Talysh Identity and Geopolitics in the South Caucasus
By Bradley Jardine
2/17/2015

In Azerbaijan, a sensitive debate is being reintroduced to the
political foreground: `Did Talyshistan belong to the Azerbaijan
Republic? And if not can the current Republic of Azerbaijan
legitimately claim the region as its sovereign territory?’ Although
this seems like an academic question, debated in the confines of
history departments; the discussion is loaded with geopolitical
baggage. Due to the vast number of ethnic groups and language
communities living side by side in the small, mountainous region of
the Caucasus, local disputes are often manipulated by regional powers
keen to either exploit, or hinder the Caucasus’s potential as both an
energy producer and transit corridor linking European markets with
Asia. Still, it came as a surprise to many when last week, the Russian
news agency IAREX published an article by the Talysh nationalist
leader Fakhraddin Aboszoda. As one might expect, Aboszoda uses the
article to argue in favour of Talysh national self-determination,
claiming that Baku has no sovereign right to Talysh lands. But why are
his views suddenly gaining traction in Russian newspapers? In the
South Caucasus, historical narratives are often used as geopolitical
weapons.

Context

Azerbaijan’s Talysh population are a Persian-speaking community
concentrated in the south of the country along the Iranian border,
with their capital in Lenkoran. The group has a history of
Russian-backed resistance to Baku. The Bolsheviks established the
Mughan Soviet Republic as a communist puppet state in 1919, with the
raison d’état of undermining the democratic Musavat government of
Azerbaijan. In 1993 again, amidst the chaos of post-soviet political
transition, Russia backed a separatist movement: the `Talysh-Mughan
Autonomous Republic’ led by Alikram Humbatov. This pseudo-state was
quickly dissolved three months later during Heydar Aliyev’s
consolidation of power. Aboszoda is himself steeped in controversy
because of his involvement with this would-be separatist state, and
furthermore, he recently argued that Azerbaijan functioned as a
miniature empire. This debate was expanded, and backed by researchers
at the Kremlin-connected think-tank, the Russian Institute for
Strategic Studies (RISI). There’s no data showing how well his views
are supported or opposed by ordinary Talysh, yet this hasn’t stopped
the Russian Federation and Armenia from involving themselves in other
recent `provocations’ of Talysh minorities.

On November 29th 2014, a television station calling itself `The
National Television of Talyshton,’ began broadcasting in Azerbaijan
under the direction of Talysh poet Zabig Madozh. The station adopted
the Russian Cyrillic script, rather than the Perso-Arabic script
typical of Talysh nationalists. Aboszoda again made a controversial
appearance, being picked as a presenter. The other host was
Zakhiraddin Ibragimi, the chairman of the Committee for the Defence of
the Rights of the Talysh. Then, in February 2007 the former
Talysh-Mughan Republic’s President Alikram Hummatov, made a guest
appearance at Yerevan State University for an event concerning the
preservation of the Talysh language.

During his speech at the University Hummatov said that: `In
Azerbaijan, the Talysh are deprived of basic rights. We are not
respected; we are being extirpated, with a policy of assimilation
being implemented against us.’ Some of his concerns are warranted. For
example, in lowland communities that were once homogenous and are now
becoming multi-ethnic, Azerbaijani is becoming the favoured language
for wider communication. In particular, children’s proficiency in
Talysh is reportedly declining, except in remote, mountain villages.

The Azeri regime predictably responded by cracking down on outspoken
individuals in the Talysh community. The day after Hummatov visited
the Armenian occupied territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azeri
government sentenced the editor of the newspaper `Tolyshi Sado (Voice
of the Talysh), Hilal Mammedov to five years in prison for trumped up
charges of `ethnic hatred’ and `drug-trafficking.’ This echoed an
earlier case in February 2007, when another of the paper’s editors,
Novruzali Mammadov, , was arrested and charged with treason, before
dying in 2009 due to lack of adequate prison healthcare.

More recently in 2013, a Talysh-language radio station, `The Voice of
Talyshstan,’ was launched in the Armenian occupied territories; a move
criticised by Baku as an attempt to stir up ethnic conflict. It began
broadcasting from the city of Shusha, in Nagorno-Karabakh on March
20th at the initiative of the Caucasus Centre of Iranian Studies at
the Modus Vivendi Centre. The station was founded by the Armenian
intellectual, Garnik Asatrian, who also established the Talysh Studies
program at Yerevan State University. Welcoming Hummatov, Asatrian
denied any accusations of ulterior motives behind Armenia’s interest
in Talysh minorities. Asatrian insisted that the department was merely
broadening its focus on Iranian studies. Armenian agitation of this
sort is nothing new. Armenian officials have a long history of denying
the existence of an `Azerbaijani’ nationality, altogether. But loose
arguments based on sweeping historically deterministic allegations
notwithstanding, the question still remains ` why now?

Geopolitical Anlaysis

Recently Paul Goble at the Jamestown Foundation wrote an article
questioning whether Moscow is putting the Talysh in play against
Azerbaijan. In it he suggests three possible reasons why Talysh
activists are rising in prominence. First, he suggests that by
supporting Talysh nationalist activities Moscow may be countering
Iranian activities in the region (i.e. the financing of Mosques).
Second, that Moscow might be trying to court Armenia after tensions
between the two countries have come to a fore over the murders in
Gyumri. Finally, that the `Kremlin’ is sending a `signal to Baku’ that
Russia has `resources within Azerbaijan’ and that they are ready to
use them `if Azerbaijan does not go along with Russia’s wishes.’

It’s worth exploring each one of these in-depth to see if they hold
any standing. Firstly, it should be noted that there’s an inordinate
amount of suspicion about Russian intentions vis-a-vis Azerbaijan and
an excessively exaggerated account of Russian abilities to act upon
them. The situation in Ukraine, and the recent treaty (read:
annexation) of South Ossetia has many analysts rightly unnerved. But
much of their suspicions regarding Russian relations with Azerbaijan
appear either fabricated or unduly influenced by the myriad of state
propaganda in the region. Unfortunately reporting on geopolitical
events of suspect importance in the Caucasus seems especially prone to
this particular brand of hyperbole.

Second, Azerbaijan is the key economic and military actor in the
Caucasus ` and Russia knows it. Its oil reserves have given the Aliyev
regime a degree of independence from outside meddling that Georgia and
Armenia simply haven’t been able to purchase. Since the completion of
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Azerbaijan’s GDP has grown year over
year at an unprecedented rate, reaching US $73 billion in 2013 (in
comparison: Georgia US $16 billion; Armenia US $10 billion). The
increase in oil revenues has sent Azeri military expenditures
skyrocketing to a record US $4.8 billion (mostly spent purchasing
Russian arms) and forced Armenia’s sickly economy to attempt to keep
pace. The situation is advantageous to Russia, because it keeps
Armenian national security dependent on Moscow’s support, and sends
capital flowing into the coffers of Russia’s military industrial
complex. With the Russian economy in a tailspin, it’s unlikely that
Putin would jeopardize lucrative arms deals with their southern
neighbor by overtly provoking some kind of Talysh separatist movement.
Further, Putin’s attempt to establish a Eurasian Economic Union would
be boosted significantly with Azeri cooperation and alienating the
regime seems like a sure way to jeopardize any future membership.

Third, unlike South Ossetia and Abkhazia ` there is no group in
Azerbaijan that would favor reunification with Russia and no sizable
Russian minority that Russia could intervene on behalf of. Quite the
contrary, Russia is already dealing with separatists in neighboring
Dagestan and Chechnya. Historically, Russia has favored stability in
the Caucasus to chaos, which is one reason why Russian authorities
tend to look favorably on the region’s strong-armed dictators who can
keep their constituent populations `in line.’ So given these
geopolitical considerations what are we to make of Goble’s three
propositions?

The first, that Russia is attempting to vie for influence vis-a-vis
Iran is not outside the realm of possibility. Moscow’s troubles with
Islamic separatists throughout the Caucasus are well-notedand it may
perceive Iran’s supposed support of the Talysh as threatening.
However, if this is indeed the case, it would seem that Russia’s best
option would be ensuring a stable secular regime in Baku ` not
attempting to undermine the one already there. The second possibility
that Russia is essentially performing a Public Relations coup in order
to repair relations with Armenia is questionable on several lines of
reasoning ` most important among them is the fact that much happened
before the Gyumri murders suggesting that if Russia is indeed involved
at all, there’s a longer strategy at play. The last possibility, that
Russia is sending a signal to Baku is the most difficult to refute but
also unlikely on several grounds which have already been mentioned `
namely that there are no sizable minorities in Azerbaijan that could
pose a significant threat to Baku.

With the aforementioned caution that much geopolitical analysis is
essentially guess work the following represents the most likely
scenario. In all probability there are many Talysh who are worried
about their loss of language and identity. There are equally likely
Talysh who resent the Aliyev regime’s brutal suppression of basic
freedoms ` just as there are many Azeris who feel the same way. Some
people within Armenia are undoubtedly stoking these concerns as part
of a much longer line of propaganda that tries to deny Azeri
nationality on questionable grounds. If Russia is indeed involved at
all, it is probably to provoke the Aliyev regime into further
crackdowns and human rights abuses. It’s partially Aliyev’s
willingness to continue to imprison journalists and anyone with
grievances that is keeping Azerbaijan from fully pursuing a Western
orientation (a la Georgia). Pursuing policies that don’t pose a real
threat to the stability of the regime, yet cause Aliyev to react in a
way that draws the ire of European and US institutions is an effective
strategy to keep Azerbaijan away from greater economic and political
integration with the West.

As is often the case, Russia’s relationship with post-Soviet minority
communities is both ambiguous, and highly pragmatic.