As the parliamentary election scheduled for June 7, 2026, in Armenia approaches, the campaign rhetoric of both the ruling party and opposition forces is increasingly centered on the risks of war escalation. Each side portrays the other as a direct threat to Armenia’s security, while presenting itself as the sole credible guarantor of stability.

This strategy – built on amplifying fears of war and framing the elections as an “existential referendum” – is a well-tested method of constructing an enemy image, whereby one side depicts the other as a threat and itself as the protector against that threat.

The instrumentalization of the “war vs. peace” dilemma is also familiar to the Georgian political context. Ahead of the 2024 parliamentary elections, the campaign of the Georgian Dream relied on similar rhetoric. Narrative promoted by the Georgian authorities – claiming that the West, Western institutions, and the so-called “global war party” were attempting to drag the country into military conflict and open a “second front” – took shape as a clear pre-election strategy.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Viktor Orbán similarly employed a structurally identical narrative as a recurring electoral tool. The claim that the opposition intended to send Hungarian soldiers to Ukraine and that only Fidesz could keep Hungary out of the war first emerged in political discourse during the 2022 parliamentary elections.

Viktor Orbán maintained this strategy ahead of the April 2026 parliamentary elections, which Fidesz ultimately lost. Through anti-Ukrainian and anti-European rhetoric, Orbán sought to convince voters that avoiding war depended on his party remaining in power. The ruling party argued that a victory by the opposition Tisza Party, given its pro-Ukrainian stance and close alignment with the EU mainstream, would draw Hungary directly into the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

However, despite lexical similarities, the “dragging into war” narrative used by the Georgian Dream and the Fidesz differs substantially from the “threat of war” messaging observed in Armenia.

Whereas in Georgia and Hungary the “war party” rhetoric targeted Western institutions and invoked a largely hypothetical risk of involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, Nikol Pashinyan’s rhetoric focuses on attempts by the pro-Russian opposition to discredit the peace process and, in this context, highlights the risks of renewed conflict with Azerbaijan.  

“Three-Headed War Party” – Pashinyan’s Main Target

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has turned the threat of a new war with Azerbaijan into one of the central themes of his election campaign. The message that an opposition victory in the elections would pave the way for war was voiced by Pashinyan himself during a press conference held on March 19 following a weekly government meeting. He accused his political opponents of being influenced by “external forces” and of seeking to revoke the peace agreement reached with Azerbaijan.

“All these forces are advocating a revision of peace, which means inevitable war very soon after the elections, in autumn the latest…. They are preparing a new September war with grave consequences.”

Later, Nikol Pashinyan further intensified this rhetoric, stating that preserving peace depends on the ruling party securing a constitutional majority in the elections.

The term “war party” has also been used with increasing frequency by Pashinyan. Speaking at the congress of the ruling Civil Contract party, the Prime Minister referred to leaders of the pro-Russian opposition as a “three-headed war party,” later accusing them of serving foreign interests.

In the pre-election context, the term “three-headed war party” has become increasingly common among representatives of the ruling party to describe pro-Russian opposition groups. It refers to the following political actors:

• The “Strong Armenia” party of the pro-Russian businessman Samvel Karapetyan 
• The “Armenia Alliance” bloc of former President Robert Kocharyan 
• The “Prosperous Armenia” party led by Gagik Tsarukyan 

In the context of the 2026 parliamentary elections, Pashinyan first introduced the “war party” narrative on March 11 in Brussels, during his speech at the European Parliament. According to him, the “war party” in Armenia is led by several disreputable members of the clergy who, together with former leaders of the country, act in the interests of a third state. In subsequent statements, pro-Russian opposition forces and their leaders became the primary targets of this “war party” narrative.

Evolution and Targets of the “War Party” Narrative

Moscow’s Reaction to the “War Party” Narrative

Statements by Nikol Pashinyan about the risk of a new war with Azerbaijan also drew a response from Moscow. The spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, linked the potential threat to the “Western course” chosen by Armenia’s authorities and placed full responsibility for any escalation on Pashinyan:

“Where have the new curators from the EU, NATO, and Washington led the situation? Please note: this statement has nothing to do with Russia. This is the exclusive responsibility of the current authorities in Yerevan and the result of their consultations with the West.”

Opposition Counter-Narrative: The Real Threat Is Not War with Azerbaijan, but Breaking Ties with Russia

The Armenian Prime Minister consistently maintains that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has ended and that, to ensure the irreversibility of the peace process and full normalization of relations with neighboring states, his team must remain in power. In response, opposition parties base their campaigns on sharply anti-government messaging and question Pashinyan’s legitimacy to speak about peace.

Pro-Russian political groups, whom Pashinyan labels the “three-headed war party,” strongly criticize the government’s foreign policy and the peace negotiation process. In their view, the current peace lacks not only a solid legal foundation but also strategic credibility.

Former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan openly appeals to Russia’s role in the process of ensuring sustainable peace and proposes, as an alternative, a peace model that would be backed not by the formally signatory parties, but by “real guarantors bearing responsibility.”

Pashinyan’s foreign policy strategy is also criticized by Samvel Karapetyan. According to this billionaire businessman and citizen of Russia, Pashinyan has turned Armenia into a battleground of geopolitical confrontation, and voting for him would bring poverty, hostility toward Russia, polarization, and economic collapse. In the same statement, Karapetyan referred to the examples of Georgia and Ukraine to illustrate the consequences of leaving Russia’s sphere of influence: “We have seen what happened to Georgia and Ukraine. We do not need new wars.”

Geopolitical Drivers Behind the War Rhetoric

Pashinyan’s narrative that Civil Contract is the party of peace, while an opposition victory would undermine the agreement with Azerbaijan and lead to renewed war, is part of a broader, well-documented shift in Armenia’s foreign policy orientation.

Following the 2020 war with Azerbaijan, strategic ties between Armenia and Moscow have gradually weakened. During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the passivity of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) contributed to declining trust in Russia’s security guarantees. In a 2024 interview with France 24, Pashinyan openly criticized the organization for failing to meet its security commitments to Armenia in 2021-2022. Ultimately, on December 4, 2024, Armenia decided to freeze its participation in the CSTO, an organization widely seen as part of Moscow’s geopolitical orbit. At the same time, in January 2025, Armenia signed a strategic partnership charter with the United States, and in March 2025, the Armenian parliament formally supported a bill to initiate the process of accession to the European Union.

Against this backdrop, foreign policy alignment and regional security dynamics have become central issues in the election campaign. While the ruling Civil Contract prioritizes deepening ties with the West, the opposition rejects this course. According to a risk assessment by the German Marshall Fund, opposition forces openly criticize the government for reassessing relations with Russia, with some advocating even deeper integration with Moscow.

All three opposition figures labeled by Pashinyan as the “war party” maintain close ties with Russia. The leader of “Strong Armenia,” billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, is the founder of the Tashir Group and a businessman who amassed his wealth in Russia, often described as a “Russian oligarch.” Forbes estimates his fortune at $4.1 billion.

Currently, Samvel Karapetyan is under house arrest, charged with public calls to seize state power, tax evasion, and money laundering. The businessman, whom Kremlin propagandist Vladimir Solovyov has described as a “close friend,” holds both Armenian and Russian citizenship. It was precisely to Karapetyan that Vladimir Putin appeared to allude during a meeting with Pashinyan in Moscow on April 1, when he raised the issue of dual citizenship and expressed a desire for more pro-Russian actors to be able to participate in Armenia’s domestic political processes – despite the fact that Armenia’s constitution prohibits electoral participation by foreign citizens.

Beyond these explicit ties to Russia, representatives of Karapetyan’s bloc, together with Kocharyan’s “Armenia Alliance,” reject Pashinyan’s peace agreement with Azerbaijan, oppose the U.S.-backed “Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) framework, and argue that Armenia is “not ready” for EU membership.

Notably, Robert Kocharyan himself, Armenia’s former president and a member of the board of directors of one of Russia’s largest investment companies, Sistema PJSFC, portrays TRIPP as a threat to the country. He calls for the immediate restoration of close strategic relations with Russia and proposes reopening the Abkhaz railway as an alternative transit route via Abkhazia, which, passing through Russia and Georgia, would provide reliable transit connectivity.