Month: June 2005

TIGRAN TOROSYAN HOPES TENSION WILL BE CURBED IN THE POLITICAL FIELD
A1plus
| 19:16:23 | 27-06-2005 | Politics |
Today the Ministers Committee monitoring Ago group, with Roland
Vegener at the head, met the members of the Armenian delegation to
PACE in the Parliament.
The head of the Armenian delegation to PACE, NA deputy Minister Tigran
Torosyan mentioned that the visit will be an impetus for Armenia
to finish the process of Constitutional reforms successfully. The
NA deputy President mentioned that the works of the last few days
in Strasbourg had their positive results underlining that the PACE
resolution will have a decisive effect on the further development of
the Constitutional reforms process in Armenia, as out country faces
the perspective of new qualitative changes.
Tigran Torosyan voiced hope that the political forces will justify
the hopes of the people. According to him, it is very important to
explain correctly what the new constitutional will give each member
of the society. He also voiced hope that the tension between the
authorities and the opposition will be reduced, which will serve
basis for future cooperation, which in its turn will contribute to
the realization of the Constitutional reform.
Roland Vegener highly appreciated the efforts of the Armenian side
underlining Mr. Torosyan’s investment into the fulfilled draft
Constitution. Mr. Veneger too voiced hope that the dialogue between
the authorities and the opposition will become possible, as the draft
constitution is mutually admitted.

WE MUST START FROM THE MAIN LAW
A1plus
| 18:46:56 | 27-06-2005 | Politics |
“Democracy is law, not exception, and we must start from the
main law on the country”, mentioned Arthur Baghdasaryan during the
meeting with Roland Vegener. Today the NA President received the Ago
monitoring delegation which is acting within the framework of the CoE
Ministers. The main theme of the conversation was the Constitutional
reforms.
The NA President found the propaganda and the participation of al the
social strata extremely important in the process of Constitutional
reforms and mentioned that it will secure the adoption of the draft
put to referendum.
Referring to the process of Constitutional reforms, the sides mentioned
that as a result of long discussions all the complex problems have been
found solutions to. According to Mr. Vegener, one of the most important
results of the discussions was the participation of the opposition in
the further discussions and their return to the legislative activity
of the Parliament.
RA NA President Arthur Baghdasaryan mentioned in reference to
the Constitutional reforms that Armenia, adopting the necessity
of enhancing in democracy and creation of legislation according to
European standards, took serious steps in that direction for the last
year. Of those steps he mentioned that adoption of the “Electoral
Code”, and especially the Constitutional reform, which are extremely
important in Armenia in connection with the enhancing of democracy.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

