Cyprus Parliament honors Armenian Genocide victims during plenary session

Dabaghian Diana
Public Radio of Armenia
April 9 2026

Armenia’s Ambassador to Cyprus, Inna Torgomyan, attended a plenary session of the House of Representatives of Cyprus, which commenced with a solemn tribute to the victims of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian Embassy in Cyprus informs.

The session opened with a special address by the President of the House of Representatives, Annita Demetriou, followed by a one-minute silence observed in memory of the victims.

A key speech during the session was delivered by Vartkes Mahdessian, the Representative of the Armenian community in the Cypriot parliament.

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Zakharova Defends Russia’s Role in Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement, Emphasizes Re

Tambiyan Samvel
Caucasus Watch, Germany
April 9 2026
9 Apr 2026 | News, Politics, Armenia, Azerbaijan

On April 8, Maria Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, commented on a statement by Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry calling on Russia to refrain from mentioning the former separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region, describing such a position as contradictory. She noted that such remarks come despite Baku regularly expressing views on territories referred to by Moscow as new Russian entities, while continuing to regard them as part of Ukraine. Zakharova emphasized that Russia, including Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, played a key role in resolving the conflict over the former separatist Nagorno-Karabakh region, stressing that Moscow’s efforts in this direction date back to the 1990s.

According to her, it was due to these efforts that active hostilities were halted in the fall of 2020, while Russian peacekeepers ensured the ceasefire for nearly four years. She added that Russia’s involvement became a crucial factor in launching the current phase of normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan, based on trilateral agreements reached between 2020 and 2022.

Zakharova also referred to the outcomes of the European Union-mediated summit held in Prague on October 6, 2022, where Armenia and Azerbaijan recognized each other’s territorial integrity in line with the UN Charter and the 1991 Almaty Declaration. She noted that in recent years, Baku and Yerevan have increasingly opted for direct dialogue without intermediaries, adding that Moscow has responded with understanding and has consistently supported constructive steps toward sustainable peace.

She further emphasized the importance of the initialing of the agreement on peace and interstate relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia in August 2025, as well as the decision by the OSCE to dissolve the Minsk Group institutions effective December 1, 2025, which, she noted, formalized the completion of the settlement process.

At the same time, Zakharova underlined that substantial work remains, including the signing of a comprehensive peace treaty, the restoration of transport and economic links, border delimitation and demarcation, and confidence-building between the two nations. She stated that Russia will continue to support these efforts at the request of both Baku and Yerevan. “The current stage of the settlement requires consolidating the achieved results,” she emphasized, expressing hope that normalization will become irreversible.

Zakharova also commented on statements by Alen Simonyan, the Speaker of the Armenian Parliament, regarding a possible response by Yerevan to changes in Russian gas prices. Reacting critically, she dismissed the remarks as emotional and inconsistent. “It’s a bit reminiscent of the story of threatening a hedgehog by revealing one’s capabilities,” she stated, adding that she did not consider such statements worthy of serious comment.

She recalled previous contradictory remarks about Armenia’s potential withdrawal from the CSTO and stressed that such issues should primarily be assessed within Armenia. “I think that Armenian citizens should be the first to comment on this,” Zakharova stated, noting that these politicians shape the country’s domestic and foreign policy.

Addressing energy cooperation, Zakharova referred to the April 1 meeting in Moscow between Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, and Nikol Pashinyan, the Prime Minister of Armenia, where gas supply terms were discussed. She noted that Armenia currently receives Russian gas at $177.50, compared to prices reaching $600 in Europe. “This example isn’t an emotional one, it’s a fact,” she emphasized.

She highlighted the importance of energy security, particularly amid volatility in global gas markets linked to escalating tensions in the Middle East, including US and Israeli actions against Iran. According to her, governments must focus on avoiding the risks posed by such instability.

Zakharova also addressed Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union, recalling that the country joined the bloc in 2015. She cited data indicating that Armenia’s GDP has nearly tripled over the past decade, rising from $10.5 billion to $29.2 billion, describing this as a foundation of the country’s economic development.

Touching upon the CSTO, she described the organization as a key mechanism for ensuring the security of its members, including Armenia, while noting that Yerevan’s participation is currently effectively frozen as a result of decisions taken by its authorities.

In a separate comment, Zakharova addressed the potential impact of upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia on relations with Russia and cooperation within the CSTO. She referred to discussions held during the April 1 meeting between Putin and Pashinyan and reiterated Moscow’s principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. “We do not interfere in the domestic political affairs of other states,” she stated.

At the same time, she emphasized the historically close ties between Russia and Armenia, including cultural and societal links, as well as the presence of a large Armenian diaspora in Russia. “This is not a business project, but part of the historical essence,” Zakharova stated.

She added that while Russia does not interfere, it remains interested in ensuring that Armenian citizens can freely express their will in elections. She stressed the importance of democratic standards and equal participation, while noting that recent amendments to Armenia’s Electoral Code, adopted rapidly, raise certain concerns.

“The main thing is that this is not used to deliberately limit the opposition’s electoral opportunities,” Zakharova emphasized, recalling earlier statements by Nikol Pashinyan affirming Armenia’s commitment to democratic principles.

Concluding her remarks, Zakharova reiterated that Armenia remains a full member of the CSTO from a legal standpoint, despite ongoing speculation. “We are, of course, interested in the Armenian side returning to full participation in our shared security structure,” she stated.

https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/zakharova-defends-russias-role-in-nagorno-karabakh-settlement-emphasizes-relations-with-armenia-and-azerbaijan.html

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Kocharyan Calls for “Balanced” Armenia-Russia Policy and “Pragmatic” Foreign A

Hambardsumian Paul
Caucasus Watch, Germany
April 9 2026
9 Apr 2026 | News, Politics, Armenia

On April 8, Robert Kocharyan, the second president of Armenia and leader of the “Armenia” bloc, said Russia expects a rational and non-hostile policy from Armenia, emphasizing the need for predictable relations based on mutual respect and shared interests.

Speaking on the “Big Politics” podcast, Kocharyan argued that Russia is ready to reciprocate constructive engagement and recalled that during his presidency, there was no pressure from Moscow, with Armenia benefiting from low gas prices and strong economic ties. He criticized current Armenian authorities for signaling a potential exit from the Eurasian Economic Union, describing such rhetoric as disrespectful and warning that treating the bloc as a “reserve option” while pursuing Europe could damage relations.

Kocharyan stressed that leaving the EAEU would have severe consequences for Armenia, arguing that Russia would barely notice such a move, while Armenia could face economic collapse due to its heavy trade dependence. He noted that a significant portion of Armenia’s trade, remittances, and labor migration is tied to Russia, making a shift away economically risky.

He also highlighted infrastructure issues, suggesting that reopening a railway through Abkhazia could significantly boost Armenia’s economy by providing shorter and more reliable transport routes to Russia and Georgia. In contrast, he warned that routes through Azerbaijan could become political leverage in the future.

Turning to politics, Kocharyan accused Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of attempting to shift blame for the outcome of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict onto Vladimir Putin. He argued that no major power, including France and the United States, ever denied Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, while also supporting the principle of self-determination.

Kocharyan maintained that Russia played a decisive role in halting the war in 2020 and deploying peacekeepers, rejecting claims that Moscow abandoned Armenia. He further claimed that Pashinyan undermined the post-war framework by recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, effectively transforming the issue into an internal matter for Baku.

Commenting on recent Armenia-Russia tensions, Kocharyan said a meeting between Putin and Pashinyan signaled that Moscow’s patience “is not infinite,” warning that continued geopolitical maneuvering could lead to consequences. He criticized what he described as inconsistent foreign policy, arguing that Armenia cannot afford to antagonize a major power while being economically dependent on it.

On foreign policy orientation, Kocharyan cautioned against positioning Armenia between Russia and Europe, noting that the European Union views Russia as an adversary. He suggested Armenia should maintain economic ties with Russia while benefiting from engagement with Europe, rather than choosing between them.

He also warned that Armenian exports to Europe remain minimal, while Russia continues to be the primary market, especially for agriculture and alcoholic beverages. In contrast, he argued that markets in Turkey and Azerbaijan would be highly competitive and potentially damaging for Armenian producers.

Finally, Kocharyan addressed domestic politics, arguing that anti-Russian rhetoric by Armenian authorities risks harming public sentiment toward Armenians in Russia, where a large diaspora contributes significantly through remittances. He concluded that Armenia’s current course risks both political isolation and economic instability, urging a more balanced and pragmatic foreign policy approach.


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Armenia Changes Electoral Code to Curb Vote Buyingg

Emil Lazarian
Caucasus Watch, Germany
April 9 2026
9 Apr 2026 | News, Politics, Armenia

Armenia’s National Assembly has adopted amendments to the Electoral Code in a second and final reading, introducing a ban on the use of personal names in the titles of electoral blocs and parties.

The changes passed in a final reading with 67 votes in favor and 6 against.

Under the new rules, bloc names may no longer include individuals’ names or references to state and local government bodies. The measure is expected to affect initiatives linked to prominent figures, including businessman Samvel Karapetyan and his “Strong Armenia” bloc.

Lawmakers also reinstated stricter ballot secrecy provisions. Ballots will now again be invalidated if envelopes contain any items other than the official ballot — a rule removed in 2024 and now restored.

Authorities argue the change is necessary to prevent vote-buying schemes, where voters could be asked to include identifying markers in envelopes to prove compliance.

The amendments are intended to close procedural loopholes and reinforce electoral integrity ahead of upcoming elections.


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Lukashenko Urges Caution on Armenia as Yerevan Leaves CSTO Future Open

Chalian Meline
Caucasus Watch, Germany
April 9 2026
9 Apr 2026 | News, Politics, Armenia

Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko has urged a “careful and accurate” approach toward Armenia within the CSTO, as Yerevan continues to freeze its participation in the alliance.

Speaking to CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov, Lukashenko noted that Armenia “seems not to support work within the CSTO, yet at the same time remains in the organization.”

He warned that the bloc should take into account Armenia’s domestic political situation. “The situation in Armenia is difficult… particularly during the election period,” he said.

Armenia suspended its participation in the CSTO in February 2024, citing dissatisfaction with the organization’s response to its security concerns.

At the same time, Armenian lawmaker Andranik Kocharyan indicated that full withdrawal remains possible. “Never say never. The world is very turbulent,” he said.

He also criticized the CSTO’s lack of concrete support. “They didn’t act, right? Our problem arose from the situation at Armenia’s borders, and we asked the CSTO for support two or three times. That support, aside from verbal statements, did not produce any results for us,” he added.

Kocharyan stressed that any future decision will be based solely on Armenia’s national interests.


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Armenia Records Strong Tourism Growth in Early 2026

Emma Jilavian
Caucasus Watch, Germany
April 9 2026
9 Apr 2026 | News, Economy, Armenia

Armenia recorded a sharp rise in tourism in the first quarter of the year, with 453,138 visitors — up 18.2% year-on-year, Economy Minister Gevorg Papoyan said.

The increase marks the highest first-quarter figure on record.

“This is 18.2% higher – or more than 70,000 additional tourists – compared to the same period last year,” Papoyan said.

The surge comes alongside steady growth in air travel. Passenger traffic at Zvartnots and Shirak airports exceeded 5.3 million between January and November 2025.

Zvartnots accounted for over 5.18 million passengers, while Shirak handled just over 127,000.

Overall traffic rose by 7.3% compared to the same period in 2024, reflecting continued recovery and expansion in Armenia’s travel sector.


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Zakharova: Moscow will respond to Baku’s demand not to mention Karabakh

Babken Chilingarian
Eurasia Daily
April 9 2026
Zakharova: Moscow will respond to Baku’s demand not to mention Karabakh

Russia will provide Azerbaijan with a response through diplomatic channels to the statement of the republic’s Foreign Ministry regarding the requirement not to mention the Karabakh issue, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said.

She recalled that Russia, and especially Russian President Vladimir Putin, played a crucial role in resolving the conflict in Karabakh.

“We have consistently sought to create the necessary conditions for resolving this most sensitive and complex issue in relations between Baku and Yerevan… It was thanks to our efforts that we managed to achieve an end to the bloodshed in the fall of 2020,” Zakharova said.

She also recalled that thanks to Moscow’s efforts, it was possible to launch the process of normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

However, Zakharova noted that there is still a lot to be done for a final settlement — to sign a peace treaty, resume transport and economic ties, delineate and demarcate borders, and strengthen trust between citizens of the two countries.

Earlier, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry called on Russia “not to use the Karabakh conflict in political discussions.”

https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/04/09/zakharova-moscow-will-respond-to-bakus-demand-not-to-mention-karabakh

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Russia to Armenia: Do as We Say

Antonian Lara
April 9 2026
Armenia has few options despite its rapprochement with Azerbaijan and Turkey and ties to the EU. None provides Yerevan with viable security.
a:hover]:text-red” st1yle=”box-sizing:border-box;border-width:0px;border-style:solid;border-color:currentcolor;font-size:1.125rem;line-height:2rem”>By Emil Avdaliani
April 9, 2026

When on April 1, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met Vladimir Putin in the Russian capital, the Armenian leader’s agenda was clear — to bolster his difficult position before the June parliamentary elections.

It did not go smoothly.

The Russian side used the opportunity to present an ultimatum to Yerevan and to broadcast the videoed exchange — choose us, Putin told Pashinyan, or choose the European Union (EU). You cannot choose both.

The Russian logic is clear — one cannot be a member state in mutually exclusive supranational economic entities such as the EU and the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

Russia is “absolutely calm” about Armenia’s efforts to forge closer ties with the EU, Putin said. While Pashinyan agreed that his country could not straddle both blocs indefinitely, he would have understood the menacing underlying message. Russia does not like the countries of what it terms the near-abroad to look wistfully westward. That was one key reason why the Kremlin invaded Ukraine, after all.

The discussion moved on to other sensitive issues, including another Russian-run grouping, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a six-member alliance that’s a low-fat version of NATO.

Armenia has not forgotten or forgiven Russia’s dismissal of its appeals for help during and after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 with non-CSTO member Azerbaijan. The Russian president said action had been impossible given that the region belonged to Azerbaijan, and that Armenia’s internationally recognized territory remained largely intact.

The 20-minute filmed exchange then moved on to far more abstract topics such as democracy and internet freedom in Armenia. The Russian president seemed uninterested and slightly irritated to hear Pashinyan’s digression, including comments on freedom that would be construed as critical of Russian authoritarianism.

Neither side can regard the exchanges as very helpful. Indeed, it seemed the meeting highlighted mutual distrust between the two long-time allies. Tensions have grown in intensity over the past year or so, when preparations for the June 7 parliamentary elections began. Pro-government Armenian politicians have consistently hinted that Russia has been working behind the scenes to deepen and exploit relations between the administration and the Armenian church.

Relatedly, Russia wants its ally, Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, to run as a potential candidate with the Strong Armenia party. The country’s leadership countered by launching an investigation against Karapetyan, placing him under house arrest. On that matter, Pashinyan told the Russian leader that “only citizens holding an Armenian passport — and no other nationality — can run in these elections”. Karapetyan says he has been stripped of his Russian nationality.

Russia sees an opportunity in Armenia. The upcoming elections present a perfect opportunity to solve what it sees as the Pashinyan problem. The 50-year-old former journalist came to power in 2018 via a peaceful revolution that was not explicitly anti-Russian but which looked to the Kremlin awfully like the so-called color revolutions that swept many sympathetic regimes in neighboring states.

Pashinyan suffers low popularity, and the Kremlin now hopes to advance its allies, which mostly feature politicians from the pre-2018 period.

Armenia has few options to counter Russian pressure. But it does have the option of withdrawal from CSTO and the EAEU, and made some signals indicating that after the Moscow meeting.

Yet the room for maneuver is tight, and Putin has already acted on his threat. Soon after the summit, Moscow announced tighter requirements for Armenian imports. The agricultural watchdog, Rosselkhoznadzor, argued that a large part of Armenian exports might not meet EAEU sanitary requirements. Russia can also use other tested weapons in its well-used coercive armory — for example, it sells gas to Armenia at a much lower price than EU levels.

Armenia’s options are limited. It’s true that the country has lately improved its ties with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Talks on reopening the long-closed border with Turkey, as well as transit through Azerbaijan underway, with some tangible results already in place. Moreover, Azeri rhetoric toward Armenia has markedly softened, and there seems to be a genuine hope for a long-term peace to be enshrined in a peace document. Both sides are also cooperating on the Trump Route planned to pass through Armenia’s southernmost region of Syunik.

Yet, this does not guarantee Armenia’s long-term security. With Iran in flames and with Azerbaijan and Turkey becoming ever closer militarily, the regional balance of power does not favor the Armenian state. Russia remains a critical component in Yerevan’s security calculus.

Then there is the EU, which has, over the two years, expanded its engagement with Yerevan but still has little to offer in terms of concrete steps that would open the door to Armenian membership. Any such prospect seems far off in the future, despite consistent French support for the country.

The Pashinyan-Putin exchanges illustrated Russia’s keen understanding of Armenia’s dilemmas and difficulties. And that its efforts to walk a narrow line between competing blocs, of playing one side against the other, has its limits.

Yerevan is increasingly facing a Russia that is more demanding, willing to issue ultimatums and to employ its well-thumbed encyclopedia of coercion to raise pressure in the run-up to the parliamentary vote. Yerevan has few options to resist.

Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of silk roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

https://cepa.org/article/russia-to-armenia-do-as-we-say/

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Arménie. Les réfugiés du Haut-Karabakh face à la paix dictée par Bakou

Emma Jilavian
Orient XXI
9 avril 2026

Arménie. Les réfugiés du Haut-Karabakh face à la paix dictée par Bakou

Les discussions de paix entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan se sont accélérées sous l’impulsion de l’administration Trump. Si elle peut amener une stabilité, bienvenue dans la région, la paix selon les règles de Bakou n’est pas imaginable pour les réfugiés du Haut-Karabakh. Reportage.

 Hugo Laulan

Le rouge, le bleu et l’orange. Les trois couleurs du drapeau de l’Arménie se déclinent un peu partout dans Erevan, la capitale. L’étendard flotte au-dessus des bâtiments officiels, sur les places, ou en format miniature dans les commerces. Accroché à un balcon à côté de la Cascade, rue Tamanyan, un autre drapeau se fait une place : celui de la république du Haut-Karabakh, appelée « Artsakh » par les Arméniens. Il reprend les mêmes couleurs que le drapeau arménien mais s’en distingue par la présence d’un chevron en gradins, symbole de la séparation entre le Haut-Karabakh et le reste de l’Arménie.

En septembre 2023, l’Azerbaïdjan a lancé une offensive éclair et repris en quelques jours le contrôle total de la province peuplée majoritairement d’Arméniens. Plus de 100 000 personnes étaient contraintes à l’exil. Cette offensive faisait suite à la « deuxième guerre du Haut-Karabakh »en 2020, au cours de laquelle l’Azerbaïdjan avait repris le contrôle d’une partie du territoire. Près de 4 000 personnes avaient été tuées durant ce conflit côté arménien, un peu moins de 3 000 côté azerbaïdjanais.

Depuis, Nikol Pachinian, Premier ministre de l’Arménie, et Ilham Aliyev, président de l’Azerbaïdjan, tentent de normaliser leurs relations. L’arrivée à la Maison blanche de Donald Trump au début de l’année 2025 a impulsé une nouvelle dynamique dans le dialogue entre les deux dirigeants.

« Je pense que lorsque Donald Trump évoque tous les conflits qu’il a résolus, celui entre l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan est peut-être le plus avancé », explique Tigran Grigoryan, directeur du Centre régional pour la démocratie et la sécurité (CRDS), basé à Erevan. « Ce n’est pas comme s’il y avait une guerre avant l’intervention de Trump, mais il y avait beaucoup de tensions et son intervention a contribué à les apaiser quelque peu », analyse le spécialiste.

La guerre en Iran, déclenchée le 28 février par les États-Unis et Israël, a par ailleurs fait craindre une extension du conflit dans le Caucase. Deux drones, probablement iraniens, ont touché l’exclave azerbaïdjanaise du Nakhitchevan le 5 mars, ravivant dans un premier temps les tensions entre les deux pays. Bakou a finalement décidé de calmer le jeu pour éviter l’escalade, Ilham Aliyev félicitant le nouveau guide suprême iranien après l’assassinat d’Ali Khamenei.

Une paix impossible

Le 8 août 2025, les deux dirigeants du Caucase ont signé à Washington un protocole d’accord, prémices d’un futur accord de paix évoqué depuis plusieurs mois. Ce texte prévoit la mise en place d’un corridor entre l’Azerbaïdjan et son exclave du Nakhitchevan, via l’Arménie : la « route Trump pour la paix internationale et la prospérité » (Tripp).

Ces échanges se sont concrétisés avec la visite, du 9 au 11 février, du vice-président états-unien J. D. Vance en Arménie et en Azerbaïdjan. Une visite fructueuse, conclue par la signature de plusieurs accords bilatéraux entre les États-Unis et les deux pays voisins. Elle symbolise également les changements de rapport de forces dans la région du Caucase du Sud, où Moscou, puissance et médiateur historique, est en perte de vitesse depuis la guerre en Ukraine, au profit de Washington.

Malgré ce regain de tensions, les discussions ont « apporté une sorte de stabilité dans la région, au moins à court et moyen terme », décrypte Tigran Grigoryan. Pourtant, les réfugiés du Haut-Karabakh rencontrés dans la capitale arménienne ont pour la plupart du mal à imaginer cette paix possible.

Au cœur d’Erevan, les Arméniens de l’Artsakh peuvent se retrouver au centre culturel Ararich, qui dispense aux enfants « des cours de dessin ou encore des ateliers de langue », explique Hunan Tadevosyan, son directeur. Si le lien avec leur terre d’origine est entretenu, le ressentiment et la douleur ne quittent pas les familles.

Dans les locaux de l’association, un grand drapeau du Haut-Karabakh est déployé. Sur les murs sont exposés les photos et les dessins de Tigran Avetisyan, un soldat arménien tué pendant la guerre. Sa mère les a légués à l’ONG et Hunan compte organiser une exposition pour les enfants.

« Je n’ai jamais vraiment quitté le Haut-Karabakh. Mentalement, je suis toujours là-bas », explique Lusine Minasyan, pendant que son fils joue avec d’autres enfants de réfugiés. Originaire de la région d’Askeran, foyer de résistance arménienne, elle a perdu son mari durant la guerre de 2020. À 38 ans, elle élève désormais seule son fils à Erevan. Dans le Haut-Karabakh, Lusine était professeure à l’université. Aujourd’hui, comme beaucoup de mères de famille, elle survit en préparant et vendant des pâtisseries typiques de sa région. « Ses baklavas sont les meilleures », assurent plusieurs parents présents au centre Ararich.

Impossible pour elle d’entendre parler d’une quelconque paix. « Comment je vais expliquer à mon fils qu’il va devoir vivre aux côtés de ceux qui ont tué son père », témoigne la mère de famille. Si la paix est signée, elle assure qu’elle quittera le pays.

Lusine Minasyan a perdu son mari pendant la guerre de 2020. Aujourd’hui, elle ne peut pas imaginer la paix avec ceux «  qui ont tué le père de son fils  ».

Marine Gabrielyan, elle aussi réfugiée du Haut-Karabakh, partage le même point de vue. « C’est irréel d’imaginer vivre avec les Azéris. Depuis mon enfance, j’ai perdu quasiment tous mes proches durant ces conflits », déplore la réfugiée. Durant la guerre de 2020, le plus âgé de ses trois fils a été blessé. Les deux femmes attendent les élections législatives de juin 2026 et espèrent un changement à la tête du pays.

« Il n’y a pas un seul mot sur nous »

Derrière le comptoir du Tumanyan’s Art, Vadim Balayan a un discours plus nuancé. Avec sa femme Kristen, ils tiennent ce café-restaurant où ils servent notamment plusieurs spécialités culinaires de leur région. Rencontré une première fois en janvier 2025, avant les accords de Washington, l’homme voyait dans les négociations de paix « un énième jeu politique », dans lequel l’Arménie « n’a d’autre choix que de signer la paix pour éviter une nouvelle guerre ».

Vadim Balayan, réfugié du Haut-Karabakh, dans le café-restaurant Tumanyan’s Art, qu’il tient aujourd’hui avec sa femme, Kristen, dans le centre d’Erevan.

Un an plus tard, avec l’avancée des négociations, il demande : « Comment pourrait-on passer à autre chose ? C’est notre vie, on ne peut pas l’oublier. » Si, selon lui, il est encore trop tôt pour tourner la page, il pointe surtout du doigt une forme de « déconnexion » au sein de la population arménienne : « Certains pensent que l’on peut encore retourner dans l’Artsakh ! »

Ce désarroi des réfugiés s’explique aussi par leur absence totale dans les négociations de paix. « Il n’y a pas un seul mot sur nous », regrette Siranush Sargsyan, journaliste originaire du Haut-Karabakh : « Comment pouvez-vous prétendre discuter de la paix et de la prospérité dans une région, en mettant de côté une partie des habitants de cette région ? C’est assez traumatisant pour nous, ils prétendent que ces gens n’existent pas.

D’autant que la plupart des réfugiés éprouvent une situation économique et sociale très tendue, avec des loyers très élevés, des difficultés à trouver un emploi combinées à la fin des aides versées par l’État.

Cette paix est totalement illusoire. On ne peut pas l’envisager si nous faisons tout ce que l’Azerbaïdjan veut.

« La principale faiblesse de cet accord est qu’il n’y a aucune réciprocité entre les deux parties, souligne Tigran Grigoryan, l’Arménie accepte toutes les demandes et les conditions de l’Azerbaïdjan. Il est nécessaire de trouver un terrain d’entente. » Le journaliste Siranush Sargsyan renchérit : « Cette paix est totalement illusoire. On ne peut pas l’envisager si nous faisons tout ce que l’Azerbaïdjan veut. »

« Ilham Aliyev fait son possible pour effacer toute trace de présence arménienne sur ce territoire », argue Altay Goyushov, historien azéri et directeur de l’Institut de recherche de Bakou. Le président azerbaïdjanais, qui dirige le pays d’une main de fer depuis plus de vingt ans, dicte aussi le rythme des discussions en posant des conditions que l’Arménie se voit obligée d’accepter pour espérer la paix. La demande la plus symbolique : qu’Erevan retire toute mention au Haut-Karabakh dans sa Constitution. À l’heure actuelle, la déclaration d’indépendance de l’Arménie, qui date de 1990 et est intégrée à la Constitution, fait référence à la « réunification » de l’Arménie et du Haut-Karabakh.

Ni guerre ni paix

Quel avenir imaginent alors les réfugiés ? Si la situation actuelle n’est pas en leur faveur, Lusine Minasyan reste optimiste : « Je n’ai pas tourné cette page, j’ai toujours l’espoir de revenir là-bas. » Lorsqu’elle évoque le futur, sa gorge se serre. « Je pense que la nouvelle génération nous ramènera dans le Haut-Karabakh. La seule demande de mon fils, c’est de pouvoir aller déposer des fleurs sur la tombe de son père », plaide-t-elle, émue.

Pour sa compatriote réfugiée Marine Gabrielyan, les discussions actuelles illustrent une nouvelle menace pour l’Arménie : « Il n’y a rien de nouveau dans ce projet de corridor, si ce n’est que ce qui s’est passé dans le Haut-Karabakh risque de se dérouler ici, dans le reste de l’Arménie. »

Pour Marine Gabrielyan, l’Azerbaïdjan pourrait dans les années à venir, lancer une offensive contre l’Arménie, comme il l’a fait pour reprendre le contrôle du Haut-Karabakh.

Un scénario impossible à anticiper, mais qui paraît plausible selon Altay Goyushov : « À court terme, tant que l’administration Trump est en place, je ne pense pas que l’Azerbaïdjan lancera une nouvelle guerre. Mais la propagande est toujours aussi présente dans le pays, l’Arménie est toujours dépeinte comme un ennemi. Le risque existe car le régime d’Ilham Aliyev est un régime autoritaire et qu’il est impossible de prédire ce qu’il va faire. »

D’autant que, selon l’historien azéri, Ilham Aliyev n’a pas besoin d’un accord de paix. « Cette situation où il n’y a pas de guerre et pas de paix convient très bien à son régime. Sa seule préoccupation est de conserver le pouvoir, et pour cela, il doit continuer d’alimenter le sentiment nationaliste », estime-t-il.

Pour conserver un semblant d’espoir, les réfugiés doivent « faire le nécessaire pour rester durablement en Arménie. C’est le minimum, et c’est un pas de plus vers un retour dans l’Artsakh ».

Difficile d’imaginer l’Arménie s’engager de nouveau dans un conflit armé après les défaites de 2020 et 2023. La position du gouvernement arménien semble même résolue. « Vous comprenez comme moi que si l’on ne referme pas le dossier du Haut-Karabakh, la paix est impossible », déclarait le Premier ministre Nikol Pachinian dans son discours à la nation le 18 août 2025.

« Je pense que la société est fatiguée de la guerre, analyse Tigran Grigoryan. L’Arménie ne semble pas avoir les ressources pour demander quelque chose de plus ambitieux. Comparée aux autres scénarios, notamment celui de l’escalade et des menaces de l’Azerbaïdjan sur l’ensemble du territoire national, il semblerait que ce soit la moins mauvaise des solutions. »

Mont Ararat depuis la Cascade à Erevan. Emblème de l’Arménie, le sommet se trouve à une cinquantaine de kilomètres au sud de la capitale, en Turquie.

Un point de vue réaliste mais difficile à accepter pour la majorité des réfugiés. Si elle ne croit pas dans la volonté azerbaïdjanaise de faire la paix, Siranush Sargsyan est consciente des marges de manœuvre limitées de l’Arménie. Pour conserver un semblant d’espoir, les réfugiés doivent « faire le nécessaire pour rester durablement en Arménie. C’est le minimum, et c’est un pas de plus vers un retour dans l’Artsakh », selon elle.

« L’Arménie a besoin de nous », affirme la journaliste avant de conclure : « Ce n’est pas juste un rêve d’y retourner. C’est notre droit. »

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U.N. Secretary-General’s envoy arrives in Iran

Tatoyan Vazgen
Read the article in: FrançaisՀայերենRussian

U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ personal envoy has arrived in Iran as part of a regional tour aimed at supporting efforts toward a comprehensive and durable resolution to the Iran war, and is also expected to visit key mediator Pakistan, the United Nations said on Wednesday.

Jean Arnault will hear Iran’s perspectives on the way forward and reiterate Guterres’ commitment to supporting a peaceful settlement, according to a U.N. statement.

Arnault also called on all leaders to choose the path of peaceful resolution and the protection of civilians, the statement said.

Read the article in: FrançaisՀայերենRussian

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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