ArmenPress
25 Oct. 2004
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT PLEDGES $925000 GRANT TO ARMENIAN AGRICULTURE
YEREVAN, OCTOBER 25, ARMENPRESS: Armenian finance and economy
minister Vartan Khachatrian and World Bank Resident Representative
Rodger Robinson have signed today an agreement under which the
government of Japan will provide Armenia with a $925,000 grant. A World
Bank affiliation, International Development Association (IDA)
administrates the Japanese grants.
Armenian finance and economy ministry said the main objective of the
grant is to facilitate preliminary work for development of rural
enterprises, as well as to help improve the skills of farmers and rural
entrepreneurs to enter markets, to promote private and government
investments in agriculture in order to increase possibilities for
creating new jobs.

ArmenPress
25 Oct. 2004
ARMENIAN MALE CHESS PLAYERS FIGHT FOR MEDALS
YEREVAN, OCTOBER 25, ARMENPRESS. After nine rounds at the 36-th
World Chess Olympiad in Spanish Calvia Armenian male chess team is
fourth. In the latest round our team played 2:2 with the leader of the
Olympiad Ukrainian team. Rafael Vahanian won the well-known Ruslan
Ponomariov, Smbat Lputian was defeated by Andrei Volokitin, while
Vladimir Hakobian and Gabriel Sarkisian ended in draw with Vasili
Ivanchuk and Alexander Morozevich.
Ukraine is leading with 27 scores, Russia comes second with 24,5
scores, USA is with 24 scores, and Armenia is forth with 23 scores.

Manila Bulletin, Philippines
25 Oct. 2004
Paragua raps junior champ
But RP takes 3-1 beating from Azerbaijan
By rey bancod
MALLORCA, Spain –International Master Mark Paragua came through with
his biggest win so far, accounting for the Philippines’ only point
against powerhouse Azerbaijan Sunday in the eighth round of the World
Chess Olympiad.
The 20-year-old former prodigy, whose grandmaster title remains
pending, trounced reigning 2003 world junior champion Shakh Mamedyarov
(2660) in 42 moves of a Benoni defense.
But the rest of his teammates floundered against a team aching to come
back from consecutive defeats to Ukraine, Spain A and the United
States.
Grandmaster Eugene Torre, playing his seventh consecutive match, bowed
to super GM Teimur Radjabov (2663) in 33 moves of a Pirc defense.
IM Jayson Gonzales, handling black, suffered his first defeat at the
hands of GM Gadir Guseinov in 36 moves of an Alekhine defense.
Rookie Darwin Laylo put to waste a gallant stand against GM Rauf
Mamedov, losing a Nimzo Indian duel in 43 moves.
The 1-3 defeat sent the Philippines reeling to a share of 27th place
with 20.5 points, 6.5 behind pacesetting Ukraine.
Ukraine was held to a 2-all draw by Armenia.
Defending champion Russia edged India, 2.5-1.5, to take solo second
place with 24.5 points, half-apoint ahead of thirdrunning United
States.
India remained the best-placed Asian team with 22.5 points followed by
China with 21.5 points.
Paragua shrugged off his disappointment over his failure to get his GM
title by buckling down to work against Mamedyarov with whom he has
played many blitz matches in the past.
Playing white off a sharp line of the Benoni, Paragua foiled a
queenside counter play by Mamedyarov and launched his own attack in the
kingside, beginning with a pawn advance on the 18th that won him a pawn
11 moves later.
On the 33rd move, Paragua forced Mamedyarov to ponder hard and deep
with a knight thrust, offering a pawn in the process.
“It was over by then. Kahit di niya kinain yung pawn, tapos na rin,”
said Paragua, whose European campaign is funded by Filway Marketing
president Hector Tagaysay.
Paragua sent his two rooks in the fray, one controlling the seventh
fray to force Mameyarov to concede.
With 5.5 points out of eight matches, Paragua improved his chances to
gain another GM norm.
Earlier, Paragua was informed by the titles and rating committee member
Casto Abundo that his application has not been acted upon following the
unexplained failure of the Alushta organizers to submit a report.
Abundo said Paragua would have to wait until January next year.
Nelson Mariano II had no such problem, having earned his GM title even
before the start of the World Chess Congress.
All’s not gloomy in the RP camp.
In a welcome development, Grandmaster Joey Antonio and the rest of his
teammates settled a misunderstanding over how players are fielded in
the tournament.
Antonio explained that contrary to perceptions, he is not imposing an
unreasonable demand that he plays white.
“I thought that we would be fielding the regular boards against
Azerbaijan, so I was expecting to play white,” said the 42-year-old
board two player.
In an hour-long bull session, Antonio poured out his emotion, taking
issue with Torre over the equal distribution of chess colors.
Antonio said he felt that distributing the chess colors equally is
affecting the team, an observation disputed by Torre.
“Some players are already complaining that they are playing black more
often than the others and not doing well. It is also important to keep
their morale high,” said Torre.
Antonio also cited his own sacrifices in his previous Olympic
appearances.
“I played black nine times in Thessaloniki, Greece in 1988, I did not
complain. In Armenia 1996, I played 12 consecutive games despite the
fact that I wasn’t feeling well,” recalled Antonio.
Antonio said he came here to help the team and not for his own personal
glory, citing an instance in 1988 where he could have earned a gold
medal in board four.
“I was 6 of 7 but I abandoned my ambition and continued to play,” said
Antonio who has so far scored 3.5 points in five rounds.
Torre said that everybody is making a big sacrifice for the team.
“I played 14 straight games in Thessaloniki and Armenia,” he said.
The meeting ended amicably with Antonio promising to give his best in
the last four rounds of the tournament.
To enable him to regain his bearing and prepare for the team’s final
push, Antonio was rested for Monday’s 10th round against 33rd-ranked
Estonia.
For the first time in the country’s Olympic participation, the
Philippines will play a round without its top two board players.
“Eugene (Torre) badly needs a rest so he would be fresh and ready for
the crucial rounds ahead,” said Estimo who said the final placing of
the team depends on the last three rounds of the tournament.

