NOSTALGIA FOR THE OTTOMANS: DISILLUSIONED WITH EUROPE, TURKEY LOOKS EAST
Der Spiegel
Nov 12 2009
Germany
As European opposition to EU membership for Turkey grows, Ankara is
looking to forge closer ties to its neighbors. Turkey wants to once
again become a leading power in the Middle East — but its relationship
with Israel may suffer as a result.
He was the last heir to the throne of the Ottoman Empire, a major
power that controlled large parts of Europe, North Africa and the
Middle East for centuries. But Prince Osman Ertugrul Osmanoglu was
a prince without a country, and he was stateless for much of his life.
When Turkish officers proclaimed the republic in 1924, they expelled
Osmanoglu and his entire family. It wasn’t until 2004 that the exiled
prince was granted Turkish citizenship.
The prince died in Istanbul on Sept. 23, at the age of 97, and the
republic that had once banished him became reconciled with Osmanoglu.
The guests at the funeral service included four cabinet ministers
from the conservative Islamic AKP government, a deputy minister,
several members of parliament, Istanbul’s governor and the city’s
chief of police. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan also sent his
condolences — privately. It was a rare show of republican appreciation
for Turkey’s Ottoman legacy.
Many Turks today believe that true greatness lies in the imperial
past — and that this past is no longer to be found exclusively
in the West. Europe, with its fondness for criticizing Turkey, is
increasingly become yesterday’s ideal. "Neo-Ottomanism" is in vogue
in Turkey, as evidenced by an exhibition at a new history museum that
opened in Istanbul at the beginning of the year, a museum commission by
Erdogan when he was still the mayor of Istanbul. An enormous panorama
painting at the museum depicts the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul in
1453, complete with a soundtrack of cannon thunder and war cries
piped through the loudspeakers.
Evoking Past Glories
This nostalgia for the Ottoman past is in keeping with an about-face
in politics that is becoming increasingly obvious. Turkish politicians
are now evoking — and glorifying — the Ottoman era as a time when
their country was still a respected hegemonic power in the Middle
East and Caucasus region. It is a role that Ankara wants to play
again today — perhaps one it is already playing.
Turkey has in fact turned its attention to the east once again,
opening up channels of communication and embarking on an approach to
diplomacy that goes beyond the usual friend vs. foe dichotomy. In
short, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu hopes to solve the
conflicts in the region with a "zero problems" policy. He intends to
act as a mediator whenever possible, and he hopes that by the end of
a reconciliation process with its neighbors, Turkey will emerge as the
strongest nation in the Middle East, both economically and politically.
The initiatives have been coming hard and fast. In early October,
the foreign ministers of Turkey and Armenia signed a protocol on the
establishment of diplomatic relations. However, the two archenemies
will have to first overcome substantial obstacles. Turkey’s "brother"
nation, Azerbaijan, is threatening to block the peace process unless
Armenia relinquishes control over Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic Armenian
enclave in Azerbaijan. Armenians living abroad, in particular, insist
that Ankara must first recognize the Armenian genocide during World
War I before the borders are opened. Despite these obstacles, Turkey
and Armenia want to continue negotiating.
Ankara has also recently begun talks with another difficult neighbor.
The de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq — a safe haven for
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) rebels and long the principal adversary
of the Turkish military — is worried about being left alone with
Shiite and Sunni Arabs in a disintegrating Iraq. Instead, Iraq’s
Kurds have sought to establish ties with Turkey.
Two weeks ago, Davutoglu flew to Arbil, the capital of the Kurdish
region, where he announced Turkey’s plans to open a consulate. A
journalist traveling with Davutoglu said she was astonished to see
a Turkish foreign minister sitting in a limousine flying a Kurdish
pennant, and that it upends everything that was official Turkish
policy in the past.
Opening the Border
So far, however, the neighbors with whom the Turks have formed their
closest ties are the Syrians.
In mid-October, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem met Davutoglu
and his large entourage at Oncupinar on the Turkish-Syrian border. The
two men cheerfully pushed aside a barrier marking the border, in a
scene meant to emulate the opening of the Hungarian-Austrian border
in September 1989.
