AS KARABAKH PEACE TALKS STAGNATING, SHELLING APPEARS TO BE ONLY METHOD OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE
ArmInfo’s interview with Ilgar Velizade, Head of the South Caucasus
Club of Political Analysts, Azerbaijani political scientist
by David Stepanyan
Tuesday, February 10, 16:13
Did the recent voting at PACE – where it was decided not to restore
Russia’s voting rights until April- show perturbations that may result
in a new geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus?
The voting was demonstrative and paradoxical. Three of the countries
that voted ‘against’ the resolution supporting the territorial
integrity of Ukraine have territorial problems. Those countries
were Azerbaijan, Serbia and Cyprus. That voting demonstrated that
there is no full consensus in the situation around Ukraine and
its interpretation by the global actors. Those three countries
sought to show their stance on all the international principles of
decision-making concerning the territorial integrity. In other words,
Azerbaijan, Serbia and Cyprus demonstrated that they anticipate
similar actions concerning their own problems. Since, nothing of
the kind has happened, they were reluctant to vote ‘against’ the
resolution to show their protest.
Nagorny Karabakh conflict also deals with the principles of
self-determination and territorial integrity…
These issues are raised during the settlement process, of course. On
the other hand, the political configuration in the South Caucasus is
changing, given the policy of the leading actors and the current
distribution of forces. Officially mediating in the Karabakh
conflict, Russia keeps developing its relations with both Armenia
and Azerbaijan. However, one can see that Russia’s benefits from the
partner relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan are quite different.
Armenia unlike Azerbaijan is a recipient of Russia’s military and
economic assistance. Meanwhile, Baku is a good trade and economic,
and, which is the most important, military-technical partner of
Russia. In 2014 alone, Sergey Shoiu made a $5 million arms deal
during his visit to Baku. Given the current problems of the JSC
Rosoboronexport – Russia’s major company engaged in arms export –
Russia cannot undervalue such a big order by Azerbaijan. Therefore,
if Baku supported the anti-Russian resolution, it would negatively
affect its partnership with Russia. Furthermore, Azervbaijan not only
would fail to settle its territorial problems, but also would face
confrontation with Russia – something it does not need at all.
Consequently, Azerbaijan’s vote was rather pragmatic and justified,
like the voting of Cyprus and Serbia, I think. It is untimely
anticipating any drastic changes in the region from the PACE voting,
Many believe that Russia has lost the confrontation with Ukraine. Do
you share these views? Will this change the distribution of forces
in the region and the balance around Nagorny Karabakh?
There are categorical assertions that Russia has failed to manage
the Ukraine crisis, but these assertions belong mostly to the media
outlets that interpret the situation in conformity with their editorial
line. That is why, one should not draw any far-reaching conclusions
from this so far. Nothing is that simple in the Ukrainian crisis. What
we are witnessing now is an extremely painful transformation of the
international and regional relations with predominance of destructive
elements. It is not likely that a new ‘construction’ will emerge from
the ongoing transformation.
Destabilizing processes continue getting new geopolitical accents,
additional negative and dramatic nature. Actually, not only Russia
and Ukraine, but also all the neighbors of Russia suffer from those
processes, particularly, the EEU member Kazakhstan that even has no
border with Ukraine.
What about Armenia and Azerbaijan?
As for Armenia, it is suffering also because its external borders are,
actually, the borders of the EEU. I cannot say how the real situation
in the case of Armenia will extrapolate, but Yerevan will inevitably
face difficulties, given that special laws that would facilitate its
special state can be adopted only in cooperation with the EEU members.
Further protraction of the Ukrainian crisis will negatively affect the
countries like Armenia, first of all. The situation is developing so
rapidly now that any decision on Ukraine influences the development
of the Ukrainian crisis. Therefore, no one can make any forecasts. As
for Azerbaijan, it has already displayed its choice in favor of Russia
by the voting at the PACE. Nevertheless, the issue of Azerbaijan’s
strategic choice is still open, because no global super actors present
Baku with a dilemma. The reason is that the EU, U.S., and Russia
are now satisfied with what they receive from Azerbaijan: Moscow –
arms deals, Brussels and Washington – energy resources.
And how does Karabakh fit into this configuration?
Unfortunately, Karabakh does not at all fit into the current
geopolitical configuration because no real ties between Karabakh
and Azerbaijan are observed. In the meantime, serious geopolitical
decisions affect the conflict. At the moment, one should not expect
any radical changes in the situation around the Karabakh conflict. Nor
should one expect Azerbaijan to make a real geopolitical choice.
Russia is not interested in the change of the status quo, because
in that case it will lose control over the conflict, especially
amid the conflict with Ukraine. So, at the moment the conflicting
parties are left to their own devices. What we see today on the
Armenian-Azerbaijani border confirms that the parties are trying
to force benefits out of the general geopolitical context. Further
protraction of the Karabakh conflict is unacceptable. Specific facts
and figures also prove that. A few years ago, the ceasefire regime
was annually breached no more than for 2-3 thsd times, and now the
number of ceasefire violations has increased dozens of times, which
demonstrates a latent war.
So, do you see an impulse for resolution of the conflict?
Certainly, I do. And that impulse is natural. The escalation of the
arms race in the region, where mountains of weapons are stockpiled,
sooner or later raises the need to use these weapons. This is what we
see today. Despite numerous calls for peace, foreign actors make no
real management of the conflict. Naturally, Azerbaijan is not happy
with the current situation and tries to give relevant signals to the
world. That is, they try to say that protraction of the situation
will not lead to durable peace in the region. External actors and
Armenia, naturally, interpret these signals in their own way, which
just makes Azerbaijan use force. Therefore, as Karabakh peace talks
are stagnating, shelling appears to be the only method of political
dialogue.
What are the prospects of that dialogue?
This dialogue has two potential outcomes: either a short-term
small-scale war or even more ceasefire breaches. This perspective is
constantly growing. Such latent conflict is not likely to spiral into
a large-scale war, as it is not within the interests of big actors.
Russia and the West will not keep calm amid growing threats to
their national interests, for instance, explosions of oil pipelines
or new problems in the Caspian Sea region. Nevertheless, they need
to manage the situation carefully enough not to spark a large-scale
destructive war. This is what explains the calls for settlement of the
conflict by means of the ‘Madrid Principles.’ To resolve the conflict,
implementation of those principles, not political rhetoric is required.
From: A. Papazian
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=9F9FEF90-B126-11E4-8D2B0EB7C0D21663