organization and was even
expelled from Armenia after the Bolshevik takeover because of its nationalist
stance.

The ARF’s activities in Lebanon—the institutions it has
built and the relationships it has established—have created a unique situation.
The Armenian community in Lebanon has been recognized not merely as an ethnic
or religious group, but as a political force with tangible influence, despite
its relatively small population, which at its peak numbered around 300,000.

Since 1921, the ARF has evolved into one of the most
influential Armenian organizations not only in Lebanon but worldwide, shaping
both community life and the Armenian presence within the Lebanese political
landscape.

Bourj Hammoud and Governance

Bourj Hammoud is located north of Beirut and was once
considered part of Greater Beirut. The area initially grew out of refugee
settlement camps where Armenians lived in the post-genocide period. The
Lebanese government later demanded that these camps be removed, and over time
permanent settlements gradually emerged in the swampy areas surrounding the capital.

Calling Bourj Hammoud a “town,” or even a “city,” is
somewhat an exaggeration. Its area is only 2.5 square kilometers, ten times
smaller than the Kentron district, the smallest district in Yerevan. Bourj
Hammoud is home to over 150,000 people, with estimates reaching as high as
200,000, the overwhelming percentage of whom were Armenians.

In 1953, Bourj Hammoud was granted the status of a separate
municipality. The first elections were held, and the Dashnaks defeated the
Hunchak party. These were the last elections held in the town. Since then,
Bourj Hammoud has functioned as a de facto one-party municipality, with the ARF
serving as the main governing authority, maintaining public order, and
supporting the stability of local businesses.

It is important to note that Bourj Hammoud, like other
Armenian neighborhoods or villages such as Ainjar, is relatively poor.
Armenians who achieve higher income levels often move to other areas of Beirut,
leaving the Armenian quarters.

The ARF’s dominant role in Bourj Hammoud reflects a broader
pattern in Lebanon: under the confessional democratic framework, one-party
dominance is common across municipalities. At the same time, this style of
governance has allowed the ARF and other Armenian parties to establish and
maintain Armenian institutions throughout the country and to wield a meaningful
degree of influence within Lebanese political life.

Within the System

In 1943, Lebanon gained independence from France. That same
year, it adopted a unique confessional power-sharing system that remains in
place today.

Under this system, government positions are allocated by
religious affiliation rather than political ideology. Each religious community
is guaranteed a set number of seats in parliament. The most well-known aspect
is the assignment of the highest state offices: the president is always a
Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of
parliament a Shia Muslim.

Armenians, as members of a distinct confession, have
historically benefited from this system. They are guaranteed six parliamentary
seats, five of which are usually held by the ARF, while one is held by deputies
from the Hunchak or Ramgavar parties. Six seats out of 128 may not seem like
much, but in Lebanon, political parties form coalitions across religious lines
to secure votes. This makes the ARF a valuable partner for local Christian
parties because it can deliver a significant portion of the Armenian vote. Over
the years, the ARF has cooperated with parties and movements such as the Kataeb
(Phalanges), Lebanese Forces, and other Maronite political groups.

The town of Bourj Hammoud, along with other Armenian
communities across Lebanon, provides a base that allows Armenians to play an
active role in Lebanese political life.

Institutionalized

Lebanon’s established system of power, which encourages
religious and ethnic pluralism, provided a sustainable foundation for the
Armenian community to thrive. Situated on the border between Europe and the
Middle East, Beirut was accessible to Armenians from across the Diaspora.
Whether an Armenian lived in Iran, Syria, Iraq, Cyprus, Greece, or France, they
could travel to Lebanon to participate in the Armenian movement.

This freedom, combined with a relative lack of local
political ambitions, allowed the Armenian community to develop institutions and
networks that have, in practice, become the political and educational center of
the pro-Armenian movement worldwide.

Each Armenian party in Lebanon maintains its own daily
newspaper: the ARF’s Aztag, the Hunchaks Ararad and the Ramgavar’s Zartonk.

Aztag circulation is around 6,500 copies. For comparison,
the largest Armenian-language newspaper in the United States also prints
roughly 6,500 copies daily. However, because the Armenian community in the U.S.
is more dispersed, those copies carry largely symbolic value. By contrast, in
densely populated Bourj Hammoud in Beirut, 6,500 copies reach a concentrated
audience and serve as an effective tool for shaping political opinion and
uniting the community.

Lebanon is also home to approximately 28 Armenian schools
that provide primary and secondary education. More importantly, it hosts the
only Armenian university in the Diaspora, the Haigazian University, which has
been operating since 1955.

Thanks to the opportunities created by the Lebanese
political system, Armenians have built a vibrant and active community, with
political rivalries, intellectual life, and cultural institutions.

In just fifty years, Armenians in Lebanon created a “state without
a state,” complete with cultural and educational institutions, governing
bodies, and even a town. This unique framework gave the Diaspora a small-scale
homeland where they could live, organize, and operate fully as Armenians,
without needing to be in Soviet Armenia.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place

While Lebanon’s confessional system benefited the Armenian
community, it also fueled tensions between Christian and Muslim Lebanese. These
tensions were further complicated by international involvement, with the USSR
supporting Muslim factions and the United States backing the Christians.

Over time, the Lebanese system became a ticking time bomb
that ultimately exploded during the Lebanese Civil War.

The Crisis of 1958

Before the Lebanese Civil War, the confessional system
contributed to the 1958 Crisis. The main grievance was that the existing
political arrangement disproportionately favored the Christian population while
largely ignoring the growing Muslim population.

This imbalance fueled rising tensions between Maronites and
Muslims. Fortunately, these tensions did not escalate into full-scale military
clashes, in part because 14,000 American troops were deployed to Beirut to
stabilize the situation.

The 1958 Crisis proved transformative for the ARF, shifting
it from a local minority party into a political actor with broader influence.
During the conflict, the ARF adopted a pro-government, pro-Western stance.
Domestically, this aimed to protect its parliamentary seats and maintain
control in Bourj Hammoud. Externally, it sought to prevent the rise of Muslim
Arab nationalism, which could threaten Armenian minority communities across the
Middle East.

For the Dashnaktsutyun, the crisis increased trust and
respect within the Christian political camp and opened new opportunities for
the wider Armenian community in Lebanon.

Lebanese Civil War

Less than 20 years later, however, Lebanon descended into
the Civil War, a brutal urban conflict that lasted from 1975 to 1990. Lebanon’s
internal political complexities, combined with the Palestinian refugee crisis
in the south, brought refugees into conflict with Lebanese authorities, similar
to what had happened earlier in Jordan. The outcomes of the Civil War still
haunt Lebanon today. For the Armenian community, it marked a turning point.
Like any war, it served as a litmus test for societal institutions. The “state
within a state,” largely established by the ARF, faced major challenges.

The war was fought between confessional militias: Maronites,
Sunnis, Shias, Druze, and others. One might assume that Armenians would side
with Christians against Muslims, as they had in 1958. In reality, however,
Armenians adopted a strategy of armed neutrality. This approach created tension
with the Maronite Christians but helped prevent clashes with Muslims.

According to the memoirs of an ARF official, at the outbreak
of the Lebanese Civil War, the Maronites demanded 5,000 Armenian soldiers from
the ARF. The party refused, in line with other rival Armenian parties. This
refusal sparked violence between the two Christian groups in the country.

To understand the significance of 5,000 soldiers in the
context of the war, it is worth noting that the list of Christian martyrs from
the Maronite militia contains around 5,000 names. An additional Armenian force
could have been crucial for the Christian side.

What were the calculations behind this strategy? During the
1958 Crisis, Armenians had sided with the pro-governmental side. What changed?
For post-genocide Armenians, the primary goal was the preservation of life, not
taking military action. Supplying 5,000 soldiers to friendly Maronites could
have resulted in mass casualties. Even a higher chance of victory did not
resolve this concern. Lebanon was still another country, not an Armenian state,
and it could not demand such sacrifices.

Moreover, taking sides could have affected other Armenian
diasporas in the Middle East. In 1958, the American presence reassured the
Christian population. In the Civil War, however, Christian militias allied with
Israeli forces. Aligning with them could have had unpredictable consequences
for Armenians in Syria, Jordan, Iran, Egypt, and elsewhere. The Lebanese
Armenian community, personified by the Dashnaks, saw itself as a leading force
in the worldwide Armenian movement and took responsibility for Armenians across
the Middle East.

The choice had consequences. The Maronite militia, while
clashing with Muslims, also initiated a battle with Armenians. In Bourj
Hammoud, where the ARF was dominant, the Armenian militia mobilized and a
curfew was imposed. Over the 15 years of war, approximately 2,000 men were
drafted into the party’s internal activist groups to maintain order.

It is important to note that the Maronite-Armenian clashes
were far less brutal than those elsewhere in the Civil War. Heavy artillery,
air power, and other advanced weaponry were not used. These were mainly local
attempts by Maronites to invade Bourj Hammoud, resembling urban skirmishes more
than full-scale insurgency.

Nevertheless, the Dashnaks’ methods proved effective.
Armenians largely avoided the bloodshed of the Lebanese Civil War, and economic
life in Bourj Hammoud continued despite the surrounding conflict. In fact, the
wartime economy there was reportedly stronger than it is today.

The success of the Dashnak strategy is especially clear in comparison
with other Armenian quarters at the time. For example, residents recall that
areas under the Hunchaks were effectively occupied by Maronites. These
communities did not participate directly in the war, likely because the ARF,
with its established structures, was a more desirable partner. Still, the
occupation deeply affected them, placing them in danger and constraining social
and economic life.

Even so, the Lebanese Civil War reduced both the Armenian
population and its influence in the country. The functioning of Armenian
institutions could not offset the hardships of years of daily wartime life.

Today

The mass migration of Armenians from Lebanon began during
the war and continued afterward. French, American, and German communities
welcomed the new arrivals. Some Armenians moved to Armenia, and a notable
Australian community began forming at the time as Lebanese Armenian refugees
settled there.

Since the 1980s, the number of Armenian voters in Lebanon
has remained roughly the same. By contrast, Sunni and Shia populations have
grown significantly.

Bourj Hamoud remains an Armenian-majority area, but it is no
longer exclusively Armenian.

In Lebanon, parliamentary seats are still occupied, parties
continue to operate, and newspapers remain active, but Armenian influence is
gradually fading year by year. Events such as the Beirut port explosion and
ongoing regional conflicts continue to reduce the Armenian population in the
country.

One measure of Armenian influence in Lebanese politics is
the degree of Turkish involvement. During the Dashnak’s prime, even amid the
chaos of the Civil War, such influence was impossible. Now, as the Armenian
population declines, Turkish influence is growing year by year.

The trend suggests that the Armenian community is unlikely
to maintain the same level of influence it once had. The foundations for that
no longer exist, and demographic changes have reshaped the landscape.

However, the experience of building a functioning “state
within a state” offers lessons that deserve far wider attention across the
Armenian diaspora. Diaspora communities naturally organize around cultural and
religious life—this is both expected and necessary. But in the Armenian case,
it has often proven insufficient in the absence of a consistently strong
nation-state. Neglecting political engagement in host countries ultimately
weakens the community’s ability to protect and advance its own interests.

Lebanese Armenians have largely resisted these trends. By
maintaining their cultural identity, they were able to exert political
influence in the country where they lived. They managed to preserve the
community through turbulent times, not perfectly, but their experience offers
important lessons for the wider Armenian diaspora.

Lebanon’s trials and tribulations are far from over, the
aftershocks of the port explosion and the country’s economic crisis, in
addition to renewed Israeli attacks and the consequent refugee crisis have
fractured the already fragile sectarian truce, leaving no community unaffected
or sheltered. The Armenian community with its increasingly diminishing numbers,
shrinking institutions and neighborhoods and the muffling of its political
impact in the face of greater local and regional crisis, is no longer the
exception.