Month: June 2022

AW: Scenic Southern Syunik

Vanyan Gary
June 7, 2022 Raffi Dadaian Travel, Culture 0

Meghri (Photo: Raffi Dadaian)

Between heaven and earth lies the majestic Mount Khustup, towering 10,500 feet and watchfully guarding the southernmost Armenian province of Syunik. 

Each corner of Armenia has its unique magical aura, bridging the timeless thousand-year-old ruins of fortresses and breathtaking churches to the local inhabitants on a backdrop of a vibrant landscape and colorful fruits. There is no doubt that visitors to the countryside have filled their lungs with air rich with stories dating back hundreds of years.

The province of Syunik is part of this enchanting landscape that has drawn me into its loving embrace over the past few years. The region’s awe-inspiring jagged peaks are only rivaled by the famous Mount Ararat. Most travelers venture to the German-designed city of Goris and the ninth century Tatev Monastery, but very few venture deeper into the mountainous expanse because of the intimidating winding roads and distance from the modern trappings of Yerevan. 

Meghri Monastery (Photo: Raffi Dadaian)

The route leading south is brutally rugged. One cannot help but imagine the proto-Armenians that first traversed these highlands like Otzi of the Italian Alps, seeking the perfect location to settle and build a mountainous refuge far from raiders and rival tribes. Off to the left and right of the meandering highway, villages can be spotted nestled in deep gorges and perched on the slopes of the Zangezur mountain range. Most are still self-reliant communities that grow their own produce, graze their own livestock and build their own houses one brick at a time. To a California mountain climber like myself, who prides himself on reaching remote valleys and summits in the Sierra Nevadas, Syunik’s skyscraper peaks feel like home. Having traveled through its massifs several times, I must admit there is nowhere else in Armenia quite like it. 

Since the 2020 Artsakh War, access into southern Syunik has become more difficult due to the hostile closure of the M2 highway connecting Goris to the provincial capital of Kapan. Movement to and from the city is now mainly along the newly-renovated, serpentine H45 road which is in rough condition and an arduous two-hour journey. The city of Kapan hugs the banks of the Voghji River with Mount Khustup in its backdrop. Soviet-era gray buildings dominate the cityscape which house much of the workforce for the largest mine in Armenia, the Kapan Copper-Molybdenum Combine. 

Halidzor Fortress is a recently renovated landmark sitting on a hilltop just outside the city limits of Kapan. It is an ancient complex turned into the headquarters of the legendary Armenian commander David Bek tasked to protect the region against an onslaught from the Ottoman Empire in the early 1700s. While many of Armenia’s old fortresses are in ruins, Halidzor is a stunning showcase of one that has been restored. The site of a historic battle where David Bek and his few hundred fighters fought off thousands of invading troops (The Armenian 300) makes this fortress a must see.  

Further south, the famous cascading waterfalls of Lichk village are rarely visited and never mentioned in any Armenia tourism guides. A local villager told us that during the Soviet era, tourists would visit Lichk for backcountry skiing expeditions. His accent was reminiscent of Western Armenian which soothed our ears as he shared raspberry picking techniques in his garden. The village’s surrounding region is designated as one of only a handful of PBAs (Prime Butterfly Area) in Armenia, home to dozens of unique species of butterflies. There are no hotels in the area. The town has a population of 161 with a single general store.

Lichk Waterfalls (Photo: Raffi Dadaian)

Straddling the northern bank of the Arax River demarcating the Iran-Armenia border is my favorite provincial town of Meghri. Originally named Karchavan in 906 AD by the Armenian King Smbat I of the Bagraduni Dynasty, the city was incorporated into the Kingdom of Syunik in 987 AD as Meghri (Honey Town). The city is home to the ruins of the 11th century Meghri Fortress and three beautiful churches dating back to the 16th-17th centuries. While the fortress is abandoned and dilapidated, the churches are well-maintained and adorned with detailed frescos reminiscent of Vank Monastery in Isfahan, Iran. Homes in the town are loosely packed, with lush gardens that produce every fruit known to grow in the Armenian highlands. When you mention “fig” in Armenia, people think of Meghri. In July, the fig trees are so full that the villagers welcome passersby to pick several so they are not wasted. Consider it a public service. 

A fig from Meghri (Photo: Raffi Dadaian)

All Armenians have heard of the Arax River—the legendary waterway that feeds the Eastern Armenian Highlands and constitutes modern-day Armenia’s western and southern borders. While the Arax is restricted on the Turkish side, on the Iranian side you can find yourself just 50 feet away from it. A Soviet-era fence still restricts direct access to the river, but the views are uninhibited from quite a few vantage points. The ultimate view is from Giorgi Babi’s cottage near the Meghri Train Station. The brown and barren mountains the Arax cuts through remind me of the Colorado River in the Southwest United States. It didn’t take long for us to play country music during our joy rides around town, enjoying the view of the wild horses running freely in the hills and feeling like cowboys in the Wild West. 

Arax River. Iran on left. Armenia on right. (Photo: Raffi Dadaian)

If you look at a map of Armenia as a human head, southern Syunik is the all-important neck—a pedestal on which the head is anchored with pride and confidence. A section of our motherland’s main artery—the North-South Highway—travels through Armenia’s heartland carrying much-needed resources and materials. On the back of this neck now stands the Turkish yataghan ready to strike. The Diaspora’s responsibility is to reinforce Syunik with tourism, investments and philanthropic endeavors. As the famed military commander and Prime Minister of the Republic of Mountainous Armenia Karekin Njdeh once said, “Anywhere without Syunik and Artsakh…without this strong geographic spine of Armenia, our holistic homeland cannot exist.”

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Raffi Dadaian was born and raised in the San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles. After graduating Ferrahian High School, he attended UC Davis where he majored in Neurobiology while spending two years conducting HIV vaccine research at the California National Primate Research Center. Raffi founded a non-profit project that distributed over 20,000 oral hygiene kits during a three year period to rural children in Armenia, Artsakh and Georgia. He is now a 4th year dual-degree dental student in the DMD/MBA program at Temple University and a proud member of the Philadelphia ARF Chapter.


AW: Debunking Myths on the Road to a Sustainable Armenia

Badalian Vardan
June 7, 2022 Guest Contributor Announcements 0

FAIR LAWN, NJ—On Wednesday, June 8, at 6:00 p.m. ET, Dr. Irina Ghaplanyan—author of Post-Soviet Armenia: the New National Elite and the New National Narrative—will present the third Zoom discussion in the What’s Next series on the post-war Armenian reality. The previous discussions—which featured analysts Lilit Gevorgyan and Armen Kharazian and examined the 44-day catastrophe and its aftermath within a wider context of Russo-Armenian relations and shifting geopolitical currents across the South Caucasus—can be watched on YouTube. 

Dr. Ghaplanyan will be discussing: 

  • Armenian exceptionalism and the clash of rhetoric and policy from Ter-Petrosyan to Pashinyan, 
  • marginalization and empowerment of the Armenian citizen,
  • regime preservation and the subordination of national security, economic and social development, and a more productive relationship with the Diaspora, and
  • steps toward a more sustainable Armenia.

Participants should register online in advance to spend an evening in conversation with Ghaplanyan and explore the myths that administrations and their supporters have presented to the Armenian public in the homeland and diaspora in lieu of articulating a vision and working toward a sustainable and secure Armenia. 

Dr. Ghaplanyan was recently featured in Civilnet with the headline Azerbaijan’s grand strategy to ethnically cleanse Karabagh Armenians.

Dr. Ghaplanyan is a political scientist, climate negotiator and published author. She holds a doctorate in political science from the University of Cambridge. Her main areas of expertise are political leadership, states in transition, climate politics, environmental management, gender and gender in conflict as well as security studies. Her education includes a master’s degree in diplomatic studies from the Diplomatic Academy of London and a Bachelor of Arts degree in international relations from the University of Malta. Dr. Ghaplanyan served as Deputy Minister of Environment for the Republic of Armenia between 2018 and 2020. She is the current senior advisor on climate change to the World Bank Group and teaches at the American University of Armenia. Dr. Ghaplanyan has worked in several international organizations and think tanks around the world including UNDP, Georgetown University, Eurasia Foundation and Chatham House.

The event is jointly sponsored by AGBU Ararat, AIWA NJ Chapter, Ararat-Eskijian Museum, Armenian Democratic Liberal Party-Ramgavars, Justice Armenia, Knights of Vartan-Bakradouny Lodge, National Association for Armenian Studies and Research (NAASR)—Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation Lecture Series on Contemporary Armenian Issues and Saint Leon Armenian Church.




RFE/RL Armenian Report – 06/07/2022

Jirair Kafian 
                                        Tuesday, June 7, 2022
Armenian, Karabakh Oppositionists Meet In Yerevan
June 07, 2022
        • Astghik Bedevian
Armenia - Karabakh flags on empty seats of opposition lawmakers boycotting a 
session of the Armenian parliament, Yerevan, May 25, 2022.
Leaders of Armenia’s and Nagorno-Karabakh’s main opposition groups met late on 
Monday amid continuing anti-government protests in Yerevan sparked by Prime 
Minister Nikol Pashinian’s conciliatory policy towards Azerbaijan.
An Armenian opposition statement on the meeting said they discussed security 
challenges facing Armenia and Karabakh and agreed to strive to “expand” the 
opposition campaign in Yerevan.
“We agreed to jointly fight for an Armenian future for Artsakh and Armenia,” 
Davit Galstian, who leads one of the three opposition parties represented in the 
Karabakh parliament, said on Tuesday.
“This was the kind of a meeting which the Armenian authorities refuse to hold,” 
Galstian told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service. “That is to say that there is no 
cooperation between the two parliaments and other state bodies.”
He said that Karabakh’s opposition forces are not staging “large-scale protests” 
in Stepanakert because the authorities there continue to reject any settlement 
that would restore Azerbaijani control over the territory. By contrast, he said, 
the Armenian government is reluctant to make clear that “Artsakh was, is and 
will remain Armenian.”
Pashinian declared on April 13 that the international community is pressing 
Armenia to “lower the bar on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status” and 
recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. He signaled Yerevan’s intention to 
make such concessions to Baku.
Armenian opposition leaders portrayed the statement as further proof that 
Pashinian has agreed to Azerbaijani control over Karabakh. The authorities in 
Stepanakert also deplored it. In a resolution, the Karabakh parliament demanded 
that the Armenian authorities “abandon their current disastrous position.”
Pashinian insisted afterwards that he will not cut any peace deals with 
Azerbaijan without consulting with the Karabakh leadership.
Armenian Opposition Blasts EU’s ‘Double Standards’
June 07, 2022
        • Robert Zargarian
Armenia - Opposition supporters demonstrate outside the EU Delegation in 
Yerevan, June 7, 2022.
Armenian opposition leaders accused the European Union on Tuesday of turning a 
blind eye to the excessive use of force by police against protesters demanding 
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s resignation.
They singled out the failure of the EU Delegation in Yerevan to condemn security 
forces for firing stun grenades during violent clashes with opposition 
supporters which broke out on Friday at a street intersection adjacent to the 
diplomatic mission.
Dozens of protesters and police officers were injured in the clashes. The two 
sides blamed each other for what was the worst violence since the country’s main 
opposition groups launched on May 1 a “civil disobedience” campaign aimed at 
ousting Pashinian.
Lawmakers representing those groups condemned the EU Delegation’s “silence” as 
they led several hundred opposition supporters demonstrating outside the 
delegation building. One of them, Aram Vartevanian, said the EU was far more 
concerned about police actions during the 2018 mass protests that brought 
Pashinian to power.
“But it is silent now,” Vartevanian told the crowd. “And with this silence it is 
encouraging the police brutality.”
“You must make a choice in Armenia,” another lawmaker, Anna Grigorian, said, 
appealing to the EU mission. “Do you support European values, democracy and the 
rule of law or Nikol’s rule?”
Armenia -- Andrea Wiktorin, head of the EU Delegation in Armenia, attends a 
seminar in Yerevan, March 6, 2020.
The head of the EU Delegation, Andrea Wiktorin, said last month that Armenian 
riot police should “follow rules” and not be allowed to “operate with impunity.”
Wiktorin also said: “There can be different perceptions of what peaceful 
gatherings are, and if there are provocations I would personally ask myself 
where does it end.”
The U.S. ambassador to Armenia, Lynne Tracy, also expressed concern over the use 
of force against protesters in Yerevan. Still, Tracy was condemned by the 
opposition after she effectively welcomed on May 18 the outcome of last year’s 
parliamentary elections won by Pashinian’s party.
Vartevanian was asked by journalists why the opposition does not voice similar 
criticism of Russia, which has not publicly commented on the Armenian 
authorities’ response to the protests. He argued that unlike the Western powers, 
Moscow does not portray Armenia as a democracy or claim to promote democratic 
reforms in the country.
Both Tracy and Wiktorin addressed on May 20 a “forum for democracy” in Yerevan 
attended by Pashinian and other senior government officials. Opposition 
representatives were not allowed to participate in the event.
Armenian Government Seeks Tighter Control Of Army Top Brass
June 07, 2022
        • Nane Sahakian
Armenia - Defense Minister Suren Papikian and General Kamo Kochunts, acting army 
chief of staff, hold a meeting in Yerevan, May 30, 2022.
Defense Minister Suren Papikian has indicated that the post of Armenia’s top 
military general will remain vacant until the government makes sure that its 
next holder is directly subordinate to him.
“We are going to have a new model whereby the chief of the [army’s] General 
Staff will be the first deputy minister of defense,” Papikian told Armenian 
Public Television in an interview aired late on Monday.
“The armed forces will deal only with the country’s defense and military 
training,” he said, adding that the General Staff will no longer be in charge of 
arms procurements and rear services.
The last chief of the General Staff, Artak Davtian, and six other senior 
generals were sacked in February through presidential decrees initiated by Prime 
Minister Nikol Pashinian.
The sackings came one year after Davtian’s predecessor, Onik Gasparian, and four 
dozen other high-ranking officers accused Pashinian’s government of incompetence 
and misrule and demanded its resignation. The unprecedented demand was welcomed 
by the Armenian opposition but condemned as a coup attempt by Pashinian.
Pashinian has still not handpicked a new army chief of staff. Opposition leaders 
regularly express concern at this fact, saying that it is having adverse effects 
on national security and defense.
Armenia - Armenian soldiers taking part in a military exercise are pictured 
against the backdrop of Mount Ararat, May 26, 2022.
Papikian again dismissed the opposition concerns, reiterating that the acting 
head of the General Staff, Kamo Kochunts, is in a position to properly lead the 
armed forces for now.
The minister made clear that the country’s next top general will be installed 
after the structural changes planned by the government are approved by the 
Armenian parliament. He did not specify when a relevant government bill will be 
submitted to the National Assembly.
Pashinian promised a major reform of the military shortly after Armenia’s defeat 
in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan. He has replaced three defense ministers since a 
Russian-brokered ceasefire stopped the six-week hostilities in November 2020.
Opposition forces blame Pashinian for the disastrous war that left at least 
3,800 Armenian soldiers dead. They also say that his administration is doing 
little to rebuild the armed forces.
Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
Copyright (c) 2022 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, Inc.
1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

Forget France: Armenia is the hub of winemaking history

Jagharian Tania
June 8 2022
By Jonny Walfisz  with AP  •  Updated: 08/06/2022 – 10:39

A new museum is delving into the history books of Armenia’s rich wine culture.

When you think of wine, there are always a few classic nations that spring to mind. Maybe it’s the lush valleys of France, the sumptuous vineyards of Italy, or a newer location like California or New Zealand.

But you’d be missing out on one of the oldest wine-making regions of the lot. With a history stretching back over 8,000 years, Armenia has wine-cred by the bottle-load.

Some of the earliest evidence for today’s winemaking industry has been found from pieces of broken pottery that were discovered in the South Caucasus region, where neighbouring country Georgia now is.

A new Armenian wine museum is jumping headfirst into wine’s long history, and showing its deep connection to the religion and culture of the region.

Just 30 kilometres from Armenian capital Yerevan is the heart of the country’s winemaking territory. The museum here is built deep into the surrounding basalt rock and as you go underground, you feel as if you’re entering a giant wine cellar.

There you can find fragments of a myth revolving around the tipple.

Around 800 BC, King Menua, the fifth king of the ancient Urartu region supposedly gifted vineyards to a woman he was besotted with named Tariri.

The ancient myth can be seen on a stone inscription in the museum.

“We passed through a mysterious tunnel and ended up in the 9th century BC in the Urartian Chamber,” says chief specialist Narine Melikyan.

“From here, you see how our King Menua gives vineyards, which he himself planted by an artificial canal, which he himself built, and now he gives these vineyards to this mysterious, beautiful woman, whose name is Tariri.”

Other ancient exhibits show how wine would accompany Armenians from cradle to grave.

A wine jug dated back to the 1st century BC was discovered by archaeologists to have the remains of a woman in it.

Upon further research, the jug – called a karas – was found to be an integral part of an ancient Armenian’s lifetime.

“When a person was born, there was a karas intended for him, during his lifetime, it was used to age wine. And after death, a person was buried in the karas, in the foetal position.”

Wine has long held connections with religion. Jesus’s first miracle after all, was converting water to wine, and the museum has centuries-old Armenian bibles to demonstrate that.

The museum also holds phallic-shaped stones, which were idols in ancient times. During rituals, ancient Armenians poured wine over the idols as a sacrifice to higher powers. 

In 2011, a 6,000-year-old Copper Age wine factory was discovered in southern Armenia. And the 8,000-year-old broken bits of pottery found to the north in Georgia are thought to be the earliest known evidence for the origins of today’s winemaking industry.

Watch the video at the link below
https://www.euronews.com/culture/2022/06/08/forget-france-armenia-is-the-hub-of-winemaking-history 

COMMENT: Russia will not tolerate the EU’s new role in Nagorno-Karabakh peace process

Albert Nalbandian
June 8 2022


By Fuad Shahbazov June 8, 2022

The European Union has gradually assumed a key role in the peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which has undermined the Kremlin’s longstanding dominance in the region. Russia is now likely to redouble its efforts to demarcate the border between the two countries and establish new regional infrastructure, but it has little interest in a final peace settlement, which would weaken its influence.

On May 22, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia gathered in Brussels for a new round of discussions regarding a final peace agreement following the 44-day long war in 2020. The meeting was initiated by the EU, which has gradually assumed a key role in the negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh. The second meeting in Brussels, followed by an April meeting, scored positive results as leaders agreed to finalise the border demarcation.

Although both sides earlier agreed to establish a Joint Border Commission to delimit their mutual boundary line and to “establish a stable security situation” around the border until the end of April, delays occurred on Armenia’s end following Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s official visit to Moscow on April 19, shortly after the Brussels meeting. In Moscow, Pashinyan discussed with President Vladimir Putin the importance of “implementation” of the 2020 November 9, 2021, January 11, and November 26 trilateral statements following the leaders’ meetings in Sochi and Moscow.

As for Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev, shortly after the Brussels meeting, he held a phone conversation with Putin to discuss the Azerbaijan – Armenia normalisation process.

The frequent contact of both leaders with Putin ahead and after their negotiations in Brussels is not a new phenomenon, as Moscow cautiously monitors the EU’s enthusiastic efforts to take the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations away from its orbit. This should not come as a surprise, as Moscow secured a position for itself as a “security guarantor” with the 2020 November 9 ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The agreement established Russia as the primary stakeholder in the post-conflict period and enabled it to build a long-desired footprint in the region by deploying peacekeeping forces to the disputed Karabakh region.

However, Moscow’s efforts to achieve tangible results in border demarcation and the establishment of new regional transport infrastructure during the Sochi meeting on November 26 and the January 2022 Moscow meeting were unsuccessful.

The  EU therefore intervened in the process to push Baku and Yerevan into more intense negotiations, which sharply undermined the Kremlin’s position as a mediator. Given the EU’s vast economic resources, allocation of post-conflict financial aid to Baku and Yerevan respectively, and experience in conflict mediation, its emergence as a new negotiation platform for Azerbaijan and Armenia has diminished the negotiating position established by Russia.

However, although Russia has been distracted by the invasion of Ukraine since February 2022, it is unlikely to tolerate the EU’s efforts to monopolise the Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations. Already, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova described the EU’s initiatives as “shameless attempts of Brussels to appropriate the subject of the well-known Russian-Azerbaijani-Armenian agreement reached at the highest level”.

In order to strengthen its image as a mediator, Russia is now becoming more actively involved in the border demarcation process between Baku and Yerevan and has managed to schedule an official meeting of the joint commission in Moscow. Given its military footprint in the Karabakh region and its substantial security leverage over Armenia, Moscow will also be directly taking part in the possible opening of regional communication lines.

In contrast to Armenia – which sees the opening of regional communication lines with Azerbaijan as a potential threat to its sovereignty and national security – Russia is interested in establishing new ways of land connection within the region. Such a development would enhance its position politically and economically and give it more leverage over the regional states.

However, unlike the EU, Moscow is less interested in mediating a final peace between the two parties as it would require the withdrawal of the Russian peace forces from the Karabakh region. It is noteworthy that Russia’s peace contingent in Karabakh has frequently become a target for harsh criticism from Azerbaijan and Armenia, as the contingent has often seemed more interested in solidifying its presence in the region than in enforcing the peace. Such uncertainty enables Russia to manipulate the peace process of Karabakh and press conference with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, – all of which  clearly showcased that Russia is trying to disparage the Brussels agreement on border demarcation. Russia is in effect warning the Europeans not to interfere in this issue, for which it has set up a trilateral Russia-Armenia-Azerbaijan format since 2020.

Russia’s reaction may also be a result of the pragmatic approach of the ruling Armenian government to normalising ties with Azerbaijan. Yerevan’s engagement in normalisation talks has led to mass unrest in Yerevan, with radical opposition leader Ishkhan Saghatelyan announcing “we are launching a popular protest movement to force Pashinyan to resign”. According to Saghatelyan, “Nikol Pashinyan is a traitor and prepares to hand over the contested region to Azerbaijan”. Though the opposition held several protests in Yerevan, no significant success has been achieved so far.

The de-facto separatist regime in Nagorno-Karabakh has also joined the vocal criticism of Pashinyan over his negotiations with Azerbaijan and even proposes more radical solutions. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the so-called separatist regime David Babayan has warned that “without Karabakh, the geopolitical landscape of the Caucasus will significantly change”.

Sasun Barseghyan, the former leader of the Askeran region within Nagorno-Karabakh, has proposed holding a referendum on joining Russia in order to “avoid physical annihilation, to save the remains of the shattered Karabakh”. The same idea was reiterated by Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of Russia Today, a Russian state propaganda media outlet. Given the status of Simonyan within the Russian propaganda network, her statement represents the _expression_ of a certain current of opinion in Moscow.

Another vocal promoter of such provocative ideas is Konstantin Zatulin, the first deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, who proposed that the analogous “model” of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DPR) and “Lugansk People’s Republic” (LPR) in Ukraine could be applied to Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh territory.

Even though Moscow seeks to monopolise the Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations, it clearly understands that there are now two major platforms for negotiations – Moscow and Brussels. Russia cannot and is not able to isolate Azerbaijan and Armenia from holding contracts with the EU.

Russia and the EU want the demarcation of the borders between Azerbaijan and Armenia to be finalised soon, though Russia is not eager to mediate the final peace agreement and the region’s final status – this would make Russia’s further military presence in the region irrelevant. As for Azerbaijan, it will be manoeuvering between Moscow and Brussels to keep both formats alive and reach a final solution to this long conflict with Armenia.

Fuad Shahbazov is an independent policy analyst focusing on regional security issues in the South Caucasus. He tweets at @fuadshahbazov.


Armenian Defense Minister: ‘No danger’ of new war with Azerbaijan

Frangulian Shushan
June 8 2022



Interview with the Minister of Defense of Armenia

Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan, in an interview with Public Television, said that despite “certain tensions” on the border with Azerbaijan, he did not see the danger of a new war. The Minister confirmed that “incidents” happen, it happens that false information comes from Baku that the Armenian side has violated the ceasefire.

“However, as a rule, the armed forces of Armenia prevent the violation of the ceasefire regime by forcing the enemy to obey it. That is, if there is a shootout, then it does not happen on our initiative”, Suren Papikyan stressed.

He also talked about the expected reforms, including the transition to a professional army, the acquisition of modern weapons, although he did not say which one.

  • EU Special Representative on Karabakh negotiations: “EU is willing to help and move talks forward”
  • Opinion: “International community should recognise direct Artsakh-Azerbaijan conversation”
  • Op-ed: Armenia should approach Brussels talks on Karabakh conflict with caution

The minister announced that the process of creating a professional army had already begun. According to him, in the near future the Ministry of Defense will come up with a large-scale legislative initiative.

The first step on this path, according to Papikyan, will be to change the quality, form and content of military educational institutions, the second – the transition of the army to a professional basis.

The minister stressed that those who criticize the situation in the army are well aware that it is impossible to change everything in one day. But the reforms are underway and will bring results.

In particular, active contract servicemen will soon have the opportunity to undergo certification, and conscripts will be offered to remain in the army – to switch to contract service.

“We will create social guarantees, opportunities for a serviceman to see his future in the army as a professional soldier. This should be the basis of our future army”, Papikyan said.

Cancellation of the meeting of the commission on delimitation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border was assessed differently by the parties to the conflict. Baku accused Yerevan of opting out, while Yerevan refuted it

The minister does not consider it a problem that the post of chief of the General Staff has been vacant for four months, although the opposition has been criticizing the government all this time, accusing the army of being deprived of its head.

Papikyan assures that the acting chief of the General Staff fully exercises these powers, and a new one will be appointed after structural changes in the ministry.

The Minister of Defense announced that a new model of government would be introduced, according to which the Chief of the General Staff would be the First Deputy Minister of Defense. And the General Staff of the Armed Forces will no longer be engaged in procurement and logistics, which is part of its functions under the current law.

“Purchase, maintenance, provision of equipment – all such issues will be dealt with by other departments. That is, starting with rear support, some functions will be removed from the servicemen. Many of these functions will be delegated to civilian services, as we have already done with the soldiers’ canteens”, he said.

These changes are provided for in the new legislative package, which has already been submitted to the government and will soon be submitted to parliament for approval.

Yet the minister acknowledged that the head of the General Staff has not yet been appointed, not only because structural changes are expected after the adoption of the new law, but also because it is necessary to “make the right decision.”

Political scientist Armen Grigoryan calls for urgent revision of Armenia’s foreign policy to replace the ongoing “pseudo-diversification” of the country’s foreign affairs

Papikyan said that in order to increase the defense capability, Armenia, of course, is replenishing its arsenal of weapons. However, the minister stressed that the government “does not intend to publicly announce the acquired weapons” and specify what exactly is being purchased.

He only stressed that all necessary steps are being taken to ensure that the Armenian army “is able to defend the sovereign territories of Armenia”.

Azerbaijani Press: Zangazur Corridor: Armenia’s extraterritoriality angst, two platforms, three neighbours

Emil Lazarian
AzerNews, Azerbaijan
June 8 2022

By Orkhan Amashov

In defeat and partial, however superficial, renunciation of its grandiose ambitions, Armenia has gained a valuable chance to reshape its selfhood. Despite some half-hearted meanderings aimed at self-analysis, within the year and a half that has elapsed since the 10 November ceasefire deal, Yerevan has achieved absolutely nothing in the department of “soul-cleansing”. What is now clear is that the vanquished nation has stumbled upon the thorny path of maladjustment, somewhat rendering itself irreconcilably at odds with its own self-interest.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have yet to forge a common understanding on how to proceed in relation to what is either called the Zangazur Corridor or the Nakhichevan route – viewed as the central segment of the post-conflict connectivity agenda by Baku.

Yerevan accepts that Azerbaijan should have access to Nakhchivan via the Syunik Province, but it remains worried that if Article 9 of the ceasefire agreement is implemented and the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federal Security Service is responsible for overseeing the transport connection, Armenia’s de facto sovereignty over its own territory will be curbed.

This is the essence of Yerevan’s extraterritoriality angst. Feigned, semi-genuine, or half-cultivated, it appears to constitute a major stumbling block on the way to implementing Article 9 of the 10 November deal.

Two platforms

The cumulative impact of the recent developments under the aegis of the EU and Russia, namely the third trilateral convocation mediated by Brussels and the 3 June meeting of the trilateral commission on the unblocking of communications in Moscow, has reinforced, albeit undramatically and with some reservations, the centrality of the overland passage connecting western Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan within the larger connectivity agenda.

The 22 May post-meeting statement of European Commission President Charles Michel touched upon the “principles governing” the route commensurate with the geographical reality of the Zangazur Corridor. On 31 May, the spokesperson for the EC President issued a written document, specifying that “no extraterritorial claims with regard to future transport infrastructure exists”, and “any speculation to the contrary is regrettable”.

On 3 June, the tenth meeting of the trilateral commission on the opening of regional transport communications took place, and a whole range of issues, falling within the scope of connectivity, including “possible routes for a highway linking mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave”, were discussed.

For Armenia, if denuded of its “corridor part”, the project is acceptable and potentially appreciable. Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan reiterated there was a common perception that “all transportation infrastructure and roads to be unblocked must operate under the sovereignty and legislation of those countries through which they pass”.

Whilst Armenia continues to flaunt its misgivings, Baku, both on a rhetorical and practical level, must act decisively. Azerbaijan expects the Horadiz-Agband railway segment of the Zangazur project to be fully operational next year. Despite this, there is no indication that Yerevan has taken any steps towards building the 43-km segment running through its southern portion.

Three Big

In addition to the aforementioned two platforms dealing with the full spectrum of the Azerbaijani-Armenian interstate normalisation, the individual lines maintained by three big neighbours of the South Caucasus – Turkey, Russia, and Iran – are unquestionably of significance.

Ankara fully backs Baku and has a strong interest in achieving unrestricted access to Azerbaijan via Armenia. The current transit route via Georgia, which allows Turkey to connect both with its first-rate ally and the Caspian Sea, is good, yet it is undeniably true that a new link via Nakhchivan will be faster and traverse lowland topography, rendering it far more attractive and efficient.

Russia’s position is unique, as it also a mediator within the trilateral format originated in the ceasefire agreement. On the whole, the Kremlin is interested in reconnecting with Armenia via Azerbaijan, thereby avoiding Georgia, and Article 9 means it will have an element of control over the proposed route.

Iran, however, begs to differ. The fear preying on the minds of those in Tehran is that a new link will undermine its access to fraternal Armenia, as the implementation of the letter and spirit of Article 9, will amount to a “change of borders”.

This concern was pacified, to some degree, in March of this year, when Azerbaijan and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding envisaging the establishment of a new communications route connecting the East Zangazur Economic Region with Nakhchivan, via Iran.

However, first things first. Both Baku and Yerevan have to move on. Many in Armenia are acutely conscious of the insipid vacuity of staying enmeshed in a lugubrious imbroglio. Deaf and blind to reason, the revenge-driven opposition prefers running amok and going berserk. Pashinyan’s government is not aimless, but impotent in achieving its objectives. Baku is unmoved and resolute, but there are constraints within which its vim and vigour could operate.

The impact of the war in Ukraine on regional cooperation in the South Caucasus

Chakrian Hovsep
Middle East Institute
June 8 2022

June 8, 2022

Vali Kaleji

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus has been unable to find a model for regional cooperation or form regional organizations. As I have noted elsewhere, “Over the past three decades, various initiatives for regional cooperation have been proposed, including the ‘Peaceful Caucasus Initiative’ (Eduard Shevardnadze), ‘Stability Pact for the Caucasus’ (Süleyman Demirel, on January 16, 2000), ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform’ (Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, August 13, 2008), and ‘United Caucasus’ (Mikheil Saakashvili). But none of these proved successful or long-lasting because each failed to satisfy all of the key members of the wider region.”

But the relative calm that followed the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, especially after the signing of the November 2020 cease-fire agreement, renewed hopes for regional cooperation in the Caucasus. Key regional actors proposed new formats, including Ankara’s “Six-Country Regional Cooperation Platform” (involving Turkey, Russia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia, and Armenia) and Tehran’s “3+3” model (involving the three South Caucasus countries of Armenia, Georgia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan plus Russia, Turkey, and Iran). The first summit within the framework of the 3+3 group was held in Moscow on Dec. 11, 2021. Although Georgia did not attend due to its differences with Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Georgian flag was flown outside the Moscow summit alongside those of the five countries in attendance. This gesture signaled a shared desire among those present for a Georgian presence in future meetings.

Summit attendees made several efforts to resolve the border disputes between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, including by holding meetings between the two countries in Sochi on Nov. 26, 2021 and Brussels on March 31, 2022. Turkey and Armenia have also taken important steps toward normalizing relations, including the appointment of Serdar Kılıç, the former Turkish ambassador to the United States, and Ruben Rubinyan, the former head of Armenia’s parliamentary committee on foreign relations, as special envoys. The two held their first meeting in Moscow on Jan. 14, 2022 and this was followed by a meeting between Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu at the second Antalya Diplomacy Forum on March 11, 2022.

Nonetheless, significant challenges to regional integration remain. Continuing border tensions between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan are one. After the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, with the return of the Zangilan, Ghobadli, Lachin, and Kalbajar regions in the west and southwest of Nagorno-Karabakh to the rule of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the borders of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan in these regions returned to the Soviet-era borders after three decades. But the existence of rural areas, pastures and water resources, mines, and roads and transit routes on both sides of the border makes it difficult and slow to determine the boundaries between the two countries. Another challenge is Armenia’s opposition to the “Zangezur Corridor” that will connect the mainland of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan exclave. The reason for the challenge is, as I have noted elsewhere,

“The ambiguity and different interpretations of the Armenian and Azeri sides of Article 9 of the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement on November 10, 2020. The interpretation and reasoning of the Azeri [side] is a ‘broad and maximum interpretation’ and in this regard, Baku believes that the meaning of ‘communication between the western regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic’ is a corridor and [a] communication corridor called ‘Zangezur’ is mentioned. On the other hand, the Armenian side has a ‘narrow and minimal interpretation’ in this regard and Yerevan believes that the word ‘corridor’ appears only in the third clause of the ceasefire agreement for the access of the Nagorno-Karabakh region to Armenia through the ‘Lachin corridor.’”

These challenges led to the failure of efforts to revive the Soviet-era railway in the South Caucasus, widespread opposition to the engagement of Nikol Pashinyan’s government in Armenia-Republic of Azerbaijan peace talks, and the still-unrealized normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations. Russia’s war with Ukraine has only complicated matters further, creating four major new challenges.

The first challenge is Georgia’s full and explicit support for Ukraine in the war, which has pushed Georgia into the Western camp and thus deepened the rifts between Tbilisi and Moscow. Indeed, in mid-May the president of the breakaway state of South Ossetia, Anatoly Bibilov, proposed holding a referendum on accession to Russia on July 17, 2022. He scrapped the idea several weeks later due to the “uncertainty of the legal consequences of the issue.” Were the referendum to happen, the dynamics of Russia’s annexation of Crimea would be repeated in South Ossetia, and it is not difficult to imagine that this same pattern could play out in Abkhazia too. These conditions have dimmed the prospects for Georgia’s participation in the 3+3 format.

The second challenge is that the Ukraine war has shifted Russia’s military focus away from the Caucasus, where it has traditionally acted as a “security guarantor” for unrecognized states, such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine has not gone to plan. Moscow’s losses on the battlefield have prompted it to redeploy Russian forces stationed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as bring in local troops from South Ossetia. Meanwhile, the Nagorno-Karabakh region has seen several military clashes since the start of the Ukraine war, including in the villages of Khramort and Nakhichanik in the Askeran region and Khnushinak and Karmir Shuka in the Martuni region on March 9, 2022. Some experts, especially Armenian ones, attribute this to the Ukraine war. Yerevan-based analyst Tigran Grigoryan is of this opinion, writing, “Azerbaijan is using the small window of opportunity created by the war in Ukraine to reach some tactical goals on the ground. Baku is also testing Russia’s red lines and limitations in Nagorno-Karabakh in this new geopolitical reality. Azerbaijan will surely keep on trying to further exploit Moscow’s weaknesses if the Russian war effort in Ukraine lasts for too long.”

As Alexa Fults and Paul Stronski have noted,

“Many Armenians view these incursions as attempts by Baku to gain as much territory and leverage as possible to force Yerevan into suing for peace on less-than-favorable terms. It may be working. The EU and Russia have sponsored a flurry of diplomatic initiatives to defuse the tension, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine now complicates these efforts to manage the conflict jointly, and Baku has seized this opportunity to introduce a five-point proposal for a comprehensive peace. This plan includes mutual recognition of each state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual renunciation of any future territorial claims, delimitation and demarcation of the border, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and the opening of regional transportation links. Missing from the proposal is a long-standing Armenian demand: an agreement and mechanism for determining the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh and its Armenian population.”

The Republic of Azerbaijan, however, rejects Armenia’s appeal and considers the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh to be Azerbaijani citizens.

In other word, Baku sees the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh as non-negotiable. The Republic of Azerbaijan even opposes the use of the term “Nagorno-Karabakh,” which it deems a vestige of Soviet-era political geography. Instead, Baku officially uses only “Karabakh” to designate this political unit of the Republic of Azerbaijan. All of this, especially the reduction of Russia’s military focus on the South Caucasus since the start of the Ukraine war, has raised concerns about the increased risk of conflict in South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Such conditions are bound to negatively impact the prospects for regional cooperation in the Caucasus, especially the 3+3 model.

The third challenge is the damage done to Russia’s economy and soft power by the Ukraine war. It is clear that no regional project in the Caucasus will succeed without Moscow’s cooperation and participation. Historically, Russia’s buy-in (or lack thereof) has played an important role in the success (or failure) of regional cooperation projects. For example, its cooperation played an important role in forming the 3+3 model proposed by Iran and Turkey after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the first meeting of the 3+3 representatives took place in Moscow. But the Ukraine war has drained Russia of its political and economic power, as well as its soft power, across the globe. Western sanctions threaten to recreate the conditions that resulted in the “Ruble Crisis of 1998,” when Russia experienced a sovereign debt default, a massive devaluation of the ruble, and a banking crisis. The debilitation of Russia at that time resulted in a great divergence within the Commonwealth of Independent States, leading the Republic of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia to withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO) in 1999. These three countries never returned to the CSTO, the crown jewel of Russia’s defense pacts. Thus, Russia’s political, economic, and military decline in the Caucasus will enable other powers to play a growing role in the region, especially Turkey. Russia, however, continues its efforts to demonstrate that the Ukraine war has no bearing on its position in the Caucasus. To this end, the foreign ministers of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Russia met in the Tajik capital of Dushanbe on May 13, 2022 to discuss the normalization of relations between Yerevan and Baku. Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan also announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin will make a state visit to Armenia by the end of the year.

Despite Russia’s attempts at damage control, the Ukraine war seems likely to have a negative long-term impact on its political, economic, and military power. As a result, it will be difficult for Moscow to advance its plans and goals in the Caucasus, including within the framework of the 3+3 model. As the formation of the 3+3 reflected a new balance of power between Russia and Turkey after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia’s decline and Turkey’s rise in the Caucasus could tempt Ankara to jettison the 3+3 model and strengthen bilateral cooperation with the Republic of Azerbaijan alone. In addition, the Ukraine war has intensified the rivalry pitting the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey against Russia. Efforts to strengthen the “Middle Corridor” or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route — which starts from Southeast Asia and China and then runs through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and further to European countries — and cement Baku’s position as an alternative gas supplier for Europe fuel trilateral cooperation between the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, leaving Russia and Iran out in the cold. These developments can only weaken the 3+3 model in the South Caucasus.

The fourth challenge is the spread of political protests in Armenia and the country’s uncertain political future. Protests against the Pashinyan government have been going on for the past two years, and the war in Ukraine has only intensified them inside Armenia, in the Armenian-controlled Nagorno-Karabakh region, and among the Armenian diaspora. Many political parties and groups opposed to the Pashinyan government believe that the Republic of Azerbaijan is seeking to take advantage of Russia’s partial eclipse in the Caucasus to assert full sovereignty over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. For such observers the signs of Baku’s intentions are all around them: in the Republic of Azerbaijan’s decision to cut off gas to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, explained away by Baku as a temporary technical problem; in military clashes in the villages of Khramort and Nakhichanik in the Askeran region and Khnushinak and Karmir Shuka in the Martuni region; and in the presentation of the five-article peace plan. Opposition parties and groups in Armenia accuse the Pashinyan government of dishonesty and a lack of transparency in the negotiation process with the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkey. For this reason, opposition political parties such as the Republican Party, Armenian National Movement, Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun), as well as a coalition of three former Armenian presidents (Leon Ter-Petrosyan, Robert Kocharyan, and Serge Sargsyan) are forming a united front against Pashinyan. Such unity is unprecedented in Armenia’s recent political history. In regard to protests in Armenia, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov said he believes they lack “broad public support,” adding that, “the number of people who participate doesn’t exceed six or seven thousand people.” But in reality, the protests in Armenia are a force to be reckoned with. The Republic of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Russia are all well aware that the fall of the Pashinyan government might bring to power someone, like former President Kocharyan, who strongly opposes the Nagorno-Karabakh cease-fire agreement, peace talks between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, and normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey. The recent decision by the Azerbaijani government to construct a 55-km highway along with railway links between Zangilan and Nakhchivan through Iran could be interpreted as a sign of this concern. This route would serve as an alternative to the Zangezur Corridor across southern Armenia in the event that Armenia-Republic of Azerbaijan relations sour. For now it has yet to be built, although not for lack of effort by the Azerbaijani government.

Over the past three decades, internal divisions in the Caucasus region between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as divisions between Armenia, Turkey, and Georgia on one side and Russia on the other, have hindered regional cooperation. The war in Ukraine, with its trans-regional fallout, seems to have nipped in the bud nascent trends in regional cooperation, especially those adopting the 3+3 model. Georgia’s prospects for membership in the 3+3 platform have greatly receded, and in practice this model has been reduced to “3+2.” The political situation in Armenia remains uncertain and unstable, and if nationalists were to win power this might seal the fate of even the 3+2 model. Meanwhile, Russia’s military focus on the Ukraine war, combined with the weakening of its economy and soft power as a result of extensive Western sanctions, also undermines the 3+3 cooperation model. To all this should be added intensifying competition in the fields of transit and energy. The Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey have cooperated in these areas, to the exclusion of Russia and Iran. With all this in mind, we must face the fact that the path to regional cooperation in the Caucasus promises to be a bumpy one.

 

Dr. Vali Kaleji is an expert in regional studies, Central Asia, and Caucasian studies based in Tehran, Iran. He has published numerous articles on Eurasian issues with the Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor, the American Foreign Policy Council’s Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at [email protected]. The views expressed in this piece are his own.

https://www.mei.edu/publications/impact-war-ukraine-regional-cooperation-south-caucasus

It’s a Lebanese-Armenian family feast at the next Monday Night Foodball

Ani Kharatian

Chicago – June 8 2022
FOOD & DRINK

Galit pastry chef Mary Eder-McClure and Butter Bird Bakery’s Kat Stuerhk Talo channel their grannies at the Reader’s weekly chef pop-up series at the Kedzie Inn.
by Mike SulaJune 8, 2022

Lebanon and Armenia are separated by vast stretches of Syria and eastern Turkey, but when Mary Eder-McClure and Kat Stuehrk Talo compared notes about the heroic family meals they grew up on, they discovered that similarities in the food they ate shrank the distance.

For one thing, there’s the abundance of generosity. And the stuffed grape leaves.

“Both of our families’ food and table experience is this sensory overload of bowls and plates everywhere,” says Galit pastry chef Eder-McClure, “with meat, rice, cheese, dips, pickles; it’s like a block party of smells and tastes—salty, sweet, acidic—all of that happening at the same time.”  

That’s why it makes perfect sense that Eder-McClure and Stuehrk Talo of Butter Bird Bakery have joined forces for an epic, family-style Lebanese-Armenian feast at the next Monday Night Foodball, the Reader’s weekly chef pop-up series at the Kedzie Inn.

The menu, which they dropped last week, doesn’t do justice to the love and effort that’s going into this Foodball. They’re starting out with a lavish mezze spread, including fresh lavash to scoop up an array of pickles and dips with a chunky sumac-spiked Armenian salad and Eder-McClure’s Nana’s tabouli. “Everybody says, ‘My grandma’s is the best,’” she says. “But honestly, my grandma’s is the best.” She’ll also be bringing out sumac-kissed spinach pies, along with Stuehrk Talo’s lahmejun: pizza-like ground beef and tomato flatbreads, reimagined in croissant form.

And then come the grape leaves—the Lebanese variety stuffed with cinnamon and black pepper-spiced beef and lamb, simmered in a lemony broth, side-by-side with the Armenian version, vegetarian stuffed with onions and herbs and served cold.

If you haven’t toppled to the floor by then there’s tender braised and pomegranate-glazed lamb shanks, and rice pilaf with toasted vermicelli, almonds, and bits of sweet apricot. To finish—or more likely, take home for later—a baklavah sampler drawn from both cuisines.

“Come hungry,” says Stuerhk Talo, who also suggests you bring your own takeaway containers because, in the spirit of grannies the world over, you will be taking food home with you.

Sounds marvelous, but this is an urgent situation. There is a slim-to-none chance to walk in and order on the spot this Monday, June 13. (I’ll let you know if it’s possible on Sunday.) The first round of tickets to both the 5 and 7:30 PM seatings have already sold out, but Stuerhk Talo and Eder-McClure (a Foodball veteran, formerly with the pozole pop-up Limon y Sal) have released four more spots for each seating. Look alive, get them here!

https://chicagoreader.com/food-drink/its-a-lebanese-armenian-family-feast-at-the-next-monday-night-foodball/

German MP sees need for finding political solution to Karabakh conflict

Chatinian Lara
PanARMENIAN
Armenia – June 8 2022

June 8, 2022 – 14:58 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – Member of the German Bundestag Till Mansmann beieves is necessary to find a political solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In an interview with Armenpress, Mansmann said Germany supports the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmanship in negotiations over the conflict.

“As a member of the Minsk Group, Germany supports the efforts of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs in the negotiations for the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, taking into account also the military clashes which started between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020 and lasted until November. Germany believes that it is necessary to find a political solution to the conflict. Following the clashes Germany has provided a total of 2 million Euro humanitarian aid at the level of the International Committee of Red Cross”, the MP said.

Mansmann also commented on the ongoing dialogue between Armenia and Turkey aimed at the normalization of the relations, stating that the long-term goal must always be the peaceful coexistence.

“No matter how hostile the relations between Armenia and Turkey are, we face a reality when both Armenia and Turkey become more interconnected in conditions of globalization. Armenia should remain open for development of peace and trade”, he said.

https://www.panarmenian.net/eng/news/300782/German_MP_sees_need_for_finding_political_solution_to_Karabakh_conflict