Russia’s Influence Continues to Decline in Azerbaijan and Armenia

Executive Summary:

• U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan in February 2026 are the most recent major indications of Baku and Yerevan’s increasing diplomatic engagement with the West and distancing from Moscow.
• Moscow’s influence in Azerbaijan and Armenia has declined sharply since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Moscow can no longer sustain the force posture that underpinned its role as the South Caucasus’s security guarantor.
• Development of the Middle Corridor, TRIPP, Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline all demonstrate that the South Caucasus is evolving into an energy and logistics hub independent of Russian leverage.

Moscow’s influence in Azerbaijan and Armenia has declined sharply since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. With hundreds of thousands of troops occupied in Ukraine and an economic crisis at home, Moscow can no longer sustain the force posture that underpinned its role as the South Caucasus’s security guarantor. The clearest evidence came in September 2023, when Russian peacekeepers stood by as Azerbaijan launched military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh and quickly gained control of the territory. In the week following, more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled Nagorno-Karabakh—most of the population of the effectively Armenia-controlled region, which then had a population of around 120,000. Russia’s deterrence against military action in the region had effectively collapsed, and the local government was fully disbanded on January 1, 2024  (OC Media, September 20, 2023).

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s visits to Armenia and Azerbaijan in February is the most recent major indication of Baku and Yerevan’s increasing diplomatic engagement with the West and distancing from Moscow (see EDM, February 24). Vance signed a framework for up to $9 billion in U.S. nuclear investment in Armenia, a direct challenge to Rosatom’s control over Yerevan’s Metsamor plant, which generates roughly 40 percent of the country’s electricity. Armenia also secured access to NVIDIA chips and an $11 million surveillance drone deal, the first U.S. defense technology transfer to Armenia. In Baku, Vance signed a Strategic Partnership Charter and agreed to supply patrol boats for Azerbaijan’s Caspian waters. One Russian newspaper reported the visit occasioned disappointment, annoyance, and a sense of helplessness in Moscow (Kommersant, February 10; Aze.media, February 12). The trip followed the August 2025 Washington Peace Summit, at which Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and U.S. President Donald Trump signed a seven-point joint pledge to continue pursuing peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia (see EDM, August 12, 2025, February 10). European Council President António Costa’s March 11 meeting with Aliyev likewise demonstrates Baku’s growing engagement with the European Union (see EDM, March 24)

Azerbaijan consolidated full authority over the Lachin Corridor, the only road linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, after restoring its control over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. After the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Moscow had been explicitly mandated to secure this road. In late 2022, however, Azerbaijani actors blocked the corridor, while Russian peacekeepers stood by (OC Media, August 31, 2023). After Baku’s September 2023 offensive and the dissolution of Armenia-controlled authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia allowed Azerbaijan to replace it as the corridor’s gatekeeper. Russia’s inaction evaporated Armenian and Azerbaijani trust in Russian security guarantees (Novaya Gazeta; Interfax, December 27, 2022).

Armenia and Azerbaijan no longer rely on Russia alone to mediate their conflicts, with increasing U.S. and EU involvement. Baku increasingly relies on Türkiye for military and diplomatic partnership. In the 1990s and into the 2000s, Russia was Azerbaijan’s largest trading partner. It now ranks third for overall trade with Azerbaijan, after Italy and Türkiye, and second in imports after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (see EDM, May 1, 2025). Russia remains Armenia’s largest trading partner for both imports and exports, but its overall trade share is declining (Eurasianet, November 1, 2023).

Russia’s relationship with Azerbaijan has deteriorated since 2023. The December 2024 Azerbaijan Airlines crash near Aktau, Kazakhstan, added a volatile dimension when leaked audio raised credible allegations that Russian air defense systems downed the aircraft (see EDM, May 20, 2025; Minval Politika, July 1, 2025). In June 2025, a police raid in Russia that killed two Azerbaijani nationals further inflamed bilateral relations (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, July 1, 2025; see EDM, July 7, 2025). Azerbaijan’s shift from Russian-origin military platforms, which has been underway since Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones proved decisive in Azerbaijan’s 2020 offensive, is accelerating, with Baku sourcing systems from Türkiye and Israel (Civil Net, April 1, 2024). Ankara has been the most decisive regional actor in occupying the space Russia vacated. The Shusha Declaration of June 2021 formalized a comprehensive defense alliance with Azerbaijan, and Türkiye’s energy engagement across the Caucasus and Central Asia is expanding rapidly (President of Azerbaijan, June 16, 2021; CACI Analyst, March 27, 2024).

Russia’s failure to back Armenia in the 2020 and 2023 Karabakh conflicts has driven Yerevan toward effectively divorcing its security from Moscow (see EDM, January 15). Disillusioned by the Collective Security Treaty Organization’s ineffectiveness, Pashinyan’s government suspended Armenia’s participation in the organization and has pursued Western partnerships since (Novaya Gazeta, February 24, 2024; Andalou, February 23, 2024; see EDM, March 5, 2024).

Pashinyan’s June 2025 visit to Istanbul signaled Yerevan’s intent to diversify security dependencies and pursue more multi-vector diplomacy. Around the same time, Moscow echoed the Armenian Apostolic Church’s criticism of Pashinyan, which some in Pashinyan’s administration took as a Russian attempt to undermine Pashinyan’s support within Armenia and among its diaspora (Armenian Weekly, June 17, 2025; see EDM, July 23, 2025). Russian Minister Sergei Lavrov said, “[Russia] would very much not like this church to be subjected to unjustified attacks essentially without any serious grounds,” prompting Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan to accuse Russia of meddling in Armenian affairs (Azatutyun, June 30, 2025).

The centerpiece of Washington’s engagement with Azerbaijan and Armenia is the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). The TRIPP, formerly known as the Zangezur Corridor in Azerbaijan, is a 43-kilometer (26.7-mile) road-and-rail corridor through Armenian territory linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave (see EDM, October 15, 2025). Aliyev and Pashinyan agreed to allow the United States to manage the route under a lease of up to 99 years during their August 2025 meeting at the White House. The project transforms the Zangezur question from a source of conflict into a U.S.-managed commercial artery bypassing both Russia and Iran (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 6).

The Zangezur question, now reframed through TRIPP, remains the sharpest test of Russia’s residual leverage. Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) border guards have long manned access points along the Armenian–Iranian border, and whether Moscow retains any role in the corridor’s security framework will measure its remaining influence. Ankara’s cooperation with Yerevan and Baku is pragmatic, not confrontational. Türkiye’s energy dependence on Russia, possession of Russian S-400 air defenses, and Russia–Türkiye cooperation in Syria impose limits on Ankara’s willingness to upset Moscow. For Moscow, Turkish advances may be a preferable alternative to deeper Western penetration in Azerbaijan and Armenia, as they represent a form of competitive cooperation rather than outright rivalry. Iran views both the original Zangezur concept and the U.S.-managed TRIPP as threats. Either could consolidate a corridor from Türkiye to Central Asia, diminishing Iran’s geographic leverage, disrupting Iran–Armenia trade routes, and reducing the relevance of its Aras Corridor project (see EDM, September 11, 2025).  

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, or the Middle Corridor), which links the PRC to Europe via Kazakhstan, is another connectivity project emerging as a viable alternative to Russian-controlled routes (see EDM, December 4, 2025). Georgia’s Anaklia Deep Sea Port would be one anchor of the network, though Georgian Dream’s increasingly Moscow-leaning posture introduces political risk (see EDM, November 20, 2025). The TITR, TRIPP, Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, and Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) all indicate that the South Caucasus is evolving into an energy and logistics hub independent of Russian leverage.

The South Caucasus is shifting from a Russian-dominated space to a contested multipolar arena in which the United States has emerged as an active player for the first time in decades. The region’s near-term trajectory will be shaped by first, whether Washington follows through on TRIPP, nuclear investments, and defense transfers or whether its engagement proves episodic; second, Türkiye’s response to a U.S.-managed corridor (TRIPP) on its doorstep; and third, Iran’s reaction to a route operated by its principal adversary. Should Russia’s war against Ukraine resolve, Moscow may attempt to reassert itself, but its credibility deficit would severely limit such efforts. In any event, Russian primacy in the South Caucasus is ending.