March: 26, 2026
In the evening, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Ghalibaf, made the most remarkable statement of the day, with signs of caution and warning at the same time.
“According to some information, Iran’s enemies are planning to occupy one of the Iranian islands with the support of one of the regional states. All enemy movements are under full control of our armed forces.
If they cross that line, all the vital infrastructure of that regional state, without exception, will become the target of relentless attacks.”
Ghalibaf is actually one of the most influential figures in Iran. They say that he coordinates the actions of the IHPK. And what he said should be taken seriously. This can also be a tactical lie or a threat, but it should not be ignored. Accordingly, a few points about this.
First, about the islands. according to their functional significance in the context of the conflict, they can be divided into 2-3 groups (the third is conditional “others”).
The islands in the Strait of Hormuz are the most important for military operations. These allow Iran to have full control over the strait.
From here, both rockets/UAVs can be launched, and sea mines can be deployed. It is thanks to them that the strait is limited, because control from land alone would not be as effective.
According to the functional division, the second is Kharg Island, which is one of the most important centers of oil production in Iran, if not the most important. It is in the north of the Persian Gulf, away from the strait.
If the islands of the strait are for attack, then defense is a priority here, because the island itself can be a target for the USA and Israel.
The mysterious regional state can be either the UAE or Saudi Arabia. The first received the most missiles from Iran during the current war.
But more importantly, the UAE has claims to three of the strait islands under Iranian control (Abu Musa, Great Tunb, Little Tunb). These islands were occupied by the Iranian army in 1971, when the British forces were withdrawing from the region.
This pretension could create a pretext for the US to occupy those islands, plant the UAE flag there, and establish itself there under that country’s flag.
The other version of the mysterious regional state could be Saudi Arabia, which is one of Iran’s main competitors in the region. The two countries have recently come to terms with each other through the mediation of China.
The participation of other Arab states is less likely. In the case of Qatar and Bahrain, the geography does not allow it, because the American soldiers have to pass through the territory of at least one more state.
Oman remained neutral and was the mediator of the US-Iran negotiations. In the case of Iraq and Kuwait, the danger from Iran is much greater than in the case of other states.
Western specialists have been talking about the option of seizing the Iranian islands for at least two weeks. Both Kharg and the islands near the strait are observed.
In the first case, by capturing Kharg, the USA and Israel can deprive Iran of its oil supply, suffocate it from the energy-economic side and force it to make concessions.
In the second case, by capturing the islands of the strait, they can stop at least the spreading of sea mines from those islands and make those islands a springboard for further operations. It is unlikely that the strait will be opened, but during the passage of the ships, air defense will have more time to react to Iranian missiles.
But the capture of the islands is the first difficult operation, and after that will come the second, more difficult one, to fortify and hold them. The territory of the islands is much closer to the territory of Iran, therefore targeting them is much easier and accessible for Iran.
And even if these difficulties are overcome, there is the next problem. the capture of the islands can further aggravate the situation (the threat of Ghalibaf is a witness) and lead to a longer war or at least the formation of a similar expectation.
And it will be disastrous for the oil/energy market. Now the market still hopes that the war will eventually come to a stage where passage through the strait will become possible and oil and gas will flow again.
And if the war moves to the stage of ground operations, the appearance of American soldiers on the territory of Iran, the expected duration of the war will certainly be extended several times, and the expectations will go in the direction of price increases.
By the way, the issue of fertilizers is also related to this. Last week I was in a lecture (on a different topic) and some of the students whose families are involved in farming confirmed that the price of fertilizer has gone up.
And yes, it is also related to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Fertilizer production is energy-intensive, and fuel is subsidized in Iran. Therefore, the production of fertilizer is cheap and can be exported (also to Armenia).
But when the Strait of Hormuz is closed, the energy needed for fertilizers increases in price, the production in other countries increases, the supply of fertilizers produced by Iran has also stopped, the prices of fertilizers in the world have generally increased.
Of course, Russia, which is also a fertilizer exporter, takes advantage of the opportunity. But in the conditions of general scarcity, Russian fertilizer has also become more expensive.
Iran today Telegram channel
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