EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS: EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY SCORECARD 2012
February 17, 2012
Europe, European Union, The Euro Crisis, Foreign Policy, International
Relations
Justin Vaïsse, Director of Research, Center on the United States
and Europe Hans Kundnani, Editorial Director, European Council on
Foreign Relations
European Council on Foreign Relations
The European Foreign Policy Scorecard is an annual evaluation-led
by Justin Vaïsse and Hans Kundnani and published by the European
Council on Foreign Relations-of Europe’s performance in pursuing
its interests and promoting its values in the world. The objectives
and basic structure of the Scorecard have not changed from the
first edition on the year 2010. Once again, the assessment is of
the collective performance of all European Union actors rather than
the action of any particular institution or member state. The focus
is on policies and results rather than institutional processes –
in other words, we are interested above all in how effective Europe
was in the world. In particular, we assign two scores (“unity” and
“resources,” each graded out of 5) for European policies themselves
and a third score (“outcome,” graded out of 10) for results. The sum
of these scores translates into letter grades (A full description of
the methodology for the Scorecard can be found here).
However, although we are retaining the same methodology to allow
comparisons with last year’s performance, we have made two innovations
for the second edition of the Scorecard. First, we have added an
assessment of European performance in the Middle East and North Africa
to the other regional issues in last year’s Scorecard and merged the
assessments of crisis management and European policy in multilateral
institutions. Second, we have added an exploration of the role played
by individual member states on 30 of the 80 components of European
foreign policy where they played a particularly significant role. In
order to do this, we have, with the help of 27 researchers around the
EU, categorized member states in each case as a “leader,” a “slacker”
or just a “supporter” of common and constructive policies.
2011 may come to be seen as a turning point for the European Union.
As its leaders failed to reassure the rest of the world about
the sustainability of their common currency and the future of the
European project, the continent seemed to be losing its agency: where
it was once seen as a critical part of the solution to international
problems, it has now become a problem to be dealt with by others. In
spite of some foreign-policy successes such as Libya and the deal
on climate change in Durban, the euro crisis seriously constrained
Europe’s ability to react to the revolutions in the Middle East and
North Africa – arguably the most important geopolitical event in its
neighborhood since the fall of the Berlin Wall. In the introduction
to last year’s Scorecard, we wrote that Europe was distracted by the
crisis. This year, Europe was diminished by it. It remains to be seen
whether 2011 will turn out to be a decisive moment in the long-term
decline of the EU or the beginning of a fight back.
>From Solution to Problem
In 2011, the euro crisis began to threaten not only Europe itself but
also the entire global economy. European leaders repeatedly failed
to take the decisive action necessary to reassure the markets that
it was committed to the single currency. While it became clear that
Germany – the largest and most important member state in the euro zone
– wanted to prevent a collapse of the euro, it remained opposed to
what it perceived as a “transfer union” and, fearing moral hazard,
opposed the idea of Eurobonds and that of the ECB as a lender of
last resort. As contagion moved from the periphery to the centre,
economists around the world began to discuss not just whether the euro
would survive but how to limit the turmoil its collapse would cause.
As a result of this role reversal from solution to problem, Europe’s
relationships with great powers around the world changed. In economic
terms, it went from being a subject to an object. In 2010, Europe
struggled to have an impact, particularly in its neighborhood. But in
2011, Europe was forced to seek the help of other powers. It was the
object of IMF intervention and went cap in hand to China and Russia
to ask them to contribute to the bailout of euro zone economies. At
the board of the IMF, where Europeans already had to make room for
emerging powers in 2010, Europeans were no longer in a position
to lecture other countries. For the US – the EU’s closest ally –
Europe went from being an underperforming partner in solving global
challenges to being one of those challenges itself.
Against this background, there was little progress in developing the
much-vaunted “strategic partnerships” with the world’s new powers.
Last year, we wrote that the EU was beginning to develop a new approach
to China based on reciprocity, but this risked being undermined
by member states’ bilateral tendencies. The cancellation of the
EU-China summit in November looked like a symbol of a strengthening
of these tendencies in 2011. Cash-strapped member states sought
investment rather than a share of the Chinese market and even the
big three prioritized their own business deals with China and left
the difficult job of developing a joint approach to China to the EU
institutions. Europeans had some successes with China – for example,
its acquiescence to military action against Libya and to action on
climate change – but these pale in comparison to the significance of
the shift in the balance of power that took place in 2011.
European Performance on the Six Issues in 2011 Issue in 2011 Score
Grade in 2010 Multilateral Issues and Crisis management 13/20 B 14 B+
(Multilateral Issues) 11 B- (Crisis Management) Relations with the
United States 11/20 B- 11 B- Relations with the Middle East and North
Africa 10/20 C+ – Relations with Russia 10/20 C+ 9.5 C+ Relations
with the Wider Europe 9.5/20 C+ 9.5 C+ Relations with China 8.5/20
C 9 C+While it is impossible to quantify the decrease of Europe’s
soft power that accompanied this loss of standing in international
relations, there is little doubt that, by the end of 2011, it had
become significantly less attractive as a model of governance for
the rest of the world than it was even a year before. The long-term
evolution towards shared sovereignty in the form of “ever greater
union” that began with the European project in the 1950s seemed to
have stalled – and perhaps even reversed – as member states pursued
their own narrowly defined national interests. As a continent that
once stood for prosperity and generous social compacts now looked
to be heading towards a decade of austerity – hardly appealing for
emerging powers whose rates of growth far surpass those of Europe –
tensions between member states re-emerged and are likely to increase
unless and until the euro crisis is solved. An additional blow to
Europe’s image in the world came from the erosion of democracy that
took place under Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Hungary. The EU’s
weak response hardly inspires confidence in its transformative power
and is an ominous sign for the future evolution of other member states.
As a conflicted and divided Europe drifted towards economic stagnation
and political gridlock, so the model for which the EU stands – that of
an expanding and ever more effective multilateralism as a solution to
the problems of a globalised world – was also discredited in the eyes
of others. Emerging powers such as Brazil and China understandably
wondered why they should pay to help rescue a continent which is
proving unable to get its act together even though it has the resources
to do so – let alone why they should listen to its lectures about
regionalism and good governance. Elsewhere in the world, for example in
Latin America and South-East Asia, advocates of regional integration
projects are now less likely to look to Europe for inspiration. Thus,
the euro crisis has had collateral damage for the concept of regional
integration in general. In short, the idea of Europe is less powerful
than it was 12 months ago.
The Arab Awakening
Perhaps partly as a result of this decline in the image of Europe, few
of the post-revolutionary political forces in Egypt and Tunisia seemed
focused on getting its help. The Arab Awakening expressed a desire for
emancipation from outside and, in particular, Western influence. But
this may have also reflected the degraded perception of Europe in
the region – perhaps exacerbated by the cozy relationships many of
Europe’s leaders had with autocratic rulers in the region: French
Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie offered Tunisian President
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali French police know-how on riot control,
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi made statements supportive
of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi until the second half of February,
and British Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech on democracy
in the Kuwaiti parliament accompanied by a business delegation that
included arms dealers.
Member states and the EU institutions managed to recover to some extent
and avoided making major mistakes in a fast-moving revolutionary
situation that took everyone by surprise. In particular, after
adapting cautiously and pragmatically to the fall of regimes they had
long supported, European leaders did their best to support political
transitions in Egypt and Tunisia, help the revolutionaries in Libya
and put pressure on Syria. The EU’s High Representative Catherine
Ashton persuaded northern, southern and eastern member states to
sign up to a common strategy in May based on greater incentives
(“money, markets, mobility”); the principle of “more for more”;
and a determination to engage with civil society and to build “deep
democracy” – that is, building respect for the rule of law, freedom of
speech, an independent judiciary and an impartial bureaucracy. The EU
also prepared to work with the new Islamist parties that have emerged
as electorally victorious across the region, in the hope of avoiding
repeating mistakes such as the refusal to talk to Hamas following
its election victory in 2006.
However, largely because of the euro crisis, member states have so
far failed to deliver much of the “money, markets, mobility” they
promised. In terms of money, the EU came up with [email protected] billion of
direct funding, and although extra resources were found in creative
ways, the bulk of it was in the form of loans through the EIB
and the EBRD rather than rapid budget relief, direct aid or debt
cancellation. (The British government offered £110 million from an
overall development budget of £7.8 billion and many other member states
offered even less.) Because of fears of public opinion and the risks
of a populist backlash, mobility was reduced to visa facilitation
for more students rather than a more broadly targeted opening of
Europe’s borders to the south. Although the EU began negotiating
deep free trade areas with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan,
the prospect of more open markets also remained distant as southern
member states fearing competition continue to oppose liberalization
of the agricultural sector.
Supporters of the current approach can claim that many politicians
and officials have apologized to people in the region and that the
new focus on civil society and conditionality is important to turn
away from the previous focus on ruling families. But European leaders
have failed to rise to the difficult conceptual challenge of inventing
a new long-term relationship with their southern neighbors.
For understandable reasons, the EU’s approach to North Africa has
to a large extent been shaped by its experiences in Central and
Eastern Europe, where it promoted reforms in exchange for market and
institutional access to the EU after the revolutions in 1989.
Although few people see a direct parallel between 1989 and 2011, the
European Commission’s strategy for responding to post-revolutionary
North Africa is partly based on a similar approach of exchanging
reform for association with the EU – a form of “enlargement-lite”,
as accession is clearly not on the cards.
The approach that was enshrined in the ENP – in which the EU signs
action plans for reform with the countries on its periphery, monitors
their performance and rewards their success with extra money, markets
or mobility – could struggle to have an impact in post-revolutionary
North Africa. In Central and Eastern Europe, the EU was able to have
a dramatic impact for three reasons: first, it was the main economic
and political power in the region; second, most of the countries
were desperate to adopt EU norms and values as an affirmation of
their European identity; and third, the EU’s promise of membership,
when it was made, provided them an extra incentive to go through the
painful process of transition.
However, none of these conditions apply in the Southern Neighborhood.
Firstly, the Middle East and North Africa is now increasingly
multipolar and Europe must compete with other players such as China,
the GCC and Turkey. These other players may not offer the funds
the EU does, and may not care whether the North African states
build their democracies or not, but that hardly matters. Secondly,
there is little desire from southern Mediterranean countries to adopt
European standards. Many of the countries in the region, especially
Egypt and Algeria, are fiercely protective of their independence
and want to emancipate themselves from foreign and, in particular,
Western influence rather than sign up to European norms – which in
any case look less appealing since the euro crisis.
Thirdly, and most importantly, against the background of the euro
crisis, Europe does not believe it can afford the more generous
approach it took in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. The argument
that engagement with North Africa will, in fact, also benefit Europe by
giving the EU an economic edge – just as Spain, Portugal and Greece
did in the 1980s and Eastern Europe did in the 1990s – has fallen
on deaf ears. The focus on “conditionality” could work if the EU
were willing to offer big carrots. But making the relatively modest
amounts of money offered to North African states dependent on lengthy
and sometimes unprioritized action plans – whilst understandable in
terms of re-assuring European taxpayers that their money will not be
wasted – seems unlikely to change the political calculus of actors in
the south. It may therefore be time to review the EU’s approach and
develop a foreign policy towards these countries based on achieving a
smaller number of political goals rather than placing so much emphasis
on regulatory convergence.
“Following from the Front”
Despite the euro crisis, Europeans did have some foreign-policy
successes in 2011. Perhaps most remarkable of all was the military
intervention in Libya, which – although it was undertaken by some
member states in an ad hoc coalition and then placed under NATO
command – was perceived around the world as a European-led war.
After all, it was Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron who convinced
the Obama administration to undertake the military intervention,
which supported Libyan insurgents and effectively enabled them
to remove Muammar Gaddafi from power. Some elsewhere in the world
were surprised – and impressed – that a continent struggling with a
financial crisis was able to respond quickly enough and to maintain
an operation that lasted six months. Against the background of what
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates called the “demilitarization”
of Europe, many doubted that the political will existed any more to
mount such a humanitarian intervention.
The split within Europe on Libya – Germany sided with the BRICS
countries rather than its Western allies by abstaining on UNSC
Resolution 1973, which authorized military action to protect civilians
– ruled out the possibility of a CSDP mission (a EUFOR-Libya mission
was approved but never activated). In this sense, this episode was
a setback for the EU as a foreign-policy actor. However, after the
operation was placed under NATO command in early April, no fewer than
11 European countries took an active part, with Belgium, Denmark and
Norway making particular contributions.
But, in order to wage the war within the constraints of the UN mandate
to protect civilians, Europeans still had to rely on US military
assets such as refueling, targeting and jamming capabilities. Given
the dramatic cuts in defense budgets announced for the next few years,
this capability deficit is unlikely to improve and may even get worse.
Thus, although the Libya operation earned the respect of some emerging
powers as much as it irritated them, it also highlighted Europe’s
limitations. It has been suggested that, by letting Paris and London
front the operation, the US “led from behind” in Libya, although the
Obama administration rejected the expression.
Conversely, it might be said that, because of its divisions and
inadequate military capabilities, Europe “followed from the front” –
that is, although it committed resources and was on the frontline,
it still found itself dependent on the US in a larger geopolitical
context in which Washington is trying to shift its focus away from the
Middle East and towards the Pacific. Europe’s lack of real strength and
influence in the region was highlighted by the inability of Europeans
to make a difference on the Middle East peace process – despite
having exceptional leverage in 2011 since their vote at the UN was
potentially pivotal and Washington was both discredited and boxed in.
Meanwhile, the EU had some surprising successes in the Eastern
Neighborhood – above all, Russian accession to the WTO and progress
on trade and energy talks with Eastern Partnership countries. But much
of the improvement in relations with Russia during the past few years
is a result of the US “reset”, of which Europe has been a collateral
beneficiary. Despite greater unity than in the past, the EU failed
to make progress in other areas – for example, the “partnerships for
modernization”, the rule of law, democracy and human rights in Russia,
Belarus and Ukraine, and the conflict in Transnistria. With the return
of Vladimir Putin to the presidency in 2012, Russia may become more
of a problem for Europeans. This may also make it more difficult to
make progress in the Eastern Neighborhood.
Europeans also had some genuine successes in multilateral institutions
of which it can be proud. Europeans and Americans managed to rally
majorities of UN member states to censure Libya and Syria, and the
G8 was turned into a forum of support for the Arab Awakening, even
though announced budgets were not as large as many had hoped. They also
supported an assertive UN mandate in Côte d’Ivoire, enforced by French
troops, to install the democratically elected president, Alassane
Ouattara. The EU took an even clearer leadership role on climate change
at the Durban conference in December. While the agreement certainly
fell short of EU objectives and disappointed those who wanted more
decisive action, the universal commitment to a legally binding deal on
climate change by 2015, to take effect starting in 2020, was a victory
for EU diplomacy. But declining budgets in development aid and support
for multilateral agencies in the near future will weaken both the
European reach in the multilateral system and harm the system itself.
Most Successful EU Policies in 2011 Category Unity Resources Outcome
Total Grade 13 – Trade liberalisation with Russia 5/5 3/5 8/10 16/20
A- 37 – Relations with the US on Iran and proliferation 4/5 5/5 7/10
16/20 A- 73 – Climate change 5/5 4/5 7/10 16/20 B+ 12 – Relations with
China on climate change 4/5 4/5 7/10 15/20 B+ 38 – Relations with the
US on climate 4/5 4/5 7/10 15/20 B+ 40 – Rule of law, democracy and
human rights in the Western Balkans 4/5 4/5 7/10 15/20 B+ 41 – Kosovo
3/5 4/5 8/10 15/20 B+ 48 – Relations with the Eastern Neighbourhood
on trade and energy 5/5 4/5 6/10 15/20 B+ 57 – The Libyan uprising
3/5 5/5 7/10 15/20 B+ 71 – European policy on human rights at the
UN 3/5 5/5 7/10 15/20 B+ 72 – European policy on the ICC and ad hoc
tribunals 4/5 4/5 7/10 15/20 B+ 78 – West Africa 4/5 4/5 7/10 15/20 B+
Least Successful EU Policies in 2011 Category Unity Resources Outcome
Total Grade 06 – Rule of law and human rights in China 2/5 1/5 2/10
5/20 D+ 07 – Relations with China and the Dalai Lama on Tibet 2/5 1/5
2/10 5/20 D+ 43 – Bilateral relations with Turkey 2/5 2/5 1/10 5/20 D+
45 – Relations with Turkey on the Cyprus question 3/5 1/5 1/10 5/20 D+
16 – Media freedom in Russia 3/5 2/5 1/10 6/20 C- 17 – Stability and
human rights in the North Caucasus 4/5 1/5 1/10 6/20 C- 25 – Relations
with Russia at the G20 1/5 3/5 2/10 6/20 C- 31 – Relations with the US
on NATO, arms control and Russia 2/5 2/5 2/10 6/20 C- 35 – Relations
with the US on the Middle East peace process 2/5 2/5 2/10 6/20 C-
52 – Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute 2/5 2/5 2/10 6/20
C-Despite individual successes for EU, however, the overall trend in
2011 was towards a renationalization of European foreign policy on the
model of the developments that occurred throughout the year around
the euro zone crisis. This is particularly problematic because, as
many (but not all) member states cut their defense, foreign affairs
or development aid budgets, there is a greater need than ever for
co-operation. In last year’s Scorecard we described how, instead of
the expected shift of power to Brussels following the Lisbon Treaty,
there was a shift to the capitals of member states. In 2011, this
trend intensified. European foreign policy tends to be most effective
when there is an alliance between big countries and small ones. But
in 2011 the big member states often went their own way and did little
for EU policy.
Throughout the year, the UK led a diplomatic guerrilla campaign
to block the EEAS, the EU’s new diplomatic service, from speaking
on behalf of the EU at the UN or the OSCE, even where precedents
existed. France launched a unilateral diplomatic offensive against
Turkey on the question of the Armenian genocide, thus further
poisoning its relations with Ankara and making EU-Turkey co-operation
more difficult. Germany blocked a larger use of the EIB funds for
financial aid to the MENA region, thus reducing Europe’s capacity to
support the Arab Awakening. Italy under Silvio Berlusconi supported
an exemption of the Russian South Stream project from the EU’s Third
Energy Package, thereby undermining the Nabucco pipeline designed to
increase the diversification of European energy sources.
More generally, European foreign policymaking was dominated by the
European Council and what Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has called ” selective
diplomacy” – that is, informal meetings where the host decides who
is included and who isn’t. This approach, which sidelines other
EU institutions such as the High Representative and the European
Commission and reduces the influence of the smaller member states,
is not good for European cohesion or for building a coherent foreign
policy. It leads, as in the case of Libya, to action by European
“coalitions of the willing” – in other words, an approach whereby
member states “opt in” rather than “opt out” after a serious debate
in the relevant EU institutions.
The findings of this year’s Scorecard illustrate this renationalization
of European foreign policy. First, in our exploration of the position
of member states on 30 of the 80 components, we found many “slackers”
in each case – an average of three per component (see full tables at
the end of the Scorecard).
“Slackers” are countries that fail to pull their weight in support
of European policies, impede or even try to block the development of
these policies. While it is not possible to compare this result to
2010, the number of “slackers” seems surprisingly high. Second, the
average score for unity in 2011 was low, and here it is possible to
compare results to 2010. The table below shows that whereas Europeans
scored 5 out of 5 on ten components in 2010, they did so on only
seven components in 2011.
Most United EU Responses in 2011 Issue in 2011 Unity 2010 policies
Unity 8 – Relations with China on proliferation 5/20 9 – Relations
with China on Iran and proliferation 5/20 13 – Trade liberalisation
with Russia 5/20 5 – Agreement with China on standards and norms,
consumer protection 5/20 22 – Relations with Russia on Iran and
proliferation 5/20 76 – European policy on Iran and proliferation
in the multilateral context 5/20 34 – Relations with the US on
the Arab Awakening 5/20 28 – Relations with the US on terrorism,
information sharing and data protection 5/20 48 – Relations with the
Eastern Neighbourhood on trade and energy 5/20 49 – Relations with the
Eastern Neighbourhood on trade and energy 5/20 70 – European policy on
the World Trade Organization 5/20 80 – European policy in the World
Trade Organization 5/20 73 – Climate change 5/20 38 – Relations with
the US on climate change 5/20 37 – Relations with the US on Iran and
proliferation 5/20 60 – Stabilisation of the Georgian border 5/20 64
– Stabilisation and state building in Iraq 5/20Partly as a result of
this renationalization, 2011 was not a good year for the CSDP either:
for the third successive year, no new crisis-management operation was
launched. Catherine Ashton was criticized for showing less interest in
security and defense policy than her predecessor, Javier Solana. But
Brussels cannot be blamed for the diminishing readiness of member
states to support even ongoing operations, with Bosnia and anti-piracy
patrols notably under-strength – or indeed for the policy divisions
that ensured that the EU was almost entirely absent from the Libya
crisis. During its EU presidency, Poland made efforts to advance
CSDP agendas but became mired in a worthy but ill-judged attempt to
force the creation of an EU operational headquarters that ran into
the predictable British veto. Meanwhile, member states discussed
“pooling and sharing” but in practice cut their defense budgets and
capabilities without any co-operation or consultation with partners
(or, for that matter, with allies in NATO).
The performance of Ashton and the EEAS – in the second full year
of their existence since the Lisbon Treaty, following a first
year during which much time was spent fighting turf wars with the
European Commission – should be seen in this context. Further progress
was made in recruiting staff for the new diplomatic service’s 140
delegations around the world, but there is still a long way to go
in order to bring it up to full strength (the EEAS is particularly
badly under-represented in the BRICS countries and the Gulf). In
a non-paper in December, the foreign ministers of 12 member states
implicitly criticized Ashton for her chairing of monthly meetings with
them as well as her neglect of security policy. Others criticized her
for failing to provide strategic direction. Ashton acknowledged in a
report to the EU institutions at the end of December that there had
been problems in setting up the EEAS but said its success “depends
on the sustained political support and collective commitment from
Member States and the EU institutions”.
Like all 27 member states, Ashton and the EEAS were initially
wrong-footed by the revolution in Tunisia but quickly learned
from the failure and led European condemnation of President Hosni
Mubarak in Egypt. She also played a key part, together with the E3,
in negotiations with Iran, and began the first direct talks between
Serbia and Kosovo – an issue that divides member states. But the
failure of Ashton to meet her critics’ perhaps unrealistically
inflated expectations for European foreign policy illustrates both
the precariousness of the EU against the background of the euro
crisis and the difficulties she faces under the terms of the Lisbon
Treaty. In order to make a difference, she must be proactive. But when
member states are divided (as they were on Libya and the Palestinian
statehood bid) or fail to commit resources (as they did in response
to the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia), her scope for action is
severely limited.
A German Europe?
There has been much discussion of how the Europe that is emerging from
the euro crisis is a German one. In 2011, against the background of the
crisis, there seemed to be not just a shift of power towards national
capitals in general but towards one national capital in particular:
Berlin. At times, as Germany was forced to concede to French proposals
to solve the euro crisis, it seemed that the Franco-German tandem that
drove European integration before enlargement had re-emerged. But,
in the last few years, the economic inequality between France and
Germany has grown. Even before Standard & Poor’s downgraded France’s
AAA rating in January 2012, Germany was perceived as the new dominant
power within the euro zone.
However, the picture of European foreign policy that emerges from
this second edition of the Scorecard is more complicated. There has
certainly been a change in Germany’s role. While in the past Germany
often deferred to France and the UK on foreign-policy issues, we
identified it as a “leader” in more cases than any other member state
in 2011. However, while Germany certainly amassed power because of
its centrality to the euro crisis, the answer to the famous Kissinger
question is not necessarily: “Call the Chancellor”.
Sometimes, Germany did exert decisive leadership on foreign affairs.
For example, together with Poland, it led the EU’s attempt to develop a
co-ordinated approach to Russia and flexed its muscles on Serbia. But
on other issues – for example, Libya – Germany did not so much lead
as use its newfound margin of maneuver to follow its own preferences
in the face of others in the EU.
Specifically, Germany seems to be emerging as a “geo-economic power”
– that is, one that uses economic means to pursue its foreign-policy
goals, which are themselves often economic rather than political. In
particular, German foreign policy is increasingly driven by the needs
of its export industry, which provides half of German GDP. In 2011,
it imposed its economic preferences on others in the euro zone but
was not prepared to use military force as a foreign-policy tool –
even where this meant breaking with its Western allies. Germany’s
response to the Arab Awakening illustrated this contrast between
economic assertiveness and military abstinence: shortly after declining
to take part in the military intervention to support the revolution
in Libya, it agreed to sell 200 main battle tanks to Saudi Arabia,
which had only a few weeks earlier sent troops to Bahrain to put down
pro-democracy protests there.
Top ‘Leaders’ and ‘Slackers’ among EU Member States Top “leaders”
Top “slackers” Germany (on 19 components) Cyprus (on 7 components)
France(18) Greece (7) United Kingdom (17) Italy (6) Sweden (11)
Netherlands(6) Poland(8) France(5) Italy (7) Poland (5) Netherlands(7)
Romania(5) Czech Republic(6) Spain(5) Denmark(6) Germany(4) Finland(5)
Belgium(4) Latvia(4)Meanwhile, even as France experienced a loss of
power relative to Germany on economic issues, it continued to play
a decisive role in European foreign policy in 2011. Paris made up
for its initial faux pas on the Arab Awakening by leading the Libya
operation and by turning against the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria.
It also provided support for the UN in Côte d’Ivoire, led attempts
to impose stronger sanctions against Iran, steered the G20 towards
support for the euro zone and retained European directorship of the
IMF. But France’s unilateral approach often antagonized its European
partners. For example, Nicolas Sarkozy pre-empted a common European
position on the Palestinian statehood bid at the UN in September.
Paris also squabbled with Italy over refugees from Tunisia, which led
to the renegotiation of the Schengen agreement to give member states
greater control over their borders. In other words, even when Paris
led, it did not always do so in a constructive way.
However, apart from the decisive role it played in Libya alongside
the French, the UK has become increasingly passive on foreign-policy
issues. Even before it vetoed a plan by euro zone countries to
create a “fiscal union” within the European treaties at the European
summit in December, it was playing less of a leadership role than it
traditionally has on key European foreign-policy issues. It continued
to support enlargement, ask for closer links with Turkey and support
development in Africa, but it did not launch any creative initiatives
to bring other member states along with it or change the terms of the
debate within the EU. On other issues such as engaging “strategic
partners” such as China and Russia, the UK was often a follower
rather than a leader. The difficulties of implementing the defense
co-operation agreement signed in 2010 and the collapse in relations
following the crucial European summit in December showed how brittle
the coalition between France and the UK is. If the euro zone’s plan
for a “fiscal compact” outside the European treaties succeeds and
the UK fails to develop a more creative diplomatic strategy to lead
in other areas, London could end up marginalizing itself within EU
foreign policymaking.
At the same time, other new foreign-policy leaders are also emerging.
We identified Sweden as a “leader” on 11 components of European foreign
policy – more times than Italy and Spain combined. This suggests that
Sweden – the 14th largest member state in terms of population and the
eighth in terms of GDP – punches considerably above its weight. This
was in part to do with its activist foreign minister (described in a
leaked US State Department cable as being “a medium-sized dog with
a big dog attitude”) and development minister. In response to the
Arab Awakening, it increased annual aid to North Africa by SEK 100
million ([email protected] million), proposed an EU democracy support mission to
Tunisia a week after the revolution there and was an early and strong
supporter of UN resolutions in support of the uprising in Libya. It
played a particularly constructive role on multilateral issues: as
well as making disproportionately large aid contributions, including
to Japan after the tsunami, it was a forceful voice on human rights.
Poland also emerged as a “leader” on eight components of European
foreign policy. It played a particularly constructive role on Russia,
where it has largely overcome its differences with Germany and is
now at the forefront of efforts to develop a genuinely strategic
approach, and on European defense (though it declined to take part
in the military intervention in Libya). Admittedly, its leadership
role in 2011 was partly a function of the EU presidency that it
held in the second half of the year. Like Sweden, it was also in
part a consequence of the activism of its prime minister and foreign
minister. But it also reflected the strength of the Polish economy,
which was expected to grow at over 3 percent in 2012 – better than
almost anywhere else in the EU. This, together with its commitment
to European action, enabled it to leapfrog larger and older member
states to become one of the key leaders of EU foreign policymaking.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Cyprus and Greece topped the listed of
“slackers” in European foreign policy. Cyprus was particularly
unhelpful in the Eastern Neighborhood: as well as still not recognizing
the independence of Kosovo, its close relationship with Russia acted
as a drag (for example, like Italy, it supported an exemption of the
Russian South Stream project from the Third Energy Package). Even as
it desperately sought a second bailout from other euro zone countries,
Greece was also unhelpful in the Wider Europe: it does not recognize
Kosovo and blocked membership talks with Macedonia and co-operation
with Turkey on regional issues. It also opposed sanctions against
Syria and attempted to slow down the planned oil embargo against Iran.
>From 2010 to 2012: The Erosion of the acquis diplomatique
Last year, we highlighted the existence of an acquis diplomatique- a
collection of areas in which Europeans collectively and successfully
pursue their foreign-policy interests. The second edition of
the Scorecard shows that the acquis still exists: in multilateral
institutions, in transatlantic relations, on climate change, on issues
of “low politics” (trade, in particular) and in the Balkans, Europeans
tended to join forces and performed reasonably well. Iran was also once
again an issue on which Europeans were (with some exceptions, such as
Greece) united around a clear policy and collectively devoted resources
– even though they may not have reached their ultimate objective –
that is, to stop Iran enriching uranium – in the short or medium
term. Given the context of the financial crisis, their performance
on the Arab Awakening was not as dismal as might have been feared.
European Performance on Cross-cutting Themes in 2011
The following table illustrates cross-cutting themes (in other words,
themes that are dealt with in various different “components” within
different “issues”) on which the EU did well and badly in 2011. An
explanation of each theme is given below.
Cross-cutting Themes in 2011 Cross-cutting theme Score Grade 2010
Climate Change 14/20 B+ 12 B- Iran and proliferation 13/20 B 16 A-
Trade liberalisation, standards and norms – “low politics” 13/20
B 12 B- Balkans 12.5/20 B 13 B Arab Awakening 12/20 B- – Energy
policy 12/20 B- 10 C+ Issues of war and peace – “high politics”
11/20 B- 11 B- Visa policy 10/20 C+ 12 B- Afghanistan 10/20 C+ 10 C+
Human rights 9/20 C+ 8 C Eurozone crisis 8.5/20 C – Israel/Palestine
8.5/20 C 9 C+ Protracted conflicts 8/20 C 10 C+ Turkey 6.5/20 C- 6 C-*
The cross-cutting themes in 2011 are the following: “Climate Change”
amalgates components 12, 24, 38, 73.
“Iran and non-proliferation” amalgates components 8, 22, 37, 62, 69.
“Trade liberalization, standards and norms” amalgates components 4, 13,
28, 29, 70. “Balkans” amalgates 32, 39, 40, 41, 42. “Arab Awakening”
amalgates 9, 23, 33, 34, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64. “Energy
policy” amalgates 20, 21, 46, 48. “Issues of war and peace” amalgates
8, 9, 19, 22, 23, 31, 32 , 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 50, 51, 52, 57,
59, 61, 62, 65, 69, 77, 78, 79, 80. “Visa policy” amalgates 14, 26,
49. “Afghanistan” amalgates 23, 36, 80. “Human rights” amalgates 6,
7, 15, 16, 17, 40, 44, 47, 53, 71, 72. “Euro Crisis” amalgates 5, 25,
30, 66, 67. “Israel/Palestine” amalgates 23, 35, 60, 61. “Protracted
conflicts” amalgates 19, 50, 51, 52.
“Turkey” amalgates 43, 44, 45, 46.
However, the collective performance of Europeans remained mediocre on
issues such as human rights, the Eastern Neighborhood and protracted
conflicts – and it was still dismal on Turkey, which continued to
drift away from the EU. The combined effect of the financial crisis
and the renationalization of politics in Europe have also started to
slowly erode the acquis diplomatique where it existed. Relations with
China, moving from a C+ to a C, are the most symbolic and worrying
illustration of this trend. Worse may be yet to come in 2012. Defense
and development aid budget cuts as well as the effects of the
centrifugal forces unleashed by the euro crisis will most probably
take a further toll on Europe’s standing in the world. In order to
reverse this trend and regain the ground they have lost, European
leaders should re-prioritize foreign policy in order to pursue their
collective and long-term interests. A coherent and effective foreign
policy is not a luxury or an afterthought of the European project;
it is central to its prosperity and future. Hopefully, 2011 will
be remembered not as the decisive year in the EU’s dissolution and
decline but as the year when it began its recovery.
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2012/0217_european_scorecard_vaisse.aspx