At this stage of the Iran-US-Israeli military conflict that began in February, oil and energy facilities are being actively targeted, and there is already talk of different goals that the US and Israel have towards Iran.

On a number of issues in the context of this topic 168.amhas had a conversation Analytical “Base”. of the center founder Vitaly with Mangasaryan.

– It has been almost a month since the US-Israeli military operation against Iran began, the military and political leaders of Iran were killed. In any case, how do you assess the course of the Iran-US-Israel war from a military, tactical point of view at the moment, who has what advantages, or what advantages and weaknesses do the parties – Iran, the US, Israel – show, including tactical, military, military-technical? By the way, during this period, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan On one occasion, he made it clear to Iran that it should prepare well and make power calculations before entering into a conflict with Israel and the USA. “Cyber ​​intelligence, radio intelligence, electronic intelligence, preventive intelligence, air surveillance, satellite data based on on intelligence… If you you are not perform your “home work” and you are not to develop your abilities this areas, then not worth it times orally skirmish in enter Israel and: America with

If: you indeed preparing are you such March then your the power this areas need is flawless be Besides this in order to the country can protect her aerial the area, he need is high efficiency safe Air defense, radar and radio electronic of pressure systems sectors”.

– When analyzing the current course of the conflict, it becomes obvious that technological and intelligence supremacy still remains on the side of Israel and the USA. The capabilities of this tandem in the fields of cyber-intelligence, radio-electronic warfare (REP) and satellite surveillance allow for surgical precision strikes, which we also saw during last year’s 12-day escalation.

One of the strengths of Israel and the United States is the effectiveness of the integrated intelligence systems. HUMINT, SIGINT, cyber intelligence and satellite data work together in a single operational network. This system allows not only to detect targets, but also to direct the strike means in real time.

In the case of Iran, the picture is different. Although inferior in technology and air, it displays enviable resilience and strategic patience. Iran has built an asymmetric warfare model, relying on medium-range missiles and drones. At the same time, in order to succeed against such adversaries, cyber, radio-electronic and air control capabilities are naturally important, where Iran, being de facto alone, has certain problems. However, Iran is trying to fill those gaps with non-standard solutions.

Iran’s volitional factor deserves special attention. If we imagine what would happen to the USA, Israel, or any other country, if they had such high-level losses, especially in influential military and scientific circles, as Iran has, we would most likely see a serious internal crisis. Iran, on the contrary, shows stability and systemic resistance. This indicates that the worst scenarios were not only calculated there, but also integrated into the state strategy for years.

At this stage, the impression is created that Iran is going to a cold-hearted and calculated “wa-bank”, well understanding that there is simply no other option. At the same time, we see how almost all existing red lines in international relations are crossed day by day. Perhaps the most dangerous line remains, the use of weapons of mass destruction, but current dynamics show that even that line is no longer guaranteed.

– In the background of the war against Iran, what are the ulterior motives behind the position taken by Israel’s strategic ally Azerbaijan and Turkey, which does not have bad relations with the USA, apart from what is officially announced? By the way, Iran does not seem to believe in Azerbaijan’s sincerity that it will not give its territory to a 3rd country, or that there are no Israeli facilities there.

– For Turkey, the situation around Iran, in general, opens up new opportunities. From the perspective of regional competition, Iran is one of the main players that limits the expansion of Turkey’s influence both in the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Iran’s weakening, for whatever reason, means that Ankara gets a wider field to advance its political and economic initiatives, including energy projects and transportation routes. At the same time, Turkey continues to pursue a cautious policy, not taking an open anti-Iranian stance, as it is interested in maintaining economic ties and avoiding unforeseen consequences.

As for Azerbaijan, we know that they declare that their territory is not used for operations against Iran, but I think that Iran does not believe those statements, to put it mildly. Tehran’s suspicions are mainly due to the fact that Baku has deep strategic relations with Israel.

It is especially important to remember that Israel’s role during the 2020 Artsakh war was significant in terms of supplying military technology and weapons, which significantly contributed to Azerbaijan’s success, and, of course, Baku has a certain obligation to Israel. Moreover, a number of previously recorded cases, which were perceived as unfriendly steps in Tehran, further deepened the atmosphere of mistrust.

I am sure that it is obvious to the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran that Azerbaijan has become a platform from which Israel can “hear and see” the deep processes of Iran. Under these conditions, Baku’s assurances are considered in Iran as a tactic to gain time.

Is it appropriate for Iran to give a tough answer to Azerbaijan at this very moment? I think that Iran is calculating and evaluating that, under the current tension, a large-scale conflict on the northern border may bring additional problems.

At the same time, I think that if the degree of danger increases, then Iran will have to start attacking the Israeli bases located in Azerbaijan.

– To what extent was the importance of Nakhichevan highlighted in the context of this war for Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey, and in your opinion, how is it possible to attack Nakhichevan with non-Iranian drones?

– The geographical position of Nakhichevan, bordering Iran and Turkey, turns it into a potential military-political base. The geographical location of Nakhichevan is the factor that theoretically makes it a suitable platform for operations against Iran, be it intelligence activity, use of drone systems or other format of intervention.

For Turkey, this area is no less important, as it provides a direct border between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This enables Ankara to quickly respond to regional developments and, if necessary, strengthen its military and political presence. In the conditions of the possible weakening of Iran, Nakhichevan can turn into an important base for the advancement of Turkish influence.

From Iran’s point of view, Nakhichevan remains a high-risk destination. It has been hinted many times in Tehran that this area can be used by third countries, especially Israel.

As for ATS, in my opinion, there are two logical options, and I think both of them have the right to life.

The first is that the management of operations in Iran is somewhat decentralized, and it is possible that the commander of an individual military unit made an independent decision to “punish” Azerbaijan for its involvement in anti-Iranian processes.

The other hypothesis suggests that such an operation could have been organized by Israel’s special services with the aim of escalating anti-Iranian sentiments.

– President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev confirmed the other day Amendments to the Law “On Expropriation of Land for State Needs”, according to which the expansion of state-owned airports and airfields, as well as the construction of new airports and airfields, have been added to the list of state needs for which land can be expropriated. We know that there are Azerbaijani airports in the occupied Artsakh territories, this is still as a result of the 2020 war, is it possible to expand them?

– It is no secret that immediately after the war of 2020, Azerbaijan started the construction of airports with great intensity and amazing speed, particularly in Fizuli, Zangelan and Lachin. Although official propaganda presents them as “international civilian airports”, the reality is different. until today, civil flights have been served, one can say, counting on the fingers, and their economic burden remains close to zero.

Opinions have been repeatedly voiced from the Iranian governmental and expert circles that these airports are being built in order to be used as a springboard against Iran in the future. The Iranian side has repeatedly expressed concern that these facilities may be provided to Israel’s special services.

The legislative changes adopted in Azerbaijan should be considered not only as an economic or infrastructural initiative, but as part of a broader strategy. If we take into account the growth of regional tension and the emerging pressures on Iran, the rapid construction of airports can have far-reaching goals.

– By the way What differences can there be between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the background of the war against Iran, which is not visible?

– If Turkey seeks the weakening of Iran in order to establish its own regional hegemony, then it is not at all interested in the complete collapse of Iran. For Ankara, Iran’s chaos means the flow of millions of refugees to its borders and the possible activation of the Kurdish factor, while Baku may have more radical ambitions related to the idea of ​​”Southern Azerbaijan” and ethnic awakening.

The second important contradiction lies in the role of Israel, which is the number one strategic partner for Azerbaijan regarding Iran, but remains an ideological and political rival for Turkey in the Middle East. In the event of a war against Iran, Azerbaijan can become the main base of the Israeli military machine, which for Turkish President Erdogan can be perceived as an unacceptable increase of Israel’s influence in his “backyard”. Ankara will not want to see a situation where Baku receives more instructions from Tel Aviv than from itself, which could lead to serious internal jealousy.

– What conclusions should Armenia make against the background of all this, from the point of view of the war against Iran, the creation of strategic relations with the USA, de facto withdrawal from the CSTO, in general, from the security point of view?

– Armenia’s primary concern should be to follow the development of events, constantly reassess the risks and be ready for various scenarios, from border instability to disruption of regional communications.

At the same time, the so-called multi-vector approach of Armenia’s foreign policy cannot have real effectiveness if it is disconnected from regional realities.

Deepening relations with the USA is important, but it should not be done to the detriment of relations with immediate neighbors, especially Iran, which is not only an economic but also a vital security partner for Armenia. The same applies to the process of de facto withdrawal from CSTO. it should be accompanied by clear calculations, alternative security mechanisms, and not remain in a “vacuum”.

Armenia should show a humanitarian gesture to friendly Iran by sending some help, for example, medical personnel or small fire-rescue units. It is surprising the fact that Armenia is able to send humanitarian cargo to Turkey, even reaching the opening of the Margara checkpoint for this purpose, but it does not show similar determination in the case of its long-standing friend Iran.

If there is a funeral at your neighbor’s house, and you not only don’t go to sympathize, but also turn on loud music and ostentatiously have fun, it is at least short-sighted. One cannot ignore the pain of one’s neighbor just because your distant friend across the distant ocean has strained relations with that family. To ignore the plight of a good neighbor means to endanger the peace of one’s own home in the future.

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