BEIRUT: Time for the second phase of the Cedar Revolution

The Daily Star, Lebanon
June 27 2005
Time for the second phase of the Cedar Revolution
By Kamal Dib
Commentary by
Monday, June 27, 2005
The world community will be surprised that the revolution that
occurred in Lebanon on March 14, 2005, did not simply dissipate with
the advent of the Parliamentary election as each warlord looked
inward after his own clan. While this could be true of the
traditional leadership that rode the wave of protest and took on the
“Opposition” tag, the civil society continued the march and will soon
impose new demands on the elected Parliament. Such popular demands
include transparency, political cleanliness, accountability, modern
good governance, investigation into corruption, civil rights and
freedoms, and secular legislation.
Now that the 2005 Lebanese Parliamentary election is completed, the
choice of leaders for the executive arm of government that meets the
ambitions of post-March 14 Lebanon is crucial. So is the choice of
individuals who run the public sector. The world community will
indeed be watching the next step in the Cedar Revolution, as the
post-election Lebanon will be a test for the entire Middle East
region. For the United States, it will be a almost a costless
peaceful transformation of a Middle-Eastern society without Norman
Schwarzkopf and the Marines.
Why, the Lebanese are modern and educated people who travel the
world, and whose civil society organizations are as strong and
advanced as what one gets in France or the United Kingdom.
So far, Lebanon has been cursed with outdated leadership based on
sectarian and regional constituencies. This conservative class
believes that the global situation exerts only a secondary influence
on Lebanon’s archaic politics and economy, and then only slowly.
Still, many believe that talk about a new leadership is something for
the next generation to handle, and that things in Lebanon will be as
usual: de facto cantons and mini-states along largely sectarian lines
complete with media establishments, social services, and even
paramilitary security.
The reality is that Lebanon has already absorbed globalization
influences in many aspects of daily life: business, the media,
education, social customs, travel, etc., and that a new citizenry has
emerged from the womb of the civil movement of “the Beirut Spring”
(similar to the 1968 Prague Spring that defied the Soviet invasion).
In a world of new technologies, converging international markets and
trading arrangements, and world scrutiny of oppressive regimes, the
external impact on the political and economic environment of Lebanon
can no longer be ignored.
The increasing democratization of Lebanon, away from the archaic
absolutist politicians of the past (the Begs and the emirs), is
bringing forward concepts like transparency, respect, secularization,
pluralism, and universal social services.
Yes, it will be the duty of the new leadership to secure electricity
around the clock, and to establish environmentally sound public
utilities and sewage treatment – matters that are taken for granted
in most countries. It is the nitty-gritty of everyday needs that
Lebanon wants, not Don Quixotes who discuss regional and
international politics and behave like world leaders in a tiny
country with slightly over 3 million people.
Both government and business in Lebanon have a joint responsibility
in adjusting to the information age and in supporting young people in
knowledge acquisition, skills development and innovation. The vision
of government and business should focus on what is currently needed
to achieve better social services for citizens and better
productivity conditions for business, and a willingness to examine
new models for learning and development.
The vision of government and business should also influence the
Lebanese society to take a fresh look at the prospects of the future
and not be buried in the tragedies and taboos of the past. While it
is easy to blame the traditional leaders, it is a cruel reminder that
the public sectarian mindset is the one responsible for the
perpetuation of the political folklore. Whither Totalitarianism
Empowerment of the citizen to make choices is the current trend
around the world; having more gadgets in the hands of dictatorships
to oppress their peoples is not. Saddam Hussein used oil revenues to
acquire the latest weaponry and intelligence equipment, but the
Iraqis were made worse off; the Lebanese government in the mid-1990
purchased telecommunication equipment to eavesdrop on phone calls;
and many Arab governments control Internet content and build barriers
in the airspace and land borders to prevent entry of critical TV
channels, radio stations, and newspapers.

Lebanese leaders cannot control people anymore and will have to deal
with different mindsets and new psychologies. For example, the
Parliamentary election was a lesson to Hizbullah, when its leaders
called on the Shiites of Beirut to vote for the Hariri list, but the
outcome was a massive vote to Hariri’s opponent Najah Wakim. Analysts
saw this as a rebuff to Hizbullah from an urbane and educated Shiite
Muslim community who will not be told how to vote en masse. Many
traditional leaders lost their Parliamentary seat to new faces, and
the non-traditionalist Michel Aoun won a respectable number of seats
among the Christian population although his primary mover is the call
for a secular Lebanon. The Challenges To be successful, the new
Lebanese leadership will have to deal with these challenges that will
have a profound impact on the future of the country:
(1) Women’s rights: the rising number and quality of women in
Lebanese society requires opening the door in a male-dominated
political system. While the current ratio of women to men in labour
market participation is 7 against 13, it is expected that the ratio
will be equal in a generation, considering health, education, and
life expectancy. Can it be acceptable that women make up only 27
percent of the employed workforce and 2 percent of Parliament, while
over 50 percent of university graduates in Lebanon are women? Is it
acceptable that women have no civil rights before the law and still
have to abide by middle-age rules of the clergy that favor men at all
times?
(2) Sectarianism and Diversity: there is a need to stress positive
outcomes in an ethnically and religiously diverse Lebanon. With
slightly over 3 million people, Lebanon is one of the most diverse
countries in the world. Arab and western media can poke fun at the
antics of the Lebanese conflict (e.g., how the Lebanese were “at each
other’s throat”), but one can only point at other countries in the
Arab world and Europe where homogenous religious and ethnic
populations are the norm, hence no explosive demographic mixture.
What is happening in Lebanon is a test-case for humanity and for the
dialogue of civilizations between Muslims and Christians and between
East and West.
The Arabic character is one of many manifestations of Lebanese
society as visitors to Beirut notice the western air of the
Mediterranean city, the multilingual abilities of the people, the
myriad of religions and sects, the prospering Armenian and Kurdish
communities, and the presence of half a million guest workers and
Palestinian refugees. Lebanon has lost much energy and talent in the
past due to religious discrimination and the lack of appreciation and
respect to diversity. In fact, one could calculate the economic cost
of the Lebanese war (1975-1990) due to the fanaticism and
discrimination in the labor market, where Beirut was split in half
and employers would not hire or do business with members of other
communities.
(3) Youth: the role of young Lebanese in globalization and its impact
on the local economy and on Lebanese society and culture, especially
to stem the brain drain. Lebanon suffers from emigration and brain
drain. Almost a million Lebanese have left Lebanon since 1975, most
of them never returned. These include thousands of professionals,
graduates, skilled workers, and tradesmen. Measuring the opportunity
cost of this loss against remittances sent back by these emigrants
shows that the gap between cost and benefit is huge.
The shift from the traditional leader to the leader of the future
entails moving from controlling to empowerment and offer of choice,
and from creating conformity with each religious group to valuing
diversity among all Lebanese, and from working through the chain of
command to making decisions at the lowest levels, and from a domestic
to an international focus. The new crop of politicians in Lebanon
should move from resisting change to becoming leaders of change.
Kamal Dib is a Canadian economist of Lebanese descent, and author of
several books on Lebanon and the Middle East, most recently “Warlords
and Merchants.” He is a frequent contributor to The Daily Star.

BAKU: Azeri, Armenian ministers meet to discuss conflict settlement

Azeri, Armenian ministers meet to discuss conflict settlement principles
Azadliq, Baku
26 Jun 05

Text of unattributed report by Azerbaijani newspaper Azadliq on 26
June headlined “The Mammadyarov-Oskanyan duet is continuing” and
subheaded “The Azerbaijani and Armenian ministers meet”
The Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers, Elman Mammadyarov and
Vardan Oskanyan, held an informal meeting at the international
conference on Iraq in Brussels.
Mammadyarov told journalists that during the meeting which lasted for
several hours, they discussed the components of the Warsaw agreement
reached by the two countries’ presidents on the settlement of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. He said that in Warsaw, the presidents
defined principles of solving the conflict.
“There are similar views on two principles now,” he said. He believes
that the ministers may meet again before the presidents’ meeting
scheduled for mid-August in Kazan [Russia].
There are no details of these two principles yet. Some reports suggest
that Azerbaijan is about to refrain from the “stage-by-stage solution”
it has been insisting on during the peace negotiations. This is
especially stressed by Armenian diplomatic circles.

TBILISI: Ethnic Armenians demand withdrawal of special troops

Georgia: Ethnic Armenians demand withdrawal of special troops after shooting
Prime-News news agency
26 Jun 05
TBILISI
Residents of Tsalka District [district in southern Georgia with a
large ethnic Armenian population] are demanding the withdrawal of a
Georgian special detachment from the area. Some 100 people are
currently demonstrating in the centre of Tsalka [town] against the
forces’ presence.
The protests have been prompted by an incident in the village of
Ulianovka involving members of the special detachment and a local
resident, (?Nazarbyan).
According to the Interior Ministry, Nazarbyan and his companions
attempted to sell arms to members of the special detachment. When the
latter to decided to search his car, Nazarbyan disobeyed their
instructions and tried to flee. The troops responded by firing on the
car, wounding Nazarbyan in the shoulder. He was later taken to
Hospital No 1 in Tbilisi.
Local residents reject the official version of the incident and are
calling for the withdrawal of the special detachment, which was
deployed in the area several months ago in an attempt to put an end to
incidents between local ethnic Armenians and Georgians, who have
settled in the area from other parts of the country.

Kocharyan, Norwegian speaker discuss boosting parliamentary

Armenian president, Norwegian speaker discuss boosting parliamentary ties
Public Television of Armenia, Yerevan
24 Jun 05
[Presenter] Armenian President Robert Kocharyan has met a delegation
of the Norwegian parliament.
The Armenian president described the visit of the president of the
Norwegian parliament, Joergen Kosmo, as important and pledged that
this visit will facilitate the development of interparliamentary ties
between the two countries.
Norway will continue rendering any political, economic and
humanitarian assistance to Armenia, the president of the Norwegian
parliament said.

Armenian minister rejects Azeri proposal to open common road

Armenian minister rejects Azeri proposal to open common road
Arminfo
25 Jun 05
YEREVAN
Azerbaijan needs the common road between Azerbaijan and Armenia
passing through the territory of Karabakh and Naxcivan more than
Armenia does, Transport and Communications Minister Andranik Manukyan
told journalists today.
“I would like the two neighbouring countries to develop the transport
infrastructure and people to be able to travel freely. But
Azerbaijan’s proposal is a political issue. At the moment, there are
no sufficient conditions for resolving this issue,” Manukyan said.
We should remind you that commenting on the meeting between the
Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers in Paris on 17 June,
Azerbaijan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov said that Azerbaijan
is waiting for Armenia’s reply about the common road between
Azerbaijan and Armenia through the territory of Karabakh and Naxcivan.
According to Azimov, the issue of communications is one of the major
issues for settling the conflict and restoring normal life in the
region.
In reply, the Armenian Foreign Ministry said that there is no such
issue on the agenda of the Karabakh talks.

EU to discuss framework for Turkish talk

Financial Times, UK
June 26 2005
EU to discuss framework for Turkish talk
By Daniel Dombey in Brussels and Vincent Boland in Ankara
Published: June 26 2005 19:24 | Last updated: June 26 2005 19:24
The last act in Turkey’s decades-long quest to hold membership talks
with the European Union will begin this week, when the European
Commission sets out the proposed rules for the negotiations.

Unless all 25 EU member states can agree on a version of the
`negotiating framework’ which sets out the principles, procedures,
and issues for the planned talks the process will not begin on
schedule on October 3.
Olli Rehn, enlargement commissioner, has called on the EU to honour
its commitment, as has Tony Blair, incoming president of the council
of EU member states.
At present, EU officials believe the negotiations will begin on time,
but are still not certain. The key discussion between EU governments
is likely to be in September, just when Germany is expected to hold
elections that could be won by the Christian Democrats, who oppose
Turkish membership.
Turkey itself plays down any risk of delay, but also sounds a much
more cautious note than last year about its chances of membership.
`The negotiations will start on time because no European leader wants
to risk a rupture of EU-Turkish relations right now,’ said a Turkish
official. `Whether in six or seven years, people decide in favour of
some kind of privileged partnership rather than membership, that is a
different issue.’
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, prime minister, underlined Turkey’s position at
the weekend, saying it would not agree to any new conditions for EU
membership.
But in line with decisions endorsed by EU leaders, the Commission’s
proposed negotiating framework for Ankara, due to be presented on
Wednesday, will be far tougher than the ground rules for the 10
countries that joined last year.
Turkey, like Croatia, the EU’s other formal candidate for membership,
must not just promise reforms but implement them during the
negotiating process.
Even so, France and the Netherlands, two countries where wariness
about Turkish membership played a role in No votes on the EU
constitution, want the EU to look at Turkey’s record in recent
reforms before even beginning the talks.
Turkey pushed through a package of reforms this month, but Paris and
the Hague want the EU to examine their implementation ahead of the
Commission’s October report on the country.
Murat Yetkin, a columnist for Radikal newspaper, wrote on Friday that
Ankara had to be prepared for more difficulties ahead in Turkey’s
relationship with the EU.
He said the government needed to be ready to address difficult
questions such as Armenian claims of genocide in 1915, recognition of
the government of Cyprus, and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from
the divided island.

ANKARA: The Indictment Concerning Swiss Prosecutor Annulled

Zaman Online, Turkey
June 26 2005
The Indictment Concerning Swiss Prosecutor Annulled
By Anadolu News Agency (aa)
Published: Sunday 26, 2005
zaman.com
The Ankara Office of Chief Public Prosecutor has annulled the
indictment concerning the Swiss Prosecutor who had initiated an
inquiry about the President of Turkish Historical Society (TTK) Yusuf
Halacoglu in relation with his statements on allegations concerning
the alleged Armenian Genocide.
The process concerning the indictment brought by The President of The
Society of the Supremacy of Law, Erdem Akyuz, concerning Swiss
Prosecutor Andrej Gnehm has concluded. The indictment has been
evaluated and nullified by Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor Abdullah
Ayhan San. After touching upon the demands in the petition of Akyuz
the text of the verdict indicated in what cases a foreigner could be
indicted for actions he committed on foreign soil, and determined
that the act of the Swiss Prosecutor did not fall under any of the
categories of crime indicated in the Turkish Penal Code. The verdict
read, “In so far as to initiate an inquiry concerning an
international political affair is as groundless as the act of the
indicted prosecutor, it is not deemed necessary to seek the
ascertainment of the allegations.”
Prosecutor Gnehm had launched an inquiry concerning Halacoglu on the
grounds that he had denied the alleged Armenian Genocide in a speech
he delivered in Switzerland. Akyuz said, the verdict established the
unlawfulness of the act of the Swiss Prosecutor.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Russia and Turkey in South Caucasus: A Geostrategic Armistice

Global Politician, NY
June 26 2005
Russia and Turkey in South Caucasus: A Geostrategic Armistice
Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. – 6/26/2005
Two meetings of the Russian president V. Putin and Turkish Prime
Minister R.T. Erdogan, held in the end of the last year and in the
beginning of this year, as well as the wide spectrum of problems
discussed and contents of the signed documents, marked the start of
the a new phase in the Russian-Turkish relations. Experts spoke about
that start in several recent years, and this phase can be
characterized as the starting period of the real strategic process.
Answers to the questions about the depth of that process, its
direction and how it will affect the situation in the region, are of
vital importance for Armenia. In our memory the remembrance about how
in 1920 the Kemalist Turkey and Bolshevik Russia, uniting their
efforts against the common enemy – the Entente, came to a secret
agreement and at the expense of Armenia put an end to the century-old
confrontation, in particular, in the Caucasus. As a result, the
`Sovietized ‘ Armenia had to sign the Kars treaty of 1921, which
defined the distorted borders of the present Republic of Armenia.
The anxiety, expressed by some representatives of the Armenian
political elite, that some rapprochement between Turkey and Russia,
may have its negative impact on Armenia at present as well, and in
particular, weakening its positions in the settlement process of the
Karabakh conflict, are well-grounded just by the reason, that the
historical precedent had already happened. These fears may be proved
or denied only as a result of an impartial and comprehensive
analysis.
The period of instability and confrontation
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and Turkey found
themselves in absolutely new geopolitical conditions, while:
-for the first time in several centuries (with the exception of
1918-1920) they have no land frontier, and the South Caucasus is
nothing but a buffer zone;
-for the first time in several decades they do not belong to two
opposing military and political blocs;
– Russia, rapidly losing its military and economic potential, the
ideological axis and political willpower, is unable to keep the
regions, belonging to former USSR, including the South Caucasus and
Central Asia, in the sphere of its geopolitical influence any longer.
The present situation produced some vacuum in the mentioned regions,
which was use by Turkey. First relying on the ideological and
political grounds of Pan-Turkism, Turkey started to rapidly spread
its influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Its actually
pan-Turkist goals were presented by Turkey as a need for spreading
the `Turkish model’ of development in the Muslim republics of the
former Soviet Union. Such policy was supported by the West, mainly by
the USA, because it dad fears that those newly independent states may
be influenced by the politicized radical Islam. In addition, the
approaches, typical to the period of the Cold War, were still strong
in the USA, we, welcoming Turkey’s diverse engagement the processes
on the territory of the former USSR, counterbalancing the Russian
influence.
In the first of half of 1990s, the Russian-Turkish relations were
quite unstable and tense from time to time, explained by their strong
geostrategic confrontation. Turkey used all possibilities, except
military, for spreading its influence not only in the South Caucasus
and Central Asia, but also in the North Caucasus and the regions of
Russia, populated predominantly by the Turkic-speaking peoples.
Russia was trying to concentrate its efforts and stop the increasing
Turkish influence. Being unable to resist as required at that time,
Russia focused its attention to the conflicts, broken out in the
South Caucasus, using them as an instrument for preserving its
influence in that region.
>From this point of view, the Karabakh conflict is remarkable, being a
culmination of the Russian-Turkish confrontation in the South
Caucasus. Turkey helped the Azerbaijani side, and Russia – to the
Armenian one. No surprise, that the conflict between the two
countries in that case was the most aggravated in the last decades of
the Russian-Turkish relations. In 1992-1993, Turkey threatened to use
force against Armenia, which followed by a swift and hard
counteraction by Russia, which openly declared its readiness to use
nuclear weapon against Turkey. Both states in that period not only
were strategic opponents, but also took the counter-partner as a
bearer of the military threat. In this sense, it is worth mentioning
the statement by the Chief of the Headquarters of the Turkish troops,
made in 1994, that Russia is the only state, posing a military threat
to Turkey.
The victory of Armenians in the military phase of the Karabakh, and
the firmness of Russia were the main factors to prevent increasing
positions of Turkey in the South Caucasus. Although Turkey
established itself in the geopolitical region and became an important
factor there, Russia, in spite of serious losses, Russia has managed
to partially preserve its influence in the region and not so big
military bases. The last circumstance, apart military, had a
geopolitical importance, which allowed to establish some balance of
powers between Russia and Turkey in the South Caucasus.
Stabilization
In the second half of the 1990s, the geopolitical situation in the
zone of the South Caucasus, was mostly characterized by the problems,
related to the Caspian energy resources. The level of the US
involvement in the region had been increasing, and Turkey in the new
conditions tried to get maximum, cooperating with the United States,
which was also interested in decreasing Russian influence in the
region. Such approach was materialized in the idea by President
Suleyman Demirel to create the `Stability pact of the South
Caucasus,’ in which the US was supposed to have the role of the most
important regional factor.
In the Russian-Turkish relations of that period, direction to their
stabilization was dominant. Rapid development of the trade and
industrial relations, which had been also visible in previous years,
started to turn into a geostrategic factor and play a stabilizing
role to some extent, which was also by such phenomena as billions in
the `shuttle trade,’ significant Turkish investments in Russia, in
particular, in the construction and public catering An unprecedented
growth took place in such a `traditional’ sphere of trade relations
between the two states as the Russian gas supply to Turkey thanks to
the multi-million `The Blue Stream’ deal, envisaging direct gas
supply to Turkey. So its dependence on the Russian gas had been
increasing.
The strategy of the Turkish regional policy, preserving its
anti-Russian direction, however, lost its aggressiveness of previous
years. For the political elite of the country, the lacking efficiency
of the political line, based on the pan-Turkist ideas, became
obvious. Not having necessary economic potential and being unable to
compete with the other external forces, Turkey had to give up its
pretentious plans in the Central Asia, which alleviated its
competition with Russia in that region.
In the South Caucasus, the Russian-Turkish confrontation developed in
the context of the ways of transportation of the Caspian oil. At the
same time Turkey tried to counterbalance the Russian military
presence in Armenia by developing the military cooperation with
Georgia. As for Russia, trying to counterbalance Turkey’s involvement
in the Chechen conflict, it started to ue the Kurdish factor to exert
pressure on Turkey. However, all these processes did not have any
substantial impact on the balance of powers, which had been
established in the second half of 1990s in the Russian-Turkish
relations, and in the South Caucasus, as a whole.
New geostrategic processes
The period of autumn 2001 – spring 2002 was critical for the whole
region, and for the Russian-Turkish relations, in particular. Two
geopolitical processes have been going on just since then, as a
reaction to the terrorist attack against the USA in September 2001.
The start of the first one was caused by a diplomatic document, which
remained unnoticed even by many experts. It was the Russian-Turkish
`Agreement on Cooperation in Eurasia,’ signed in New York in November
2001. It envisaged periodical consultations between the Foreign
Ministries of the both states for some coordination of the regional
policy. Actually, two regional powers reacted on then just emerging
intentions of the only superpower – the United States, to spread the
scope of its influence in the Eurasian continent under the pretext of
the struggle against the Islamic terrorism.
The above-mentioned US intentions materialized in spring 2002, when
the dislocation of the US advisers in Georgia. The Russian reaction
was quite stormy and very negative. The Turkish reaction was also
negative, but less exposed. Actually, the Americans chose not to
apply for Turkish assistance, and to have their own, though symbolic,
military presence in the South Caucasus. So the new US strategy was
started in the South Caucasian region, aimed at rapidly changing the
balance of powers that have been established here in the recent
years. The `Rose revolution’ in Georgia comes to prove that.
The reciprocal visits of the Russian and Turkish leaders, mentioned
just in the beginning of this article, which were considered as an
evidence of the Russian-Turkish rapprochement, took place in these
new realities. However, from the geostrategic view, the process,
going on here, is different – two powerful regional forces, old
geostrategic opponents, which remains intact up to the present, on
the basis of mutual consent are trying to alleviate or stop their
competition to resist the third force – the United States with their
unprecedented activity in the region. Actually, Russia and Turkey are
trying to preserve the status quo in the region, meanwhile the USA
wish to break it.
This new situation supposes a new quality of the bilateral relations,
for which an appropriate diplomatic wording has been found and fixed
in official documents – `multifaceted cooperation.’ We think that
within the geostrategic analysis, it would be correct to characterize
the current stage of the Russian-Turkish relations as a `geostrategic
armistice.’ In their verbal statements, Russian and Turkish officials
note that these new realities are an interim stage on the way to the
`strategic cooperation.’ it seems that both parties are trying to
create an impression that they have allegedly overcome all
contradictions, but it is not so. In particular, in spite of all
attempts to reach some mutual consent in the Chechen and Kurdish
questions (Russians passed to Turks some intelligence information
about Chechen terrorist organizations,
operating in Turkey, expecting that the authorities would suppress
their
activity; and Turks demand from Russia to ban the PKK, etc), there is
no news
about any positive results.
Some ideological and political concepts of Eurasianship and
`strategic depth’ there appeared as an ideological ground for the
outlining rapprochement in the Russian-Turkish relations. The
apologist of the first idea is the Russian geopolitician A. Dugin,
frequently visiting Turkey in the recent time; and the second concept
belongs to the foreign policy advisor of the Prime-Minister
R.T.Erdoghan, Professor A. Davudoglu.
Conclusion
So the geopolitical situation of the South Caucasus in the recent
years has entered the second phase of the post-Soviet era, which is
characterized by the above-mentioned new trends. Certain geostrategic
changes are also taking place in the Russian-Turkish relations, and
their main sense is in the striving of the both parties to preserve
the balance of powers, established between them in the South
Caucasus. This means that Russia and Turkey will try to keep what
they have already had. For Russia, it is its military presence in
Armenia and by that in the entire South Caucasus, meaning that
Russian will never make any concession to Turkey, for example, in the
Karabakh issue, will not endanger its allied relations with Armenia.
In any case, in this stage of the `geostrategic
armistice’ with Turkey.

Prof. Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. is a Professor of International
Relations at Acharyan University in Yerevan, Armenia. He’s also the
Director of the Department of Turkish Studies at Institute of
Oriental Studies, Armenian National Academy of Sciences. In the past,
he served as a Counselor of the Armenian Embassy in Germany and was
the Deputy Director of the Department of Political Analysis for the
Office of the President of Armenia.

Apricots drive Armenian production

Freshinfo , UK
June 26 2005
Apricots drive Armenian production
Armenia’s fruit crop will be significantly bigger this year, due to
unusually favorable weather conditions, according to the country’s
agriculture ministry.
Garnik Petrosian, head of the ministry’s fruit-growing department,
told local media that farmers across the country are expected to
collect nearly 400,000 tonnes of grapes, apples and other fruit, 54
per cent more than last year.
`We are now expecting a very big harvest,’ he said. `We will even
have trouble selling fruit.’ Petrosian added that apricots, estimated
to total 80,000t this year, will be responsible for most of the
anticipated gain.
A short but destructive spring cold snap limited the 2004 apricot
harvest to a comparatively modest 6,000t. Petrosian said that the
government also expects a sizable increase in the yields of key
vegetables such as potatoes and tomatoes.

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Bravery before and after the war

Toledo Blade, OH
June 26 2005
Bravery before and after the war
Some of Bob Dole’s greatest challenges came in his struggle to
recover from injuries sustained in World War II.
( THE BLADE )
By JACK LESSENBERRY
ONE SOLDIER’S STORY. By Bob Dole. Harper Collins. 287 pages. $25.95.
Years ago, when he was getting ready to run for president for the
first time, I spent part of a day with then-Senate Majority Leader
Robert Dole. My strongest memory of him up till then had been that of
the cranky, nasty hatchet man President Gerald Ford chose as his
running mate in 1976.
To my surprise, prickly old Bob Dole turned out to be an incredibly
decent man who was thoughtful and sensitive. The night before, he had
not shown up at a state dinner, and the Washington Post speculated on
whether he was miffed at some position President Reagan had on a
bill, or was delivering a snub to his main rival for the GOP
nomination, George Bush.
But when I asked, he told me it was neither; his wife, Elizabeth, was
out of town, and thanks to the terrible wounds he received in World
War II, he couldn’t put on a tuxedo by himself, `and I know I could
have asked one of my aides, but I’m not the kind of man who can
easily do that.’
Two years later, the vice president easily defeated him for the
nomination, ending his best shot at the White House. By the time he
did get nominated, he was, most voters felt, too old, and running
against a dynamic young president.
Now, years later, Bob Dole has produced a poignant and surprisingly
wonderful book that is mainly about his struggle to recover something
resembling a normal life after being wounded in the war.
This is not a conventional war memoir; he saw, in fact, little
combat. But he was seriously injured in Italy by a shell fragment
that ripped into his back, damaging his spine, three weeks before the
German surrender. He was at first completely paralyzed, and several
times was expected by his doctors to die.
Most felt Mr. Dole would never walk again, or regain the use of his
hands and arms. Yet he never gave up, and spent years fighting to
regain his body. He spent much of that time at what was then Percy
Jones Veterans’ Hospital in Battle Creek, Mich., where he came to
know two other wounded vets, Phil Hart and Daniel Inouye, who both
also became distinguished U.S. senators.
Eventually, thanks to a selfless physician who was a refugee from the
Armenian holocaust, and the donations of friends and neighbors in
tiny Russell, Kansas, Mr. Dole managed – after a long series of
complex, painful operations – to regain enough use of one arm to
function.
He went on to a highly distinguished career, but he wisely left
virtually all of that out of this book, which is special because it
speaks for perhaps the most neglected group of World War II veterans:
the severely disabled who, in virtually every case I have known
about, refused to give up. `Patience is an acquired trait, and I’ve
spent a lifetime impatiently trying to acquire it,’ he says, in
typical homespun, pithy, self-deprecating fashion.
`But few things will cause you to stop and focus on the moment, as
well as on the big picture, more than not being able to get out of
bed for six months; not feed yourself for more than a year. You learn
perhaps the toughest lesson in life: to wait … with a faith to
endure.’
He had that, all right. What is surprising is, in this short book he
seems to have captured perfectly what it was like to be a small-town
boy who grew up during the Depression, went off to war, and then came
home to cope with a daily challenge perhaps greater than any military
battle.
The story of how he did it is deeply inspiring. When this book went
to press Bob Dole was nearly 82, and was recovering from a nasty fall
that had left him, again, temporarily immobile.
Yet he was itching to get back on the road. `When you stop dreaming
about the future, and quit looking for new projects to do, you dry up
like a prune, and life becomes boring. I want to keep going and
growing.’
This may be the surprise blue-ribbon winner in all the books marking
the anniversary of the end of World War II this summer.
Unfortunately, it does nothing to clear up the two great mysteries
remaining about the life of Robert J. Dole. One is, why in the world
this distinguished statesman allowed himself to be made into a
pitchman for Viagra.
More significantly, reading this book I wondered what would have
happened if the senator had found the time to write his gripping,
warmly personal story in 1985? Might it have established a very
different kind of connection between America and Bob Dole?
My own belief is that he could well have been president. What Robert
J. Dole became instead was an authentic hero, in uniform and out,
which may, in the greater scheme of things, turn out to have been
even better.