************************************************** ****************************
Armenian National Committee of America-Western Region
104 North Belmont Street, Suite 200
Glendale, CA 91206
Phone: 818.500.1918 Fax: 818.246.7353
Email: [email protected]_
Website: _www.anca.org_
******************************************************************************
PRESS RELEASE +++ PRESS RELEASE
For Immediate Release: Friday, September 10, 2004
Contact: Armen Carapetian
(818) 500-1918
ANCA Praises Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger For Signing Into Law
Poochigian Bill on Armenian Genocide Heirs
Los Angeles, CA – The Armenian National Committee of America
â^À^Ó Western Region (ANCA-WR) praised California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger for signing into law Senate Bill 1689, which will exempt
Armenian Genocide life insurance settlements from state taxation
and other calculations related to income. SB 1689 was authored by
California State Senator Chuck Poochigian.
â^À^ÜSenator Poochigianâ^À^Ùs bill addresses an injustice that New
York Life insurance committed against its policy holders who were
massacred by the Turkish authorities,â^À^Ý commented ANCA-WR Executive
Director Ardashes Kassakhian.
â^À^ÜThe road to justice for the victims of the Armenian Genocide
has been long and arduous. The passage of SB 1689 is an important
step in this process,â^À^Ý added Kassakhian.
The exemptions in this bill, which will now become law, are similar
to exemptions provided to recipients of the Holocaust. This bill
was crafted due to longstanding insurance policy claims by survivors
and descendants of the Armenian Genocide. From the period of 1915 to
1923, Armenians were subjected to a systematic genocide perpetrated
by the Turkish Ottoman Empire. The Armenian Genocide is currently
and actively denied by the Republic of Turkey and their lobbyists
operating in the U.S. Congress.
Prior to 1915, the New York Life Insurance Company wrote thousands
of life insurance policies to Armenians living on historic Armenian
lands in the Ottoman Empire. New York Life had refused to pay out
many of the claims until a settlement was reached last year as a
result of a class action lawsuit. SB 1689 allows the victims and
their descendants to collect their settlements without being subject
to taxation by the State of California.
SB 1689 was introduced by Senator Poochigian on February 20, 2004 and
was subsequently referred to the committee on Revenue and Tax. The
bill was passed by a unanimous 11-0 vote in committee followed by a
37-0 vote by the entire State Senate. SB 1689 secured strong support
in the California State Assembly.
It was then sent to the Governor Schwarzenegger on September 2,
2004 and
quickly signed into law on September 10th.
The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) is the largest
and most influential Armenian American grassroots political
organization. Working in coordination with a network of offices,
chapters, and supporters throughout the United States and affiliated
organizations around the world, the ANCA actively
advances the concerns of the Armenian American community on a broad
range of issues.
####
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly
Vol. 4, No. 35, 10 September 2004
A Weekly Review of News and Analysis of Russian Domestic Politics
************************************************************
HEADLINES:
* ORGANIZING SPONTANEITY
* THE KREMLIN’S REACTION: STAY THE COURSE
* THE KREMLIN AFTER BESLAN
************************************************************
KREMLIN/WHITE HOUSE
ORGANIZING SPONTANEITY
By Julie A. Corwin
If the “Kursk” submarine disaster of August 2000 caused a
short-term dip in President Vladimir Putin’s popularity, it’s
not difficult to imagine that the trio of terrorists acts in the past
three weeks might also erode — if only temporarily — the 70
percent-plus approval ratings of Russia’s commander in chief.
After all, Putin came to power promising to “rub out” Chechen
terrorists in the outhouse. Now, he — rather than they — appears to
be on the run.
Although Putin’s popularity may suffer, it’s not
clear that any other politician or party will benefit. The response
to the events from Russia’s weakened political parties has
largely been confined to the issuing of public statements. It was the
Kremlin and regional authorities, after all, and not the political
opposition, who organized the nationwide “protest” against terrorism
held on 7 September. Writing in “Izvestiya” the same day, commentator
Aleksandr Arkhangelskii noted that while formally the trade unions
organized the gathering of more than 100,000 people in central Moscow
to express support of the people of Beslan, it was “understood” that
they were simply stand-ins for the authorities.
Similarly in other cities, regional youth organizations were
nominally listed as the organizers for protests, when in fact it was
regional officials who were arranging the events, frequently by
resorting to “traditional organizational methods,” “Nezavisimaya
gazeta” reported on 8 September. And, if “Vedomosti’s” reporting
on 8 September is correct, deputy presidential-administration head
Vladislav Surkov deserves the real credit, since he reportedly
orchestrated the series of antiterrorist rallies on the
president’s orders. Surkov is widely credited for overseeing
Unified Russia’s victory in the December 2003 State Duma
election.
Writing in “Izvestiya,” Arkhangelskii asked, “Why does our
opposition prefer to tearfully complain about the Kremlin, but does
not summon the people even when they would follow?” He continued,
“Yes, the authorities would not allow meetings with antigovernment
slogans…[but] what if [we] were simply silent, standing shoulder to
shoulder, elbow to elbow, demonstrating to ourselves and to our hated
enemy and that [we] are not afraid? And, afterwards having revived
their trust and rallied potential voters, the opposition could
organize an antigovernment meeting under less dramatic
circumstances.”
Arkhangelskii answers his own question by pointing to the
personal shortcomings of individual liberal politicians. While those
may be contributing factors, another possibility is that the law on
public demonstrations and street rallies is already having its
intended effect. According to the new law, relevant authorities must
be notified no more than 15 days and no less than 10 days before an
event, which means that the organizers of the 7 September rally
against terrorism should have applied for permission sometime between
22 and 27 August — before the seizure of the school in Beslan even
began, “Kommersant-Daily” noted on 8 September. However,
mayoral-administration officials denied that any regulations had been
violated in order for the event to be held, and Moscow trade-union
leader Mikhail Nagaitsev told the daily that the meeting was
originally going to be held just to commemorate the 25 August
collision of the two airplanes that resulted in 90 deaths. However,
the Club for Heroes of the Soviet Union, which was another one of the
formal organizers of the event, told the daily that it learned of the
meeting only on 6 September.
The political opposition not only lacks the assurance that
legal officials will look the other way when it comes to completing
the necessary paperwork on time to hold a demonstration, they also
lack the “administrative resources” necessary to ensure a good
turnout. According to gazeta.ru on 7 September, railway workers,
medical-establishment employees, and students at higher educational
institutions were all “tasked” with attending the 7 September protest
against terror. According to “Kommersant-Daily” on 8 September, the
police helpfully rearranged protesters so that persons bearing the
same signs wouldn’t be standing next to one another.
The irony is that all the arm-twisting and heavy-handed
organizing may not have been completely necessary. “Vedomosti”
reported that some people came to the rally in Moscow simply because
they couldn’t stay home and watch TV. And “Nezavisimaya gazeta”
noted that many residents of St. Petersburg of their own accord
burned candles in their windows in memory of the victims of Beslan.
At the demonstration, everyone cried, even men, especially when two
large screens showed fresh news from Beslan.
Pollsters will soon measure how and whether Putin’s
popularity has been affected by Beslan. A longer-lasting effect of
the recent wave of terrorism than a movement up or down in
Putin’s approval rating may be a further expansion of the state
on the pretext of preventing new terrorist acts. Sverdlovsk Governor
Eduard Rossel, a recent convert to the cause of the Unified Russia
party, suggested at a press conference in Yekaterinburg on 6
September that like Americans, Russians are ready to give up part of
their rights for greater safety, “Novyi region” reported on 6
September. Rossel said: “We are ready to limit our rights in the name
of the security of our children. Today we say: less political
intrigues, more security. Society is ready to grant the president
additional powers in the struggle against terrorism.” And with
additional powers and an even stronger state, President Putin may
find public opinion less and less relevant.
WAR ON TERROR
THE KREMLIN’S REACTION: STAY THE COURSE
By Robert Coalson
Nearly a week after the horrifying denouement of the hostage
crisis at a school in North Ossetia, the Russian government seems to
have formulated its response, a reaction that is characterized by
bolstering the mechanisms the administration of President Vladimir
Putin has installed over the last five years, rather than by any
perceptible change of course. Putin and other officials have,
predictably, ruled out any softening of the government’s policies
in Chechnya, going so far as to deny that there is any connection
between the situation in the breakaway republic and the Beslan
hostage crisis. “Just imagine that people who shoot children in the
back came to power anywhere on our planet,” Putin told Western
journalists and experts during a Kremlin meeting on 7 September,
Russian media reported. “Just ask yourself that and you will have no
more questions about our policy in Chechnya.”
He pledged that the Kremlin will proceed with its policy of
installing a new administration in Chechnya. “We will strengthen law
enforcement by staffing the police with Chechens and gradually
withdraw our troops to barracks, and leave as small a contingent
there as we feel necessary, just like the United States does in
California and Texas,” Putin said. On 9 September, the government
announced a $10 million reward for Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov
and for radical field commander Shamil Basaev, formally assigning the
two men equal culpability for the Beslan events and seeming to
destroy any remaining hope that the government might choose to
consider Maskhadov an acceptable partner in the search for a
political solution in the republic.
Having ruled out a change of course in this area, the Putin
administration has focused on containing the public and political
reaction to the events, which have been widely viewed as a failure of
the administration in the very area — security — that it came to
power promising to prioritize. The administration cannot help but be
stung by comparisons between the latest series of terrorist attacks
— in which well over 400 people have been killed, including the 90
who died when two civilian airliners were blown up on 24 August —
with the fall of 1999, when more than 200 people were killed in a
series of apartment-building bombings in several Russian cities and
Chechen militants launched a major incursion into neighboring
Daghestan. Putin was elected in large part because of his tough talk
in response to those events and widespread public insecurity.
Now, of course, the administration is doing everything it can
to make the claim that the latest incidents are not a continuation of
this violence, but the launching of a new war against Russia by
unspecified outside forces that are backed by other unspecified
outside forces. The administration so far has been more proactive in
responding to the potential for a political crisis created by the
Beslan events than in responding to that attack itself.
Measures have been taken to keep the public focused on the
tragedy of the events and on the need for ever greater unity, themes
that Putin stressed during his 4 September speech to the country.
“This is not a challenge to the president, parliament, or
government,” Putin said. “It is a challenge to all of Russia, to our
entire people.” He called on people to show their “responsibility as
citizens” and said Russia is stronger than the terrorists because of
“our sense of solidarity.” The wave of government-orchestrated public
demonstrations against terrorism in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other
cities was the most visible of these efforts, with the administration
marshalling its control of national television and of the
quasi-independent Federation of Trade Unions to bring out good
crowds. Only a few voices, such as that of Free Russia leader Irina
Khakamada, could be heard pointing out that a spontaneous
demonstration would have been more satisfying.
