‘OPEN BORDER A WIN-WIN SITUATION FOR ARMENIA, TURKEY’
Today’s Zaman
Dec 1 2008
Turkey
Richard Giragosian, an Armenian-American analyst who has been based
in Armenia for the last two years, has said an open border between
Turkey and Armenia would be a good move for both sides, as Armenians
would be able to import and export goods at a much lower cost by
circumventing the Georgian monopoly on the trade route and Turkey
would benefit from its role as a transit state.
He also said Turkey even may benefit more from such a move than
Armenia in the short term. "The opening of the border will help the
Turkish government offer economic stability to the Kurdish region,
especially job creation and some new economic activity. Also that
kind of cross-border trade will lead to a bigger and larger role for
Turkey in the region."
Turkey severed its ties with Armenia in the early 1990s in
protest of the Armenian occupation of the Azerbaijani territory
of Nagorno-Karabakh. Official Turkish policy has stipulated that
the normalization of ties depends on Armenian withdrawal from
Nagorno-Karabakh, the termination of the Armenian policy of supporting
claims of an Armenian genocide at the hands of the Ottoman Empire and
an official endorsement by Armenia of the current border between the
two countries.
There are signs of a possible resolution to the conflict as both
sides have started to show signs of backing away from insistence on
preconditions for the opening of the border.
In an interview with Monday Talk in Yerevan, Giragosian elaborated
on these and other issues.
When you look at the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement from the Armenian
side, what obstacles do you see ahead?
If we look at the diplomacy, we see that it is not only the Turkish
efforts to reconcile many outstanding issues. This Armenian government,
more than many other governments in the past, is facing an internal
political challenge of limited legitimacy and very limited popular
support. So a breakthrough on Turkish-Armenian relations with this
Armenian government is more important than ever before.
Do you say that because of the present Armenian coalition government?
I say this because on March 1 we saw a violent clash between the
opposition and the government. President Serzh Sarksyan was elected
in February. That was an election tainted in terms of voting fraud
and irregularities, like many elections before. What was different,
however, was the opposition’s demonstration in protest of the
election results and the police crackdown, which killed at least 10
people and injured many more. Some opposition supporters are still
being held in Armenian prisons, and the underlying tension remains
unresolved. Therefore, this Armenian government seems desperate for a
foreign policy success, not only to normalize relations with Turkey and
open the border, but also to divert attention away from the internal
domestic situation. It’s also important for the Armenian government
to divert the attention of the international community away from the
shortcomings of its democracy and focus on foreign policy success.
Could you talk about the vested interest of the oligarchs, who seem
to be obstructing normalization of relations with Turkey?
Many of the oligarchs here have emerged from the Nagorno-Karabakh war
conflict during the difficult transition from the former Soviet economy
to a market economy — like Russia, where during the privatization
process they were using their connections in government and corruption
to acquire power and economic businesses unfairly. What they do is
operate cartels, big monopolies that are based on control of the
import and export of specific commodities. They exercise this control
without allowing competition from other Armenian businesses or foreign
investors, and they see the opening of the border as introducing new
competition that they don’t want, because that may threaten their
economic position and power. More recently, in 2005, they decided —
smartly, from their point of view — to go beyond simple economic
power and acquire political power. Just as the oligarchs in Russia
have entered the political field, oligarchs in Armenia have also
acquired seats in the parliament; they have become deputies in order
to safeguard their wealth and power, and to be able to sustain that
wealth and power.
What is the worst thing they could do to prevent the opening of
the border?
Because of a lack of popular support, the Armenian government
desperately needs to be able to fight corruption and confront these
powerful oligarchs in order to maintain its power. But it’s a difficult
situation, because the oligarchs are the key to real power here,
and the worst thing they can do is much bigger and deeper than simply
delaying or opposing the opening of the border with Turkey. They may
actually pressure the government more to not carry out the economic
or political reforms that it needs to.
Then what is the real strength behind the Armenian government?
In the face of a lack of legitimacy combined with lack of popular
support, the only real foundation for the power of the government
now rests on two things: One is control over the security services,
the police and the army, in terms of instrumental power. And,
secondly, by using the system of corruption to be able to basically
buy off votes and intimidate. In other words, we have a system of
authoritarian-managed democracy, similar to Russia but much smaller,
where the power is somewhat fragile. It’s weaker than power based
on legitimacy or popular support, but it’s power also because the
opposition is marginalized and there is no real political threat
or alternative. An ordinary Armenian citizen does not have much of
an alternative.
And you think the public is ready for the opening of the border?
This is the interesting paradox. Unlike Nagorno-Karabakh, unlike
the domestic political situation, the Armenian government is very
lucky because, by proceeding with diplomatic talks with Turkey,
negotiating a possible opening of the border, etc., this is one area
where public opinion is strongly behind the government. And even
the opposition is supporting the government’s efforts at engaging
Turkey in dialogue. It’s no longer a question of if we can normalize
relations with Turkey, but a question of when.
How do you think the Armenian public reached that point?
Following the past 16 years of closed borders, blockades and sanctions,
the Armenian people are fed up. They want real change, and they want
real change in every category — economic reform, more democracy and,
at the same time, an end to the closed borders. And it sees that
the only future for progress in Armenia requires having a normal
relationship with its neighbors. Public opinion has evolved to the
point where the years of denying any relationship with one of Armenia’s
most significant neighbors, Turkey, has proven fruitless. It’s been
more harmful than useful.
What would you say about the genocide claims?
It’s the most difficult obstacle in the long run because it’s not
only about the genocide issue. From the local Armenian and diaspora
perspective, it is one thing to address the past, but another to look
forward. The second obstacle is that many years of official Turkish
policy of genocide denial has made the issue more important than it
really should be. And the Turkish position throughout the ’70s, ’80s
and ’90s was actually counterproductive; it gave more significance
to this issue than it ordinarily would have. And what this means
is that while the genocide issue is important, it is only one of
many important issues. There is optimism that progress can be made
in diplomatic relations, opening of the border, economic relations
and exchange of people, so it will allow for an environment later to
produce results in genocide issue.
What do you think will change economically for the Armenian people
following an opening of the border?
I don’t exaggerate the potential of immediate economic benefits
from an open border. Everyone would gain in the long run but, in the
short run, Armenia would be able to import and export goods on a much
cheaper basis without relying on the Georgian monopoly on the trade
route. Turkey would also benefit from its role as a transit state. I
think the real benefits are in terms of the psychological benefits,
as much as economic. Given the nature of the Armenian system, the
benefits will be limited in the immediate term. Actually, Turkey may
benefit more economically than Armenia.
How?
Because from a security perspective, part of the problem in the east
of Turkey, in terms of the Kurdish-populated regions, is a problem of
security and instability. And the rise of Kurdish nationalism after
the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the continuing threat of PKK
[outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party] terrorism mean that the military
solution to the Kurdish problem in Turkey has not been effective
enough. Now it’s also a political issue in terms of EU engagement,
in terms of Kurdish language broadcasting and linguistic rights, but
what was missing was the economic factor. Opening of the border will
help the Turkish government offer economic stability to the Kurdish
region, especially job creation and some new economic activity. Also,
that kind of cross-border trade will lead to a bigger and larger role
for Turkey in the region because if we look at the Turkish engagement
with Armenia, it’s only one piece of the puzzle.
Would you elaborate on that idea?
Especially after the events of August in Georgia, we see a new role
for Turkey as a regional leader, where it’s not Turkey acting on
behalf of the US nor as a NATO member. Turkish foreign policy is now
asserting Turkey’s leadership on its own two feet. It’s more about
Turkey expanding its options in foreign policy for its own benefit
and that of the region.
US-Turkish ties will be more significant than Armenian genocide
for Obama
What would you say about Barack Obama’s election to the American
presidency and how that will affect the genocide issue?
The Turkish reaction to the election of President-elect Obama is
exaggerated. There is an exaggerated fear that Obama’s rather strong
statements on the Armenian genocide as a candidate will mean that
as president he will be just as dynamic. I don’t think so. Once in
office, like every other American president, the broader significance
of US-Turkish relations and the need to repair and improve US-Turkish
relations will be a more significant factor than the Armenian
genocide. In other words, it’s a role for the US Congress, in their
opinion, and less of a role for the US executive branch.
What if there is improvement in Turkish-Armenian relations, like
opening of the border?
That will be much more important than a limited, simple resolution in
the US Congress not binding on the United States government. While the
Armenian genocide is, of course, significant, from the US national
security point of view, so is dealing with the need to repair
US-Turkish military relations and bilateral relations. The challenge
is not from the Armenian genocide; the core challenge is actually
resolving the emergence of the Kurdish proto-state in northern Iraq,
and as the Americans pull out of Iraq, how Turkey is challenged by
the vacuum that’s left, in terms of Kirkuk, in terms of northern
security and in terms of PKK activity.
So you believe US-Turkish relations will improve?
As the US withdraws from Iraq in the next one or two years, there will
be more of a US need to work with Turkey, to strengthen Iraq and also
to ensure that the PKK threat does not increase. The most important
and most interesting factor in terms of the US-Turkish dynamic is
that it’s no longer about simply talking about genocide or even the
opening of the border, but it is more about the process that the
late Hrant Dink started. In many ways he accomplished more in his
death than he did in his life by demonstrating that the real future
of Armenian-Turkish relations is not talking about these issues in
Washington or Brussels, but talking about and debating the future of
Turkish identity within Turkey, and the future of Turkish-Armenian
relations within Armenia and Turkey. That’s why real exchange and
dialogue is most important between the people of Turkey and Armenia,
and much less about what Washington wants or what Brussels demands.
Richard Giragosian
An analyst specializing in international relations, with a focus
on economics, military security and political developments in the
former Soviet Union, the Middle East and Asia, Giragosian has been
based in Armenia for the last two years. He is a regular contributor
to publications of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and the
International Security Network (ISN) and is a contributing analyst
for the London-based Jane’s Information Group.
For nine years Giragosian served as a professional staff member of
the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, and also worked as
an analyst for the Abt Associates Inc. consulting firm from 2000-2005.
Among the publications he has contributed to are Jane’s Defence Weekly,
the China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Jane’s Intelligence Digest,
Asia Times Online, Demokratizatsiya, Jane’s Foreign Report, the
Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst,
the Turkish Daily News and the Turkish Policy Quarterly.