I do not comment. Belarus is Belarus, Armenia is Armenia. I am in charge of my country. NA Speaker Alen Simonyan said this in a conversation with journalists, referring to the note of protest handed to the Chargé d’affaires of Armenia yesterday by the Belarusian Foreign Ministry.

Responding to the question whether his statements, since they were the basis of the note, do not further worsen the relations between Armenia and Belarus, Simonyan, in fact, accused Minsk. 

 “The disrespectful attitude towards Armenia, towards the CSTO partner, towards the statehood of Armenia worsens the relations, preparing a 44-day war with Azerbaijan worsens the relations. The political course is a matter of choice for each state. Human rights and freedoms are the most important values ​​for Armenia. We chose the path of democratization of Armenia, they chose a slightly different path, not like ours.”

Continuing, he emphasized that Armenia will not be a peripheral region, will not be in political dependence and Armenia will raise the level of its sovereignty.

“Belarus’ example of governance is unacceptable for my country and for me,” stated Alen Simonyan. Then he got nervous, retorted to the journalists: “What did you paste from Belarus?”, then added that he had read the news about the protest note in the press and had no other information.

VERELQ wrote that on May 5, Artur Sargsyan, the charge d’affaires of Armenian affairs in Belarus, was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, and a note of protest was handed to him regarding “unfriendly steps”. The reason for dissatisfaction of the Belarusian side was the recent statements of the Speaker of the National Assembly Alen Simonyan, where he stated that Armenia should not be “governed like Belarus”.

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On the eve of parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7, Armenia’s domestic and foreign political agenda is attracting the attention of the international community. The recent European Political Community (ECC) summit held in Yerevan, the surprise visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, as well as economic contacts with Russia raise many questions about the future vector of the country’s development. VERELQpolitical scientist and economist in the interview Hrant Mikayelyan analyzed the current geopolitical situation, assessing the influence of the West, Russia and Turkey on the internal processes of Armenia.

VERELQ. In our last interview, you mentioned that the EU views Armenia through the prism of confrontation with Russia. Did the results of the European Political Community (EPC) summit held in Yerevan and the “Armenia-EU” format confirm this thesis? What exactly did it express?

Hrant Mikayelyan. Yes, of course, this summit endorses such approaches. First, what is Armenia from the perspective of the West? it is not only the context of the fight against Russia, but also the vast periphery of Europe, which must protect it from external influences: migration, political, economic, etc. That is, it is a large periphery and a frontier (border zone), an area where conflict takes place. This is exactly how the EU perceives Armenia, and Emmanuel Macron clearly expressed it two years ago, calling Armenia a buffer state.

Why was it expressed now? The holding of the summit itself fits into the pre-election context, which is clearly seen in Europe through the prism of the fight against Russia. The emphasis is on the fact that the current government is pro-Western, which means that any other power is labeled as pro-Russian. It is very important to note here. In the West, any non-Western and non-anti-Russian force is labeled as pro-Russian. In Armenia, there are pro-Russian forces, there are neutral forces, but they are all perceived equally. The main function of this summit is to provide pre-election support to Nikol Pashinyan, because these elections are of great importance for the West.

How does the European Union participate in these elections? First, he funds some of the candidates. Second, back in December, the Armenian government asked for help to counter hybrid threats, and in March, an advisory group arrived, which works with the government to develop laws, deal with political planning and information response for elections. The summit is now underway, and thus the European Union is fully involved in the entire context of the Armenian elections.

VERELQ. Is the visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to Yerevan merely a ceremonial part of the CIS summit or a diplomatic impulse to Moscow?

Hrant Mikayelyan. It is, of course, not a ceremonial part, because the arrival of Vladimir Zelensky was not planned from the beginning and happened practically at the last moment. Why did it turn out that way? The representatives of Donald Trump from the USA (Jared Kushner and Steven Utkov) were supposed to arrive in Kiev, who were planning to discuss his diplomatic line towards the settlement of the Ukrainian conflict. Zelensky was very reluctant to meet with them, and his European colleagues helped him by offering to come to this summit. Naturally, Nikol Pashinyan could not refuse. here is the whole story.

Today, if someone pursues a pro-Western policy, that “package” definitely includes working with Zelensky. Even Robert Fitzo, who previously had a conflict with the Ukrainian leader, in recent days has formed a positive relationship with him as much as possible. So this is indeed an impulse to Moscow, but it is an impulse from Brussels. The most important thing was that it was necessary to find a place so that Zelensky could avoid unpleasant negotiations with the Americans.

VERELQ. Messages are received about the suspension of the sale of large batches of Armenian “Jermuk” mineral water in Russia and the problems of sale of Armenian products in Russian marketplaces. Is this a direct consequence of the freezing of Armenian-Russian relations? What other steps and consequences do you expect on the eve of the June 7 parliamentary elections?

Hrant Mikayelyan. Yes, without a doubt. Russian economic restrictions are a consequence of the deterioration of relations and the realization by the Russian authorities of the inevitability of their further decline. They did not immediately respond. The European Union, as a rule, prefers to react instantly, as soon as it does not like some political changes in the country, such is the Western tradition. And the Russian tradition presupposes a response to an already established fact. This is how Russia currently views the broken relationship. The proof of this became the language fight between Vladimir Putin and Nikol Pashinyan, which came out into the public information domain.

As for further steps by Russia, I would not like to speculate now on what harm the parties can do to each other, there is no benefit from it, although such steps are not excluded. I am more interested in what will follow the election. Nothing definite can be said here. First, it is not guaranteed that the current government will win. Second, even if it wins, it is not entirely clear how Moscow will react. They will either decide. “Okay, because the current authorities won, so we remove the restrictions,” or vice versa. “Pashinyan won, he is running an unfriendly course, so we are strengthening the restrictions.” This scenario is unclear at the moment, so I can only point to that particular fork in the road.

VERELQ. Recently, the representative of the Security Council of the Russian Federation announced that the possible severance of relations between Armenia and the EAEU will lead to a 23% decline in the Armenian economy. How realistic do you think such estimates are? What is your macroeconomic forecast in such a scenario?

Hrant Mikayelyan. As for the mentioned statement, if I am not mistaken, it was made by the Federation Council. As an economist, I believe that such calculations should not be presented by politicians or representatives of the security sector. If the Russian economists, even on the order of their government, have made a detailed and justified calculation of what economic impact the conflict with Russia can have on Armenia, I would certainly like to get acquainted with it. In the framework of such a calculation, the methodology and the set scenario should be understood. What exactly will Russia do? Does this 23% mean the complete elimination of Armenian-Russian economic relations, and will such a thing ever happen at all? Here we see uncertainty at least.

In addition, it is possible that the European Union will compensate some of the losses. As a rule, this does not happen in full, but a certain portion can be compensated. Some of the decline may be masked by parallel economic growth. Or, on the contrary, a deep economic crisis may begin, the decline will intensify, and this will be perceived exclusively as a consequence of the conflict with Russia. There are so many variables here that the 23% number means nothing to me at this point. As for my personal macroeconomic forecast, I have not made any special calculations and I do not consider it appropriate to do so now based on the conditions I mentioned.

VERELQ. If the current government retains its position as a result of the elections, do you expect a further acceleration (forcement) of the European vector of foreign policy? Or will the course become more balanced, taking into account the objective realities – Armenia’s dependence on Russian energy carriers and sales markets?

Hrant Mikayelyan. In case of the victory of the current government, I expect acceleration of the Western vector, but I want to point out a very important circumstance. The point is that active meetings, consultations, negotiations and summits with European partners take place with great frequency (and the held summit is one such focused phenomenon that the EU needs to support Pashinyan before the elections), but all these contacts do not translate into concrete results. Diplomatic results in the European direction are equal to zero. I would like to say this very clearly. a huge number of documents, statements, protocols, declarations are signed, but their sum is equal to zero. There are no practical results either in the economic sphere, or in the security sphere, or even in the diplomatic sphere, if we do not consider the actual resolutions and declarations as results.

Accordingly, in Armenia we are dealing with a huge European PR-fog, against the background of which there is a real increase in the influence of Turkey. Does this happen randomly or on purpose? It is not an accident, this is the line of the European Union. Ursula von der Leyen and other EU representatives openly stated that they support the integration of the energy systems of Armenia and Turkey, as well as the normalization of Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

It can be said that regulation is good, but regulation is different from regulation. Now it is proceeding in the format of Armenia’s capitulation, and the European Union supports it. Four years ago, at the first summit of the European Political Community, Pashinyan, during a meeting with Charles Michel and Ilham Aliyev, recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, after which the blockade and physical destruction of Nagorno Karabakh quickly began, for which the EU is also responsible.

Thus, the European Union does not have its own specific political goals in the South Caucasus and conducts a mediated policy (policy by proxy) with the help of Turkey. The joint goals of the EU, USA and Great Britain, which together support Pashinyan in the elections, are to isolate Russia from Iran and push Russia out of the region. Armenia is the last country where Moscow is still present, so all attention is focused here. The replacement of Russian and Iranian influence is possible only with Turkish, if the West itself does not plan to be present “on the ground” (on the ground), which, as we see, is not happening.

The EU is interested in the strengthening of Turkish influence, so the Turkish vector of Armenia is hidden under the PR of the European vector. In fact, this is exactly what happens “on the ground”. There is no significant European course, it is just a PR cover for increasing Turkish influence in the region and particularly in Armenia and the policy of Turkish penetration.

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