Against the background of the announced Iran-US ceasefire, information was circulated, particularly about the role of Turkey, especially the country’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT). Turkish sources said that even before the war, the intelligence structure of the country established intensive contacts with all sides of the conflict, and after the war, it was already in constant contact with both the American-Israeli and Iranian sides.

In addition, during this period, Turkish intelligence “cooperated” with Iraq, Pakistan, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Great Britain, Germany, France.

Furthermore, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization used its conduits and connections with the IRGC to pass Turkish proposals and messages to Iran regarding a cease-fire.

It should be noted that there is also clear information about the serious role played by Turkish intelligence and the former head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, now the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hakan Fidan, in preventing Kurdish and other armed groups from entering Iran.

For their part, perhaps taking all this into account, Israeli circles have noticed that there is a high probability that Turkey will become the “new monster” of the region amid the weakening of Iran, because Ankara is pursuing a policy that can harm the interests of the United States, NATO and regional security.

How realistic or true these claims in Israel’s political science and expert circles are, and why they exist, is open to speculation. On the other hand, during the military operations against Iran, Turkey mainly targeted Israel and not so much the USA, which was also understandable and expected.

On these and other issues 168.amhas talked Analytical “Base”. of the center expert Shiraz Khachatryan with

– Naturally, in the background of the Iran-US war, a new balance of power will be formed in the region, where the relative weakening of Iran will create a vacuum of new influence. States with regional ambitions immediately try to fill that vacuum, and Turkey is one of the most active among them, if not the most active.

Ankara is consistently trying to strengthen its presence in the region in all intelligence, military and political directions, especially in areas where Iran is temporarily weakened.

In this case, Israel’s concern is logical, for it Turkey is a problem not because it is a direct opponent at the moment, but because Ankara is rapidly becoming an independent player, unpredictable and not fully controllable, even for the West. If we don’t go into the historical details of the tense Turkish-Israeli relations, then the situation is quite classic: there is a redistribution of power in the region, where Turkey is gradually strengthening its positions, and Israel is trying to restrain this process.

– What changes will the increase in the role of Turkey, which already has an influential presence in the region, lead to?

– The question is extensive, but if we formulate it briefly and with axes, then the picture is approximately like this. Turkey’s role in the region continues to grow, Russia is no longer the former monopoly actor in the South Caucasus, and here the logic of creating new channels with Western and American support is practically aimed at bypassing both Russian and Iranian limiting influence. In this sense, Turkey is trying step by step to replace Moscow, becoming the main organizing force in the region. In the case of Russia, it is clear that it will not return to its previous position of absolute control. But this does not mean that he was irreversibly pushed out of the region. Moscow will try to remain in the Caucasus as a balancing and sometimes disruptive force, using its remaining leverage: security ties, energy dependencies, bilateral agreements and crisis management experience.

In other words, the role of Russia has decreased, but it has not disappeared. it moves more from the “monopoly controller” model to the “balancing player” model.

For Azerbaijan, the strengthening of Turkey is both an opportunity and a long-term risk. It is an opportunity because Baku enters deeper into the key architecture of the Middle Corridor, becoming an important energy and logistics hub in the South Caucasus. But the problem is that Azerbaijan also has strategic relations with Israel and Russia at the same time, and the need for a complex balance may arise here. If Turkey, for example, enters into a tougher competition with Israel or some centers of the West, Baku will have to make a more difficult maneuver without losing either Ankara or Tel Aviv. In other words, Turkey strengthens Azerbaijan, but also makes its foreign policy more complex and under multi-vector pressures.

And for the USA, which came to the region, the growing role of Turkey has a double significance. On the one hand, it is useful because Turkey helps contain the influence of Russia and, to a certain extent, Iran, and also contributes to the promotion of communication projects that correspond to Western economic and strategic interests. On the other hand, Ankara never operates entirely according to American rules. Turkey is trying to advance its own agenda, its own regional ambitions and sometimes shows quite contradictory behavior towards the western circles. In short, we are in the process of forming a new competitive balance in the region. Turkey is getting stronger, Russia is retreating, but still remains in the game, Azerbaijan is winning, and the USA is trying to take advantage of the situation. The most important thing in this whole restructuring is how much Armenia will be able to benefit from these regional reforms.

– In the background of all this, what developments can be expected around the TRIPP project, can there be revisions, and how much has the US interest been preserved in relation to this or about it?

– TRIPP’s competitiveness largely depends not only on what the project offers to Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also on how much Iran continues to be a regional “obstacle” or counterweight to American strategy. If we consider a theoretical worst-case scenario, for example, if Iran loses its infrastructure and political control as a result of a long war, the US may reevaluate the priority of this project passing through the South Caucasus. In that case, TRIPP can be considered not so much as an urgent geopolitical tool, but more as a backup or long-term logistical option in the context of competition between Russia and the common Eurasian channels.

– There is an article on this topic the other day publish Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, where he addressed several issues. First, according to him, new trade corridors inevitably redistribute influence, and that Russia and Iran, which derive economic and strategic weight from existing transit routes, will not view these developments neutrally. Moreover, their political and economic responses will shape the environment in which TRIPP operates. Basically, we talked about this above. And the former foreign minister is also of the opinion that the security guarantees based on the protection expected from the great powers have proven to be useless, because they are based on interests, and the interests of the great powers are variable and change over time, and etc. In the case of TRIPP, the political opposition is talking about different guarantees. In your opinion, what kind of guarantee does Armenia need to mitigate possible risks, and how do you imagine the strategic equal presence of regional players in this case?

– This question is a logical continuation of this question and my answer to it. A project like TRIPP cannot work only with the promises of one great power, because such “guarantees” are always temporary and depend on changes in interests. New trade corridors are indeed redistributing influence, and the big regional players are unlikely to look neutrally at a project that changes the existing transit balance and reduces their role, in this case it is about Russia and Iran. That is exactly the environment in which TRIPP should operate, and the stability of that environment will be determined not by statements, but by the reactions of regional powers.

In these conditions, Armenia does not need abstract protection promises, but more practical, measurable and multi-layered guarantees.

The first is the legal guarantees, where it will be clearly established that the road, infrastructure, customs and security regime remain under the sovereign jurisdiction of Armenia.

The second is the multilateral institutional guarantees, that is, not only the US, but the involvement of several actors here, so that the project does not become a political tool of one center.

It is also important to have a mechanism of economic counterbalances, so that Armenia is not only a transit area, but receives a controllable economic benefit, and has compensation and pressure reduction mechanisms in non-working or crisis moments.

Next are operational safety mechanisms, which do not depend on the will of the “guarantor”, but are based on local control, monitoring and quick response. This is the real guarantee, not the on-duty political statements.

As for the “equal presence” of regional players, I don’t think of it as a beautifully balanced symmetry, because such symmetry has almost never existed in the region. It is more realistic to talk about controlled versatility. In other words, the USA can remain the political sponsor of the project, but if Russia and Iran are completely left out of the project’s calculations, they will work to either disrupt or “make” its implementation more expensive. That is why, in my opinion, a model where Russia and Iran are not completely excluded from the regional calculation is in the interests of Armenia.

– By the way the other day, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Zulfugarov, also stated that the most important thing for them is the connection of the main part of Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan and ensuring an unhindered transition, and it is not important whether it will be through the November 9 document or TRIPP, in the latter case, Baku is not a direct party.

– This statement of Zulfugarov quite openly and honestly shows the true priority of Baku. The key thing for Azerbaijan is not the specific format in which the issue will be resolved, with the document of November 9 or through TRIPP, but to ensure the uninterrupted, controllable and stable connection between the main part of Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. In other words, the format is secondary, the goal is to create a permanent and practical connection.

This also explains why Baku is trying not to be completely tied to any one project and to maintain a wide field of maneuver. The caution towards TRIPP is due to the fact that it is more of an American initiative, and the active involvement of the US in such a project may limit Azerbaijan’s independence in managing the corridor and its political use to some extent.

On the other hand, the November 9 format is more suitable for Baku in the sense that it is closer to the logic of regional and bilateral control without an overt external dominant actor. In other words, the essence of the issue for Baku is not who builds or sponsors that road, but under what conditions it will operate. The more seamless that transition is, less controlled by Armenia and more beneficial for Azerbaijan, the more acceptable it will be for Baku, regardless of the political packaging in which it is presented. This is exactly the point that should be understood: the primary thing for Azerbaijan is not the name of the document, but the practical provision of corridor logic.

– And in the end, in the background of the war against Iran, did the geopolitical role of Syunik increase, why not also that of Nakhichevan?

– Of course, the questions related to TRIPP in my previous observations can be extended to the whole of Syunik as well. The current US-Iran war showed that Iran not only did not “collapse”, but was also able to resist and thwart the maximum goals of its opponents. In this case, the US will not lose its importance to all the points through which it is possible to exert continuous pressure on Iran, in terms of security, logistics or economy. From that point of view, Syunik remains a zone of high value, because it can be used both in the framework of new transit projects and in the framework of reshaping the balance of power around Iran. But this is where the danger lies for us, because the “increasing importance of Syunik” is not automatically beneficial for Armenia, if it grows only at the expense of competition and positioning of external actors.

In the case of Nakhijevan, the growth of its importance has a slightly different nature. If Syunik is a hub of competition for foreign powers, then Nakhichevan is more of a living platform of the emerging Turkish-Azerbaijani project, not only against Iran, but also against Russia. In other words, if there is still a struggle for the distribution of influence around Syunik, then Nakhijevan has practically turned into a base for strengthening the Turkish-Azerbaijani influence.

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