By Laura Thornton
Published on March 17, 2026

Armenians head to the polls on June 7 to elect all 101 members of its parliament, the National Assembly, at a time of intense regional and geopolitical uncertainty. A country long dependent on Russia for security guarantees and economic stability, the 2018 Velvet Revolution and the 2023 war in which Azerbaijan seized the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh have spun off new foreign policy alignments — and prospects — for the country. The government of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has sought to turn around the 2023 loss by redoubling his pursuit of new ties with the European Union and the United States and by redefining Armenia’s relationship with powerful neighbors Azerbaijan and Turkey. He is seeking to finalize a peace agreement with Azerbaijan that the two sides agreed last year at the White House, and is discussing new border and trade deals with Turkey.

In the first regular parliamentary election since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan’s ruling Civil Contract party faces a challenge from two oligarch-led opposition blocs that are closely tied to Russia. Many Armenians are undecided and dislike their options, according to polling, and describe the country’s political parties as personality-driven and scant on policy. However, one clear distinction between the political options is on the country’s future foreign alignment.

The ruling party is running on “peace,” emphasizing the continuing negotiations with Azerbaijan and closer ties with the EU and the United States. Pashinyan and his supporters accuse the opposition of being puppets of Russia (more on that later). The main opposition blocs criticize the government’s peace agreement, claiming to have an alternative plan (though scant on details) and accuse the government of being under Azerbaijani and Turkish control. The main opposition blocs also do not support EU membership, arguing that the country is not ready.

Unlike in some other frontline democracies teetering between authoritarianism and democracy and between a Western orientation and Russian control, the political divides don’t run neatly along “pro-West vs. pro-Russian” lines. Relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey are front and center, evolving and being redefined in the aftermath of the 2023 war. Armenians see both Azerbaijan and Turkey as far greater threats to the country than Russia. Further, none of the viable parties embraces a full break from Russia, mindful that a plurality (43 percent) of Armenians believe Russia is the country’s most important political partner, though it did nothing to prevent Azerbaijan’s offensive in 2023. Still, the parties do differ significantly on how the relationship with Russia should look going forward.

As for Russia, despite being largely consumed by its war on Ukraine, it is loathe to have Armenia drift further from its sphere of influence. The Kremlin has thus turned to its well-practiced hybrid-warfare toolkit, employed in Georgia, Moldova, and other countries, to defeat the ruling party in Armenia. Disinformation campaigns, influence operations, and financial cooption are in full swing, presenting an extraordinary stress test for the fledgling democracy.

While in Armenia recently on a pre-election mission with the McCain Institute, Armenian government officials, civic leaders, and international representatives all acknowledged the unprecedented scale of — and lack of preparedness for — such hybrid threats. Russia dominates the information space without consequences, and Kremlin investments in political, religious, media, and societal actors go mostly unchecked and take advantage of plentiful legal loopholes. Armenian stakeholders said the Trump administration’s elimination of foreign aid has undermined the country’s democracy efforts and ability to defend against Russia.

The Armenian Apostolic Church is also a key player in these elections, given the ongoing conflict between the government and Church leaders that the Kremlin has both fueled and used to its advantage. Church leaders — headed by Karekin II, the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians — have called for the resignation of Pashinyan. In turn, Pashinyan last year alleged they were fomenting a “coup” and the government has taken action against clergy, including arresting several bishops on various charges, prosecutions which many independent groups believe lack strong evidence. Church leaders are campaigning against the government and actively supporting the opposition, particularly the block run by Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan.

In addition to threats to the election process — disinformation campaigns, possible cyberattacks, financial interference, vote buying — observers fear that the post-election period might be contested if the ruling Civil Contract party wins. Opposition parties, aided by Russia and its proxies, are sowing the ground to reject the results of the elections, casting doubts on the integrity of the election process.

Armenia is at a fragile crossroads. The election represents an opportunity for the country to carry on a new course for peace, foreign policy alignment, and democracy but many forces stand in the way and support is needed.

Foreign Relations Pivot

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Armenia has been closely tied to Russia — part of the Eurasian Economic Union, a Russian initiative to ensure economic integration, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led security alliance. Russia has been Armenia’s largest supplier of military aid and a key trading partner. However, Russia’s failure to defend Armenia during the 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict soured ties between the two states. Following a months-long Azerbaijani economic blockade of Armenian-occupied territory, Azerbaijani forces seized the area and forced most ethnic Armenians to flee. Russia did not intervene. Yerevan has since suspended its participation in the CSTO and ordered the removal of Russian border troops from the airport that had been stationed there since 1992. Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a historic peace agreement.

As it turns away from Russia, Armenia has pursued European Union (EU) accession. Pashinyan made EU membership an explicit part of his government’s agenda in 2024, and, in March 2025, Armenia’s National Assembly endorsed this goal. Armenia has also signed a strategic partnership agreement with the United States. In January, Armenia and the U.S. announced a framework to implement the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which aims to establish a transit route in the south Caucasus, building off the peace agreement.

While the ruling Civil Contract party prioritizes deepening these new foreign alignments, the opposition disagrees. The opposition bloc Armenia Alliance is led by former President Robert Kocharyan, who serves on the board of directors for Sistema PJSFC, one of Russia’s largest investment companies. Russian citizen Samvel Karapetyan founded the other major opposition bloc, Strong Armenia. Karapetyan is the owner of the Russia-based Tashir Group conglomerate. In addition to their obvious Russian ties, representatives from both blocs stated clearly during my visit that they reject Pashinyan’s peace agreement, do not approve of TRIPP, and believe Armenia is “not ready” for the EU. Both opposition blocs are campaigning on a strong anti-government message. Pressing their allegation that the government is under Azerbaijani and Turkish influence, they argue that Armenia’s “sovereignty is at stake.” Of the opposition parties, only Strong Armenia is polling above the required 8 percent threshold to enter parliament.

Russia’s Hybrid Warfare

During my visit to Yerevan, international observers, diplomats, and experts in Russian threats described Russia’s hybrid warfare in Armenia today as unprecedented and “incredibly sophisticated.” They noted that the primary goal of Russia’s efforts is to thwart a Pashinyan victory.

Journalists described how Russia dominates the airwaves. Unlike bans on Russian broadcasting in countries like Moldova, there are no such regulations in Armenia and multiple Russian channels freely broadcast on television. There is also no regulation of the online space, and Ministry of Internal Affairs officials explained that the only situation in which they can legally remove or block a website is if it related to drug transactions. Russian music, films, and news are also ever-present and serve as effective psychological warfare. Films such as Ararat 73, which is ostensibly about an Armenian football team, is embedded with Kremlin messages about Armenia’s loyalty to the Soviet Union.

Russian narratives are similar to those used elsewhere, leaning heavily on anti-LGBTQ rhetoric and gender issues and associating any defense of such rights with a move toward the West. Messaging also reinforces the opposition’s talking points, building fear about Armenia’s security if it abandons its ties with Russia and giving false hope that Russia will “bring back” Nagorno-Karabakh. Economic messages, according to international organizations that track foreign interference, include “Armenia will collapse if they leave the Russian market” and “Turkey will swallow Armenia and kill its economy.”

The Kremlin has also infiltrated charities, movements, and foundations, such as the “Foundation to Battle Injustice,” established by the late Wagner Group leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin. Russia also actively uses Armenian clergy to spread their narratives. Garegin II, the Catholicos of All Armenians, the supreme head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, has a close relationship with President Vladimir Putin, who bestowed him with the Russian State Honor in 2022, and Garegin’s brother serves in the Armenian church in Russia.

To pay for these operations, Russian money can easily flow into Armenian politics as Russian banks and businesses operate throughout the country. Internal Affairs Ministry officials acknowledged that foreign transfers were “very significant” and that they did not have satisfactory measures to address it. There are also legal loopholes. Third-party expenditures by entities such as movements, charities, and foundations on behalf of political campaigns are not covered under existing regulations. Further, political finance reporting for parties occurs only annually, preventing real-time monitoring and exposure.

There are key vulnerabilities in the election process, as well. Election officials explained they were under-resourced and lacked the tools, legislation, and mandate to effectively address hybrid threats. A key issue raised by election experts was how Russia was actively involved in paying and organizing groups of diaspora Armenians in Russia to return home to vote. The Central Election Commission acknowledged that 60,000 such voters could affect the outcome. Disinformation about election results has also been a problem in the past, and Armenian observer groups expressed an even greater concern this year, with Russia and its proxies already sowing distrust in the election process. For example, Russia uses doppelganger accounts to mimic real news sites and spread false information. Cyberattacks are another risk, and observers worry about the possibility of Russia interfering with the cameras in polling stations.

Church and Democracy

The conflict between the government and leaders of the Armenian Apostolic Church dominates the political landscape and translates into partisan divisions. In Yerevan, one bishop explained the Church leadership blamed Pashinyan for “losing the war” in Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to Catholicos’ demand for the prime minister’s resignation. The government, for its part, has arrested several clergymen on various charges. Most notably, Archbishop Mikael Adjapahyan was arrested for inciting a coup against the government. Church leaders and the main opposition parties accuse the government of violating free speech and committing judicial malpractice, describing a “culture of fear” for believers.

Many civil society, media, and international representatives also believe that the government overstepped in its prosecution of clergy. According to one diplomat, the investigations of the Armenian Apostolic Church were launched based on “the prime minister’s wants.” This has fed into broader concerns about the government’s anti-democratic behavior. Though democratic progress since 2018 is undeniable, accusations of selective justice and abuse of freedom of speech beleaguer the government. One representative from an international observer group said there was clear “abuse of the judicial system.” A leading Armenian civic leader said, “Over the past six months, we have seen alarming signs of democratic backsliding in Armenia, including the ruling party’s instrumentalization of law enforcement and the judiciary for narrow political interests.”

International Support Needed

Armenia’s coming parliamentary election represents a generational opportunity for the country to solidify a new course for peace, foreign policy alignment, security, and economic opportunities, which would have profound positive ripple effects on regional stability and growth. The United States and the EU benefit from a democratic ally in the region, in contrast to Georgia to the north, which has descended into authoritarianism and forged ties with Western adversaries, and Iran to the south.

But forces inside and outside the country are investing in thwarting those opportunities. The country is not adequately prepared to take on these threats, particularly unprecedented Russian hybrid attacks on the election process. The elimination of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has made matters far worse, by kneecapping critical civic and media efforts, government monitoring and preparedness, and strategic communications support.

There is much the Armenian government, civil society, and election bodies can do to fortify against threats – improving inter-agency communication, appropriating resources and staff, enhancing investigations and oversight, and investing in public communications, increased cyber security efforts, and voter education. But they need international support. That should include increased technical assistance, financing, and training for Armenian partners and enhanced intelligence cooperation, as well as exchanges with other countries for officials involved in Armenian election, anti-corruption, and security bodies.

The United States and the EU also are in a unique position to ensure Armenia stays on the democratic path by including clear reform benchmarks in their agreements. Democratic strength, security, and strategic alignment go hand-in-hand, while backsliding democracies are far more likely to abandon Western alliances and form closer ties to autocratic regimes.

Without Western support, the risk is that Russia is successful in Armenia. That means Armenia could fall as Georgia has — forging closer relations with Iran and China, serving as a sanctions-evasion route, and adopting a hostile anti-American, anti-EU posture. The result would be a new adversarial, anti-democratic wall built from Russia to Iran, blocking the West from economic, trade, and security alliances in the region.