AllAfrica.com, Africa
June 27 2005
The Spread of the Genocide Ideology Within the Great Lakes Region:
Challenges for Rwanda
The New Times (Kigali)
OPINION
June 27, 2005
Brig. Gen. Frank K. Rusagara
Kigali
………….Continuation .
4) The RPF/A’s Anti-racist struggle
In the period after the overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda in 1979, the
Rwandan refugees in the country were scapegoated and at times blamed
for the excesses of the Idi Amin regime. And when the National
Resistance Movement started the guerrilla campaign in 1981, President
Obote blamed Rwandans for supporting Museveni who derogatorily was
being referred to as a Rwandan and therefore a refugee or alien.
Come 1982, Rwandan refugees in Uganda alongside some Kinyarwanda
speakers in the country were expelled, thereby disenfranchising the
latter. These Rwandan refugees and Uganda Rwandaphones found
themselves stranded and were refused entry into Rwanda by the
Habyarimana Government. This provoked a new sense of Rwandan
nationalism within the region. In the meantime, the Habyarimana
regime tightened its noose around the Tutsi in Rwanda, the perennial
enemies of the regime. Thus the “racial” hatred within Rwanda
deepened under government orchestration with continued Tutsi pogroms.
Against this background the Rwanda Patriotic Front was formed to end
the discrimination and gain back their natural, inalienable rights as
Rwandan citizens, even if it meant use of force. The continued
pogroms in and outside Rwanda led to the RPF gaining in strength and
membership. It also led to the RPF resolve to end the regional
conspiracy and menace against the Rwandans through armed struggle,
beginning with the October 1990 RPF invasion of Rwanda.
It was with this invasion, however, that the Habyarimana regime felt
persuaded to put in place a genocidal machinery that was informed by
the entrenched racial ideology against the Tutsi. In time, with the
other RPF struggles to prevent Tutsi killings, there would come into
being the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement between the Government of
Rwanda and the RPF, which was brokered by the International community
within the Great Lakes context to prevent further bloodshed.
Arusha was an African initiative in which both the OAU and several
African states played a central role. The president of Tanzania was
the facilitator of the process. But western nations were involved as
well, including just about every party that should have some
presence. The OAU was instrumental not only in bringing the parties
to the bargaining table, but also in setting an agenda that addressed
the imagined root causes of the conflict.
In a series of separate negotiations, most of the major issues were
tackled: the establishment of the rule of law and a culture of human
rights; power sharing in all public institutions; the transitional
arrangements that would obtain until elections were held; the
repatriation of refugees; the resettlement of internally displaced
persons; and, the integration of the two opposing armies.
The Arusha Protocol III on military integration was the most
difficult part of the negotiations, as it was based on ethnically
perceived quotas that would still ensure the Hutu domination of the
military. For instance, the RPF/A were allotted 40% of the men in the
military, and the FAR 60% on the understanding that the former were
Tutsi and the latter Hutu. This illustrates how the root cause of the
conflict, that is, the constructed racism, was not addressed, but
used as part of the solution by allotting quotas to the supposed
different people and parties.
Thus, the Arusha Peace Agreement could not prevent the 1994 Rwanda
genocide that led to over one million people dead. That is despite
the warning of Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, the Rwanda Government
chief negotiator, about the “apocalypse deux” after the signing of
the Agreement. The aftermath of that “apocalypse”, also saw the
massive exodus of 2.5 million Rwandan refugees into the region.
Alongside, the refugees was the fleeing genocidaire Government that
in exile would only rekindle the latent “racial” divisions in the
already fragile Great Lakes Region.
5) Post-genocide Rwanda in the DRC
As the situation unfolded, the genocidal forces continued their
“racial” mission in the Kivus with the complicity of the Mobutu
government and the French collaboration through the Turquoise
arrangement. There followed UN resolutions in which it was
acknowledged that the Interhamwe and ex-FAR were a menace in the DRC
and continued their genocide ideology, as illustrated in the killing
of the Tutsi in the Kivu region. The targeted Congolese Tutsi fled to
Rwanda in 1995 and 96 and settled in Gisenyi Prefecture. When the
insurgency broke out in Rwanda in 1997 and 98, these Congolese Tutsi
and their Rwandan brethren were targeted by the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe insurgents.
At the same time, the 2.5 million Rwandan refugees in the Kivus were
held hostage by the genocidaire military, who converted humanitarian
assistance into military hardware to destabilize the new government
in Rwanda. This called for preemptive attacks on the ex-FAR and
Interahamwe bases in the refugee camps in 1996. It resulted in the
repatriation of the 2.5 million Rwandan refugees and the eventual
overthrow of Mobutu. Laurent Desiré Kabila was installed the new
President of Zaire in May 1997.
Despite the propping up of Kabila as an ally in Rwanda’s intention to
neutralize the genocidaire forces, Kabila reneged on “a gentleman’s
agreement” and turned around to support the Interahamwe and ex-FAR.
This resulted into increased insurgency operations in North and
Western Rwanda in the years 1997 and 1998, taking advantage of the
security vacuum created by the increased Rwanda Patriotic Army
deployment in the DRC. In August 1998, the RPA relaunched into
Eastern Congo to deny the insurgents in the North and Western Rwanda
a rear base and supply of arms from Laurent Kabila.
Meanwhile, the same security concerns predicated on the racist
paradigm in the genocide ideology of the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe
reappeared under Laurent Kabila’s sponsorship, this time pleading a
Tutsi/Hima (Rwanda/Uganda) conspiracy against his regime. This
“racist” interpretation found sympathy with President Mugabe of
Zimbabwe, himself a professed victim of white racism, and, as Mamdani
would say, informed his “conservative nationalism” that saw the
replacement of the “settler prerogative” with the “native
prerogative” demonstrated in the current Zimbabwe land policy.
However, the Zimbabwean opposition saw Mugabe’s intervention in Congo
as a ploy to scapegoat his domestic problems while pleading
pan-Africanism.
Mugabe used his position as the Chairman of the SADC Military
Commission to draw into the conflict countries that included Namibia
and Angola. In the case of Angola, however, their involvement was
subject to Laurent Kabila denying Jonas Savimbi of UNITA a rear base
in Congo. The conflict, pitting Uganda and Rwanda on one side, and
all the above countries on the other, led to the Lusaka Peace
Agreement of July 1999. Some of the provisions in the agreement
included the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Congo.
6) Regional Peace Initiatives
In the case of the Rwanda, the Rwanda Defense Forces’ withdrawal was
subject to the disarmament, demobilization, re-assemblement and
repatriation (DDRR) of the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe. Implementation
of the agreement stalled, leading to Rwanda’s unilateral withdrawal
in October 2002. This means that the issue of the ex-FAR and the
Interahamwe and their genocidal racist ideology remains unresolved,
as they continue to receive unqualified support from President Joseph
Kabila, who took over from his assassinated father.
South Africa, being a regional power with economic interests in the
Congo, has of late become a dominant actor in the Great Lakes
conflict system. Unfortunately, in pursuing its national interests
South Africa is blind to the racist paradigm within the region’s
conflict system as exemplified by the ex-FAR and Interahamwe bigotry
with complicity from Kabila.
South Africa fails to grasp that the false racial paradigm in the
Great Lakes Region, unlike in Zimbabwe and South Africa, is not as it
used to be in black against white and vice versa, but an enduring
colonial construct of false white (Tutsi) against Negroid Bantu
(Hutu) black, as typified by the perpetual nationality debate in the
DRC.
Likewise, the current Burundi peace process which is facilitated by
the former Vice President, Jacob Zuma, ironically recognizes the
Tutsi and Hutu as separate institutions (i.e. political parties,
quotas in the military, etc) and therefore antagonistic parties in
the conflict. This is predicated on the wrong premise that this is a
civil war between the Hutu and Tutsi, when it really is a power
struggle between elites thriving on the ignorance of the Burundi
masses and peasantry.
Challenges for Rwanda
This Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy entails the security dilemma in Burundi and
the region through the balkanization and institutionalization of the
political life along the unsustainable racial constructs, which find
expression in the current political parties and quotas in the
national army in Burundi. How can a sectarian Hutu or Tutsi party or
army serve national interests? It can only be a recipe for continued
antagonisms and conflict locally and in the region. A clear example
of this is the recent massacres of the Congolese Tutsi in Gatumba
Refugee Camp in Burundi by the FNL/PALIPEHUTU party militia. Our
experience in Rwanda is that the Tutsi genocide may not have
happened, had it not been for the sectarian Hutu military that
planned and executed it. This genocide has continued to be a
challenge for Rwanda.
The challenges for Rwanda, however, are both internal and external,
and are defined by the genocide ideology. But these internal and
external challenges are intertwined in the solution for Rwanda and
the region. In other words, charity must begin at home, which means
that regional integration must be preceded by national integration.
The Rwandan genocide entailed disintegration and collapse of the
state, leaving the Government with no resources to address the
socio-economic concerns of the population – a population that was
desperately wretched and polarized by the very act of the genocide.
The complexity and peculiarity of the Rwandan genocide was that it
was between close relatives, in which siblings set on each other and
neighbour killed neighbour.
Contrasting it to the Holocaust or the Armenian genocide, the Germans
decimated the Jews and the Turks the Armenians. In both of these
cases there was a socio-cultural difference between the victims and
perpetrators, as opposed to Rwanda which had none whatsoever between
its people.
While the Armenian and Jewish survivors found a solution by going
home or finding place to run to, the Rwandans had nowhere else to go
and had to live with each other. Given that dilemma, it was through
the dynamism of the Rwandan heritage, that a homegrown solution had
to be found in the Gacaca as a re-integration mechanism.
Through this all-inclusive process of intra-community mediation,
Rwanda is being re-born through reconciliation predicated on truth
and justice. This will ensure the unity of a people, in whose
strength, even the external challenges such as those posed by the
unrepentant Interahamwe and their cohort genocidaires will be
checked.
To achieve that national unity and re-integration, the Gacaca as a
people-driven process will provide the renaissance or rebirth of the
nation in the aftermath of colonialism and the genocide. To this end,
there is a six step approach in the Gacaca’s overall strategy.
These are “the coming out with the truth among the stakeholders;
” the administration of justice;
” dispelling any perceptions of impunity;
” the collective ownership of the tragedy;
” reconciliation through the concept of intra-community conflict
mediation; and,
” socio-economic and political development, both at the individual
and national level.
In this entire process, the truth forms the basis of success of the
six step Gacaca strategy towards national integration. There are some
truths, foremost of which is the truth about the unity of the Rwandan
nation. It is this truth that has all along eluded Rwandans and many
Rwanda scholars, since the coming of the colonialists. It has been
about the Rwandan identity and how Rwandans historically related to
each other. It includes the truth about their social relations and
the alleged “historical wounds” that continue to impact on the
current social discourse. It is also the truth about the social
categorization of Rwandans into different races. There is also the
truth about colonial reconstruction of the Rwandan society that
forced Rwandans into their own self-denial as one people, their
heritage and historical social institutions.
These distortions of the truth form the bedrock of the colonial
racist ideology that informed the Rwandan genocide. Unless, and
until, we understand these complexities of the truth, reconciliation
and re-integration may not be possible in Rwanda.
Regionally, it remains the same that unless the truth of the Rwandan
genocide and the racist ideology behind it is understood, it will
continue to pose a challenge not just for Rwanda, but for the region
and the world at large. The fact that the Interahamwe genocidaires
can find sanctuary in the region underlies the manifest indifferences
and complicity to the genocide ideology in the region.
Conclusion
If Rwanda could sell the genocide ideology to the region, so can
Rwanda sell its example of national unity and re-integration. Rwanda
has started by “de-racializing” its society and being
all-integrative, so that citizenship is not based on descent but
residence. In other words, you are citizen of Rwanda because you say
so. Rwanda therefore is a microcosm of what an integrated Great Lakes
Region could be.
That is our hope and, I believe, the very reason for this forum.
This article was based a presentation at the just concluded Amani
Forum Regional Conference on the Causes and Consequences of the
Rwanda Genocide on 18th June, 2005.
[email protected]
–Boundary_(ID_EVIlUCrKsRldL8SYY+HCSg)–

Wimbledon-Nalbandian ends teenager Gasquet’s run
By Pritha Sarkar
Reuters
Mon Jun 27, 2005 2:58 PM BST
LONDON, June 27 (Reuters) – An ill-tempered David Nalbandian charged
into the Wimbledon quarter-finals with a 6-4 7-6 6-0 victory over
France’s hot prospect Richard Gasquet on Monday.
Two days after ending the challenge of 18-year-old British hopeful
Andrew Murray, Nalbandian captured the scalp of the last teenager in
the men’s draw en route to the last eight for the first time since
2002, when he lost in the final.
The Argentine 18th seed’s victory set up a last eight meeting with
former Australian Open champion Thomas Johansson.
Despite running away with the final set, Nalbandian did not have it
all his way against the talented young Frenchman, who had claimed
his first ATP tour title on grass at Nottingham.
Midway through the second set, trailing 3-1 and attempting to gain a
break back in the fifth game, he became embroiled in a heated exchange
with umpire Wayne McKewen.
Nalbandian marched up to the Australian and shouted: “You can’t tell
me you didn’t see that (ball) fall on the line?”
McKewen retorted: “Be careful with what you’re saying.”
Nalbandian then appeared to calm down and swiftly broke Gasquet to
get back on to level terms.
Gasquet matched Nalbandian’s tenacious baseline play with some
blistering shots of his own during the first two sets but once the
Argentine had clinched the tiebreak 7-3, the 27th seed simply wilted
on a baking court two.

AzerTag, Azerbaijan
June 27 2005
NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADORS TO AZERBAIJAN PRESENT COPIES OF THEIR
CREDENTIALS TO DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
[June 27, 2005, 22:33:11]
On June 27, 2005, Mr. Khalaf Khalafov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the
Republic of Azerbaijan, received Her Excellency Jean Dunn, His
Excellencies Amara Bangura, Anthony Mannix, Li Don Pal, Abdullah Al
Duwaikh, Mikhail Laur, Hol Deng Alak and Peter Lusaka Chintala, newly
appointed non-resident Ambassadors to Azerbaijan from respectively,
Australia, Republic of Guinea, Republic of Ireland, People’s
Democratic Republic of Korea, State of Kuwait, Republic of Moldova,
Republic of Sudan and Republic of Zambia.
Deputy Minister K. Khalafov congratulated the Ambassadors upon their
appointments and expressed his confidence that their activity will
contribute to further development of relations between Azerbaijan and
the nations they represent.
Khalaf Khalafov spoke about crucial political, social-economic and
democratic reforms underway in Azerbaijan and positive impact the
achievements in these fields will bring to the bilateral relations.
He also informed the diplomats about the Armenia-Azerbaijan
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which resulted in occupation of 20 percent
of Azerbaijan by armed forces of Armenia and in about one million of
refugees and displaced persons in our country.
In the meetings, the sides also discussed the perspectives for the
development of bilateral relations, especially considerable potential
for economic cooperation. They also stressed the existing effective
cooperation within international organizations and the importance of
further strengthening this interaction.
The Ambassadors having emphasized their pleasure at being appointed
to Azerbaijan stated their intention to use all venues to further
broaden and develop relations between their respective countries and
Azerbaijan.
At the meetings the Ambassadors presented copies of their credentials
to Deputy Foreign Minister K. Khalafov.

PACE to mull Garabagh conflict in September
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
June 27 2005
Baku, June 23, AssA-Irada
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) temporary
committee on Upper Garabagh conflict decided on Friday to discuss
ways of settling the conflict in Paris on September 12.
Parliamentary delegates from the conflicting sides represented at
PACE as well as representatives of the mediating OSCE Minsk Group
member states will participate in the meeting to last 24 hours,
said member of the Azeri delegation at PACE Asim Mollazada.
Mollazada said Azerbaijan has suggested that the Committee cooperate
with the Venice Commission in outlining the legal aspects of the
conflict resolution.
The Azeri delegation appealed earlier to the PACE Ministerial
Committee over the inactivity of the temporary committee. The appeal
said that although the Committee has been operating for six months,
its experts have not visited the conflict zone yet. The Azerbaijani
parliamentarians raised the issue on realization of the visits in
July at the Ministerial Committee.
The temporary committee was established on the basis of a resolution
passed by PACE in its winter session.*

Int’l organizations, gov’t in dispute over refugees’ integration
Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
June 27 2005
Baku, June 24, AssA-Irada — The State Committee on Refugees and
international organizations have different views on the issue of
displaced persons’ integration into society.
“Although we are trying to prevent these people’s integration into the
local population, international organizations, on the contrary, apply
pressure on us to do this”, the Committee chairman Ali Hasanov told
a news conference at the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party office on Friday.
“We have not and will not do this, as in all conflict zones around
the world, serious problems arise over the return of these people
after the problem is solved.”
Hasanov did not rule out that the ‘Armenian factor’ may play a role
in the pressure on the part of international organizations.
“Armenia has been aspiring to this from the first day. They have
always been concerned over the densely-populated Azerbaijanis, so
that there will not be anyone left to return to their homes after the
[Armenia-Azerbaijan] conflict is settled.”

Armenian, Azerbaijani foreign ministers discuss Karabakh
Interfax
June 27 2005
YEREVAN. June 27 (Interfax) – Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian
and his Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mamedyarov held brief talks in
Brussels on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement, Armenian Foreign Ministry
spokesman Gamlet Gasparian told Interfax on Monday.
“The Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers held a 20-minute
meeting in Brussels,” Gasparian said. The talks were held within the
framework of a forum on Iraq, he said.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Russian troop redeployment will not affect Caucasus regional balance of forces – parliamentarian
RIA Novosti, Russia –
June 27 2005
MOSCOW, June 27 (RIA Novosti) – The partial redeployment of Russian
troops from Georgia to Armenia will not affect the balance of forces
in the Caucasus, a senior member of the Russian parliament’s lower
chamber said Monday.
Konstantin Kosachev, the chairman of the State Duma’s international
affairs committee said the troops could not be used to resolve the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
“This is an issue for Russian-Armenian relations,” he said.
“Naturally, the redeployment does not upset the balance of power in
the region and will not be used to resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict.”
Kosachev said that Russia had been forced to withdraw its bases from
Georgia after the authorities there made the corresponding decision.
According to him, Russia would not have had to send its troops to
Armenia if the withdrawal had been a routine process.
“But as we were virtually forced out of Georgia, we had to make other
decisions and redeploy troops to a base in Armenia, but this was done
with the permission of the Armenian side,” the parliamentarian said.
He added that if Azerbaijan had made a similar proposal, Russia might
have accepted it.

Moving Russian military equipment to Armenia not to affect Karabakh settlement.
ITAR-TASS, Russia
June 27 2005
MOSCOW, June 27 (Itar-Tass) – The redeployment of Russian military
equipment from Georgia to the Russian Defence Ministry’s base
in Armenia will not change the balance of forces in the Karabakh
conflict zone and will not hamper the quest for the ways of peaceful
settlement. Konstantin Kosachev, the chairman of the Committee for
International Relations of the State Duma lower house of parliament,
expressed his confidence in this on Monday.
He said, the Russian military bases are being speedily removed from
the Georgian territory. The Russian military base situated in Gyumri,
in the Armenian territory, is a possible place to which armaments
and equipment can be moved from Akhalkalaki base.
“If Azerbaijan offered an opportunity for the deployment of military
forces in its territory, Moscow would consent to this,” Kosachev
said. “Therefore, the redeployment of Russian military forces will
not affect the prospects for erasing tension in relations between
Armenia and Azerbaijan,” he said.