Agence France Presse — English
August 18, 2004 Wednesday 2:37 PM GMT
Azeri FM in Moscow: Nagorny Karabakh and Caspian on agenda
MOSCOW
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said Wednesday that the
conflict in the enclave of Nagorny Karabakh and the status of the
Caspian Sea had been top of the agenda of talks with his visiting
Azeri counterpart Elmar Mamedyarov.
Lavrov told reporters he was sceptical about the effectiveness of
international mediation to settle the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh,
an enclave in Azerbaijan with a majority Armenian population over
which Azerbaijan and Armenia fought a four-year war.
Russia “is ready to lend its aid (in the settlement of the conflict)
but no one can resolve the problem in the place of the two parties,”
he said.
The conflict has cost an estimated 35,000 lives and forced about one
million people on both sides to flee their homes.
A ceasefire was agreed in 1994, leaving Armenian forces in de facto
control of the enclave and surrounding Azeri regions. Azerbaijan has
said it is determined to force Armenian troops out of the territory.
Peace talks have been taking place intermittently for 10 years, under
the mediation of the Minsk Group (France, Russia and the United
States) to hammer out a permanent solution.
Mamedyarov, who said Azerbaijan saw its relationship with Russia as a
strategic partnership, meanwhile called for an “intensification of
diplomatic efforts” to find a status for the Caspian Sea.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1994 the five countries
bordering the sea have been in dispute over how to share its oil and
gas reserves, estimated to be the third largest in the world.
Iran and Turkmenistan says each of the five littoral states should
own 20 percent of the sea’s resources. But Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Russia say that the shares should reflect the length of the
coastline, which would leave Iran with only 13 percent.

Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part A (Russia)
August 18, 2004, Wednesday
August in Russia: a midsummer night’s dream of politics
WPS Observer
It’s mid-August: the height of the holiday season. Everyone’s on
vacation! The press is providing vivid coverage of Boris Yeltsin’s
trip to Norway for some fishing – at the invitation of King Harald V.
The last time Yeltsin visited the land of the fjords was in 1996,
notes the Novye Izvestia newspaper; that was an official visit during
which Yeltsin faced many unpleasant questions about the fate of
Alexander Nikitin, a Russian member of Norway’s Bellona
environmentalist organization. Moreover, at the time the Kremlin was
concerned about NATO exercises taking place in Norway close to
Russia’s border.
Times have changed. Yeltsin will fish for salmon on a Norwegian
Island, sail along the coast on a 19th century schooner called the
Paulina, and picnic among the fjords, with shrimp and white wine –
entirely carefree.
Norwegian papers are saying that retirement has been good for
Yeltsin: in contrast to past occasions, “he looks good, speaks
rationally, and not only gets his facts straight, but even corrects
others.” To everyone’s surprise, Yeltsin has proved to be remarkably
well-informed. “When Yeltsin was shown a document stating that the
first official border between Norway and Russia was established in
1826, he protested loudly: No, no! The first border agreement was
reached back in 1348!” It’s hard to believe this is the same
historical figure who at one time said the legendary “Chechen
snipers” numbered only 38.
Actually, Yeltsin isn’t forgetting about business affairs during his
vacation. According to Novye Izvestia , Yeltsin is making this family
visit to Norway in order to lobby for the interests of Aeroflot and
his own son-in-law, Aeroflot chief Valery Okulov: the main aim is “to
help his son-in-law sign an agreement for Norwegian salmon to be
shipped to Japan by Aeroflot via the Erland Airport.” Thus, it’s a
traditional attempt to combine business with pleasure.
President Vladimir Putin is taking a break as well: “at least until
the end of this week – or until early September, according to some
reports,” says Nezavisimaya Gazeta .
Putin has headed in the opposite direction from Yeltsin: to his
Bocharov Ruchei residence in Sochi. All the same, he also intends to
combine relaxation with work, and has already found time to discuss
Chechnya’s upcoming presidential election with Central Electoral
Commission Chairman Alexander Veshnyakov. And the Kommersant
newspaper reports that Veshnyakov wore a white suit, in keeping with
the summer season, but Putin wore “business gray” despite the 30
degrees Celsius heat. (Ever since Putin’s historic meeting with
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who took the liberty of turning up at the
Kremlin without a tie, the press has carefully monitored the clothing
details of everyone who meets with Putin.)
But the meeting with Veshnyakov was only the start of an extensive
work schedule. As Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports, Putin’s schedule for
this week includes meetings with President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine
and President Robert Kocharian of Armenia. At the end of August,
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder may visit Bocharov Ruchei; and
rumor has it that French President Jacques Chirac might come along.
In short, the summer season of politics is at its peak.
Meanwhile, Moscow’s politicians and political analysts have been
looking at the results of the first hundred days of Putin’s second
term and weighing up the head of state’s political prospects.
Some very diverse opinions have been expressed: as the Vremya
Novostei newspaper reports, after 90 minutes of debate at a special
forum the analysts taking part still didn’t manage to reach
consensus.
Vyacheslav Nikonov, director of the Politics Foundation, declared
optimistically during the discussion that he considers the balance of
the first hundred days to be positive. In his view, the authorities
are being “bold and active” in carrying out the reforms which will
“make Russia more comparable with the rest of the world.” Nikonov
even quoted Mikhail Khodorkovsky, although he added that in his view,
“Putin is more liberal than 90% of the citizenry, not just 70%.”
Nikonov then proceeded to employ a metaphor: “In recent years our
Russian plug has never quite managed to fit into Europe’s
power-points, but these days we are making good progress on
redesigning the plug.”
Mikhail Deliagin, director of the Globalization Institute, disagreed
with Nikonov: “Europe’s power-points are different, and American
power-points are different, and normal people don’t keep changing
their plugs – they just buy an adapter.” Deliagin also resorted to
metaphors, comparing the state administration reforms to an axe:
“Ever since the axe-blow fell in March, the government has remained
in a state of paralysis.”
Boris Makarenko, first deputy director of the Political Techniques
Center, was even harsher in his criticism: “Putin’s system of
governance is turning itself into a closed model, and a closed model
soon becomes stupid.”
Vremya Novostei observes that the only issue on which the analysts
were unanimous was the YUKOS affair. Even Vyacheslav Nikonov admitted
that “the drawn-out conflict over YUKOS is fraught with negative
consequences.”
Then again, as the Izvestia newspaper notes, this forum of political
analysts at the Media Center didn’t seem too concerned about Putin’s
first hundred days as such. The analysts were more interested in what
the political landscape will look like by the time of the next
parliamentary and presidential elections. Everyone agreed, with
concern, that at present the political stage in Russia remains
closed, and instead of dialogue between the authorities and the
citizenry there is only “propaganda through one gateway”: thus, the
preconditions for the emergence of any significant “successor” to
Putin simply don’t exist.
But Vremya Novostei points out that the analysts are all sure Putin’s
political career will not end in 2008.
Mikhail Deliagin was the most skeptical on this point: “No, a person
doesn’t make such titanic efforts just in order to vacate the chair
afterwards.” In Deliagin’s view, “even if we aren’t facing an
eternity of Putin, we certainly aren’t facing only four more years.”
Deliagin was contradicted by Vyacheslav Nikonov, who pointed out that
former heads of state in Europe often go on to hold other important
posts; so after Putin steps down as president, he might become prime
minister, for example.
But Boris Makarenko disagreed with Nikonov, saying that there cannot
be two centers of political power in Russia – a president and a prime
minister. So in 2008, we should expect to see a re-run of Operation
Sucessor.
The discussion was rounded off by Gleb Pavlovsky, who said that once
Putin is no longer president, he will still remain the leader of the
nation, “and the new head of state will have to measure up to Putin.”
Pavlovsky explained his views in more detail in a lengthy interview
with Nezavisimaya Gazeta .
In Pavlovsky’s view, Putin’s main problem at present is his lack of
real support among the political class. “What do we have now? We have
President Putin, and then we have a vast rabble – in the bureaucracy,
the media, and business – who claim to act in Putin’s name, but lack
any mandate from the people and pursue their own entirely mercenary
goals.”
Corruption in Russia, according to Pavlovsky, has progressed to a
qualitatively different level: now it is “no longer a phenomenon, but
a class.” Ties of corruption permeate the state bureaucracy from top
to bottom: “This is a huge stratum, involving millions of people. Our
political future will be determined by the extent to which our
society and political forces succeed in resisting this.”
So far, as the YUKOS affair has shown, the corrupt are skillfully
making money “by taking advantage of inside information obtained via
their positions in state service, in an entirely criminal manner.” Of
course, says Pavlovsky, “they are scoundrels. But Putin can’t
separate the state from the scoundrels all on his own.” When a
political community “is passive and also corrupt, a leader is forced
to wait.”
Pavlovsky believes that in the YUKOS affair, Putin has run up against
“a weakness in non-party leadership”; rather than “a coalition of
interests, there has been an explosion of incoherent emotions which
provide no political support and need not be taken into account.”
At present, says Pavlovsky, “we can discern the start of a battle
with those who seek to convert their personal loyalty to Putin into
capital.” However, according to Pavlovsky, “this will not be a battle
of the liberals versus the security and law enforcement people
(siloviki). Why should they fight each other? While the siloviki are
sending people to jail, the liberals can play with on the stock
market with frozen shares.” And that’s basically what is now
happening to YUKOS.
Meanwhile, rather than developing productive political ideas, the
political class is offering Putin “a mixture of insults and
nonsensical hints about Putin’s alleged intention to bring back
totalitarianism.”
Pavlovsky categorically denies any such accusations against the head
of state: “If he did want to do that, I assure you that given the
present state of our society, he wouldn’t encounter any strong
objections.”
Pavlovsky points out that Putin has seen two convincing examples of
“the inferiority of totalitarian systems” – the Soviet Union and East
Germany. So Putin is well aware that while the mobs are “breaking
into offices and pissing on secret files,” the masters of those
offices are doing deals and redistributing portfolios.
According to Pavlovsky, the problem with the Russian citizenry today
is that it displays “a paralysis of will, along with the wish to
retain the role of onlookers in politics.”
Among those adopting this dangerous stance is the Kremlin’s party
itself, United Russia: “it is still a self-contained, politically
helpless organization without any political personnel reserves.”
And there is no source of new political personnel: “What does a young
man find if he joins United Russia in the hope of pursuing a regular
career in state service? A sign saying ‘Closed’ – with everyone off
claiming pieces of property. So he’ll turn away and go into business.
So later on, the state will be forced to approach the private sector
for new personnel again. And the private sector will supply them –
along with lobbyists” – that is, with the prospect of further
corruption.
In Pavlovsky’s view, the political vacuum between the president and
the citizenry has been created by “pseudo-parties that collapsed
after failing to find any support in society.” These days, the
leaders of those parties “are visiting America, all expenses paid,
and denouncing ‘Putin’s authoritarianism’ there – even though they
themselves have no authority and no ideas.”
Meanwhile, an August poll by the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM)
indicates that by no means all the political parties are viewed as
having “no authority and no ideas.” According to the Novye Izvestia
newspaper, one “predictable sensation” has been the opinion of
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) voters of the LDPR
faction’s performance in the Duma in its first session since the
elections: 22% of respondents who voted for Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s
party say that the faction’s performance has fully met their
expectations, and a further 15% say the faction is doing even better
than they had expected. Novye Izvestia notes: “So it turns out that
Vladimir Zhirinovsky has been well rewarded for withstanding a
barrage of stones and old shoes during a demonstration on Teatralnaya
Square.”
Left-wing voters are watching the activities of their Duma members
most closely of all: 60% of respondents who voted for the Communist
Party (CPRF) and 56% of those who voted for Motherland (Rodina) say
they keep track of what the corresponding Duma factions are doing.
But these voters are also the most disappointed: 24% and 22% say the
CPRF and Motherland factions are not performing well enough in
parliament.
And 57% of respondents who voted for United Russia last December now
say they have no interest at all in what the United Russia faction is
doing.
“Many of them aren’t even aware that such a party exists,” says
Andrei Piontkovsky, head of the Strategic Studies Center. “After all,
at the Duma elections these people just voted for the Vladimir Putin
brand-name.” In Piontkovsky’s view, those who voted for the left-wing
parties are being unfair in their assessments now: “the CPRF and
Motherland have actually done even more for their voters than they
might have.” But their electorate, made up of “the socially
discontented layers of the population,” values results: these voters
believe that the CPRF and Motherland have been unsuccessful in
defending their interests.
The Vedomosti newspaper quotes Alexander Prokhanov, chief editor of
the leftist-patriotic Zavtra newspaper: “Information about what the
CPRF faction is doing in the Duma simply isn’t reaching the people.”
And this also explains why United Russia’s performance is rated
fairly high (16% approval): “Pro-government propaganda depicts United
Russia member Andrei Isayev, chairman of the Duma’s labor and social
policy committee, as standing up for the people’s rights.” In
Prokhanov’s view, “the people see that the very last of what they
have is being taken away from them, and they don’t know who’s taking
it away. But they do see Isayev standing up for them.”
Vedomosti points out that many analysts predicted a substantial drop
in support for United Russia, since it has been responsible for
getting the unpopular reforms through parliament. To all appearances,
however, this hasn’t happened: United Russia voters still have a
neutral or positive attitude to the party.
Dmitri Oreshkin, head of the Mercator Analytical Group, says this is
because most of those who consciously voted for United Russia are
people who have “adjusted to life,” so they aren’t very interested in
social benefits: “They expected the party to support the president’s
policies, and that’s what it has been doing.”
What’s more, United Russia continues to strengthen its leadership
positions. In early August, five United Russia members, joined by
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, submitted a bill amending the constitutional
law on the federal government. If this amendment passes, will
overturn the existing ban on senior state officials, including
ministers, holding leadership posts in public organizations or
political parties.
As Kommersant-Vlast magazine observes, United Russia’s handlers in
the Kremlin “have evidently decided it’s time to follow the example
of the Soviet Constitution, which used to uphold the ‘guiding and
directing role’ of one particular party.”
Then again, says Kommersant-Vlast , the proposed amendment would not
oblige all Cabinet ministers to join United Russia en masse – and
anyway, state officials have always been responsive to the tasks and
objectives of each successive Kremlin-backed party.
However, according to Kommersant-Vlast , there is no doubt that the
opportunities offered by this change in legislation will be taken up:
the government’s most important decisions will be “sanctified” by the
will of the party, and United Russia will indeed come to resemble the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, Kommersant-Vlast draws attention to a theory popular among
many political scientists, on the subject of what Vladimir Putin
might do after his second term expires: “After the 2008 election,
Putin could become the leader of United Russia and the government it
will form – thus in effect becoming the head of state, while the new
president will be a decorative figure who is 100% personally loyal to
Putin.”
All the same, says Kommersant-Vlast , United Russia might be doing
itself a disservice by taking full responsibility for everything that
happens in Russia.
Of course, if oil prices keep on rising, and the modest sums of money
now being offered to the people as compensation for social benefits
are increased, a party-based government will not face any threats.
But if the economic situation deteriorates, says Kommersant-Vlast ,
the Kremlin may require a “scapegoat” – and United Russia would be
perfectly suited to that role.
If that happens, then in December 2007 voters might turn away from
the self-discredited United Russia and vote for another party: one
for which the efforts of state-controlled television channels would
create an image as the defender of the rights of the common people.
In the opinion of Kommersant-Vlast , exactly who ends up replacing
United Russia isn’t all that important: it could be a party led by
Dmitri Rogozin or Gennadi Zyuganov or Gennadi Semigin, or some
newly-formed organization. What’s important is that the Kremlin’s new
party “would not be tainted by complicity in passing unpopular
reforms, so it could not only replace United Russia as the nation’s
leading party, but also become a reliable support base for Putin’s
successor in the election of 2008.”
Needless to say, as Kommersant-Vlast points out, the Kremlin would
have to “exercise a certain amount of skill in policial tactics” when
replacing one party with another right before an election. But this
task is well within the capabilities of the Kremlin team led by
Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of the presidential administration,
“who has long since gained a reputation as a master of
behind-the-scenes political maneuvering.”
More opinion poll results indicate that some political moves of this
nature may indeed be required.
In a poll done by the National Public Opinion Research Center
(VTsIOM), reported in Vremya Novostei , only half of respondents said
the hopes they had held of Putin’s presidency have been fulfilled to
some extent. Thirteen percent said they never had any particular
hopes. And 28% said their hopes for some improvements in the
situation have been disappointed.
Vremya Novostei reports that respondents in the higher income
brackets were most inclined to give the president’s performance a
positive evaluation: 68% of them were optimistic. In the medium
income brackets, 57% of respondents expressed approval. Among the
poorest respondents, the figure was down to 40%.
These contradictory evaluations indicate, says Vremya Novostei , that
there is still no consensus in our society about Putin’s policy
course: some people see the president as a pro-West liberal reformer,
while others see him as a “strong hand” fortifying the hierarchy of
governance. One thing is clear, says Vremya Novostei : “As he
implements such radical reforms as monetizing benefits, Vladimir
Putin is unlikely to be able to maintain the balance between the
interests of various societal groups while also retaining a high
approval rating across all layers of the electorate.”
Eloquent evidence of this can be seen in the recent fall of Putin’s
approval rating: according to VTsIOM, it’s down to 59%, while the FOM
puts it at 48%.
Irina Yasina, program director at the Open Russia Foundation, says in
the Moskovskie Novosti weekly: “What is currently happening to the
social benefits system is the result of the state’s greed, laziness,
and disrespect for all of us.”
Yasina emphasizes that the whole country, “even the illiterate,” is
aware that oil prices are currently very high. The regime has
received a “windfall,” and everyone knows that. “People might not be
very clear about the exact size of the windfall, but they do
understand that enormous revenues are involved.” What’s more, thanks
to the efforts of state-controlled television channels, everyone also
knows about the Central Bank’s growing gold and currency reserves.
“And all of a sudden – there’s this penny-pinching. Begrudging a few
hundred rubles to cover the cost of medications for invalids and war
veterans, whose homes are cluttered with bottles and jars of pills.”
Yasina says that in a country with practically no health insurance
system, “some other field for stinginess should have been chosen.”
Moreover, says Yasina, the authorities are showing “total disrespect
for their own citizens” – not considering it necessary to explain
their actions or the consequences of those actions. Then again,
Yasina believes that “we fully deserve such disrespect”: a society
that prefers not to get involved with the government’s actions
eventually receives whatever the authorities consider convenient for
themselves.
In the Vedomosti newspaper, leading television journalist Olga
Romanova says: “The people aren’t being told anything. Either this is
a preventive measure, or there’s nothing to say and no one to say
it.”
The impression, says Romanova, is that “over there in the Kremlin,
the Cabinet, and Bocharov Ruchei there is also dead silence – not a
sound. Politicians and ministers have stopped communicating – not
only with the people, but even among themselves.”
Is this only because it’s the summer vacation season? But Romanova
says it’s possible that this “midsummer night’s dream of politics”
may not end with the coming of autumn: “Actually, everyone benefits
from the absence of both domestic politics and foreign affairs. No
news – no disturbances. No objectives – no need to achieve them. No
government – no criticism.”
Only Gleb Pavlovsky is having premonitions of trouble: “We keep
assuming that a calm sea means it’s impossible there will ever be a
strong wind. Our political system has now become accustomed to a calm
sea. In this situation, only one prediction can be made: some day,
the calm will be replaced by a storm.”
Then again – who knows? As Pavlovsky says, only one thing in Russia
is predictable: Russia’s unpredictability.
Translated by Andrei Ryabochkin

ITAR-TASS News Agency
TASS
August 18, 2004 Wednesday
Russia, Azerbaijan start talks, including on Karabakh conflict
By Natalya Lenskaya, Irina Chumakova
MOSCOW
Russian and Azerbaijan foreign ministers Sergei Lavrov and Elmar
Mamedyarov started talks in Moscow, one of whose topics will be the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Azerbaijan minister arrived in the
Russian capital on an official visit on Tuesday.
Russia hails the continuation of the Azerbaijan-Armenian dialogue at
various levels, Tass learnt from Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman
Boris Malakhov. “We believe that the participants in the conflict
should find out a mutually acceptable solution,” the Russian diplomat
emphasized. Moscow “is ready to render in this case the most active
assistance both on a bilateral basis and as a co-chairman of the OSCE
Minsk Group”, he added.
Struggle against terrorism will be also considered at the ministers’
meeting. They want to pay special attention to practical steps in
countering this threat.
Besides, Malakhov continued, the ministers will exchange opinions on
the regional and international situations as well as higher
cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States.
They will also discuss implementation of top-level understandings,
aimed at boosting volumes of bilateral economic cooperation,
including doubling of trade turnover. According to the spokesman,
Lavrov and Mamedyarov will discuss work on a legal status of the
Caspian and prospects for the second Caspian summit.
It is the first official visit by Mamedyarov to Russia as Azerbaijan
foreign minister. He was appointed to this post last April.

ITAR-TASS News Agency
TASS
August 18, 2004 Wednesday
Russia, CIS propose to UN to institute world remembrance day
By Vladimir Kikilo
UNITED NATIONS
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have put forward a proposal
to the U.N. General Assembly to announce May 8 and 9 Remembrance and
Reconciliation Days.
The proposal to put this issue as additional item on the agenda of
the forthcoming 59th session of the U.N. General Assembly is included
in the letter sent to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan by the
countries. Permanent representatives of these states at the United
Nations signed the letter.
“In 2005 the world will celebrate the 60th anniversary of victory
over fascism,” it is said in an explanatory note to the letter, in
particular.
“The great victory in the World War II was achieved by joint efforts
of peoples of many countries. It gave a powerful impetus to the
international community cohesion, which resulted in the establishment
of the United Nations Organisation. Through the suffering and death
of millions of people the nations of the world came to realise that
there is no alternative to the system of collective security that
took shape in the U.N. Charter for maintaining international peace,”
the message says.
“The peoples of our countries have shouldered the main burden of the
war, so we are convinced like no other that there are no such goals
that would justify unleashing of wars,” it is stressed in the
document.
“U.N. member states should jointly exert every effort with a view to
putting an end to the current armed conflicts using political
methods, preventing the emergence of such conflicts in the future and
promoting the maintenance of a stable and solid peace,” the document
says.
“It is in the common interests of humanity to further strengthen the
role and effectiveness of the United Nations Organisation as the
central element of the collective security system in the fulfilment
of the high task proclaimed in its Charter – to relieve the coming
generations from the scourge of war,” the letter reads.
The authors of the letter proposed to the U.N. General Assembly to
adopt a resolution that would announce May 8 and 9 the days of
remembrance and reconciliation, as well as to hold a special solemn
session of the Assembly in order to adopt a declaration aimed at the
unification of humankind in the name of peace and progress and
prevention of new world wars.

The hazards of a long, hard freeze
Unresolved wars have poisoned the newly independent republics of the
former Soviet south – and could flare anew
The Economist
August 19th 2004
STEPANAKERT, SUKHUMI, TIRASPOL AND TSKHINVALI — If the so-called frozen
conflicts of the Black Sea region are ever thawed
out, somebody will need to be standing by with a very large bucket indeed.
To outsiders, that may seem like an odd warning: unless you have a special
interest in the obscure enclaves of small, impoverished states, where local
feuds have flared up and died down, a frozen conflict may sound like a
conflict you can forget. But such a conclusion would be wrong: the region’s
unresolved wars-in Transdniestria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Nagorno-Karabakh-are a big reason why the newly independent states of the
former Soviet south have failed miserably to fulfil their potential. Instead
of enjoying their freedom, they have emerged into the world as stunted,
embittered and ill-governed creatures. And if real fighting flares again-a
process which has begun in South Ossetia (see article)-things could
become far worse.
At the heart of each conflict is a claimed mini-state whose rulers
prevailed, by dint of Russian arms, in a local war. While there are huge
differences, these statelets have things in common. Ten years or more of
isolation under unrecognised governments have left them as harsh,
militarised societies, with few functioning institutions, and economies
open to crime.
South Ossetia is the pettiest, but currently the hottest of the conflict
zones. It is a landlocked province of Georgia which would have no viability
as a legitimate country. It survives as a conduit for smuggling between
Georgia and Russia, mainly in cheap spirits, arms and grain, under the
diplomatic protection of the Russian government and the military
protection of Russian troops.
Of the four statelets, Karabakh comes closest to being a normal society-at
least for the ethnic Armenians who remain there. Nearly a million people
from both sides of the war were put to flight by the fighting which
concluded in 1994 with a big victory by soldiers from Karabakh and
Armenia itself.
Especially since 2001, when a local bully and racketeer, Samvel Babayan, was
put in jail, Karabakh-which calls itself independent but is in practice
virtually joined to Armenia-has had something recognisable as local politics
and a mixed economy. Investment from the Armenian diaspora has boosted the
economy. One new arrival from America, Vartkes Anivian, started a
dairy-products company after the war, and now employs 250 people. Municipal
elections have just been held in the enclave-to the fury of Azerbaijan, to
which Karabakh legally belongs-and there was genuine competition between the
candidates. The atmosphere in Stepanakert, Karabakh’s capital, is
orderly in a post-Soviet way, not chaotic.
So Karabakh might have a decent future if the enclave’s future could somehow
be settled. Four years ago, a compromise seemed within reach: most of
Karabakh would have been joined to Armenia, while the Azeris recovered the
surrounding areas and gained a corridor between their republic’s two parts.
More recently, the mood on both sides has hardened, and a big body of
Azerbaijani opinion longs to recover the land by force.
Small wars, or medium?
The fighting over Karabakh was and could again become a fair-sized war;
South Ossetia by comparison is a small, though strategically significant,
squabble. Abkhazia, in Georgia, and Transdniestria, in Moldova, fall
somewhere in between.
Both Abkhazia and Transdniestria can make claims to special political
status, if not to independence, on historical grounds. Both regimes control
territories and economies capable of standing alone. But both are willing
hostages of Russia, which helped them fight their wars of secession when the
Soviet Union collapsed, and has given them military and diplomatic support
ever since. It has issued passports so freely that probably a majority of
the population in each enclave could claim Russian nationality. But Russia’s
“protection” has also become the main obstacle to a constitutional
settlement. Russia prefers to keep the enclaves as its own pawns. At its
most mischievous, the Kremlin’s strategy may view Transdniestria as a second
version of Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave near Poland-in other words, a
trouble-making outpost on the borders of NATO. And some of the worst
features of Russia’s own governance have been transferred to its protégés in
Georgia and Moldova: organised crime, corruption, and authoritarian
leadership.
For the people of these non-countries, life goes on, after a fashion. “It is
a normal town, but blown up a bit,” says a United Nations official trying to
put the best face on Sukhumi, “capital” of Abkhazia. And there is indeed the
ghost of something lovely in the landscape, where the beaches curve
north to the Russian border.
“It is a normal town, but blown up a bit”
But to call Sukhumi “normal”, even by the elastic standards of the Caucasus,
is stretching things. For one thing, half of its population is missing.
Ethnic Georgians fled the city or were driven out in the civil war of
1992-93. And to say that Sukhumi is blown up “a bit” risks flattering a town
where only about one-third of the buildings are in good shape, one-third are
badly run down, and one-third are derelict. The roads are crumbling, the
pavements are grassing over, and the airport is dead save for a few UN
helicopters. Tourists from Russia are the mainstay, along with agriculture,
of the visible economy. The invisible economy belongs to burly men who drive
smart cars with handguns on their hips. They, or their like, run a
blacker-than-black trade centred on the port. Smuggling probably involves
drugs, arms, fuel and stolen cars. “Whatever you have”, says the UN
official, “it disappears into a black hole when it hits the docks.”
Tiraspol, the capital of Transdniestria, presents a more orderly façade.
Streets are eerily quiet and clean, and almost bare of cars, even on a
weekday afternoon. Nobody in civilian clothes carries a gun openly. A statue
of Lenin looks down from a pink marble column in front of the presidential
palace. The Bolshevik leader looks uncannily like Transdniestria’s own
bearded “president”, Igor Smirnov, a former metalworker from Kamchatka in
the Russian Pacific who moved to Tiraspol in 1987 as a factory manager and
manoeuvred his way into power. Mr Smirnov’s son heads the “state customs
committee”, the second-biggest job in a land which lives largely on trade,
licit and illicit, between Ukraine and the rest of Moldova.
In the past month both Moldova and Ukraine have announced much tighter
customs controls on goods moving out of Transdniestria. Moldova was
retaliating against a decision by the authorities in Transdniestra to shut
schools there still teaching Romanian in the Latin alphabet.
But despite such occasional flurries of firm government, experience suggests
that Transdniestria’s borders will remain porous enough for it to go on
supplying Moldovan markets with untaxed consumer goods, and to go on
shipping its more sinister cargoes, including arms, out through Ukraine or
by air. According to a recent report from the International Crisis Group, a
Brussels think-tank, Transdniestria has five or six arms factories making
small arms, mortars and missile-launchers, for sale to the world’s
trouble-spots. A recent study from the German Marshall Fund of the United
States has called the conflict zones “unresolved fragments of Soviet Empire
[which] now serve as shipping points for weapons, narcotics, and victims of
human trafficking, as breeding grounds for transnational organised crime,
and last but not least, for terrorism”. That may be a bit too hard on
Karabakh, but a fairly accurate account of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Transdniestria. It may be time for the world to slop them out.

The Armenian genocide
Face history’s heartbreaking truth
The International Herald Tribune
Thursday, August 19, 2004
By Jay Bushinsky
JERUSALEM — When the writer Franz Werfl, visiting this majestic city in
the early 1930s, sought a shoemaker, he was told that there was a very
competent one on Jaffa Road. His wife, the former Alma Mahler, had lost
one of her shoes aboard ship en route to Palestine and was desperate to
have the missing one replaced.
The shoemaker’s name was Garabidian – an Armenian name. Werfl was
surprised to discover Armenians in Jerusalem. When he found out that the
Old City had an Armenian Quarter and that most of its inhabitants were
survivors of the 20th century’s first genocide, he was overwhelmed with
emotion. That conversation inspired his internationally acclaimed novel,
“The Forty Days of Musa Dagh.”
The carnage perpetrated by the Ottoman Turks 89 years ago, in which 1.5
million ethnic Armenians were killed or deported, was a tragic prelude
to the Nazi Holocaust of 1939-1945 in which six million Jews were
annihilated.
Hitler’s determination to destroy European Jewry was encouraged by the
world’s lack of interest in the Armenian tragedy. In a speech delivered
to his troops on Aug. 22, 1939 – nine days before he invaded Poland – he
was quoted as having said: “Who, after all, speaks today of the
annihilation of the Armenians?”
The fact that these words were not included in the official text has
prompted skeptics to contend that they never were uttered. They may have
been said off the cuff, since it is hard to believe that they could have
been invented by others.
Ironically, Hitler’s rhetorical question is inscribed on one of the
walls of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial in Washington, and rightly so. But
there is a vast chasm between moral sentiment and political expediency.
The latest attempt by Armenian-American activists to win Congressional
recognition of the Armenian genocide was a failure. Other interest
groups, including Jewish ones, misguided or opportunistic, convinced a
vast majority of the American lawmakers that a resolution along those
lines would offend the Turks at a time when the United States needs them
as allies.
Israeli diplomacy also puts contemporary priorities ahead of moral
obligations. When a major documentary about the Armenian genocide was
due to be screened here, the foreign ministry intervened out of
consideration for Turkish sensibilities. It is hypocritical to expect
compassion and sympathy from the peoples of the world for the lives lost
in the Holocaust when ‘raison d’état’ prevents Israel and most Israelis
from commiserating with the Armenians.
Israel’s government winced when Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, assailed its policy and behavior in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip as well as toward the Palestinians in general. But neither Israel
nor the overseas Jewish organizations dared remind Erdogan that leaders
of nations that had committed crimes against humanity had best refrain
from preaching to others – a lesson learned and followed by Germany.
Historical truth must be faced regardless of how heartbreaking it may
be. It cannot be subordinated to the ebb and flow of modern
international relations. Anyone who visited the Armenians’ grim memorial
to their martyred brothers and sisters south of Yerevan, Armenia’s
capital, in the shadow of biblical Mount Ararat, cannot but grieve with
them.
Israelis, Jews, Zionists and their supporters should comfort the
Armenians in their national sorrow and the Turks should accept the
photographs, documents and above all testimony, which commemorate the
Armenian genocide, instead of insisting that it never happened.
By Jay Bushinsky is a freelance writer based in Israel.

Athens2004 Official Website
Armenian Athletes at Athens 2004 Olympics
Name National Olympic Committee Sport
AGAEV Mamed – ARM Wrestling
ALEKSANYAN Gevorg – ARM Weightlifting
ANDREASYAN Aram – ARM Canoe/Kayak Flatwater
ANDREASYAN Serob – ARM Rowing
ARAKELIAN Avetik – ARM Athletics
ASMARYAN Gevorg – ARM Canoe/Kayak Flatwater
ATOYAN Gegham – ARM Weightlifting
AVETISYAN Varduhi – ARM Swimming
BAKHTAMYAN Norayr – ARM Shooting
BERBERYAN Martin – ARM Wrestling
DANIELYAN Artur – ARM Weightlifting
DANIELYAN Ashot – ARM Weightlifting
GALSTYAN Haykaz – ARM Wrestling
GALUSTYAN Vaghinak – ARM Wrestling
GEGHAMYAN Levon – ARM Wrestling
GEVORGYAN Arayik – ARM Wrestling
GHAZARYAN Armen – ARM Weightlifting
GHAZARYAN Marine – ARM Athletics
HAYRAPETYAN Arshak – ARM Wrestling
HOVHANNISYAN Zhirayr – ARM Wrestling
HOVSEPYAN Hayk – ARM Canoe/Kayak Flatwater
ISRAYELYAN Varuzhan – ARM Judo
JAVAKHYAN Vahagn – ARM Athletics
JUHARYAN Vahan – ARM Wrestling
KAMALYAN Tigran – ARM Weightlifting
KHACHATRYAN Sos – ARM Weightlifting
KHURSHUDYAN Hripsime -ARM Weightlifting
KOLOYAN Mikayel – ARM Swimming
KYAPANAKTSYAN Khachatur-ARM Weightlifting
MALUMYAN Artak – ARM Boxing
MARKOSYAN Suren – ARM Wrestling
MARTIROSYAN Armen – ARM Athletics
MARTIROSYAN Tigran – ARM Weightlifting
MATEVOSYAN Samvel – ARM Boxing
MELIKYAN Arsen – ARM Weightlifting
NALBANDYAN Aleksan – ARM Boxing
NAZARYAN Armen – ARM Judo
NURIJANYAN Eric – ARM Athletics
PAPOYAN Davit – ARM Wrestling
SARGSIAN Sargis – ARM Tennis
SARGSYAN Makar – ARM Rowing
SARGSYAN Meruzhan – ARM Athletics
SHAHNAZARYAN Andranik – ARM Archery
TOROSYAN Aida – ARM Athletics
TOVMASYAN Harutyun – ARM Boxing
TOVMASYAN Marat – ARM Boxing
VARDANYAN Garsevan – ARM Wrestling
VASILYAN Varazdat – ARM Weightlifting

Athens 2004 Official Website
Armenian Coaches at the Athens 2004 Olympics
ADAMYAN Vardan – ARM Rowing
ALAVERDYAN Pashik – ARM Weightlifting
BABAYAN Tigran – ARM Judo
BICHAKHCHYAN Vahan – ARM Weightlifting
DANIELYAN Roman – ARM Weightlifting
GASPARYAN Aram – ARM Wrestling
GEVORGYAN Samvel – ARM Wrestling
JULFALAKYAN Levon – ARM Wrestling
KHACHATURYAN Sargis – ARM Athletics
MARGARYAN Samvel – ARM Wrestling
MEHRABYAN Rafik – ARM Boxing
MIRZOYAN Hoksen – ARM Wrestling
NIKOGHOSYAN Seyran – ARM Shooting
SARGSYAN Bagrat – ARM Tennis
SIMONYAN Simon – ARM Canoe/Kayak Flatwater
YENOKYAN Hrant – ARM Wrestling
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Athens 2004 Official website
Armenian Referees/Judges at Athens 2004 Olympics
KAZARIAN Levon – Armenia – Wrestling
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Tenterfield Star, Australia
Aug 19 2004
Entertainment – International ensemble on the way to Tenterfield
Thursday, 19 August 2004
A GROUP of four international artists is set to bring a unique
musical experience to the audience at a concert in Tenterfield next
Thursday, August 26.
The four musicians, known as the Tavantinsuya Ensemble, play violin,
clarinet, viola and piano in a wide repertoire of works. They combine
in different ways to present a variety of duos, trios and quartets
and for this concert they have chosen works highlighting the elegance
of Mozart, the romantic warmth of Max Bruch and the Latin American
rhythms of Salzelo. They’ve included some folk-style intensity of the
music of Armenian composer Khacharturian as well as selections from
George Gershwin’s ‘Porgy and Bess’, an intriguing short piece by
young Australian composer Nigel Sabin and some popular clarinet
pieces.
The concert will take place at the Sir Henry Parkes Memorial School
of Arts from 8pm with pre-concert wine and cheese available from 7pm
to 8pm and during intermission from the Friends of the Sir Henry
Parkes Memorial School of Arts.
Meet the artists
Ronald Woodcock
Ronald Woodcock had toured in over 87 countries during a
distinguished career as concerto and recital soloist, chamber player,
teacher and orchestral conductor.
He has performed in centres such as London, Vienna, Paris, Berlin,
Warsaw, Copenhagen, Tel Aviv and Buenos Aires as well as in remote
countries such as Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Peru and the Solomon
Islands where he has introduced Western classical music to audiences
for the first time.
Iola Shelley
Iola Shelley was born in Wales and began piano lessons at four. At
the age of 13 she was the youngest student ever to receive the LRAM
and ARCM Performing Diplomas. Along with an illustrious solo piano
career, she has also studied cello, oboe and organ.
In Christchurch, Iola Shelley was one of the founding members of the
Christchurch Conservatoire which was formed in 1978 by members of the
Camerata Piano Quartet.
Graham Evans
Graham Evans first learnt the piano but later took up the clarinet
which became his professional instrument. He was a member of the Band
of the Irish Guards which led to winning a scholarship at the Royal
College of Music. On graduating, he joined the Northern Sinfonia,
Britain’s longest established chamber orchestra. He toured
extensively throughout Europe, the USA and South America as well as
recording with leading musicians for the major record companies.
Louise Woodcock
Louise Woodcock studied viola and piano at the Capetown College of
Music, gaining her LRSM (Performers) and winning a scholarship to the
Vienna Academy of Music. She was a member of the Capetown, Durban and
Auckland Symphony Orchestras and violist in the New Music Group
chamber ensemble in Auckland. For 20 years she was a string teacher
for the Education Department of South Australia and being appointed
string examiner for the Australian Music Examinations Board.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress