RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 5, No. 23, 9 June 2005
A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Domestic Politics.
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HEADLINES:
* DOES NORTH OSSETIAN LEADER’S DEPARTURE HERALD OTHER
RESIGNATIONS?
* NASHI GATHERS MOMENTUM
* GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES NEW ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TELEVISION CHANNEL
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DOMESTIC POLITICS
DOES NORTH OSSETIAN LEADER’S DEPARTURE HERALD OTHER RESIGNATIONS?
By Jean-Christophe Peuch
North Ossetia’s 71-year-old president, Aleksandr
Dzasokhov, announced his resignation on 31 May after talks with
President Vladimir Putin’s envoy to the Southern Federal
District. The veteran leader said he is stepping down voluntarily so
that a younger politician can take his place. But analysts believe
that the Kremlin forced Dzasokhov out in a bid to reassert central
control over the small North Caucasus republic. Will other regional
leaders soon follow?
Addressing reporters at the outcome of a meeting with Dmitrii
Kozak, the presidential envoy to the Southern Federal District,
Dzasokhov said he had sent a letter to Putin requesting that his term
in office be abridged.
“I’m pretty sure I’ve made the right decision,”
Dzasokhov said. “It is extremely important that we open the way to a
younger generation. We should sometimes look at ourselves with
hindsight. We would then see that following us is a generation of
politically mature and well-prepared people.”
A longtime Communist leader, Dzasokhov first became North
Ossetia’s president in 1998. He was reelected three years ago.
His mandate was due to expire at the end of this year.
Dzasokhov claimed he first thought about stepping down well
before the September 2004 Beslan hostage crisis that resulted in the
deaths of more than 300 people, many of whom were schoolchildren.
Accusing Dzasokhov of mishandling the crisis, Beslan
residents and regional opposition parties staged street rallies for
months, demanding his resignation. In January, protesters blockaded
the main highway linking southern Russia to Azerbaijan.
Despite his earlier criticism of Dzasokhov, Putin denied on 1
June he had anything to do with the departure of the North Ossetian
leader. But most political commentators believe Dzasokhov did not
decide to step down on his own. Russia’s “Nezavisimaya gazeta”
and “Kommersant” newspapers quoted unidentified government officials
on 1 June as saying Dzasokhov resigned under direct pressure from
Kozak.
Both dailies suggested the final decision to dismiss
Dzasokhov was reached two months ago after he refused to sign an
agreement to facilitate the return to North Ossetia’s Prigorodnii
Raion of ethnic Ingush displaced by the 1992 Ossetian-Ingush
conflict.
But analysts argue that the Kremlin had many other reasons to
replace Dzasokhov — who was considered loyal but no longer able to
manage his small republic.
Vakha Petrov is editor in chief of yufo.ru, an information
website specializing in regional affairs based in the southern
Russian city of Rostov-on-Don. He told RFE/RL that years of economic
mismanagement, corruption, and clan politics had long undermined
Dzasokhov’s popularity.
“Dzasokhov had long stopped suiting the Kremlin, even before
the Beslan events,” Petrov said. “His position within the republic
had already been weakened, and with Beslan he lost all remnants of
legitimacy. His rating then dropped down to 7 percent. You can
imagine what this means for the head of a republic, especially in the
North Caucasus region, where the situation can explode at any moment.
Dzasokhov had lost all legitimacy, and it seems that this is why it
had been decided to dismiss him long ago. Simply, the implementation
of this decision had been delayed.”
Petrov said he believes the main reason that federal
authorities refrained from dismissing Dzasokhov immediately after
Beslan is that they did not want to give the impression they were
yielding to pressure from the public. He said Kremlin officials
feared this might trigger a wave of similar protests in neighboring
republics.
Grigorii Shvedov, the editor in chief of Russia’s
“Caucasian Knot” information website, said he believes other
unpopular regional leaders — such as Kabardino-Balkaria’s
Valerii Kokov, Daghestan’s State Council Chairman Magomedali
Magomedov, or Ingushetia’s Murat Zyazikov — might soon meet a
fate similar to Dzasokhov’s.
“I believe the [North Ossetian] model will be applied
elsewhere,” Shvedov said. “The only question is whether the Kremlin
has a real plan. The actions of the federal authorities show that
they have no strategic development plan for either the North Caucasus
or the Southern Federal District as a whole. There is a Russian
policy toward Georgia. There are Russian policies toward Armenia and
Azerbaijan — even if they contradict each other. But, aside from a
vague idea that we need to combat Wahabbism — which allegedly
embodies terrorism — we don’t know of any clear-cut policy
toward the North Caucasus.”
Putin has long indicated he is unhappy with the leaders of
the North Caucasus republics.
In a televised interview in 2004, the Russian president
castigated the region’s leaders, citing as an example a
multiple-murder case involving the son-in-law of
Karachaevo-Cherkessia’s President Mustafa Batdyev and the street
protests it had triggered.
“What we have there are regional clans that are vying for
influence and trying to use power leverage to settle economic
problems and divide up property,” Putin said.
Regional experts appear to support the idea that the decision
to replace Dzasokhov stems from Putin’s plans to reinforce the
so-called power vertical throughout the North Caucasus area.
Petrov of yufo.ru warned that any attempt at disrupting the
balance of power that exists, for example, in Daghestan — where the
regional leader is chosen under a delicate ethnicity-based rotating
system — could foster further destabilization.
“If the head of this republic were to be appointed [by the
Kremlin], that would signal the end of the existing system and could
create serious problems,” Petrov said. “One can even say with a great
deal of certainty that that would trigger political tensions that
could in turn degenerate into full-scale interethnic unrest. The same
thing goes for all republics in the region — even though it is less
of a problem in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, or, to an even lesser extent,
in Ingushetia.”
Petrov said the Kremlin, which is reportedly aware of those
risks, might play for time and “decide not to decide” — that is, to
not replace other regional leaders in the immediate future.
In the meantime, Dzasokhov suggested a possible way out. The
outgoing North Ossetian leader voiced comments on 31 May that sounded
like a thinly veiled recommendation to his regional counterparts.
“I am setting a precedent,” he told journalists in
Vladikavkaz, adding, “While everyone else is trying to have his
mandate extended, I decided to shorten mine.”
REAPPOINTING THE INCUMBENTS. At the beginning of the year, a
political reform took effect that eliminated the direct election of
regional executive-branch heads and replaced them with a system under
which local legislatures confirm nominees selected by the president.
Since then, about one-quarter of Russia’s 89 regions have gone
through the process and only three incumbents have been replaced.
Below is a chronological list of President Vladimir Putin’s
choices so far. (Robert Coalson)
4 February–Primorskii Krai–Incumbent Sergei Darkin
reappointed.
17 February–Tyumen Oblast–Incumbent Sergei Sobyanin
reappointed.
18 February–Vladimir Oblast–Incumbent Nikolai Vinogradov
reappointed.
22 February–Kursk Oblast–Incumbent Aleksandr Mikhailov
reappointed.
24 February–Amur Oblast–Incumbent Leonid Korotkov
reappointed.
24 February–Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug–Incumbent
Aleksandr Filipenko reappointed.
25 February–Jewish Autonomous Okrug–Incumbent Nikolai
Volkov reappointed.
3 March–Saratov Oblast–Unified Russia activist and former
Balkovo nuclear-power plant director Pavel Ipatov named to replace
incumbent Dmitrii Ayatskov. Ayatskov subsequently named ambassador to
Belarus.
11 March–Evenk Autonomous Okrug–Incumbent Boris Zolotarev
reappointed.
11 March–Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug–Incumbent Yurii
Neelov reappointed.
25 March–Republic of Tatarstan–Incumbent Mintimer Shaimiev
reappointed.
30 March–Tula Oblast–Engineer Vyacheslav Dudka appointed to
replace popular Communist incumbent Vasilii Starodubtsev.
15 April–Koryak Autonomous Okrug–Deputy Governor Oleg
Kozhemyako appointed to replace disgraced incumbent Vladimir Loginov,
who was fired on 9 March by President Putin for failure to cope with
his responsibilities.
18 April–Chelyabinsk Oblast–Incumbent Petr Sumin
reappointed.
20 April–Kemerovo Oblast–Incumbent Aman Tuleev reappointed.
21 April–Kostroma Oblast–Incumbent Viktor Shershunov
reappointed.
23 April–Orel Oblast–Incumbent Yegor Stroev reappointed.
26 April–Samara Oblast–Incumbent Konstantin Titov
reappointed.
14 May–Penza Oblast–Incumbent Vasilii Bochkarev
reappointed.
28 May–Lipetsk Oblast–Incumbent Oleg Korolev reappointed.
8 June–North Ossetia–Legislative speaker Taymuraz Mamsurov
appointed to replace President Aleksandr Dzasokhov, who resigned
under Kremlin pressure. Dzasokhov was made the republic’s
representative in the Federation Council.
(Sources: RFE/RL, Panorama, Moscow Carnegie Center)
NASHI GATHERS MOMENTUM
By Robert Coalson
The pro-Kremlin youth movement Nashi continued to hog the
media spotlight this week, following a 1 June report in “Izvestiya”
that several of the organization’s leaders met behind closed
doors in the Kremlin with President Vladimir Putin the previous day.
Although the Kremlin refused to confirm or deny the meeting, Nashi
co-leader Vasilii Yakemenko, who says he attended the meeting,
provided details to the daily and to other media outlets.
Yakemenko, 34, told “Izvestiya” that all four national
commissars, as Nashi’s central leaders are called, and Nashi
regional coordinators from St. Petersburg, Voronezh, Tula, Bryansk,
Tambov, and other cities participated in the meeting with Putin, at
which Putin expressed surprise that Nashi was able to bring out
60,000 people to a Moscow rally on 15 May. Yakemenko told grani.ru on
2 June that 12 Nashi activists were at the meeting, which lasted
about two hours.
“We discussed a wide circle of issues from within Russia and
from beyond its borders,” Yakemenko told the daily. “In part, we
discussed Russia’s position with respect to the Baltic states and
Russia’s relations with the European Union. Among domestic
issues, we discussed issues of youth politics and relations between
youth and the state. Of course we discussed the important question
‘where are we going?'”
“The president of Russia did us a great honor and
demonstrated his solidarity with ‘our’ [nashi, which means
“our” in Russian] patriotic views,” Yakemenko told grani.ru. “We hope
very much that such contacts will become regular.”
The meeting with Putin (and the media attention that
accompanied it) and the massive 15 May rally, at which Nashi staged a
symbolic passing of the torch from the World War II generation to the
Nashi generation, are the latest manifestations of the movement’s
rapidly growing prominence.
In addition, Nashi announced last week a new program to train
young managers at specially created Nashi academies, with the goal of
replacing the current “defeatist generation” of bureaucrats over the
next few years. “This year our unique educational program will train
3,000 of our commissars,” Yakemenko told “Komsomolskaya pravda” on 31
May. “In five years, we will have trained 10,000 and in eight,
100,000. These are the people who in reality will carry out the
modernization of the country when they occupy key posts at all levels
of power. It will be a revolution, not in form, but in content.”
At a time when most observers believe the state’s
persecution of former Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovskii has dried up
funding for non-Kremlin-sponsored political initiatives, Nashi seems
to be thriving financially as well. The meeting with Putin will
almost certainly be seen as a signal by Kremlin-friendly businessmen
that this is a project to be supported. So far, Nashi has relied
heavily on state resources, including holding its founding congress
in a facility owned by the Academy of Sciences. On 28 April,
“Nezavisimaya gazeta” reported that Nashi has had particular support
from Tver Oblast Governor Dmitrii Zelenin, who spoke at Nashi’s
founding congress together with Education and Science Minister Andrei
Fursenko. The daily reported that Nashi activists are being trained
at a police training facility in the oblast and are organizing street
patrols in Tver.
The 15 May rally in Moscow, however, involved bringing in
activists from at least 30 federation subjects, as well as
considerable expenditures on promotional materials, signs,
entertainment, and the like. Yakemenko has refused to disclose how
much the demonstration cost, but he told “Novye izvestiya” on 27 May
that it was “very expensive.” He told kreml.org on 24 May that it
cost “a great deal of money indeed” and “a monstrous amount.” The
creation of a national network of educational academies, the first of
which is already operating in Moscow, will also demand considerable
resources.
Some voices have been warning that the Nashi movement could
ultimately prove dangerous and uncontrollable. Federation Council
Chairman Sergei Mironov sharply criticized the organization on 19 May
and again on 31 May. He told RosBalt on 31 May that “grown-up men”
stand behind Nashi. “We need to talk to these men and convince them
that although this may seem like an easy path, it could turn out to
be very difficult and absolutely incorrect,” Mironov said. Instead of
protecting Russia from a “colored” revolution, Nashi “could stand at
the head of their own kind of revolution.” In his earlier comments,
Mironov called Nashi “ideological wolves that could become
uncontrollable.”
MEDIA
GAZPROM MAKES THE NEWS
By Claire Bigg
Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned gas monopoly, acquired
control on 3 June of the prominent “Izvestiya” daily newspaper.
Gazprom is the same state-owned entity that four years ago took
control of NTV, a major television station critical of the
government, after a battle between the Kremlin and NTV’s owner.
Now, the purchase of “Izvestiya” has raised fears that the Kremlin
will clamp down on one of the country’s most independent and
professional dailies.
Gazprom-Media, a subsidiary of Russia’s state-controlled
gas giant, announced on 3 June it had purchased a controlling stake
in “Izvestiya.” The official spokesman for Gazprom-Media refused to
comment, however, and the company said in a written statement that it
will not reveal the value of the deal. Gazprom bought just over 50
percent of “Izvestiya” shares from Interros, a vast holding company
belonging to oligarch Vladimir Potanin.
A number of media professionals have voiced deep concern over
the Gazprom takeover of “Izvestiya,” a respected daily considered to
be one of Russia’s most objective, high-brow publications. Many
view the takeover as the latest move in the Kremlin’s campaign to
silence news organizations critical of its policy.
“I am very much afraid that there will be attempts to cleanse
‘Izvestiya’ and make it as loyal as everything that belongs
to this huge holding, Gazprom-Media, to make media outlets obedient,”
said Manana Aslamasyan, the vice president of Russia’s National
Association of Television and Radio Broadcasters.
Mikhail Kozhokin, a former editor in chief of “Izvestiya,”
said both sides might well have had a financial interest in the deal.
But he also described Gazprom’s purchase of “Izvestiya” as an
attempt to muzzle independent media.
“In Russia, business is interknitted with politics, just as
business decisions and political processes are interknitted in the
media sphere,” Kozhokin said. “Media outlets increasingly find
themselves under the control, or the strong influence, of the
government through a variety of methods.”
In 2001, after a trial of strength between the Kremlin and
the exiled media baron Vladimir Gusinskii, Gazprom took control of
NTV, a major television station overtly critical of President
Vladimir Putin’s regime.
In the official statement, the head of Gazprom-Media remained
ambiguous about possible changes in the “Izvestiya” editorial staff.
He said his company needs to carry out a detailed analysis of the
situation within the paper before deciding whether to introduce such
changes.
Many experts fear “Izvestiya” will meet the same fate as NTV,
which was deserted by a number of prominent journalists after the
Gazprom takeover. The television station has since considerably toned
down its criticism of the government.
Igor Yakovenko, the general secretary of the Russian Union of
Journalists, accused Gazprom of “killing” NTV and called the
“Izvestiya” deal “bad news” for the daily. He said “Izvestiya” was
well managed by ProfMedia, the publishing arm of Interros, and
predicted that Gazprom would run the prestigious daily into the
ground.
“When ‘Izvestiya’ belonged to the ProfMedia holding
— although this holding is extremely loyal to the authorities —
these people did business and therefore looked for ways to keep
‘Izvestiya’ running and make it truly interesting,” Yakovenko
said. “[The takeover] will lead to the destruction of one of
Russia’s oldest and best media brands.”
The takeover has also prompted speculation that Potanin is
selling “Izvestiya” to Gazprom as a gesture of goodwill toward the
Kremlin. Potanin is viewed as someone who is particularly careful not
to anger the Kremlin.
Following the Beslan hostage tragedy in September,
“Izvestiya” Editor-in-Chief Raf Shakirov resigned amid rumors that
Potanin had asked him to leave for fear the Kremlin would be riled by
the explicit photographs of the massacre published by “Izvestiya.”
GOVERNMENT LAUNCHES NEW ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TELEVISION CHANNEL
By Claire Bigg
Russia wants to shake off its “bear” image, and it is
planning to do so by launching a new English-language satellite
television station, Russia Today. Russian authorities, who are
heavily subsidizing the project, announced on 7 June that Russia
Today will start broadcasting before the end of the year in the
United States, Europe, and some Asian countries. In Russia, the
venture has inspired a mix of interest and apprehension, raising
fears that the station will turn into a Kremlin propaganda machine.
The government had long floated the idea of creating a
Russian English-language television station aimed at improving
Russia’s standing abroad. In 2001, then-Media Minister Mikhail
Lesin lamented the negative coverage of Russia in the West and
declared the country must promote a positive image for itself if it
wanted to avoid “always looking like bears.”
Speaking at a press conference on 7 June, Federal Press and
Mass Communications Agency Director Mikhail Seslavinskii agreed that
the world needs to know more about Russia: “A big segment that exists
in other developed countries was missing [in Russia] — an account in
English of what is happening now in the Russian Federation.”
Seslavinskii said Russia Today could not have been created
without help from the government, which has earmarked some $30
million to get the station off the ground. But he was quick to
dismiss claims that the Kremlin — which has been slammed in the West
for clamping down on independent media — will have a say in the
channel’s editorial policy.
“I just can’t image a special department somewhere in the
corridors of power where people would sit and read the news in
English, and cross things out with a red pen — ‘We say this, we
don’t say that, there is a grammatical mistake here and two
commas missing there,'” Seslavinskii said. “The company will work
on its own as an independent editorial office.”
Russia Today’s Editor in Chief is Margarita Simonyan, a
25-year-old former Kremlin reporter for the RTR state television. She
says the new channel, which in the long run hopes to support itself
through advertising, will offer a Russian view on world news. She
vowed the channel will provide a platform of expression for all
political forces, including opposition parties.
Simonyan concedes that competition for global
English-language television is tough, but nonetheless has ambitious
plans for the new station and its 300-strong team.
“Of course we understand that it is difficult to compete with
the big companies in the world that exist on this market,” Simonyan
said. “But we have some things they don’t have. I don’t know
if you do, but I don’t know a single foreigner who wasn’t
surprised the first time he came to Russia. I think this happens
precisely because Russia is not often portrayed in the way it looks
when one arrives here. I would like to show my country the way I see
it, the way my editorial team and the people with whom I work see
it.”
Some observers have welcomed the project as an opportunity to
tell foreigners more about a country that largely remains an enigma
abroad. Yassen Zassourskii, the dean of the journalism department at
Moscow State University, says the station has a good chance of
attracting viewers, provided it remains objective and does not focus
too much on Russia.
“Much will depend on how the channel’s service is
organized,” he said. “This is one thing I know: it will get ratings,
success, and it will be watched if it provides extensive and varied
information on what is happening in the world, on Russia’s point
of view on this, and is sufficiently many-sided.”
Others, however, are not convinced. Igor Yakovenko, the
general-secretary of the Russian Union of Journalists, is convinced
Russia Today will become a propaganda tool for the Kremlin and is
doomed to failure. He considers the creation of the channel to be
positive in itself, but condemns the fact that it will be broadcast
within the country as well as abroad: “The presence of a state
monopoly in the media makes attempts at improving Russia’s
external image problematic. The United States forbids its own state
radio station to broadcast in the United States, because it is bad
for people’s health. Russia has the opposite policy. They think
propaganda should hit their own citizens first. This is a big
problem.”
Russia Today is set to begin broadcasting before the end of
the year with the backing of the state-run RIA-Novosti news agency
and RTR state television.
CHECHNYA
NEW RESISTANCE LEADER VOWS NO MORE HOSTAGE TAKINGS
By Liz Fuller
Abdul-Khalim Sadullaev, the successor to slain Chechen
President and resistance leader Aslan Maskhadov, told RFE/RL’s
North Caucasus Service on 3 June that he strongly condemns terrorism,
and said it is not part of the resistance’s policy.
Sadullaev also said that while the resistance will continue
to try to inflict the maximum damage on the Russian armed forces and
military targets, they will not attack peaceful civilians, women, and
children, and will not take them hostage. Sadullaev was answering
questions submitted to him by RFE/RL.
Sadullaev was virtually unknown until he was named Chechen
president three months ago following Maskhadov’s death. It is
therefore not possible to say with any certainty whether he played
any role in the Moscow theater hostage taking in October 2002 or last
September’s hostage taking in Beslan. Russian officials blame
both Maskhadov and radical field commander Shamil Basaev for those
terrorist acts.
Sadullaev admitted that Maskhadov’s killing on 8 March
was “a painful blow for us,” but he added that the ongoing struggle
for the freedom of the Chechen people is not being waged in the name
of one man. “If something happens to one of us, it does not mean the
war of liberation will end; those who survive will continue the
struggle.”
Sadullaev said that in 2001, “at the beginning of the second
war,” Maskhadov signed a decree naming Sadullaev vice president but,
at Sadullaev’s request, did not make that decree public.
Sadullaev said “I did not believe that he would be killed and I would
take his place…I did not want him to die first.” He said that “when
peace comes…we shall hold elections and elect a new president.”
Sadullaev said that Maskhadov’s death has not resulted
and will not result in any “hasty” changes in tactics. He said “Aslan
believed that this cause is just and he was ready to die for it if
need be.” He went on: “the path we have chosen is the only one and we
have one single goal. Freedom is impossible in an unfree country, and
in an unfree country human rights are worthless and cannot be
protected. Russia has shown us this yesterday and continues to do so
today.”
Sadullaev claimed that human rights have never been respected
in Russia, and he cited the example of TV footage on combating crime
which frequently shows Russian policemen beating a detainee who is
lying on the ground. If a man is already on the ground, Sadullaev
argued, there is no need to beat him. He said such police brutality
in Russia is “the norm.” For that reason, Sadullaev continued, “there
is no way Russia can teach us human rights or justice.”
Asked about his relations with radical field commander Shamil
Basaev, Sadullaev hinted at disagreements within the Chechen
resistance leadership, but he did not at any point mention Basaev by
name. He said he is trying to maintain unity within the resistance
and channel its efforts in a single direction, and for that reason he
will neither sever relations with anyone or try to force anyone to
cooperate against his will. “Our nation is very small,” he pointed
out, and so unity is of paramount importance.
He said that in line with Maskhadov’s decree of 2001
naming him vice president, it was envisaged that field commanders
should meet and take decisions on “important strategic issues” and
matters of internal and foreign policy only after discussing them
within the Defense Council.
Sadullaev argued that “we have the right to accept any help
that will enable us to inflict damage on the enemy in the political,
ideological and economic sphere and by targeting his [armed] forces.
We can do this, and we have a right to do it.” He said that he met
with Maskhadov shortly before he was killed to discuss possible
military targets in Russia. In that context, Sadullaev stressed that
attacks on such targets should avoid injuring civilians.
Sadullaev spoke with undisguised contempt of those Chechens
who cooperate with the pro-Moscow Chechen leadership, especially the
“Kadyrovtsy,” the notorious special police regiment loyal to First
Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, whom he referred to as
“pharisees.” Sadullaev recalled that during a search operation in the
village of Samashki several weeks ago, the Kadyrovtsy openly stole
belongings from villagers’ homes while Russian servicemen
accompanying them stood by and watched, but did not intervene to stop
them. He said of the collaborators that “there is nothing human and
nothing Chechen left in them,” especially Ramzan Kadyrov and Sulim
Yamadaev, commander of the so-called Eastern Batallion.
Asked to comment on the policies of Russian President
Vladimir Putin, Sadullaev said he seeks to create new points of
tension in the North Caucasus by provoking “people who are living
peacefully” to the point that there is a backlash against Moscow.
Sadullaev said explosions and killings in Daghestan have become as
frequent as in Grozny because Putin has no cohesive North Caucasus
policy. He said the situation is just as bad in Ingushetia, and only
a little better in Kabardino-Balkaria. Adyegya, for the moment,
remains comparatively quiet, but Moscow is trying to provoke unrest
there, too, he said.
Sadullaev predicted that Putin will move against the
long-time president of Kalmykia, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, as “he wants to
install his own people everywhere.” Sadullaev went on: “It was Putin
who began this war and he has no way to end it. The war cannot end
with us being forced to our knees and capitulating, and Putin has
left himself without an alternative. With his loud pronouncements,
those of a stupid and shortsighted person, he has cut off the only
path to ending the war.” Sadullaev predicted that the war will
continue “as long as the price of oil remains high, as long as
Russian kids are ready — despite the demographic crisis — to put on
Russian uniforms and serve in the army, and until something breaks
Putin’s back.” But he continued: “I do not think this can go on
for much longer. There will have to be an end, especially as our
forces are not becoming weaker, and we are prepared to go on
fighting.” Sadullaev went on to predict that “Putin will try to get
rid of those people who witnessed massive human rights violations and
genocide. He will try to destroy anyone” who could record what
happened for posterity.
POLITICAL CALENDAR
11 June: The Motherland party to hold an
extraordinary party congress
Late June: Chinese President Hu Jintao to visit Moscow
16 June: Moscow Arbitration Court to open hearings on
Yukos’s suit against the government seeking $11.5 billion in
compensation for the seizure of Yuganskneftegaz
19 June: Referendum in Samara on dismissing Mayor Georgii
Limanskii
20-22 June: Meeting of the Collective Security Council
(Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) in
Moscow
23 June: Yukos shareholders meeting
24 June: Gazprom shareholders meeting
24 June: NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to
visit Moscow
25 June: Meeting of the CIS Defense Ministers’ Council in
Moscow
4 July: 750th anniversary of the founding of Kaliningrad
5-6 July: Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana,
Kazakhstan
6-8 July: G-8 summit in Scotland
9 July: End of the Duma’s spring session
August: CIS summit to be held in Kazan
September: First-ever Sino-Russian military exercises to be
held on the Shandong Peninsula
1 September: Date by which President Putin has ordered the
government to submit its plans for the elimination of the estate tax,
the simplification of individual tax declarations, and the
simplification of the requirements for real-estate purchases
5 September: Fall plenary session of the State Duma opens
1 October: Date by which President Putin has ordered the
government to submit its economic-development plans for the Far East,
the North Caucasus, and Kaliningrad Oblast
23 October: Referendums to be held in Kamchatka Oblast and
the Koryak Autonomous Okrug about the merger of those two federation
subjects
1 November: Public Chamber expected to hold first session
1 November: Date by which President Putin has ordered the
government to submit its proposals for limiting foreign-capital
participation in the defense sector and strategic-resource
development
1 November: Date by which President Putin has ordered the
government to submit its proposals for judicial reform and combating
crime, especially terrorism
Second half of November: Chechnya to hold legislative
elections, according to pro-Kremlin Chechen President Alu Alkhanov
1 December: Date by which President Putin has ordered the
government to submit its plans for reducing traffic accidents,
alcoholism, and drug addiction, as well as its proposals for
improving health care
1 December: Date by which President Putin has ordered the
government to submit its plan to increase state-sector wages by 50
percent within three years
2006: Russia to host a G-8 summit in St. Petersburg
1 January 2006: Date by which all political parties must
conform to law on political parties, which requires at least 50,000
members and branches in one-half of all federation subjects, or
either reregister as public organizations or be dissolved
4-7 June 2006: World Newspaper Congress and World Editors
Forum to be held in Moscow, hosted by the Guild of Publishers of the
Periodical Press.
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Copyright (c) 2005. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly” is prepared by Robert Coalson
on the basis of a variety of sources. It is distributed every
Wednesday.
Direct comments to Robert Coalson at [email protected].
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress