THE CURRENT TURKISH-ARMENIAN PROTOCOLS
By Prof. Vahakn Dadrian
AZG DAILY
12-11-2009
Armenia-Turkey
There are three elements in the new Turkish initiative calling for
Attention:
1. The protocol on establishing diplomatic relations stipulates
"commitment…for the principles of…territorial integrity and
inviolability of frontiers." It also requires "the mutual recognition
of the existing border between the two countries as defined by
the relevant treaties of international law." In other words the
stipulation is based on the latter part of the paragraph whose basis
is a misconstrued, if not faulty, interpretation of a definition of
what it calls "relevant treaties of international law."
The fact is, however, that "international law" was seriously encroached
upon by the signing of these "relevant treaties." Involved are here:
1. The Treaty of Moscow, signed in Moscow on March 16, 1921 between
RSFSR (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic) on the one hand,
and (Kemalist) Turkey, on the other. The other, no. 2, the Treaty
of Kars, was signed some seven months later, i.e., on October 13,
1921, between (Kemalist) Turkey, on the one hand, and the three
Soviet Republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, on the other,
with the participation of RSFSR. The cardinal fact is that Ankara’s
Kemalist Turkey, the signatory of these twin Treaties, at that time,
was not a legitimate, functioning government; rather, it was a rebel,
improvised governmental set-up in contest with a then legitimately
functioning government in Istanbul, then the official capital of the
Empire, and ruled by a legitimate Sultan.
Consistent with this fact, in a series of governmental as well as
court-martial decisions, this legitimate authority on May 24, 1920,
issued a death verdict against Mustafa Kemal (Takyimi Vekay-i no.
3864), and 12 days later, June 6, 1920, six of the latter’s cohorts,
including Ismet (Inonu), were likewise court-martialed in absentia
and were condemned to death. Whether or not Sultan’s government was
popular, or its policies were deemed prudent or wise at the time, are
issues that are irrelevant here. What is paramount and incontestable,
however, is the fact that the Sultan was then the sole legitimate
and superordinate authority of the Ottoman Empire – in contrast to
the rebel character of the Kemalist government. Accordingly, any
agreement, convention or treaty signed with such a government is
under international law illegitimate, hence invalid.
Thus, from the vantage point of "international law," the Treaties
of Moscow and Kars are bereft of legality and can, therefore, not
be treated as legitimate instruments of negotiations. Moreover,
the Moscow Treaty is additionally illegitimate by any standard of
international law, for the reason that the RSFSR (Soviet Russia)
was then not recognized by any nation-state, it then had almost the
same status as the revolutionary, rebellious Kemalist regime. (It was
only in 1922 when Germany, as the first nation-state, granted de-jure
recognition of the Union at Prapallo). As if these legal deficiencies
were not enough, Soviet Armenia, on the insistence of the Ankara
government’s representatives, was excluded from the negotiations in
Moscow that culminated in the Treaty of Moscow on March 16, 1921,
these Turkish representatives had adamantly objected to inclusion in
these negotiations of any Armenian representative. As a result, the
lack of evidence of Armenian participation is one of the most signal
features in the protocols of this Treaty. It should be noted in this
connection that one of the three Turkish delegates, who prevailed in
Moscow for the final drafting of this Treaty, was Colonel, later in
the Turkish Republic, Major-General, Sevket Seyfi (Duzgoreu).
One of the foremost organizers of the Armenian Genocide, Seyfi
distinguished himself in the task of recruitment, mobilization
and deployment in the provinces of Special Organization’s killer
bands, mostly convicted criminals especially selected and released
from the empire’s prisons for this task, they played a major role
in the implementation of the genocidal scheme. As to the ensuing
Treaty of Kars, again it was the leaders of RSFSR, which assumed
responsibility for prevailing upon the three Transcaucasian Soviet
Republics to accommodate the Turks, their feeble efforts of some
opposition notwithstanding. That treaty in fact materialized as an
extension and reconfirmation of the preceding Moscow Treaty thanks to
the exertions of the dominant Bolsheviks. It is painful to point out
once more the rather treacherous conduct of a certain Budu Mdivani,
a Georgian, serving as a communist mediator between the military
defeated agonizing Armenians who had welcomed him, and the arrogant,
victorious Turks. Instead of serving the interests of his Russian
masters in Moscow, he secretly tried to collude with the Turks, urging
Kazim Karabekir, their military commander, not to be satisfied with
the Arax River as a new frontier between Armenia and Turkey, but rather
to push beyond that river deep into Armenia. (Kazim Karabekir, ISTIKAL
Harbimiz, the 1969 edition. Istanbul, Turkiye Publishers, p. 952)
2. The protocol no. 2 dealing with the theme of "Development of
Relations between Armenian and Turkey" seductively starts as item no.
1 with a promise to "open the common border within 2 months after the
entry into force of this Protocol." Then, under items no. 2 and no. 3
come the two most critical issues preventing the bulk of the Armenian
people from considering reconciliation. Through them, the unrepentant
heirs of the Great Crime of 1915 are once more seeking to railroad
the central issue by way of indirection, covert language and resort
to alluring, seductive techniques. The Armenian government should
declare unequivocally, if not emphatically, that there is nothing to
"examine scientifically" with respect to the matter that covertly
but allegorically is called "the historical records." These records"
have been subjected to criminal investigation by a Turkish military
Tribunal in the pre-Kemalist, postwar Turkey, 1919-1921. Relying on
a vast corpus of authenticated, official Turkish wartime documents,
this Tribunal, demonstrated that these "records" were nothing
but a repository of incontestable evidence of a gigantic crime,
a centrally organized mass murder enacted against the bulk of the
Ottoman Empire’s own Armenian citizens. The bill of charges, the
key indictment, replete with specific documentary material that
constituted the Tribunal’s evidence-inchief renders the resulting
series of Verdicts an irrevocable evidence of the comprehensive scale
of the wartime extermination. The prosecutors were Turks, the judges
were Turks, and equally, if not most important, most of the witnesses
were Turks, including the high-ranking military officers. Likewise,
the court-martial proceedings were based on Ottoman Turkish domestic
penal laws.
One would think that a government driven by a sense of Justice would
above all tackle these court proceedings in its quest for truth
and justice. But, remarkably, there is not only silence about them,
but complete silence about the disappearance of the respective trial
records following the capture of Istanbul by the Kemalists in the Fall
of 1922. The proposal of enlisting commissions to "study" the problem
and "formulate recommendations," has all the sly elements of purposive
procrastination, of a gimmick to inject uncertainty, ambivalence,
and above all pressure for, ultimate compromise. We see here the
use of standards of a "give and take" culture that often determines
the outcome of such "commissions" and "sub-commissions," presumably
consisting of people knowledgeable about the Ottoman language. Perhaps
the most unusual and, therefore, in a sense, bizarre aspect of this
whole protocol, a feature of decades-long official Turkish posture,
is the idea that, the Turks, identified with the perpetrator camp,
would visit a vis-a-vis those representing the victim of population,
and negotiate as co-equals. Underlying this vagary of sheer power
play is the fact that Turkey, whether officially or unofficially,
is still irrevocably committed to a posture of denial as far as the
key element of the crime is concerned, namely, a state-sponsored and
state-organized mass murder against her Armenian citizens.
Indeed, Articles 300, 309, but especially 301, of Turkey’s current
Penal Code, will as long as they are in effect, continue to legitimize
and even extol this posture.
3. Given the track record of the Turkish politicians, the heirs of
an established and centuries-old Ottoman tradition, it is difficult
to resist the temptation to label this entire initiative a clever
stratagem to lure the Armenian government into a trap. There is
not only a scheme of prolongation of the diplomatic traffic in an
atmosphere of continuous uncertainty, as far as a final outcome is
concerned (Abdul Hamid skilfully used this tactic when confronting
the European Powers, which were pressuring him to finally implement
the so-called Armenian Reforms – in Turkish it is called Ovalamak),
but also an underlying design to promptly wrest from the government
of Armenia, a long-cherished concession: the formal recognition of
the existing borders between Armenia and Turkey. Secondly, there is
Turkey’s looming goal of joining the European Union. Turkey needs
to preserve the appropriate facade of conciliatoriness that is but
expected of a candidate worthy of becoming an integral part of a
civilized Europe. When reinforced by the possession of significant
strategic assets and the leverage of distinct military power, however,
such facades can prove very functional.
The situation becomes even more enigmatic, if not outright deceptive,
when taking into account the pervasive current linkages between
the republics of Turkey and Azerbaijan. Knowing the intensity of
the latter’s frustrations if not fury, in relation to Armenia, and
Turkey’s significant dependence of Azeri oil, not to speak of other
kinship ties, are we to believe that the Turkish Republic earnestly
and honestly is prepared to cement new ties with Armenia that by
definition are bound to hemorrhage its relationship with Azerbaijan?
Even though Armenia is, and for the foreseeable future, will remain,
more or less isolated, and in some respects even economically
handicapped, there is such a thing as the principle of essential
national priorities and, consequently, the eternal need for
circumspection and exigent vigilance.
Professor Dadrian is the director of Genocide research at the Zoryan
Institute.