Qamishlo commemorates Armenian Genocide 111th anniversary, draws parallels wit

Kurdish Press, Syria
April 23 2026

A lecture organized by the Armenian Social Council in cooperation with the Armenian Union Party, commemorating the 111th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, highlighted the massacres and forced displacement which Armenians were exposed to at the hands of the Ottoman state, a systematic extermination that targeted their existence and identity, noting that what happened in history bears similarities to what the world is witnessing today in terms of conflicts that are planned and target other peoples.

The Armenian Social Council, in cooperation with the Armenian Union Party, organized a lecture on Thursday at al-Qira’a (The Reading) Park in Qamishlo to commemorate the 111th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, remember the victims, and highlight the historical and humanitarian dimensions of this tragedy.

The event was attended by representatives of the Autonomous Administration institutions, as well as religious, community, and cultural figures from various components; Yazidis, Muslims, and Christians.

The lecture comprised three main axes; the first of which presented by Hanna Soumi; the researcher specializing at indigenous peoples’ affairs, addressed the massacres and genocides perpetrated against Armenians at the Ottomans’ hands, reviewing the historical background and humanitarian consequences. The second axis focused on agreements related to Armenia, while the third one explored the commonalities among peoples who have suffered genocide, emphasizing the nature of the threats these peoples have faced throughout history.

In his lecture, Hanna Soumi addressed a number of historical issues related to the Armenian genocide, and recalled the genocide during the Ottoman era, saying, “The Ottomans exterminated more than a million Armenians with a Turanian mentality.” He pointed out that the Ottoman project was an Islamist political project, and the massacres began from 1877 until 1908. Then, preparations were made for another phase of genocide during the Young Turk Movement between 1908 and 1918, followed by a third phase that culminated in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which eliminated what remained of the Armenians’ rights. The Kurds were also affected, considering that these events are linked to Islamist political thought, which led to the fragmentation of peoples.

Soumi stated that the Russian Empire, as an Orthodox Tsarist state, sympathized with the Armenians, adding that it had managed to enter Armenian territories, particularly Western Armenia, which comprised six provinces. He noted that these regions were granted to the Armenians under the Treaty of San Stefano, signed on March 3, 1878, which granted them rights related to the six provinces. This was later amended in the Berlin Treaty on July 13, which, affirmed in Articles 16 and 61 the guarantee of Armenian rights and the implementation of reforms in the Armenian regions.

He pointed out that the Ottoman authorities under Sultan Abdel Hamid II did not accept these reforms and began neglecting these regions, arresting and killing Armenians. He noted that the Armenians responded with the Sassoun Uprising of 1894, led by Armenian political parties against the Ottoman rule, and that this uprising contributed to strengthening Armenian national identity.

He noted that during that period, the Hamidiye Brigades were formed, comprising groups of devout Sunni Kurds alongside some aghas (local leaders), where religious and nationalist factors intertwined, and they raised the banner of jihad as guardians of the Islamic empire against the Armenians.

Soumi pointed out that the Sassoun events continued until 1896, resulting, according to him, in the deaths of approximately 30,000 Armenians. He also mentioned another uprising in Sassoun in 1904, during which Armenians were subjected to further massacres in that region and other Armenian areas.

He pointed out that during that period, the “Hamidiye Brigades” were formed, comprising groups of devout Sunni Kurds alongside some aghas (local notables), as religion and nationalism intertwined in this movement, which raised the banner of jihad as guardians of the Islamic empire against the Armenians.

Soumi pointed out that the Sassoun events continued until 1896, resulting, according to him, in the killing of approximately 30,000 Armenians. He also mentioned another uprising in Sassoun in 1904, during which Armenians were subjected to further massacres in that region and other Armenian areas.

Soumi made clear that coordination later took place between the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) and secular parties, with the aim of working to change the Ottoman system and establish a democratic system that included all peoples.

He addressed the Turanian ideology, pointing to what he described as the role of various groups during that historical period, and scattered historical events dating back to the late 19th century, including the convening of the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897.

He explained that preparations for the genocide took place through closed meetings to discuss mechanisms for ending the Armenian presence, which at the time numbered approximately three and a half million according to Ottoman state archives. He added that the Armenian elite in Istanbul was targeted, with hundreds arrested and subsequently executed.

He further stated that the killings directly targeted males, and that orders were issued by Ottoman leaders, including Talaat Pasha, to carry out widespread killings and deportations, including forced displacement towards areas in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. He also spoke of the widespread violations that accompanied those operations.

He stated that “April 23, 1915, marked a turning point in these events, initiating the mass deportations and the accompanying human tragedies.” Eastern Anatolia was completely emptied of Armenians, and then, according to the narrative, a second phase began between 1916 and 1918, involving investigations and trials, as those responsible for these crimes were pursued, while some fled Turkey.

Soumi highlighted the crimes committed against the Armenians, which claimed the lives of over a million Armenians, who were brutally murdered during the Armenian Genocide. This genocide began primarily in 1915, and its repercussions, including killings and deportations, continued until 1923.

He noted that the deportations took place in convoys towards areas such as Deir ez-Zor, where Armenians endured harsh humanitarian conditions. Soumi also pointed out that the suffering of the Armenians continued in later phases, referring to the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, and asserting that “history is repeating itself” through Erdogan’s use of mercenaries; the Hamzat and Amshat in some recent conflicts.

At the end of the lecture, the researcher Hanna Soumi highlighted the stances of some peoples, noting that Kurdish and Yazidi figures and groups contributed to protecting Armenians and saving thousands of them, such as the Yazidi leader Hamo Sherro, in remarkable humanitarian acts that emerged during those bloody massacres perpetrated against the Armenians.

ANHA

https://hawarnews.com/en/qamishlo-commemorates-armenian-genocide-111th-anniversary-draws-parallels-with-present

Opinion: Is Azerbaijan to blame for the delay in normalising relations between

JAM News
April 23 2026
  • JAMnews
  • Baku

Armenia’s parliamentary speaker Alen Simonyan told journalists in Istanbul that Azerbaijan is influencing the pace of efforts to normalise relations between Turkey and Armenia.

“On the one hand, Azerbaijan is negotiating with us; on the other, it does not allow Turkey to negotiate with us. It is a strange situation. Turkey has, in a way, become a hostage to these relations,” Simonyan said.

He added that earlier there had been talk of reopening the border after resolving the Karabakh issue, followed by a focus on an Armenian-Azerbaijani peace agreement. Despite reaching consensus on 17 points, this has not translated into practical results.

The remarks drew particular attention as they came shortly after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum that Ankara is pursuing normalisation with Armenia “step by step in coordination with Azerbaijan”.

This apparent contradiction underscores the relevance of the issue: while Ankara and Yerevan have kept channels of normalisation open since 2022, Turkey’s leadership has openly linked the process to the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace agenda.

Simonyan’s statement therefore goes beyond a political remark, once again raising the question of how closely the two parallel processes — Turkey-Armenia rapprochement and the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement — are interconnected.

Historical and political context

The historical background is clear. Turkey recognised the independence of Armenia in 1991, but diplomatic relations between the two have never been established.

According to Turkey’s foreign ministry, Ankara closed its land border with Armenia in 1993 following the occupation of Azerbaijan’s Kalbajar district.

Armenia’s foreign ministry also notes that Turkey shut both air and land borders in 1993, although air links were partially restored in 1995.

The closure of the border has therefore been shaped not only by bilateral tensions between Ankara and Yerevan, but also by the wider regional dynamics of the Karabakh conflict.

In recent years, this alignment has taken on a more institutional form. The Shusha Declaration, signed in 2021, elevated relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey to the level of an “alliance”, formalising the principle of “one nation — two states” as the political foundation of their ties.

Analytical assessments also suggest that the main obstacles to normalisation between Ankara and Yerevan over the decades have been the Karabakh conflict and the strategic coordination between Baku and Ankara. In other words, Turkey’s position is shaped less by pressure from lobbying groups and more by interests in energy, security, transport and regional influence.

From this perspective, Turkey’s solidarity with Azerbaijan is not simply an emotional slogan, but part of a broader geopolitical choice.

Assessing Simonyan’s claims

The facts suggest that Alen Simonyan’s argument contains an element of truth, but does not capture the full picture.

As part of the current normalisation process, launched in late 2021, special envoys Ruben Rubinyan and Serdar Kılıç have held six rounds of talks. On 1 July 2022, the sides agreed to open the land border to third-country nationals and diplomats.

Direct flights resumed in February 2022, and direct cargo flights have been permitted since early 2023. On 29 December 2025, an agreement was announced to simplify visa procedures for holders of diplomatic, service and special passports, which, according to the Armenian side, entered into force on 1 January 2026.

Official statements from both sides emphasise the goal of full normalisation and a willingness to engage without preconditions.

At the same time, Turkey has explicitly linked meaningful progress to the signing of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

In August 2025, Turkey’s foreign ministry welcomed progress in the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process and voiced support for “brotherly Azerbaijan”. In November, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told parliament that Turkey would be ready for full normalisation with Armenia only after a final peace agreement is signed.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reiterated this position on 17 April in Antalya, stating that normalisation is proceeding “in coordination with Azerbaijan”.

Simonyan’s reference to an “Azerbaijan factor” is therefore not without basis. However, portraying it solely as an obstacle imposed by Baku would be an oversimplification, as Turkey has consistently framed this sequencing as part of its official policy.

Moreover, although a 17-point draft agreement was initialled on 8 August 2025 in Washington, D.C., a final peace deal has yet to be signed, due to issues related to Armenia’s constitution and other unresolved questions.

Reactions in Azerbaijan

The dominant line of reaction in Azerbaijan can be summed up as follows: Ankara does not act under Baku’s dictate on the Armenian track, but rather in close strategic coordination with it.

In an article by Caliber.az, Alen Simonyan’s remarks are criticised in a polemical tone. The publication argues that Turkey sees the opening of the border not as a result of being a “hostage”, but as a step that can only follow a final settlement, based on principles of brotherhood and alliance with Azerbaijan.

The same article cites a statement by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Antalya as a key argument. This reflects a broader trend in pro-government analytical discourse in Azerbaijan: Turkey pursues an independent policy, but its regional priorities are closely aligned with Baku.

In this context, media narratives also point to the continued open coordination between the two sides.

Regional context

Alen Simonyan’s remarks are difficult to assess in isolation from the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. At the forum, held on 17–19 April, Armenia was not represented by Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan or special envoy Ruben Rubinyan, but by Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan.

This marked the first time since 2022 that Yerevan participated in the Antalya platform at a lower level.

The Armenian side has not officially explained the decision, but experts quoted by JamNews interpret it as a signal of dissatisfaction with Turkey over the lack of progress on previously agreed steps, including the opening of the border.

At the same time, Kostanyan met his Turkish counterpart Berris Ekinci in Antalya and told CNN Türk that Armenia is ready to open the border both politically and technically, while further progress now depends on Ankara. This suggests that dialogue remains open, even as rhetoric has hardened.

Domestic political timing is also a key factor. Parliamentary elections in Armenia are scheduled for 7 June 2026, and both the OSCE and regional analysts see them as critical for the country’s foreign policy trajectory.

Azerbaijani political analyst Farhad Mammadov noted in March that the election results, as well as a possible constitutional referendum in Armenia, could significantly affect the peace agenda. In this context, Simonyan’s sharper rhetoric may also be aimed at a domestic audience — signalling that the government remains committed to normalisation with Turkey, while avoiding the appearance of unilateral concessions.

Meanwhile, in Istanbul, Numan Kurtulmuş floated the idea of involving Armenia in the Turkey–Azerbaijan–Georgia format. This indicates that trilateral or broader regional frameworks remain open and could expand further if a peace agreement is reached.

Azerbaijan Destroys Armenian Holy Mother of God Church in Artsakh

April 23 2026

Satellite imagery confirms that the regime demolished the church in Artsakh’s former capital city of Stepanakert.

The sustained threats to Armenian religious and cultural heritage across Artsakh (also known as Nagorno-Karabakh) have reached a new level following reports that the Azerbaijani regime has razed another prominent church in the region.

Satellite imagery obtained by Caucasus Heritage Watch (CHW) confirmed that the Holy Mother of God Church, which stood in the former capital city of Stepanakert, was demolished within the last eight weeks.

The Artsakh Tourism and Cultural Development Agency shared the news of the church’s destruction on social media on Tuesday, April 21, only three days before the 111th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. Though the agency did not share photos of the demolition in its notice, CHW’s researchers were able to pinpoint supporting photographic evidence within a day by pulling images from the Sentinel-2 satellite from March 3 and April 2.

“Higher resolution imagery will provide a clearer picture in the coming weeks,” the group of scholars said in a statement. “CHW will also continue working with satellite image providers to try to provide greater resolution on the timing of the destruction.”

Unlike the centuries-old churches and burial grounds that have been damaged, appropriated, or destroyed by the Azerbaijani regime since the forced displacement of over 130,000 Armenians in September 2023, the Holy Mother of God Church was consecrated in 2019 after 12 years of construction. During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, the church served as a bomb shelter amid the Azerbaijani bombardment of Stepanakert.

Scholars have warned that Azerbaijan’s targeted destruction of these sites, having accelerated since the swift and deadly 2023 takeover of the Artsakh region, amounts to “cultural genocide.”

News of the latest demolition comes shortly after the resignation of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute Director Edita Gzoyan at the request of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. While accompanying United States Vice President JD Vance and his wife for a visit to the Tsitsernakaberd Memorial complex in Yerevan last February, Gzoyan reportedly presented Vance with a book about Artsakh, which Pashinyan interpreted as a “security issue.”

“On my instructions, yes, I asked her to write a resignation letter. I considered it a provocative act, contrary to the foreign policy pursued by the government,” Pashinyan reportedly said at a briefing.

In his campaign for reelection coming up on June 7, Pashinyan, who has long been blamed for the dissolution of the 33-year-old autonomous state, has repeatedly reiterated that further dialogue surrounding Artsakh threatens the 2025 peace agreement in which Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to recognize each other’s (newly established) territorial integrity. On April 20, Pashinyan most recently emphasized that the “Karabakh topic,” as in the push for negotiating the ethnic Armenian population’s right of return to the region, has been closed for the sake of peacekeeping.

This Friday, April 24, institutions and individuals around the world will commemorate the victims of the Armenian Genocide, the mass killing of 1.5 million Armenians under the Ottoman Empire in 1915, which the governments of Turkey and Azerbaijan continue to deny to this day.

Baku–Moscow Tensions Subdued, but Underlying Distrust Persists

Jamestown Foundation
April 21 2026

Baku–Moscow Tensions Subdued, but Underlying Distrust Persists

04.21.2026 Vasif Huseynov

Executive Summary:

  • Azerbaijan lodged diplomatic protests against Russia over President Vladimir Putin’s comments on Karabakh during his April 1 meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which Baku regarded as an attempt to reopen an issue it deems resolved.
  • Despite accumulated grievances over the past year and a half, including the December 2024 targeting of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 and Russian strikes on Azerbaijan’s embassy in Kyiv, the sides have largely compartmentalized disputes to protect economic ties.
  • Azerbaijan’s commitment to non-alignment keeps its relations with Russia open, but Baku is seeking concrete steps from Russia to repair relations, grounded in respect for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

The April 1 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Moscow was intended as a bilateral affair to manage the fraying edges of Russian–Armenian relations ahead of Yerevan’s parliamentary elections (President of Russia, April 1). Instead, it unexpectedly injected fresh irritants into Azerbaijan–Russia ties, already strained by a succession of grievances accumulated over the past year and a half (see EDM, January 15).

During his meeting with Pashinyan, Putin addressed the Karabakh question directly. He said, “Of course, the most sensitive issue to this day—and we recognize this, we discuss it often—is everything relating to Karabakh. We come back to it time and again” (President of Russia, April 1). He repeated the traditional Russian narrative that, after Armenia recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan in Prague in 2022, “It simply became wholly inappropriate for the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] to become involved in a process that had taken on an intra-Azerbaijani dimension.” Putin further noted that thanks to Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s joint efforts, and with active U.S. involvement, relations had been stabilized, and transport routes were being unfrozen. While seemingly benign—and designed largely for domestic Armenian consumption—the public airing of the Karabakh issue at a Russian–Armenian summit set off alarm bells in Baku.

Putin’s statement that “we come back to [the Karabakh issue] time and again” contradicts the current positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as both countries have been moving closer to effectively closing that chapter of the conflict. They are no longer negotiating issues related to Karabakh and are instead focusing on the normalization of their bilateral interstate relations (see EDM, February 11). Putin’s justification for the CSTO’s inaction also raises questions (see EDM, February 8, 2023). Putin himself dismissed the possibility of CSTO involvement during the Second Karabakh War. In early October 2020, he told the media that the war was not taking place on Armenian territory. Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov further clarified that the CSTO’s security guarantees “do not extend to Karabakh” (The Moscow Times, October 7, 2020).

Azerbaijan’s reaction was swift and pointed. Baku’s position that the use of its Karabakh region for political speculation is unacceptable was conveyed to the Russian government via diplomatic channels (Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 5). The formal protest was compounded by public commentary. Azerbaijani National Assembly Member Rasim Musabekov stated that Putin’s statements on Karabakh was completely inappropriate, insisting that the Karabakh issue is closed and cannot be revived (EDnews, April 8). He shares the common view that these references bring the loss of Karabakh to the forefront of Armenian politics before the June parliamentary elections and, as such, put Pashinyan in an unfavorable position vis-à-vis the Russia-backed opposition groups.

The irritation in Baku deepened when Peskov subsequently added to the controversy. He said, “The question of Karabakh’s ownership is in no way related to Russia; that decision rests with the Armenian authorities” (TASS, April 5). Far from defusing the situation, this framing—appearing to minimize Moscow’s historical posture toward Azerbaijani sovereignty—only compounded Baku’s indignation. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to this statement. It reminded the Russian side that “no country, including the Russian Federation, has ever questioned the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan, including the Garabagh [Karabakh] region” (Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 5).

Putin’s diplomatic spat over Karabakh was only the most recent episode in a longer pattern of tension. The deeper structural irritant in Baku–Moscow relations remains the December 2024 downing of Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) Flight 8243 over Russian airspace (see EDM, January 15). Russia’s Investigative Committee’s account of events appeared to absolve Russia’s military of any blame, attributing the crash to poor weather and failed landing attempts. This investigation omitted any mention of missile detonations or shrapnel damage, points that Putin had himself acknowledged during his meeting with Aliyev in Dushanbe in October 2025 (see EDM, November 12, 2025). Baku’s fury at what it perceived as a deliberate cover-up continued to simmer into the new year.

Adding another layer of grievance, at the Munich Security Conference in February, Aliyev declared that Russia had “deliberately attacked” Azerbaijan’s embassy and infrastructure in Kyiv, Ukraine, on multiple occasions. He stated that this occurred even after Baku provided Moscow with the coordinates of its diplomatic missions (Azertag, February 14; Euronews, February 16). Three attacks on the embassy compound occurred in July, August, and November 2025. Moscow denied intentionality, attributing the damage to Ukrainian air-defense malfunctions, but the repeated nature of the incidents lent little credibility to Russian disclaimers in Baku’s eyes (TASS, February 14).

Against this accumulation of grievances—the airline cover-up, the embassy strikes, and now the Karabakh commentary—the two countries have nonetheless worked to contain the damage and maintain the functional architecture of their bilateral relationship. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk’s visit to Baku in early March was emblematic of this compartmentalization. Overchuk thanked Aliyev for providing prompt assistance in evacuating Russian nationals from Iran during the U.S.–Israeli strikes, and the two sides discussed implementation of practical steps to resolve the 2024 AZAL crash issue in accordance with agreements reached in Dushanbe in 2025 (President of Azerbaijan, March 2). Overchuk noted that despite all the problems that have plagued relations in recent months, trade and economic cooperation have remained unaffected, with bilateral trade nearly reaching $5 billion in 2025 (TASS, March 2). Russia also separately expressed gratitude to Azerbaijan for assistance in delivering humanitarian aid to Iran (Report.az, April 1).

At the diplomatic level, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin and Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to Russia Rahman Mustafayev met on April 8 to discuss prospects for bilateral cooperation in trade, economic, cultural, and humanitarian spheres. Both sides noted their “mutual commitment to continuing effective joint work aimed at further strengthening multifaceted Russian–Azerbaijani ties and allied cooperation” (Report.az, April 8).

Baku has made clear that it has no interest in escalation with Moscow and no intention of severing the economic and other ties that bind the two neighbors. Azerbaijan’s stated preference is for friendly, mutually respectful relations—a posture consistent with its broader foreign policy of strategic balance and non-alignment in great-power rivalries. Overchuk’s assurances that the AZAL crash would be resolved in line with Putin’s commitments in Dushanbe—including compensation for the victims and their families—were received in Baku as a welcome signal that Moscow retains the political will to make good on its word. Baku is now waiting for those promises to be implemented. Concrete steps on accountability and compensation, more than any number of diplomatic communiqués, will be the true measure of whether Russia’s expressions of regret translate into meaningful redress.

The goodwill generated by Overchuk’s visit risks being eroded by developments on the Armenian track. The instrumentalization of the former Karabakh conflict for Russian political messaging ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections has left a sour aftertaste in Baku. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, every time Russian officials reach for the Karabakh file as a rhetorical prop in their dealings with Yerevan, they signal that Moscow has not fully reconciled itself to the post-2023 regional order in the South Caucasus. If Russia genuinely seeks to stabilize its ties with Baku, then respect for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and acceptance of the post-2023 regional order are prerequisites for the kind of relations both sides profess to want.

Cyprus Community of NSW affirms support ahead of Armenian genocide commemorati

Greek Herald
April 22 2026
Cyprus Community of NSW affirms support ahead of Armenian genocide commemorations

By Michael Peters Kyriacou, Honorary President, Cyprus Community of NSW

The tragedy of the Armenian Genocide remains one of the defining moral reckonings of the modern world. In the early twentieth century, an ancient people were subjected to systematic persecution, displacement, and destruction. What followed was not only the loss of life on an unimaginable scale, but the scattering of a civilisation across continents. Yet from this devastation, the Armenian people carried forward something that could not be extinguished: their faith, their culture, and their identity.

In the aftermath, many Armenian survivors sought refuge wherever safety could be found. Among those places was Cyprus, which became a sanctuary at a time when refuge itself was scarce. The island received Armenian families who arrived not with possessions, but with memory and resilience.

Over time, these communities took root, particularly in Nicosia, Larnaca, and Limassol. There, they built churches, established schools, and restored a sense of belonging. In doing so, they did more than rebuild their lives—they preserved a culture others had sought to erase.

The Armenian presence in Cyprus has never been peripheral. It has been woven into the broader fabric of Cypriot society, contributing to its cultural and intellectual life, while maintaining a distinct identity with quiet strength. It stands as a reminder that integration does not require assimilation, and that belonging does not require forgetting.

The connection between Armenians and Greeks—particularly Greek Cypriots—is neither incidental nor superficial. It is grounded in a shared civilisational experience shaped by history, geography and faith. Both peoples emerge from ancient traditions that have endured empire, upheaval and displacement. Both are shaped by Christianity, expressed through the Greek Orthodox Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church. These traditions have informed not only religious life, but the enduring emphasis on family, education, community cohesion and cultural continuity.

This shared inheritance has fostered a natural understanding between the two peoples—one shaped not only by similarity, but by parallel historical experience. Cyprus itself, particularly in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, carries its own narrative of displacement, loss and unresolved justice. While the contexts differ, the emotional resonance is unmistakable. It is here that empathy deepens into solidarity.

The Cyprus Community itself has not been untouched by tragedy. Many of its members, their families, and generations of their offspring have endured profound loss—carrying the pain, the scars, and the enduring memories of events that no human being should be asked to bear. This shared experience of suffering is not abstract; it is deeply personal and intergenerational. It is through this painful connection that the bond between the Cypriot and Armenian peoples has only been strengthened, deepened by mutual understanding, empathy, and a shared commitment to remembrance, dignity, and justice.

For decades, the Cyprus Community of NSW has maintained a close and enduring bond with the Armenian people. This relationship is grounded in shared history and cultural affinity, but also in a deeper understanding of resilience, identity and continuity. It is a bond strengthened through generations—through faith, community and a shared commitment to preserving heritage in the face of adversity.

In this spirit, the Cyprus Community of NSW affirms its support for the Armenian people in their rightful pursuit of justice and recognition of the Armenian Genocide. This position is not shaped by political convenience or semantic debate. It is grounded in principle. Recognition must extend beyond politics and beyond language; it must be anchored in truth, respect and an unwavering commitment to historical reality.

Recognition of the Armenian Genocide is not simply a matter of history—it is a question of justice and the integrity of international norms. To acknowledge what occurred is to affirm that crimes against humanity cannot be obscured by time or diminished by denial. It is to uphold the principle that the suffering of any people demands recognition, not silence.

In Sydney, this solemn remembrance will be marked by a formal commemoration hosted by the Armenian community, honouring the 111th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. The event, convened by the Armenian Genocide Commemorative Committee, will be held at the Chatswood Concourse, bringing together community leaders, dignitaries and members of the public in a collective act of reflection.

The commemoration will take place on Friday, 24 April 2026, with guests arriving at 6:30pm for a 7:00pm commencement, concluding at approximately 9:00pm. Attendance is limited, with invited guests requested to confirm in advance.

Such occasions are not merely ceremonial. They affirm that memory endures, that recognition matters, and that the principles of truth and justice must be upheld across generations. Through gatherings such as this, the Armenian community honours its past with dignity while inviting others to stand alongside them in acknowledgement and respect.

The Armenian people, in their endurance, stand as a testament to the resilience of civilisation itself. Their story is not only one of tragedy, but of survival with dignity. It reminds us that recognition is not about reopening wounds, but ensuring that they are neither ignored nor repeated.

For the Cyprus community, recognition is inseparable from our own historical consciousness. We understand that the past cannot be set aside—it must be acknowledged with honesty, not to entrench grievance, but to guide us toward a more just future. The Armenian experience forms part of a broader human narrative that calls for accountability, remembrance and respect.

To stand with the Armenian people is not an act of politics, but of principle. It reflects a commitment to the values that underpin civilised society: truth, dignity, faith and the rule of law. It affirms that the suffering of one people is never isolated, but part of a shared human responsibility.

In this spirit, the bond between Armenians and the Cyprus community endures—rooted in history, sustained by shared values, and expressed through a collective commitment to recognition and justice. Through remembrance, we honour those who were lost. Through recognition, we uphold the standards of humanity. And through solidarity, we affirm that such tragedies must never again unfold in silence.

ANN/Groong – Calendar of Events – 04/23/2026

Armenian News Calendar of events

(All times local to events)


    What: “American Organizations Supporting The Armenian Cause: An Overview”

    a lecture in English is given by Raffi Hamparian

    When: Thursday, April 30, 2026, 7:30 pm Pacific time

    Where: Crescenta Valley Meher & Satig Der Ohanessian Youth Center Hall

    2633 Honolulu Ave. Montrose, CA 91020

    Misc: This presentation will provide a broad overview of American institutions and prominent

    individuals who are working today, in tandem with the ANCA, to advocate for Armenia

    and Artsakh. In his remarks, Raffi Hamparian will address how American organizations 

    provide a powerful force to counter efforts by other lobbies to weaken and break the 

    ANCA’s leadership as it relates to advancing the  Armenian Cause.

    Raffi Hamparian served as the national chairman of the Armenian National Committee

    of America (ANCA). He is currently the chair of the ANCA Endowment Fund.
    We invite the greater community to attend this free public presentation.

    Tel: 818-244-9639


      Armenian News’s calendar of events is collected and updated mostly from

      announcements posted on this list, and submissions to Armenian [email protected].

      To submit, send to Armenian [email protected], and please note the following

      important points:

      • Armenian News’s administrators have final say on what may be included in Groong’s calendar of events.
      • Posting time is on Thursdays, 06:00 Pacific time.
      • Calendar items are short, functional, and edited to fit a template.
      • There is no guarantee or promise that an item will be published on time.
      • Calendar information is believed to be from reliable sources. However, no responsibility is assumed by Armenian News Administrators for inaccuracies and up-to-date-ness..
      • No commercial events will be accepted. (Dinners, dances, etc. This is not an ad-space.)

      • The Week in Review Podcasts
      • The Critical Corner
      • The Literary Armenian News
      • Review & Outlook
      • Probing the Photographic Record
      • Armenia House Museums
      • ..and much more

      © Copyright 2026, Armenian News Network / Armenian News, all rights reserved.

      Regards,
      Armenian News Network / Armenian News
      https://Armenian News.org/

      Los Angeles, CA     / USA

      What did Wings of Unity party PM candidate Arman Tatoyan tell EU ambassador to

      News.am, Armenia
      April 22 2026

      Arman Tatoyan, the prime minister candidate of the Wings of Unity party and former Human Rights Defender of Armenia, presented facts that, according to him, testify to direct and veiled threats coming from Azerbaijan regarding a possible change of power in Armenia.

      He addressed this issue—with a letter—to Ambassador Vassilis Maragos, Head of the European Union (EU) Delegation to Armenia, emphasizing that the EU, which has declared its readiness to counter Russian influence in Armenia’s parliamentary election on June 7, should respond in the same way to threats coming from Azerbaijan.

      “Among the documented cases are the following: An MP from the ruling party of Azerbaijan made a public statement warning that the victory of the opposition in Armenia could prompt Azerbaijan to formally make territorial claims against Armenia. A newspaper controlled by the Azerbaijani presidential administration stated that a ‘revanchist’ government in Armenia ‘will have nothing to govern,’ while a media outlet controlled by the [Azerbaijani] defense ministry stated that ‘it is especially important’ that power in Armenia remains in the hands of forces that are in line with Azerbaijan’s strategic goals. These statements, taken together, represent a coordinated attempt by state actors in Baku to influence the results of the Armenian elections through intimidation,” the letter states, in part.

      Vardanyan-linked party announces cooperation agreement with Karapetyan’s Stron

      OC Media
      April 22 2026

      The Country to Live party, linked to former Nagorno-Karabakh State Minister and businessperson Ruben Vardanyan, has announced a memorandum of cooperation with the Strong Armenia Alliance of Parties, founded by Russian–Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, ahead of Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections.

      Vardanyan is currently serving a 20-year sentence in Azerbaijan on charges of crimes against peace and humanity, war crimes, and terrorism — allegations he rejects.

      According to the memorandum signed on Tuesday, Karapetyan’s alliance and the Country to Live ‘are uniting their political, organisational, and human resources’ to participate in the 7 June parliamentary elections.

      The party said the agreement envisages ‘forming a unified political agenda and ensuring the active involvement of the regional teams’ of Country to Live within the alliance.

      Strong Armenia’s electoral list, published again on Tuesday, does not include the Country to Live party’s founders, Mesrop Arakelyan and Mane Tandilyan, though no detailed explanation was provided. Other members of the party were included.

      The party said the decision to cooperate was made amid ‘serious security, political, and value-based challenges’ in Armenia, which ‘require nationwide consolidation, responsibility, and clear political will’.

      The statement also stressed that cooperation was based, among other issues, on the ‘inarguable priority of returning Armenian prisoners as a key prerequisite for restoring national dignity and establishing a just and lasting peace’.

      ‘On 7 June, around 2.5 million people will have the opportunity to make a choice. Around 2.5 million, except for 19, who remain imprisoned in Baku solely for being Armenian’, Arakelyan said, expressing confidence that Karapetyan would ‘spare nothing’ to ensure their return.

      Azerbaijan has officially acknowledged holding 19 Armenian detainees, including former political and military leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh, who are serving sentences on various charges.

      Arakelyan further noted that the parliamentary elections would be ‘a choice between surrender and resistance’ and ‘a choice to have a state where the return of Armenian detainees becomes an unquestionable priority’.

      The statement was made while Strong Armenia convened a congress to approve the first 30 candidates on the alliance’s electoral list to be submitted to the Central Election Commission.

      On the same day, the alliance also announced it would be formally named the Strong Armenia Alliance of Parties, after dropping Karapetyan’s name in line with recent amendments to Armenia’s electoral code banning personal names in alliance titles.

      Pashinyan accuses Karapetyan and others of being ‘foreign agents’

      Alongside Karapetyan’s party, the coalition includes two smaller, less prominent parties — New Era and United Armenians. Earlier talks saw the group considering the inclusion of more established parties, such as the Armenian National Congress under Armenia’s first president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, but negotiations failed to produce an agreement.

      Public opinion surveys have indicated that Karapetyan’s alliance is poised to be Pashinyan’s Civil Contract’s primary opponent in the June elections.

      In the meantime, Karapetyan remains under house arrest, which was extended by three months in mid-April, on charges of calling for a coup, money laundering, and others.

      He is also not included in the alliance’s electoral list despite being named its prime ministerial candidate. This move sparked controversy due to legal requirements that stipulate that candidates for the position should hold only Armenian citizenship and have resided in the country for the past four years.

      Karapetyan announced in April that he had initiated the process of renouncing his Russian and Cypriot citizenship ahead of the elections.

      Istanbul authorities ban 24 April Armenian Genocide memorial for fifth consecu

      April 22 2026

      ISTANBUL — Authorities in Istanbul have banned the annual commemoration of the Armenian Genocide on 24 April for the fifth consecutive year, according to Gazette Agos.

      The 24 April Memorial Platform had applied for permission to hold this year’s memorial in front of the Kadıköy Süreyya Opera House on the evening of Friday. However, the group said in a statement that authorities denied the request, continuing a pattern of refusals over the past four years.

      The platform noted that it had organized 24 April memorials in public squares across several cities, particularly in Istanbul, from 2010 to 2019. These events began to be banned at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the past four years, authorities have reportedly provided no official explanation for the continued prohibition.

      “Commemorating on 24 April is a democratic right,” the platform said. “These memorials provide a space to express respect for the hundreds of thousands of people who were killed and to show that we have not forgotten those who were torn from their families, livelihoods, and communities. They are also a message to those living today.”

      The statement added that remembering the victims is essential for strengthening democracy, fostering coexistence, and combating violence and hate speech. “To remember those we lost — the people, the culture, and the traditions — and to confront the past is fundamental,” it said. “We protest the ban and call on decision-makers to reconsider their position.”

      Armenia’s Human Rights Defender refused Vardanyan’s request to visit Azerbaija

      Caucasian Knot
      April 22 2026
      Armenia’s Human Rights Defender refused Vardanyan’s request to visit Azerbaijan.
      Convicted Karabakh State Minister Ruben Vardanyan demanded the Armenian government’s involvement in the fate of Armenian prisoners and asked the ombudsman to visit Azerbaijan with a delegation of the prisoners’ relatives. Ombudsman Anahit Manasyan declined the visit, citing a lack of authority to protect Armenians outside the country.

      As reported by the “Caucasian Knot,” on February 17, the Baku Military Court sentenced Ruben Vardanyan to 20 years in prison. The defendant, who headed the Karabakh government for several months during the blockade of the Lachin corridor, was found guilty of war crimes. Vardanyan declined to appeal, explaining that he does not recognize the verdict as an act of justice.

      The court has been hearing the case of the former Nagorno-Karabakh state minister since January 2025.
       At the final stage of the trial, Ruben Vardanyan forbade his lawyer from speaking and delivered the closing speech himself, quoting classic Azerbaijani poetry. He explained his position by saying that “this is not a court, but a trial,” where “there were no opportunities for a normal trial.”

      Manasyan explained her refusal to visit Armenian prisoners by citing lack of authority.
      Armenia’s Human Rights Defender, Anahit Manasyan, responded to Ruben Vardanyan’s request by stating that she cannot conduct monitoring visits to prisons outside the country, Novosti-Armenia reported today.

      “The status of the Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia presupposes that he cannot and does not conduct negotiations on behalf of the state, nor does he implement the state’s foreign policy. “He acts exclusively within the framework of RA legislation and international standards, within the mandate granted to the human rights ombudsman,” the publication quoted Manasyan as saying to Vardanyan.

      Accordingly, according to Manasyan, the ombudsman’s powers extend exclusively to recording alleged human rights violations by state bodies and local governments in Armenia.

      “The RA Human Rights Ombudsman has the authority to conduct monitoring visits to places of detention and may freely use all of his tools during such visits exclusively within the territory of the RA,” Manasyan explained in the publication.

      On March 13, during a conversation with the family, Vardanyan attempted to convey a public appeal to the Azerbaijani ombudsman, Sabina Aliyeva, requesting a meeting. According to him, a month after the trials ended, neither he nor the other convicted leaders of Nagorno-Karabakh received copies of the verdicts, and it was impossible to contact the ombudsman. The Azerbaijani side disconnected the call.

      Vardanyan demands that the Armenian authorities attend to the fate of Armenian prisoners
      Ruben Vardanyan’s appeal to the Armenian ombudsman was conveyed during a telephone conversation with his family and published on April 21 on a Telegram channel run by Vardanyan’s representatives.

      In his appeal, Vardanyan called on Anahit Manasyan to come to Baku and visit the Armenian prisoners along with their relatives. He explained that he had met with Azerbaijan’s Ombudsman, Sabina Aliyeva.

      “During the conversation, the Azerbaijani Ombudsman also mentioned that the possibility of your visit to Baku had already been discussed, and the Azerbaijani side expressed its readiness to facilitate its organization. However, this initiative has not yet been realized,” Ruben Vardanyan explained in his address.

      Armenian citizens have been held in Azerbaijani prisons for long periods without meetings with their families or independent monitoring, and the institution responsible for protecting the rights of Armenian citizens “demonstrates a lack of initiative,” the former Karabakh state minister emphasized.

      The lack of such coordination is a de facto denial of the only humanitarian channel.

      “The issues I raised with the Azerbaijani Ombudsman require coordination between the Ombudsmen of both countries. The lack of such coordination is a de facto denial of the only humanitarian channel. channel,” he said.

      He asked Manasyan to publicly answer questions about whether the possibility of organizing an official visit to Baku by a delegation with relatives of Armenian prisoners is being considered, how the Armenian Ombudsman’s Office plans to coordinate with the Azerbaijani Ombudsman on humanitarian issues concerning Armenian citizens, and what measures the Armenian Ombudsman’s Office has already taken to protect the rights of Armenian prisoners since their detention.

      “The Armenian government’s disregard for the interests of its citizens illegally held in Azerbaijan is incompatible with the state’s obligations to its citizens,” the publication says.

      According to a statement by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Azerbaijan officially confirms the detention of only 33 Armenian prisoners of war and civilians, but Armenian human rights activists have reported another 80 prisoners Armenians. The ICRC terminated its mission in Azerbaijan on September 3, 2025, at the request of the Azerbaijani government.

      As a reminder, Ruben Vardanyan only announced his decision to renounce his Russian citizenship and move to Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2022 to support local residents who were “in a grave psychological state.” In October 2022, Vardanyan agreed to head the government, and became state minister on November 4, 2022. However, on February 23, 2023, Vardanyan was dismissed after serving as state minister for less than four months. During this period, Vardanyan was forced to seek solutions to the problems faced by the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh due to the blockade of the Lachin corridor.

      Later, in a Baku court, Vardanyan’s defense pointed out that the prosecution accused him of events that occurred, among other things, many years before his arrival in Karabakh. Azerbaijani citizens recognized as victims also testified about this in court. In particular, they spoke about shelling in the Kelbajar region, which came under Baku’s control back in 2020, and in the Zangilan region, which was also occupied by Azerbaijan in 2020.

      The same court, starting in January 2025, has been hearing the case of 15 former leaders and residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, detained in September-October 2023. They were charged under 20 articles of the Criminal Code, including war crimes. All defendants denied guilt, but on February 5, the court sentenced them to life and long prison terms.

      The “Caucasian Knot” has prepared reports “Highlights of the Sentences of Former Nagorno-Karabakh Leaders” and “Vardanyan and 15 Karabakh Leaders: Highlights of the Baku Courts”.

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