In the late 1990s, the two countries were still on the verge of war,
because of Syria’s support for the PKK extremists. Today their armed
forces conduct joint maneuvers, while their foreign and defense
ministers meet as part of a "strategic cooperation council." As
journalist Zeynep Gurcanli wrote in the influential Turkish daily
Hurriyet, Turkey has never cooperated this closely with any other
country. Could Ankara’s current efforts eventually lead to a "Middle
Eastern Union" modeled after the European Union?
The end of the decades-long dispute between Turkey and Syria is
seen as a true success for Davutoglu — and for the Syrians, who are
overjoyed at the upgrading of their country after being ostracized in
the West. But Damascus is also pleased for another reason. At almost
exactly the same time as the Turkish-Syria rapprochement was happening,
Turkey’s relations with another country suddenly went into a nosedive.
For "technical reasons," as the Turkish government initially claimed,
Turkey decided to exclude Israel from its international military
exercise "Anatolian Eagle." Erdogan later explained the real reasons
for the decision: Ankara could not allow fighter jets that had also
been used in missions against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to fly
over Turkish airspace. The Turks’ decision to conduct joint military
exercises with the Syrians while putting their often-cited "strategic
partnership" with Israel on ice shows how deep the shift in Ankara’s
foreign policy already is.
It also reflects a domestic idiosyncrasy: Because the conservative
Islamic AKP government has strengthened its positive relative to
the secular military, it can now conduct a more self-confident
foreign policy. It no longer needs to show so much respect for the
Turkish-Israeli alliance, which in reality was always a project of
the elite.
Part 2: Displays of Displeasure
However, Ankara’s spat with Israel had already begun before the Gaza
war that so outraged the Turkish public. The army, too, is upset
with Israel, says Haldun Solmazturk, a retired Turkish general,
because there have been no reliable agreements with the Israelis
for a long time, and because the Turks feel that the Israelis have
treated them condescendingly.
The Israelis’ Gaza offensive was the straw that broke the camel’s
back, triggering a display of displeasure with Israel from the Turkish
side. During the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland in early
2009, Erdogan vented his anger on Israeli President Shimon Peres. His
rant brought him fresh popularity at home and in the Arab world,
where he has since been called the "Conqueror of Davos."
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad now considers the Turkish prime
minister a good friend, and the feeling — to the West’s chagrin —
is mutual. The government in Tehran is being treated unfairly, Erdogan
said before his most recent state visit to the Islamic Republic. The
West, according to Erdogan, ought to give up its own nuclear weapons
because threatening Iran with sanctions.
Western diplomats could hardly believe their ears. Was the only
Muslim member of NATO siding with Tehran in the dispute over Iran’s
alleged nuclear ambitions? Wasn’t this — especially after Erdogan’s
anti-Israeli tirade — even more evidence that Europe had in fact
already lost Turkey, and that Ankara is looking to the east instead?
Erdogan’s chief foreign policy adviser, Ibrahim Kalin, finds such
charges peculiar. Even the West, he says, is not unfamiliar with the
concept of pragmatic, interest-based politics. "When the Americans
open up to Russia, it’s hailed as a new era in diplomacy," he says.
"But when Turkey opens up to Iran, people ask themselves whether we
are changing our axis." Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad paid a second visit to
Istanbul last Sunday, where he attended a summit of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
Another summit guest, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who has been
condemned by the international community over war crimes in Darfur,
did not attend, even though he had been expressly invited by the
Turks. "A Muslim cannot commit genocide," Erdogan had earlier said,
dumbfounding the West once again.
A Benefit for Europe
Turkish Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bagis is nonetheless unwilling
to concede that Turkey is turning away from the West. He insists that
the successes of Ankara’s diplomacy with the East should be seen as
a benefit for Europe.
The West, says Bagis, consistently describes Turkey as a bridge
between East and West. But how, he asks, can a bridge stand on only
one strong pillar?
"The good news is that Turkey is not turning away from the West,"
says Burak Bekdil, a critic of Erdogan. "The bad news is that it
isn’t turning toward the West any more, either."
But should this come as a surprise? The French and Austrian governments
are firmly opposed to Turkey’s bid to join the EU.
Meanwhile in Germany the majority of people are disillusioned with
EU expansion.
In Germany’s conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the image
of the bridge is even seen as an expression of distance. If it were
to become a full-fledged EU member, says new Finance Minister Wolfgang
Schäuble, Turkey could no longer perform the function of a bridge.
After all, he said, a bridge doesn’t belong to either side.