PROBLEMATIC ALLIANCE
By Prof. Dr. AlÝ L. KaraosmanoÐlu
Today’s Zaman, Turkey
March 12 2007
Relations between Turkey and the US have, from the very start, been
characterized by their up and down nature. But despite the various
crises and difficulties neither side has ever considered completely
breaking off relations.
The alliance has been beneficial for both sides in different ways,
which is why it has continued. However, the Turkish-US alliance is
today at its most difficult point since the 1947 Truman Doctrine.
It was for the US, as much as it was for Turkey, a turning point when
then-US President Harry S. Truman stood before Congress on March 12,
1947 and delivered an historic message that stressed the importance
of support and protection for Turkey and Greece against the Soviet
threat. When in the immediate wake of World War II the Soviet Union
demanded the right to place its soldiers on the straits of Turkey
(Bosporus and Canakkale) and to take land from eastern Anatolia,
Turkey faced a new, real, concrete and life-threatening danger. Thus
what the Truman Doctrine offered to Ankara, which was experiencing
very difficult conditions at the time, was critical support.
Until then the concept of alliances had been foreign to US tradition
in international relations. In the past the US had tended to regard
the spread of Soviet power from a strictly geographical perspective.
Washington’s primary concern was focused on Turkey’s straits.
Turkey’s eastern regions, in fact even the eastern Mediterranean and
Middle East, were overshadowed by the strategic importance of these
straits. Despite this narrow geo-strategic perspective, which continued
almost until the start of the 1950s, the Truman Doctrine heralded the
first step towards radical changes in traditional US policies. From
that date onward the US, as it began to shoulder responsibilities on
a world level, started down the road toward becoming a superpower.
Although the Truman Doctrine offered Turkey important support it
did not quite satisfy Ankara. The Turkish capital was looking for
an alliance that would promise even stronger security. After NATO
was formed, Turkey began to see this very one-sided Western military
alliance of nations as offering the strongest security possible and
duly began to push with perseverance for membership. It was at this
time that Turkey moved to a multiparty regime and, in order to show
its belief in the Western alliance of nations, it sent soldiers to
Korea. Finally in 1952 with the strong and decisive support of the US
— and in the face of opposition from many of the founding nations —
Turkey joined NATO.
After Turkey became a NATO member its relations with the US began
to develop further. It was able to benefit from the advantages
of a multinational military alliance as a deterrent against the
Soviet threat. At the same time the Turkish Armed Forces underwent a
modernization process and, during the Cold War years, our contributions
to NATO were great. By devoting up to 30 divisions to the area under
the Soviet/Warsaw Pact, the Turkish Armed Forces greatly relieved
the pressure presented by the Soviet military over the middle front
of the NATO alliance centered in Germany. And the control over the
straits guaranteed an unshakeable 1,500-kilometer NATO defense line
over the Mediterranean — spreading all the way down to Sicily. In
addition Turkey allocated military bases and facilities for the use
of NATO and the US. In short the benefits of the alliance were felt
on all sides, not just in Ankara. Beyond this the new NATO alliance
ensured that Turkey would continue to be the most functional regional
tie to the West long after the Cold War was over.
Within NATO though, Turkish-US relations were not entirely flawless.
On the contrary the relations between the countries sometimes produced
problems. For example Turkey was unable to fully embrace the Middle
East policies of the US. It was natural that Turkey would have its
own particular interests and problems when it came to relations with
neighboring countries. The US was opposed to NATO attempts to expand
into a shape which would include the Middle East and the Gulf of
Basra in its ring of responsibilities. It fostered, in addition to
its Soviet deterrent policies, a policy of trying to extend subtle
messages of reassurance to Moscow rather than trying to openly frighten
or scare the Soviet capital.This two-pronged policy from Washington
occasionally brought the US and NATO to loggerheads.
Within this framework Ankara did not accept a single project aimed
at updating the short-range nuclear missiles based in Turkey. In
addition the difficult relations between Turkey and Greece, as well
as the continuing Cyprus problems, also managed to affect Turkey’s
relations with both NATO and the US.
Besides all these other issues, Turkish-US relations faced three
serious crises during the Cold War years. One of these was that,
during the 1962 Cuba crisis, midrange Jupiter missiles that had been
placed on Turkish soil at the Cigli air base were removed following
bargaining between the White House and the Kremlin. This in turn
caused Ankara to enter into a crisis of trust with regards to the US.
Another crisis that caused even deeper disappointment on the part of
Ankara was the infamous 1964 Johnson letter. The third crisis came
about with the passage of an arms embargo against Turkey by the US
Congress in the wake of the 1974 Cyprus movement. The embargo was
lifted in 1978, but after that the near-annual "genocide" bills brought
before Congress by Armenian lobby groups perpetuated this tension.
Turkey-US relations have never affected Turkish public opinion as
negatively as they do now. The US has never experienced as great a
loss of respect in the eyes of the Turkish public as it currently
does. This phenomenon is one that has emerged in the wake of Sept.
11, the US invasion of Iraq and US Middle East policies in general.
The neocon perspective on Islam; an outward stance that ignores
religious sensitivities; an inability to cease the ongoing violence
in Iraq; the failure to take appropriate precautions against the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) presence in northern Iraq; and the
discounting of Turkey’s various interests in Iraq: all of these are
factors which have worked to poison Turkey’s relations with the US.
As for the US side of matters, it also appears that certain politicians
— in particular those with military ties — have not been able to
rise above the desire for revenge in the wake of the shock resulting
from the Turkish Parliament’s infamous March 1, 2003 decision.
Despite the generally dark tableau presented here, the two allies can
not break apart from one another. Their alliance continues. As a NATO
member Turkey is providing support to the US in Afghanistan. A full
60 percent of equipment support for US soldiers in Iraq comes through
Turkey. The Ýncirlik Air Force base in Adana provides support for the
US efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Baþer-Ralston cooperation
(against PKK forces in northern Iraq) still continues.
The US, which understands Turkey’s importance more than any other
nation in the post-Cold War world, does not limit itself simply to
expressing support for US membership in the European Union, it is
working actively on this front. In the meantime the implementation
of the F-35 jet project, which will bring the latest in airplane
technology to Turkey, has begun.
It would be incorrect to view Turkish-US relations from only one
angle. This relationship has always been a problematic one and it is
a fact that the problems faced nowadays are more serious than ever.
But the alliance continues, in different shapes and forms. What
needs to be focused on now is the search for ways to develop economic
relations. An increase in the variety and type of economic ties, as
well as between aspects of civil society between these two countries,
would reduce pressure on strategic relations and would help in the
overcoming of any crises which might occur in the future.
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