On the political level, the Kremlin-linked leftist
“opposition” party Motherland has called for the resignation of the
government in response to Beslan, a move that takes some of the
pressure off of Putin. If truly independent forces in the Duma such
as the Communist Party insist on forcing a discussion of the
terrorist attacks, Motherland and Unified Russia will easily be able
to make sure the spotlight remains on the cabinet and not on the
administration. Although such a turn of events is highly unlikely,
even the resignations of some cabinet members would not be perceived
as a personal defeat for Putin, since the current government has been
widely billed as a “technical government” intended to implement and
take the heat for painful reforms such as the recently adopted
social-benefits bill.
Perhaps the most telling example of how the government used
the tools at its disposal to protect itself is how deftly the
security forces were apparently able to deal with journalistic
threats to the regime, as opposed to their less-stellar protection of
civilians from terrorists. “Novaya gazeta” reporter Anna
Politkovskaya and RFE/RL correspondent Andrei Babitskii, both of whom
have long been considered by the Kremlin to be sympathetic to the
Chechen cause, were both intercepted well before they got anywhere
near Beslan and entirely prevented from reporting on the crisis.
Babitskii was arrested on trumped-up charges in a Moscow airport,
while Politkovskaya was apparently poisoned on a flight to
Rostov-na-Donu, spending the rest of the crisis in a local hospital.
In these cases, the security organs, the police, and the courts seem
to have worked in close coordination to prevent any damage to the
Kremlin’s image or version of reality.
The Kremlin’s response to Beslan is predictable, given
the instruments of management that it has strengthened and cultivated
over the past five years. Other instruments — independent political
parties, judiciary, mass media, and public organizations — might
have produced a significant change in political course, or perhaps
even a significant crisis of stability. Instead, the
administration’s control of the security organs, law enforcement,
the mass media, public debate, and the political process predetermine
that its focus will be on managing the perception of the crisis first
of all. And the more the foundations of that system are shaken by the
events, the more the administration will bolster its control over
those instruments, ensuring a policy that amounts to nothing more
than “more of the same.”
Of course, the security situation in Chechnya and the North
Caucasus in general will have to be addressed. But that response will
not take into consideration calls for a real political process there
to replace the sham of stage-managed referendums and elections and
the facade of local administrations that is fully controlled by the
Kremlin. It will not take into consideration calls for an end to
human rights violations by federal forces in Chechnya: when asked
about this during his 7 September meeting with Western journalists,
Putin compared them to the events at Iraq’s Abu Ghurayb prison,
saying, “In war there are ugly processes that have their own logic.”
It will not take into consideration the widely perceived need to root
out the corruption that has almost certainly played a role in every
major terrorist incident Russia has faced in recent years.
Instead, the Kremlin will most likely rely on its control of
society, of information, and of the political process to cover up an
intensification of the military policies it has pursued in Chechnya
for most of the post-Soviet period. The information blockade of the
republic will be redoubled and the seemingly endless “antiterrorism
operation” there will continue. But these policies are not without
their risks. “There is fear if no one knows the truth,” Khakamada
told “The Moscow Times” on 8 September. “If people don’t
understand, it makes it easier for terrorists to buy people off. If
we are slaves, it is easier for them to recruit. The more things are
pushed underground, the better it is for the terrorists.”
THE KREMLIN AFTER BESLAN
By Victor Yasmann
President Vladimir Putin on 4 September appeared in a
nationally televised address in the wake of the bloodiest terrorism
incident in modern Russian history. He linked the takeover of a
school in Beslan and the deaths of hundreds of schoolchildren,
parents, and teachers to a series of other terrorist incidents that
have rocked the country since 24 August, including the 24 August
downing of two jet airliners and the 31 August suicide bombing
outside a Moscow subway station. In all, more than 400 people were
killed in less than 10 days.
“What we are dealing with are not isolated acts intended to
frighten us, not isolated terrorist attacks,” Putin said, according
to the text posted on the presidential website
(). “What we are facing is the direct
intervention of international terrorism directed against Russia.” He
added that the entire country is now engaged in “a total, cruel, and
full-scale war.”
Putin admitted that the country has been victimized by
terrorism because of its weakness. “We showed ourselves to be weak,”
he said. “And the weak get beaten.” He went on to say that this
weakness was a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union — an event
about which Putin expressed some regret — as well as Russia’s
inadequate defenses and pervasive corruption in the justice and
law-enforcement systems.
Putin also made several far-reaching statements that seem to
be a notable departure from his general policy of deferring to the
West and speaking of the need for cooperation with the United States
in combating international terrorism. For the first time in several
years, Putin said that Russia faces threats “both from the east and
the west.” Without specifically mentioning Chechnya or his own
policies in the Caucasus, Putin seemed to place the blame for the
increased terrorist activity in Russia on unspecified outside forces
that are threatened by Russia’s nuclear-power status. “Some would
like to tear from us a juicy chunk,” Putin said. “Others help them.
They help, reasoning that Russia still remains one of the world’s
major nuclear powers, and as such still represents a threat to them.
And so they reason that this threat should be removed. Terrorism, of
course, is just an instrument to achieve these aims.” Because
Russia’s nuclear arsenal is targeted primarily at the United
States, Putin seemed to be referring directly to that country.
However, does this really reflect the way Putin thinks? As a
former intelligence officer and a well-informed political leader, he
knows that the West has little reason to worry that Russia’s
nuclear weapons would be used in the current international
environment. The West is concerned, of course, that Russia’s
nuclear arsenal could be a tempting target for international
terrorists who are actively striving to acquire weapons of mass
destruction. These concerns are increased by the weak and corrupt
law-enforcement system that Putin describes.
It would seem, then, that Putin’s statements about
external forces working against Russia through terrorists were
addressed to his domestic audience, in an effort to avoid political
responsibility for the failure of his policies in Chechnya and the
Caucasus. He also undoubtedly wishes to avoid forcing his beloved
state-security organs to be accountable for this stark failure to
protect Russian citizens. The externalization of culpability is often
a defense of those in weak positions.
Effective Politics Foundation head and Kremlin insider Gleb
Pavlovskii told RTR on 6 September that during the Beslan siege the
present political system demonstrated its uselessness because no
political parties or politicians raised their voices against “the
lies that overflowed the whole country.”
Another Kremlin insider, National Strategy Institute head
Stanislav Belkovskii, told RFE/RL on 7 September that the Kremlin
administration was seized by panic and dismay during the crisis, as
reflected by numerous conflicting statements from Russian officials
during this time.
The Beslan crisis has highlighted the failure of the
Kremlin’s policies in Chechnya, despite the concerted efforts of
the Kremlin to deflect such considerations. Belkovskii noted that the
Kremlin’s policy in the region relies on pro-Moscow figures like
Ingush President Murat Zyazikov and Chechen leader Alu Alkhanov,
figures who all but disappeared from public view during the crisis.
The country’s political parties — on both ends of the
political spectrum — have only slowly been aroused from their
lethargy and begun to criticize Putin’s claims of external forces
behind the wave of terror. In a statement posted on its website
() on 7 September, the Communist Party said, “The
roots of the tragedy can be found not in ‘international
terrorism,’ which is a convenient smokescreen for the drama, but
inside the country.”
The Communist Party statement called for the resignation of
the entire Russian leadership. “The Putin regime directs all its
efforts toward the struggle with the [political] opposition, the
suppression of the independent mass media, with producing the
‘required results’ in elections, and the construction of a
vertical of power that proved helpless during this crisis,” the
statement said. “Law enforcement has been transformed into an
instrument for carrying out the authorities’ political orders.”
Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinskii on 7 September also called
for the resignation of the heads of the security organs and for the
creation of an independent commission to investigate the terrorist
attacks, grani.ru reported. The Motherland party similarly called for
the resignation of the government and for disbanding the Duma, which
it dismissed as “a rubber stamp,” the website reported.
Clearly, as the period of mourning recedes, many Russians are
seeing the real face of the country’s leadership in a whole new
light.
POLITICAL CALENDAR
8 September: Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmad Qurei will visit Russia
10-11 September: President Putin will visit Germany
12 September: Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov will
visit North Korea
13-14 September: Fourth annual meeting of the Russian Jewish Congress
14 September: British Prince Edward, Earl of Wessex, will
visit Petrozavodsk
14-17 September: Third annual Baikal Economic Forum will take place
15 September: Summit of CIS presidents will take place in
Astana, Kazakhstan
15 September: Russia will play supervisory role at OPEC
meeting in Vienna
15-18 September: The third International Conference of Mayors
of World Cities will be held in Moscow
15 September: Supreme Court will render a final decision on
when to hold gubernatorial elections in Samara Oblast
20 September: The State Duma’s fall session will begin
20-23 September: South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun to visit
Russia
21 September: U.S. pianist Van Cliburn will perform a concert
in Moscow in memory of the victims of the Beslan tragedy
26 September: State Duma will consider draft 2005 budget in
its first reading
29 September: Auction for the government’s stake in LUKoil will be
held
October: President Putin will visit China
October: International forum of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference will be held in Moscow
1 October: Deadline for population to select a management
company to handle their pension monies, according to
“Kommersant-Daily” on 3 September
1 October: Date by which the government will decide whether
to sell a controlling stake in Aeroflot, according to Economic
Development and Trade Minister German Gref
7 October: President Putin’s birthday
10 October: Mayoral elections scheduled for Magadan
23-26 October: Second anniversary of the Moscow theater
hostage crisis
25 October: First anniversary of former Yukos head Mikhail
Khodorkovskii’s arrest at an airport in Novosibirsk
31 October: Presidential election in Ukraine
November: Gubernatorial election in Pskov and Kurgan oblasts
14 November: Mayoral election will take place in Blagoveshchensk
20 November: Sixth anniversary of the killing of State Duma
Deputy Galina Starovoitova
22 November: President Putin to visit Brazil
December: A draft law on toll roads will be submitted to the
government, according to the Federal Highways Agency’s
Construction Department on 6 April
December: Gubernatorial elections in Vladimir, Bryansk, Kamchatka,
Ulyanovsk, and Volgograd oblasts; Khabarovsk Krai; and
Ust-Ordynskii Autonomous Okrug
December: Presidential elections in Marii-El and Khakasia republics
5 December: By-elections for State Duma seats will be held in
two single-mandate districts in Ulyanovsk and Moscow
5 December: Gubernatorial election will be held in Astrakhan Oblast
29 December: State Duma’s fall session will come to a close
1 February 2005: Former President Boris Yeltsin’s 74th birthday
March 2005: Gubernatorial election in Saratov Oblast.
*********************************************************
Copyright (c) 2004. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.
The “RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly” is prepared by Julie A. Corwin
on the basis of a variety of sources. It is distributed every
Wednesday.
Direct comments to Julie A. Corwin at [email protected].
For information on reprints, see:
Back issues are online at
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

PRESS RELEASE/NEWS REVIEW
MELKONIAN ALUMNI CYPRUS
Contact: Masis der Parthogh
P.O. Box 16077, CY 2085
Nicosia, Cyprus.
Tel. +-357 22 678666
Fax. +-357 22 678664
Email: [email protected]
Founders’ nephew joins Melkonian campaign
Cyprus Weekly – Friday, September 10, 2004
THE worldwide campaign to save the Melkonian School in Nicosia took
a new turn this week as Jack R. Melkonian, a nephew of the founders,
joined the campaign at a crucial meeting in London with delegates of
the alumni and friends.
The London meeting decided to take joint action to challenge and
prevent a decision if the US-based central board of the AGBU (Armenian
General Benevolent Union) to close down the Melkonian next year.
Taking part in the meeting were alumni representatives from Cyprus,
the UK, the USA, Canada and Lebanon, while Jack Melkonian represented
the family of the brothers who founded the shool 80 years ago.
An announcement by the alumni said: “It was a most interesting meeting,
Mr Melkonian is fully in agreement with the joint strategic and legal
action to be taken, on the advice of legal counsel presented by law
experts in Cyprus and overseas.”
The meeting expressed its gratitude to the government of Cyprus for
its support and the warm hospitality it continues to provide the
Melkonian Educational Institute and the welfare and education of the
Armenian community.

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one’s belief or religion
The right to join together and express one’s belief
=================================================
Friday 10 September 2004
TURKMENISTAN: BAPTISTS RAIDED AND JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES REJECT PRESIDENTIAL
PORTRAITS
In the third known set of raids on religious communities in August, police
interrogated and threatened members of a Baptist church in the western town
of Balkanabad, warning Nikolai Matsenko that any further unregistered
services in his home will lead to fines. Meanwhile a Jehovah’s Witness
elder told Forum 18 News Service from the capital Ashgabad that if his
faith gets registration, it will reject official demands made of other
faiths to hang the country’s flag and a portrait of the president where it
worships. “These are unacceptable demands,” he declared. Forum 18
has been unable to get confirmation of a 5 September report that President
Saparmurat Niyazov ordered the registration procedure for religious
organisations to be tightened up once more.
TURKMENISTAN: BAPTISTS RAIDED AND JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES REJECT PRESIDENTIAL
PORTRAITS
By Felix Corley, Forum 18 News Service
As an unconfirmed report says President Saparmurat Niyazov has ordered
rules on registering religious communities to be tightened up once again,
Forum 18 News Service has learnt that police launched another major
crackdown on a Baptist congregation in the western town of Balkanabad
(formerly Nebit-Dag) in late August, threatening church members that if
they meet for worship again they will be fined. Meanwhile, a Jehovah’s
Witness elder has told Forum 18 from the capital Ashgabad that although his
community is planning to lodge a registration application, it will not
accept official demands made of other faiths to hang the country’s flag in
places of worship and a portrait of the president. “These are
unacceptable demands,” the elder, who preferred not to be named, told
Forum 18 on 10 September. “The constitution is clear: religion and the
state are separate. Plus as Jehovah’s Witnesses we do not get involved in
politics.”
An officer of the criminal investigation department arrived at the
Balkanabad home of Nikolai Matsenko in the afternoon of 20 August, Baptists
in Turkmenistan told Forum 18 on 28 August. After questioning him about the
church’s activity, the officer warned him that if any further services take
place in his flat he will be fined. Later that evening, another police
officer arrived at Matsenko’s home, presenting himself as the new local
policeman and declaring that he had come to get to know him.
At 11 pm the following evening, a group of people knocked on Matsenko’s
door. One of them introduced himself as the local policeman (although this
was not the same man as the officer who had arrived the previous day).
“They insistently demanded that he open the door and let them into the
flat,” the Baptists told Forum 18. “But as it was night, brother
Nikolai didn’t open the door. Threatening dire consequences, they
left.”
The Baptists reported that police visited several other church members in
the town, including new converts, at the end of August. One young man was
forcibly dragged from his home to the police station. “All were asked
exactly the same questions about the internal life of the church,” the
Baptists complained.
The Balkanabad Baptist congregation belongs to a Baptist network of
churches that refuse to register on principle in any of the former Soviet
republics where they operate, regarding such registration as unacceptable
state interference. Matsenko was among a large group of church members in
Balkanabad given heavy fines at the beginning of the year for participation
in the church (see F18News 9 January 2004
).
August saw several other raids on religious communities. The secret police
raided a Baptist home on 4 August in Abadan (formerly Bezmein) near
Ashgabad, where a prayer and Bible reading service was underway (see
F18News 9 August 2004 ).
Three days later police raided the home of an Adventist family in the
eastern city of Turkmenabad [Chärjew], even though no religious
meeting was in progress (see F18News 11 August 2004
).
The Ashgabad Jehovah’s Witness elder told Forum 18 that their communities
still cannot meet in large numbers. “Everything is continuing as
before,” he declared. “We can only meet in small groups, maybe
five or at most six people.” He confirmed that the two Jehovah’s
Witness prisoners, Mansur Masharipov and Vepa Tuvakov, both arrested in May
and sentenced to a year and a half in prison, have not been freed (see
F18News 25 June 2004 ).
There appears to have been little progress on registering religious
communities. So far this year, only the Adventists, one group of Baptists,
the Baha’is and the Hare Krishna community are known to have received
registration. Many others who have applied or sought information on how to
apply languish without registration. As Turkmenistan’s religious law
specifically prohibits unregistered religious activity, failure to gain
registration can have serious consequences.
The exiled human rights group the Turkmenistan Helsinki Initiative reported
on 7 September that some ethnic Kurds – about 6,000 of whom live
mainly in Ashgabad and other southern regions of the country along the
border with Iran – are unable to practice their faith freely. Most
are of Sunni Muslim background, and can therefore worship in
government-approved mosques. “However, there are also Shia Kurds and
even Christians who often face problems regarding freedom of religion with
the local special services,” the group reported.
Particularly affected are Kurds who belong to the Yezidi faith, a uniquely
Kurdish ancient faith. Seiran Amanov, a resident of Bikrov near Ashgabad,
told the Turkmenistan Helsinki Initiative that his religious affiliation
has meant that he has been repeatedly interrogated by the secret police and
has been accused of belonging to a “dangerous Islamic sect”.
“As Seiran states, this happens despite the fact that everybody knows
two religious movements of the Kurds: Yezidism and Aliallahism.”
The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Yezidis are among many faiths in Turkmenistan
that do not have registration, including Pentecostals and other Evangelical
Christians, Catholics, the Armenian Apostolic Church, Lutherans, Shia
Muslims and Jews.
However, even registration appears to be of little help in being able to
function. Adventist pastor Pavel Fedotov complained in early August that
his church is unable to rent anywhere to hold services (see F18News 11
August 2004 ). Baptist
and Hare Krishna leaders have made similar complaints to Forum 18 that
registration has not helped their communities function openly.
One Baha’i leader in Ashgabad told the Turkmenistan Helsinki Initiative
that despite the group’s new registration the authorities have made life
for the community very difficult, banning it from renting places for
meetings. A secret government order bans registered religious and civic
groups from opening accounts at any of Ashgabad’s banks, while the new
registration rules require a bank account for all financial transactions,
the group reported on 15 August.
A local Baha’i reported that mainly old people who have a long association
with the faith keep in contact with the community. “This can partly be
explained by the fact that special services have conducted meetings with
many Baha’i followers and threatened them with dismissal from work,”
the Baha’i told the Turkmenistan Helsinki Initiative. “So registration
by itself does not guarantee that we can profess our faith openly. I think
this easing of registration restrictions has merely a declaratory
character.”
The German-based Central Asian Press Agency reported on 5 September that
President Niyazov had issued an instruction to the Adalat Ministry at a
conference of law-enforcement officers that it should tighten up “the
rules for registering religious sects and non-governmental
organisations”, as well as to work closely with the National Security
Ministry “to stamp out any illegal actions”. Forum 18 has been
unable to confirm that Niyazov issued such an instruction from any other
source.
On 10 September Forum 18 was unable to reach Maifa Sarieva, who has headed
the department at the Adalat (Fairness or Justice) Ministry which registers
religious communities for the past two months. No other ministry officials
could tell Forum 18 whether the president had given such an order for the
registration rules to be tightened up, what was holding up the registration
of religious organisations and why religious communities that have
registration cannot in practice function openly.
Meanwhile, the state-run media has insisted that the decision to remove
from office the head of the country’s largest religious group, the Sunni
Muslims, came from the muftiate. Kakageldi Vepaev, who had been appointed
chief mufti by President Niyazov in January 2003, was sacked on 24 August
for “serious shortcomings in his work”, according to the
state-run media, as well as deficiencies in his private life. Appointed as
his successor was 27-year-old Rovshen Allaberdiev, former chief imam of the
Lebap region and former chairman of the government’s Gengeshi (Council) for
Religious Affairs at the Lebap regional administration.
The previous chief mufti Nasrullah ibn Ibadullah, sacked by Niyazov in
January 2003, remains in prison.
The Sunni Muslim community is the most tightly-controlled faith in
Turkmenistan. No leaders or imams can be appointed without government
approval, granted through the Gengeshi. Allaberdiev’s close links with the
state are clear from his previous double appointment as regional chief imam
and government religious affairs official. On being sacked as chief mufti,
Vepaev presumably also lost his job as one of the Gengeshi’s deputy
chairmen. As a Gengeshi official, he had personally taken part in raids on
religious services by minority faiths.
For more background, see Forum 18’s Turkmenistan religious freedom survey
at
A printer-friendly map of Turkmenistan is available at
s/index.html?Parent=asia&Rootmap=turkme
(END)

© Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved.
You may reproduce or quote this article provided that credit is given to
F18News
Past and current Forum 18 information can be found at
=================================================
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

PRESS RELEASE
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Communication and Information Department
Tel: (04) 410001, 410003
Fax: (04) 419724
E- mail: [email protected]
Web:
PO Box 70 317
Antelias-Lebanon
Antelias Mourns the Passing of Archbishop Vartan Demirdjian
Antelias, Lebanon – His Holiness Aram I, Catholicos of Cilicia, members of
the Brotherhood of Cilicia, announce with deepest sadness the passing of His
Eminence Archbishop Vartan Demirdjian. Archbishop Vartan died suddenly in
Antelias, Lebanon, on Thursday, September 9. He was 65 years old.
The Extreme Unction and Burial services will take place on Saturday,
September 11, 2004, at 11 a.m. at St. Gregory the Illuminator Cathedral in
Antelias. Interment will follow in the Mausoleum of the Holy See of Cilicia.
His Holiness Aram I will preside over the services.
Archbishop Demirdjian, a member of the Cilician Brotherhood, was born in
Lebanon in 1939. He was ordained a celibate priest in 1957 and was
consecrated a Bishop in 1977. He has served the Armenian Church in various
capacities including several years of service in Iran and Greece, as a
teacher at the Cilician See’s Theological Seminary, and Director of the
Printing House. At the time of his death he was the Librarian at the
Catholicosate’s Library.
##
View printable pictures here:
******
The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia is one of the two Catholicosates of
the Armenian Orthodox Church. For detailed information about the history and
the mission of the Cilician Catholicosate, you may refer to the web page of
the Catholicosate, The Cilician Catholicosate, the
administrative center of the church is located in Antelias, Lebanon.

Armenian constitutional reforms to amend relations between branches of power
Mediamax news agency
10 Sep 04
Yerevan, 10 September: The new packet of Armenian constitutional
reforms envisages amendments to relations between the president,
the government and the parliament, Armen Arutyunyan, the Armenian
president’s representative on constitutional reforms, said today,
Mediamax reports.
He pointed out that the changes to the constitution will not have a
revolutionary nature.
“We just want to make the constitution more effective,” Armen
Arutyunyan said.

Azerbaijan: ANS TV to suspend broadcasts over Armenian servicemen’s visit
ANS TV, Baku
10 Sep 04
[Presenter] A protest has been staged by media outlets at the
initiative of the group of ANS companies, against the expected
arrival of Armenian officers in Baku to attend NATO exercises [on
13-26 September]. There are plans to stage more serious protests
in case of their arrival. Our guest, the president of the group of
ANS companies, Vahid Mustafayev, is in the conference hall. Hello,
Vahid-muallim [form of address].
[Mustafayev] Hello.
[Presenter] Today is 10 September and the possibility of Armenian
officers’ arrival in Baku is becoming more real. What is ANS planning
to do to protest against their arrival?
[Mustafayev] Unfortunately, Armenian officers’ arrival in Baku is
still on the agenda. In this connection, ANS TV will stop broadcasting
entertainment programmes today at 1600 [1100 gmt]. Documentaries and
other programmes will be aired instead about criminal and brutal acts
that were committed by Armenian officers against our people.
Unlike last time when we suspended broadcasts for an hour, tomorrow
we will suspend broadcasts for two hours and during this time, our
employees will visit the Avenue of Martyrs and lay red pinks on the
graves of our martyrs. May the martyrs rest in peace.
[Presenter] May them rest in peace. This was the head of the group
of ANS companies, Vahid Mustafayev.

Head of IMF mission hails cooperation with Armenia
Noyan Tapan news agency
8 Sep 04
Yerevan, 8 September: Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Markaryan
received the head of the mission of the International Monetary Fund
[IMF], Enrike Gelbard, the permanent representative of the IMF in
Armenia, James McHugh, and a member of the mission, (?Susan George).
Having described the nearly 10 years of cooperation with Armenia as
rather effective, the head of the IMF mission said that the purpose
of his regular visit was to continue the dialogue and discussions
with the executive authorities on a number of financial and economic
issues. They include issues of assisting small and medium-sized
businesses in Armenia, relations between businessmen and state
structures and the need to expand cooperation between appropriate
state structures.
The press service of the Armenian government told Noyan Tapan news
agency that the Armenian prime minister has submitted his approaches
regarding the aforesaid issues. Andranik Markaryan expressed the hope
that thanks to active cooperation with the IMF, the aforesaid issues
will be resolved effectively.

US general in Azerbaijan to ensure NATO drills go smoothly – paper
Ekspress, Baku
10 Sep 04
The deputy commander of the US European Command, Charles Wald, has
arrived in Azerbaijan to convince Baku of the importance of Armenian
presence at NATO exercises due to be held in Baku in mid-September
and to ensure that the exercises go smoothly, Azerbaijani newspaper
Ekspress has reported. The newspaper believes that it is not by
chance that the US general’s visit coincided with the Armenian
Defence Ministry’s appeal to the Azerbaijani authorities to issue
Armenian servicemen with entry visas. The following is the text of
Alakbar Raufoglu’s report by Azerbaijani newspaper Ekspress on 10
September entitled “Why has Charles Wald come?”; subheadings have
been inserted editorially:
, arrived in Baku yesterday morning. Express newspaper has learnt from
diplomatic sources that the Pentagon official is being accompanied
by members of the Joint Civilian Orientation Conference and several
other officers. The aim of the visit is to discuss military relations
between Baku and Washington and regional security issues.
US general, Azeri defence minister discuss military ties, Karabakh
Yesterday’s meeting between the US general and Azerbaijani Defence
Minister Col-Gen Safar Abiyev mainly focused on the Pentagon-led
projects that are being implemented in the South Caucasus and NATO-Baku
cooperation. The future development of military cooperation between
the two countries, the Karabakh settlement, and preparations for
the planned NATO exercises Cooperative Best Effort 2004 in Baku were
discussed during the talks.
“The processes under way here and the existing situation are
being closely observed by international organizations,” the US
general said. He highly praised US-Azerbaijani military contacts:
“Washington attaches great importance to this cooperation and supports
its expansion.” As for NATO’s Baku-hosted exercises, Wald believes
that the event will be successful and “we hope that the exercises
will bring Azerbaijan even closer to NATO”.
Speaking about the Karabakh settlement, Wald said that “the South
Caucasus is rife with unsettled problems. But the Karabakh conflict
should find its resolution at the international level. The USA,
Russia and Turkey should be closely involved in the resolution of
the conflict. Fighting terrorism jointly is important. Your country’s
problems should be quickly resolved and the region should see economic
prosperity.”
In turn, Abiyev said that the people of Azerbaijan are concerned
about the fact that the conflict has not been resolved yet. This
problem also has a negative impact on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan [oil
pipeline] and other business projects. Therefore, the minister urged
the international community to make efforts to find a speedy solution
to the conflict. “However, everyone should know that Azerbaijan will
not cede an inch of its territory,” Abiyev said.
USA has no concern about Baku-hosted drills
At a news briefing after the meeting, Wald declined to go into the
detail of the visit and only said that “our countries enjoy close
ties, and relations are developing”. Asked by Express newspaper
about Armenians’ participation in NATO’s Baku-hosted exercises, Wald
answered that the USA “understands” Baku’s concern. Asked if it was
possible for Armenians not to come to Baku, Wald said that he had no
information in this regard.
Incidentally, before his visit to Baku, in his interview with the
Pentagon mouthpiece Defence News newspaper, the US general said
that NATO had no concern about the exercises in Azerbaijan and
“preparations for the event are nearing the end, and it meets both
Azerbaijan’s and the alliance’s interests”.
USA wants to ensure NATO drills go smoothly
As Wald’s Baku visit is rather unexpected and its agenda limited and
since it is being held behind closed doors, it is hard to guess what
is behind it. The statement by the US embassy in Azerbaijan on the
visit is so vague that we can only guess.
This is the third visit of the deputy commander of the US European
Command to Azerbaijan in the last five months. Based on Wald’s brief
statements aired in Baku, we could conclude that the USA is anxious
about the fate of the programmes being implemented in the region,
particularly in Azerbaijan. However, pundits believe that Wald’s
regular visits to Baku can also be interpreted as the USA’s wish to
show that it has interests in the region.
During his recent visit to Yerevan, Wald said that Armenian officers’
involvement in the NATO exercises in Baku was important and Baku
had officially guaranteed their participation. It is worth noting
that the US general’s unexpected visit coincided with the Armenian
Defence Ministry’s appeal to the Azerbaijani embassy in Georgia to
obtain entry visas. Apparently, the Pentagon general was compelled
to pay another visit to Azerbaijan to resolve the matter on the spot.
The former presidential aide [on foreign issues], Vafa Quluzada,
thinks that the latest frequent visits by Wald to Azerbaijan point
to the Pentagon’s interests in the immediate implementation of joint
military projects in our country: “These visits have a positive impact
on Baku-Washington military relations,” he told our newspaper.
Quluzada believes that Wald’s visit could also be linked with NATO’s
Cooperative Best Effort 2004 exercises: “This shows that the USA
wants the exercises to be conducted smoothly.”

Pentagon reportedly to supervise NATO exercises in Azerbaijan
Ayna, Baku
10 Sep 04
Azerbaijani Defence Minister Col-Gen Safar Abiyev and the deputy
commander of the US European Command, Charles Wald, yesterday discussed
preparations for the 13-26 September NATO exercises Cooperative
Best Effort 2004 in Baku and the development of military cooperation
between Azerbaijan and the USA.
[Passage omitted: report from the Defence Ministry’s press service]
Nevertheless, yesterday’s meeting between Safar Abiyev and Charles Wald
contains aspects hidden from the Azerbaijani public. As a military
source told Ayna newspaper, at his meeting with Abiyev, Wald said
that Washington was concerned over causing the Azerbaijani public’s
distrust of NATO.
Recently the Azerbaijani public, including some official circles,
have been making anti-NATO statements. Azerbaijani Speaker Murtuz
Alasgarov, for example, issued a statement several days ago and
denounced NATO. He said that “NATO will never resolve the Karabakh
problem. The alliance is trying to set up a base for itself here. NATO
is planning to enter the Caucasus.”
The speaker said he understood people’s anxiety and added that “the
killers of our children cannot enter Azerbaijan”. Alasgarov said that
the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry should seriously deal with the issue.
“Armenians have occupied our lands. Now they want to arrive in Baku
to boast. Certainly, every sober-minded citizen of our country cannot
reconcile himself or herself to such disgrace. I understand people’s
protest, but everything should be carried out reasonably. Talks have
to be held with NATO’s leadership. I regard the military exercises
as inopportune at this moment,” Alasgarov said.
Obviously, the Pentagon in the current situation has taken control
of the Cooperative Best Effort 2004 exercises in Azerbaijan. Wald’s
impromptu arrival in Azerbaijan and discussions with certain officials
cannot be groundless. Wald is said to have told Safar Abiyev how
important the upcoming exercises were for Azerbaijan. However, whether
Armenian military officers will participate in the exercises remains
a mystery.
Our paper has learnt that Abiyev filled the US general in on the
existing dissatisfaction of the Azerbaijani public and political
circles with Armenian officers’ visit.
In turn, Wald said that he would report to NATO and the Pentagon
leadership on the matter.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress