Azerbaijan destroys historic Christian churches in Nagorno-Karabakh: ‘Cultural

Christian Post
April 30 2026

Sports: Armenia’s strong volleyball ambitions to shape the federation’s next

May 1 2026

LAUSANNE, Switzerland, April 30, 2026.- For the first time in history, the Volleyball Federation of Armenia’s leadership visited the Volleyball House, as the newly elected President Karen Asmaryan, a former setter of the national team, outlines an ambitious roadmap for the sport’s future in the country.

At the heart of the vision lies a bold objective: to host the country’s first-ever Age Group World Championships, with the matches being played at the backdrop of iconic Yerevan’s downtown locations. This innovative concept reflects both confidence in the future of Armenian volleyball and a desire to bring the sport into the very heart of the country.

On the road to this inspiring vision – in alignment with the FIVB Strategic Vision 2032 – Armenia aims to continue benefiting from FIVB Volleyball Empowerment projects to elevate the performance of its national teams and enhance the availability of equipment across the country. At the same time, plans are underway to establish a Centre of Excellence, underlining a clear commitment to nurturing the next generation of volleyball and beach volleyball talent.

These ambitions come at a landmark moment in the federation’s history. In 2026, the Volleyball Federation of Armenia celebrates its 100th anniversary, with the centenary marked across national championships and competitions throughout the year. With a shared strategic direction with the FIVB and ambitions that stretch from grassroots development to a World Championship in the heart of Yerevan, the next 100 years of Armenian volleyball are off to an exciting start.

Syriac MP in Turkey George Aryo in response to Sayfo denial in National Assemb

April 30 2026

ANKARA — During a speech before the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Syriac MP George Aryo of the Peoples’ Equality and Democratic Party (DEM Party), whose state-imposed surname is Aslan, challenged remarks made by Turhan Çömez of the Good Party (İYİ Parti), who had described the victims of the 1915 Sayfo Genocide and Armenian Genocide as terrorists.

Speaking during the parliament’s 87th session, Çömez stated, “The Ottoman Empire was forced to take this decision against armed terrorist organizations backed by imperialists, and this decision was not a genocide.” He added that efforts to commemorate the events of 24 April as genocide — both domestically and internationally — misrepresent what he described as a historical process.

In response, Aryo posed a pointed question: “Under Ottoman rule, the population stood at 13 million, including 3 million Armenians, Syriacs, and other Christian peoples. What happened for only a small number of them to remain today?”



Çömez replied that some people died during relocation but insisted that the Ottoman authorities had taken necessary precautions, describing the events as decisions made within the empire’s own territory. He further accused Armenian groups of forming armed organizations allegedly backed by foreign powers, claiming these groups contributed to unrest and violence during World War I.

He argued that the Ottoman government’s actions in 1915 — such as dissolving Armenian political organizations and relocating populations — were driven by wartime conditions, as the empire was fighting on multiple fronts, including Gallipoli, the Caucasus, and Syria.

Aryo repeated his question, noting that while the population of Armenians, Syriacs (Arameans–Assyrians–Chaldeans), and other Christian communities should have grown into the millions over the past century, their numbers have instead dwindled to a fraction of that. “What happened to these people?” he asked. “Why did their numbers not increase? Where did they go?”

Çömez reiterated his earlier claims, again attributing deaths to wartime conditions and relocation, without directly addressing the demographic collapse raised by Aryo.

Aryo then shifted focus, asking, “Let us leave the Armenians aside. What did the Syriacs do? What was their crime?”

In response, Çömez argued that Syriacs (Arameans–Assyrians–Chaldeans) had emigrated from the region for various reasons and suggested that raising the issue in parliament could be linked to political agendas. He also accused certain groups of supporting what he described as terrorist organizations, reiterating his position that the historical narrative is being distorted.

Following the exchange, Sezai Temelli, also of the DEM Party, intervened, criticizing Çömez’s interpretation of history. He argued that Ottoman-era archives have not been fully opened and challenged claims about Armenian political groups, noting that some had legal status within the empire at the time. Temelli emphasized that preserving history requires acknowledging the experiences of all peoples who lived in Anatolia and warned against reducing complex historical events to accusations of terrorism.

Despite the passage of 111 years since those tragic events, the same rhetoric still persists from the perpetrator who has turned the victim into the accused. By insisting on denying his crime, he adds a new wound to the memory of peoples who continue to seek recognition and justice.

Israel’s New Ambassador to the ‘Christian World’ Served as Envoy to Azerbaija

April 30 2026

US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee said on Thursday that he met with Israel’s new ambassador to the “Christian World,” as Israel is attempting to repair its global image among Christians.

The man assigned to the position, George Deek, was the first Christian to serve as an ambassador for Israel when he was appointed envoy to Azerbaijan, a role he held from 2019 to 2025, one of the darkest periods for Christians in the region in recent history.

During his time in Azerbaijan, Israel was arming Baku with drones and other military equipment amid its war to take over Nagorno-Karabakh, known to its former Armenian Christian residents as Artsakh, a historically Armenian territory that is within Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders, which were drawn by the Soviet Union.

The Israeli-supported military offensive led to the ethnic cleansing of the entire Armenian Christian population, more than 100,000 people, and the end of an ancient Christian community. Today, Azerbaijani authorities are destroying churches in the territory.

Israel appointed Deek to the new position after facing significant backlash over a photo of an IDF soldier smashing a statue of Jesus Christ taken from a crucifix in a Christian town in southern Lebanon. In response to the global outrage, Israel said that two soldiers, the one who destroyed the statue and the one who filmed him, were being jailed for 30 days.

The IDF also claimed that it worked in coordination with the local community to replace the crucifix, but it turned out that Italian troops in Lebanon, as part of the UNIFIL peacekeeping contingent, donated the real replacement and helped erect it.

TCHAKAROV: Inside the seductive complexity of Armenia’s election maths

Intellinews
May 1 2026
By Ivan Tchakarov of GlobalSource Partners May 1, 2026

At first glance, Armenia’s upcoming elections may seem easy to dissect. They are anything but. Below the surface is a tangle of thresholds, partnerships and swing voters that makes this race a conundrum of political maths – one that, at least for now, is still tilting toward the incumbent. Two new polls released in recent weeks provide a fresh and updated look at where things stand. Crucially, they follow a two-month hiatus since the previous batch of surveys was produced, thus allowing sufficient time for alliances to harden and preferences amongst voters to coalesce. 

A subtle shift toward the incumbent

The latest EVN poll is particularly useful as it uses the same methodology as its February edition, and it shows that Civil Contract is gaining ground. Support for Prime Minister Nikol Pashiyan’s party has risen from 26.1% to 33.6%, while opposition numbers have barely nudged. Importantly, the share of undecided voters has declined somewhat, from 42% in February to (a still large) 37% in April, but remains uncomfortably high. 

This combination matters. The slight increase in backing for the incumbent indicates some consolidation of power rather than erosion of attraction. Crucially, the still-large share of undecided voters keeps the race open, suggesting a positive trend for Civil Contract, but also an outcome that is not locked in.

The three diverse simulations with final seat assignments

The most under-appreciated factor in this election is not voter sentiment, but the opaqueness of the electoral system. Armenia’s rules create a structural advantage for larger, more cohesive players. Thresholds matter. Single parties need just 4% to enter parliament while alliances face higher barriers — 8% or even 10%, depending on their size. That’s a problem for the opposition, which remains fragmented across several blocks. While three forces are almost certain to make it into parliament — Civil Contract (party), Strong Armenia (alliance), and Prosperous Armenia (party) — a fourth, the Armenia Alliance (alliance), is hovering right on the edge. Moreover, the stable majority rule dictates that 52% of seats are required for the formation of a stable government. There is still another rule that says that at least a third of parliament seats must be held by the opposition.

And this is where things start to get interesting.

In the baseline simulation, which I centre on the average of released 2026 polls, Civil Contract and the three main opposition forces make it through to the National Assembly. The exact figures indicate that, while it may not be a perfectly even split, it certainly favours the incumbent (Table 1). Civil Contract would be expected to win 54 out of the total 101 parliamentary seats — a clear majority, yet a far cry from its dominance in 2021 when it won 71 seats.

Table 1: Simulation based on average of 2026 polls suggests that four entities will enter parliament

But if Armenia Alliance slips below the threshold in a second scenario, which I generate mechanically by removing a mere 0.3% off its showing in the baseline and assigning it to the “Other” category, the maths shifts, albeit not dramatically (Table 2). Civil Contract’s seat count jumps to 60, strengthening its majority in a single-party government. 

Table 2: Simulation assumes that borderline Armenia Alliance does not enter parliament

The wild card in the elections are the undecided voters, and there are many of them — roughly 35-40% of the electorate. In theory, undecided voters could swing the election. In practice, the bar for doing so might be prohibitively high. 

Hence, I calculate the break-even point for the undecided voters that would allow the united opposition to claim just enough seats for a majority. Assuming a 90% voter turnout (the April EVN poll suggests that many people intend to vote), I infer what percentage of undecided voters would need to cast their lot with the opposition, so that, if united, it would get the law-mandated 52% of parliament seats. Table 3 shows that, if 73% of the undecided voters who intend to vote end up siding with the opposition, the ultimate distribution of seats will be the following: 48 for Civil Contract and 53 in total for Strong Armenia, Prosperous Armenia and Armenia Alliance. 

Table 3: 73% of undecided voters need to lean to the opposition for it to stand a chance of forming a government

This strikes me as unlikely, albeit not impossible. It may also be structurally difficult. Even if such a shift were to occur, there is no guarantee that a government can be formed as the three opposition forces may not be able to coalesce around a single programme to lead Armenia. In this case, a runoff may be necessary between the two leading contenders, Civil Contract and Strong Armenia, to determine the final winner. 

What this means for policy and investors

For markets and policymakers, the message is relatively clear: continuity remains the base case, although with less political comfort and room for manoeuvre. A Civil Contract-led government is still the most likely outcome, and this would imply broad policy continuity, continued engagement with the EU and Western partners, and gradual reform rather than abrupt shifts.

Even the alternative, as unlikely as it might appear at this stage, may not be as disruptive as generally feared. Armenia’s course is pretty clear for anyone who follows the geopolitics of the region. The country is now facing a fait-accompli in the necessity of completely normalising its relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan even at conditions that it deems unjust and unfair. Losing the 2020 war, the emptying of Artsakh, and the weakening of its ally Russia may have essentially taken any suspense out of the elections. Even if the opposition wins, it will have to more or less continue the policy of this government. The 4th republic and Real Armenia slogans represent the varnished and well packaged submission of Armenia to its eastern and western neighbours, and one should not necessarily be critical of it as it has little other choice. This is arguably best Armenians can get (if they are lucky) at this point in history.

Ivan Tchakarov is partner for the Caucasus and Central Asia at GlobalSource Partners.

Azerbaijan-EU Clash Over Armenian Prisoners Sparks Diplomatic Tensions

DevDiscourse
May 1 2026

Azerbaijan summoned the EU ambassador to protest a resolution condemning the detention of Armenian POWs and backing Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians’ rights. The resolution demands immediate release of detainees and highlights destruction of Armenian heritage. Azerbaijan dismisses the resolution, citing voluntary departure of Karabakh Armenians, labeling prisoners as criminals.

Azerbaijan summoned the European Union’s ambassador on Friday in response to an EU resolution condemning the detention of Armenian prisoners of war and supporting rights in Nagorno-Karabakh. The resolution criticizes what it terms as Azerbaijan’s ‘unjust detention’ and demands immediate release.

The resolution also reiterates EU backing for the rights of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, calling for accountability for the destruction of Armenian cultural and religious heritage. Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry criticized the resolution as ‘unfounded and biased.’

Baku argues that Karabakh Armenians left voluntarily, asserting that the prisoners labeled as POWs by the EU committed serious crimes, including war crimes. The intricate political history involves two wars, Azerbaijan reclaiming the territory in 2023, and ongoing trials in Baku.

(With inputs from agencies.)

Armenia arrests two Russian nationals over alleged money smuggling

OC Media
May 1 2026

Two Russian nationals were placed under house arrest after authorities uncovered separate attempts to bring large amounts of undeclared Russian rubles in cash into Armenia via Zvartnots International Airport — with one one carrying ₽65 million ($700,000), and another ₽7.6 million ($82,000).

According to the State Revenue Committee, which oversees customs, the cases were uncovered as part of ‘enhanced control over cash being transported across Armenia’s air and land borders’ carried out jointly with the National Security Service (NSS).

The agency said that ahead of the arrests, it had received information that Russian citizens, who were only identified by their initials, had conspired to bring a large amount of cash from Russia into Armenia.

The two were detained after arriving in Armenia a day apart from each other at Yerevan’s Zvartnots International Airport in recent days, but the exact dates were not published. According to Armenian authorities, they are relatives, though their exact relationship has not been disclosed.

The arrests come as Armenia gears up for parliamentary elections scheduled for 7 June, amid a series of detentions linked to alleged election bribery involving affiliates of Russian–Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia party, as well as reports from Armenian authorities on foreign interference.

Armenian officials have recently warned of what they describe as a rise in foreign disinformation campaigns targeting the country, reportedly recording an average of 2–3 such campaigns per day. They have also pointed to Russian bot networks allegedly involved in their dissemination.

In March, the election observation group Independent Observer warned that an unnamed opposition party had reportedly booked a large number of buses to transport voters — primarily from Russia — for the 7 June elections.

Separately, on Thursday, Armenian authorities placed an affiliate of Karapetyan under investigation for allegedly bribing people to attend a rally in support of the opposition figure on 11 April in Yerevan.  The unnamed suspect has only been identified as a municipal councillor from Lori province.

Another one of Karapetyan’s affiliates, Artur Avanesyan, went on hunger strike after he was placed under pre-trial detention over charges of electoral bribery earlier in April.

These cases are the latest of several investigations involving Karapetyan’s affiliates, which authorities say are related to alleged electoral bribery or inducement of participation in party rallies.

Public opinion surveys suggest Karapetyan’s alliance is expected to be the main challenger to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party in the upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled to be held on 7 June.

Azerbaijan summons EU envoy in row over treatment of Karabakh Armenians

Reuters
May 1 2026
By Nailia Bagirova
  • Azerbaijan angered by European Parliament resolution
  • Baku rejects charge it unjustly detained ethnic Armenians
BAKU, May 1 (Reuters) – Azerbaijan summoned the EU’s ambassador on Friday to protest against a European Parliament resolution, opens new tab condemning Baku’s detention of Armenian ‌prisoners of war and backing the rights of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh.
The resolution denounced what it called Azerbaijan’s “unjust detention” of Armenian prisoners of war, detainees and hostages” and demanded their immediate release. It also reiterated the European Union’s support for the rights of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and called for accountability for the destruction of their cultural and religious ⁠heritage.
Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry dismissed the resolution as “unfounded and biased”, saying Karabakh Armenians had left the region voluntarily. It said those described by the EU as prisoners of war had committed serious crimes, including war crimes.
Ethnic Armenians in Karabakh, an internationally recognised part of Azerbaijan, broke away from Baku’s control as the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991.
Azerbaijan and Armenia fought two wars over the mountainous territory before Baku took it back in 2023 and its entire ethnic Armenian population of around 100,000 people fled to neighbouring Armenia.
Karabakh officials captured at that time were ‌placed ⁠on trial in Baku in January 2025, accused of a battery of charges including war crimes. International human rights groups have raised concerns about the fairness of the trial.
In February, Ruben Vardanyan, an Armenian-born billionaire banker who served as a senior official in Nagorno-Karabakh, was sentenced to 20 ⁠years in prison.

BAKU COMPLAINS OF EU ‘SMEAR CAMPAIGN’

In a further sign of fury at the European Parliament’s resolution, Azerbaijan’s parliament said it was severing ties with the assembly, which it accused of conducting ⁠a “smear campaign” against Baku.
“This organisation not only hinders the development of relations between Azerbaijan and the European Union, but also opposes measures aimed at establishing long-term peace and stability ⁠in our region,” the parliament said in a statement.
“By encouraging revanchist forces, it is attempting to turn our region into a hotbed of conflict once again,” it said.

Thessaloniki honours Armenia with cultural plans ahead of independence anniver

Voria, Greece
May 1 2026


Talks focus on shared historical memory as the city prepares to celebrate the 35th anniversary of Armenia’s independence

Thessaloniki’s mayorStelios Angeloudis, met with Armenia’s ambassador to Greece, Tigran Mkrtchyan, to discuss ways to strengthen bilateral ties, highlight shared historical memory and promote tourism and cultural cooperation, in a meeting also attended by Thessaloniki’s Honorary Consul of Armenia, Akis Dagkazian.

Particular emphasis was placed on initiatives marking the 111th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, with participants noting this year’s decision to give special prominence to Thessaloniki in related commemorations, recognising its historic role as a “refuge city” and the presence of a strong Armenian community.

As part of these events, a major concert was co-organised at the Thessaloniki Concert Hall on Thursday, in collaboration with the State Orchestra of Thessaloniki and the Armenian Embassy. Plans for further cultural activities in September to mark the 35th anniversary of Armenia’s independence were also discussed, along with proposals to highlight Armenian heritage in the city.

“The city of Thessaloniki remains a beacon for the Armenian community. We honour the history of the Armenian Community of Thessaloniki and are committed to supporting every initiative that keeps memory alive and strengthens the bonds between our peoples,” Mayor Angeloudis said.

Armenian communities have maintained a continuous presence in Thessaloniki since at least the late Ottoman period, particularly after survivors of the Armenian Genocide arrived in the early 20th century. An estimated one million Armenians were annihilated in the Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1917. 

In Thessaloniki, Armenians established churches, schools and cultural associations, contributing to the city’s multi-ethnic character. Today, the city remains one of the main centres of Armenian life in Greece, with commemorative events and cultural initiatives central to its public calendar.




Displaced Lives: Uncertainty over Citizenship and Electoral Choice Looms Large

Caucasus Watch, Germany
April 30 2026

The campaign for the upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia can already be considered launched. Prime Minister Pashinyan and his team are traveling through the cities and villages of Armenia, familiarizing themselves with the problems of ordinary people and handing out orange Armenia map-badges, which he also wears on his chest.

Meanwhile, Robert Kocharyan stated in a recent podcast that the Abkhazian railway represents a new opportunity for Armenia and is much better than TRIPP could ever be. In another turn of events, Samvel Karapetyan sent an AI-generated video message to a rally organized by his political force in Yerevan’s Opera Square. “We want to make Armenia a blessed home where people can live with dignity, work with dignity, and be fairly paid — not a poor shelter that everyone wants to escape from. We will be strong in Moscow, we will be strong in Washington, and we will be strong in Beijing,” the AI-generated message declared.

No matter how much the opposing sides and political forces accuse each other of corruption, wars, and bad governance, in the end, the discourse often boils down to the binary concepts of “pro-Russian” and “pro-Western.” However, while they compete and wait for the election results, it is crucial to understand how significant the role and involvement of Karabakh Armenians are in this electoral process.

The Passport Dilemma

The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh hold Republic of Armenia passports, but in the past, they held their own elections in Karabakh and did not vote in Armenian national elections. Historically, the results of elections in Nagorno-Karabakh were not much different from those in authoritarian countries. For example, the former leader of Nagorno-Karabakh, Bako Sahakyan, who is currently imprisoned in Baku, reportedly collected 83 percent of the vote during his election.

Nonetheless, in September 2023, the entire population of Nagorno-Karabakh arrived in Armenia with their Armenian passports, and to this day, their status remains controversial. Are they refugees or citizens of the Republic of Armenia? Although they hold the same blue Armenian passports, the Armenian government does not consider them full citizens and suggests that they apply for a new, “regular” passport.

Curiously, without any obstacles, Karabakh Armenians can travel to all Schengen countries with their “070 code” passports. Currently, the main motivation for applying for formal Armenian citizenship is to take advantage of the government’s housing program, which offers financial assistance to buy or build a home. However, the bureaucratic process remains lengthy.

Overloaded Systems and Political Suspicions

In an interview with Sputnik Armenia, Nelly Davtyan, Director of the Migration and Citizenship Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Armenia, addressed the question of whether the process of granting citizenship to Karabakh Armenians is being deliberately delayed before the elections due to their perceived opposition views.

Davtyan noted: “Yes, there is a certain delay. However, this is naturally not due to the pre-election period, but to the fact that we launched a new program on January 1. Objectively, our system is severely overloaded. In four months, we have already received as many applications as we would typically process in a year. But we are already close to returning to an accelerated process, and I do not exclude that even if a displaced person decides to become an Armenian citizen today, he or she will have time to receive a passport and participate in the elections. Now, the results of all cases under our jurisdiction will be received before the elections, and we have not registered any refusals.”

According to Davtyan, 36,000 Karabakh Armenians have received new passports, 12,000 of whom are minors, and 6,700 applications are pending. This means that only approximately 24,000 Karabakh Armenians, plus a few thousand expected to receive documents before the vote, will be able to participate. This raises a critical question: what about the remaining 70,000 or more adults who have Armenian passports but cannot vote? Earlier, it was officially announced that 11,000 Karabakh Armenians have left Armenia permanently.

A Quest for a “Pro-Armenian” Choice

To date, the “070 code” passports have not been declared invalid. However, the Armenian government issued Karabakh Armenians a temporary refugee certificate in 2023. To transition, they must fill out a form stating, “I am not a citizen of any country,” after which they receive a passport with a new code and become “real” citizens of the Republic of Armenia. Consequently, thousands will not have the right to vote in the upcoming elections because some are still waiting, while others refuse to apply at all.

“As far as I know, after obtaining Armenian citizenship, we will have the right to vote in a year,” says Narine Grigoryan, a Karabakh Armenian. “I applied for citizenship online and am still waiting. My parents will not apply because they each have 20 square meters of living space in Armenia; they consider it unnecessary to apply for a ‘new’ passport. However, if I had the right to vote, it would be difficult for me to make a choice. Some are pro-Russian, others are pro-Western, but I am looking for the pro-Armenian one,” Narine told Caucasus Watch.

Tatevik Khachatryan, another Karabakh Armenian, shared a different perspective: “My husband and I have already obtained Armenian citizenship, but I do not consider it ethically correct to say now which political force we will vote for. In any case, we will definitely not vote for the current authorities. In my opinion, Karabakh Armenians are involved in the electoral process, even those who do not have the formal right to vote. It is clear that many do not want to see the current authorities remain in power.”

She added: “The government of Armenia decides how much tax we should pay, what financial assistance we receive, and in which army our sons and brothers should serve. Therefore, I consider it natural that all Karabakh Armenians should have the right to vote in these elections. Personally, I should have the right to know who will make decisions for my child’s future.”

The Weight of History and Future Uncertainty

The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh has always played a vital role in Armenian elections. A long-standing stereotype suggested that the President of Armenia must be of Karabakh origin to ensure the region was not “sold out.” The fact that Armenia’s second president, Robert Kocharyan, and third president, Serzh Sargsyan, were of Karabakh origin gave many a sense of security. Today, many Karabakh Armenians remain united around them or sympathize with Samvel Karapetyan, who promises to solve the social problems they have faced since 2023.

Deeply disappointed with both the Armenian government and their former local authorities, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh find themselves in a difficult position. When Nagorno-Karabakh authorities attempted to form a government in exile after 2023, Nikol Pashinyan declared that there is only one government in Armenia: the government of the Republic of Armenia.

“Many have joined Samvel Karapetyan’s forces, although they may not see him as Prime Minister. I thought of voting for Kocharyan because he brought the country out of chaos during his presidency. However, this time, I am undecided. I just know the country needs a strong leader. The current authorities must leave,” says a Karabakh Armenian currently living in Gyumri.

Ani Balayan, a journalist from Nagorno-Karabakh, notes: “Three of our five family members have already received Armenian citizenship. My parents’ applications have been prolonged. I think 90% of those who can vote will prefer an opposition force.” Another displaced person in Masis added: “There is no clear orientation regarding the elections yet, but many around me want to see Samvel Karapetyan as Prime Minister.”

The “Unclosed Page”

Despite the bureaucratic hurdles, former Nagorno-Karabakh deputies recently elected Ashot Danielyan as the Speaker of their National Assembly. “The page of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) is not closed. This is an irreversible commitment,” Danielyan stated during the Armenian Diaspora Conference in Paris on April 11. “When state policy ignores or underestimates our national values, despair and distrust arise. This policy not only destroys national unity but also allows hostile forces to continue the humiliation and defeat of the people.”

While representatives travel to international conferences, ordinary people in Armenia continue to face pressing social and bureaucratic issues. For many, their “daily bread” is more important than domestic political maneuvers.

The situation for Karabakh Armenians remains fragmented: some consider themselves representatives of a government in exile, some are now full Armenian citizens ready to vote, and a vast majority are simply waiting for documents. In conclusion, it appears that the involvement of the majority of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians will not play a decisive role in the elections scheduled for this summer. At best, competing parties will use their social needs as campaign promises or once again leverage the Karabakh issue for political gain.

Contributed by Marut Vanyan

https://caucasuswatch.de/en/insights/displaced-lives-uncertainty-over-citizenship-and-electoral-choice-looms-large-over-karabakh-armenians.html