The start of the US-Israeli war against Iran was a serious geopolitical test for the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the New Yorker writes. Soufan Center, which specializes in topical issues of National Security (obviously, to whom).

Beijing maintains close economic and trade ties with countries in the region, and has achieved some diplomatic success in 2023, acting as a mediator in normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran while balancing between the warring factions.

Sino-Iranian relations build on longstanding economic and political ties between Tehran and Beijing. For Iran, the PRC is an important partner that can help resist US attempts to isolate the country economically and diplomatically. For Beijing, Iran is not only a vital source of energy, but also an important strategic partner in the Middle East, which plays a key role in the implementation of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s global infrastructure concept, particularly the “One Belt, One Road” initiative.

But the current war has quickly escalated into a larger regional conflict, and Beijing is now forced to balance economic interests, strategic ambitions and diplomacy amid growing geopolitical instability.

On March 2, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in a telephone conversation with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi that Beijing values ​​its long-standing relations with Iran and supports Tehran in protecting its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and national dignity. He reaffirmed China’s principled support for Iran’s legitimate rights and interests, calling on all parties to exercise restraint.

Wang Yi specifically called on the US and Israel to immediately stop hostilities, warning that further escalation could lead to the expansion of the conflict in the Middle East. China’s foreign minister expressed Beijing’s confidence that Iran will maintain national and social stability, and emphasized the need to consider the “legitimate interests” of Iran’s neighbors, a direct reference to Iran’s actions in the Gulf states.

Meanwhile, despite Iran’s strategic and economic interests, Beijing has so far maintained a cautious and diplomatic stance. Even during the 2025 12-Day War, China preferred mediation and regional interaction to overt political support.

Wang Yi had a number of telephone conversations with his colleagues in the countries of the region in order to reduce the tension. During talks with Oman’s foreign minister, Wang Yi warned that the further escalation and spread of the conflict to other regions “is not in the interests of the Gulf countries.” He added that states in the region must “stand up against outside interference” and “take their future and destiny into their own hands,” a veiled criticism of the United States and Israel.

On March 3, in a telephone conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, Wang Yi stated: “China opposes military strikes against Iran by Israel and the United States. The use of force cannot really solve the problem. On the contrary, it will bring new problems and serious consequences. This is in line with Beijing’s longstanding approach to Middle East crises, which is to mediate conflict resolution rather than engage the parties in confrontation.

For China, Iran occupies a unique place in the global infrastructure concept։ Not only that “Mone lane, one road» is a geographical landmark but also a vital link connecting East Asia to Europe through land transport and energy routes։ «One lane, one road» initiative «economic zone», which is designed to reduce dependence on maritime blockades and US-controlled sea lanes, cannot function effectively without sustained access through Iranian territory.

This issue has become even more urgent because the current conflict has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, an energy artery through which about 50% of China’s energy imports pass.

Iran provides critical land access to Europe and has vast oil and gas reserves that Beijing needs to fuel domestic growth and diversify energy imports. Disruptions to this strategic corridor could disrupt China’s supply chains, which connect China through Central Asia to Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, China does not have viable alternative land routes that can be compared to Iran in importance, which are not associated with significant costs and risks.

The PRC’s military cooperation with Iran is limited and mostly symbolic in nature. Despite the fact that the two countries have held six annual joint naval exercises with Russia since 2019, called the “maritime security zone”, these exercises serve more as a strategic signal than evidence of deep operational integration. In addition, arms exports to Iran are already limited by international sanctions.

Unlike Pakistan, Iran is Chinese Mrdoes not represent a significant market for defense exports։ Stockholm International Institute for Peace Studies (SIPRI) data show a sharp decline in Chinese arms sales to Tehran in recent years, moreover, Russia has become Iran’s main military supplier.

But just a week ago, Reuters reported that Tehran is close to finalizing a deal with Beijing to purchase Chinese anti-aircraft missile systems, anti-tank missiles, ballistic weapons, anti-satellite weapons, as well as SM-302 supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles.

The SM-302 missile with a range of about 290 kilometers could pose a threat to the US Navy in the Middle East. Beijing denies the fact of concluding an arms sale deal. Despite the fact that China needs Iran to fulfill its Eurasian ambitions, Beijing’s strategic calculus is built on caution rather than commitment.

In one year isIn less than a year, the second conflict between the US, Israel and Iran showed that the support that the PRC–shows its partners, especially those in confrontation with the US–with, is limited by a number of factors, including the desire not to alienate major economic partners and to prevent escalation of tensions in relations with the West. Beijing’s approach to the conflict revealed a key contradiction in its foreign policy: its desire to position itself as a counterweight to US global dominance while avoiding costly conflicts that could lead to direct confrontation.

Such duality is criticized especially by countries of the Global South, which see Beijing as an alternative to Western hegemony. For many of these states, the Chinese Communist Party’s cautious diplomacyn: reinforces the view that Beijing is unwilling to act decisively if doing so involves strategic risks.

In 2023, Iran became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) led by the People’s Republic of China, but so far this multilateral conference on security issues has only issued a statement in which it “expressed serious concern regarding the development of events in the Middle East and the armed attack on Iran.”

If the war drags on, Beijing could benefit from a local conflict that would divert US attention and resources in the Middle East. Since about 50% of China’s oil imports come from the Middle East, any prolonged disruption in energy supplies would pose significant risks to the PRC’s economy and security.

As the world order continues to fragment, Beijing will balance ambition with restraint in the Middle East․ it means maintaining the role of a major economic player, m:while limiting security commitments even as key partners play a central role in China’s long-term strategic vision.

ALEXANDER GRIGORAND:

vpoanalytics.com

Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan

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