STATE OIL FUND REVENUES STEADILY RISE
[October 25, 2004, 21:09:20]
AzerTag, Azerbaijan
25 Oct. 2004
Revenues of the State Oil Fund of the Azerbaijan republic made AZM
819,8 bln, and expenditures – AZM 625,4 bln from January to September
2004. The Fund’s press service announced that for this period, the
revenues from oil contracts were AZM 819,8 bln, including AZM 677,8
bln from selling profitable oil, AZM 47,7 bln from transit payment
for transportation of oil along the territory of the Republic of
Azerbaijan through the Baku-Supsa export pipeline, AZM 7,9 bln from
bonus payments, and AZM 6,3 bln from per acre payments. Revenues from
foreign companies’ assets made up AZM 2,3 bln.
During the nine month of 2004, the Oil Fund Budget set aside AZM
15,7 bln to finance settling and improvement of social conditions
of refugee and IDP families ousted from native lands as a result of
the ethnic purge committed by Armenia, AZM 36,4 bln as share of the
Azerbaijan Republic in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline
project, and AZM 488 bln were transferred to the State Budget.
Expenditures for the mentioned period constituted AZM 51,7 and those
connected with revaluation of currency assets – AZM 49,4 bln. The
State budget received AZM 33,6 bln. in tax revenues.
The Fund’s resources made up AZM 4 trillion 209 bln (approx US$ 857,7
mln) in 31 September 2004 against AZM 4 trillion 15 bln (approx US$
815 mln) in 1 January 2004.
/US $1 = AZM 4,903/

Conference of South Caucasian Media
CASCFEN, Baku
25 Oct. 2004
Published: 25.10.2004
Rustavi 2, Tbilisi, 25.10.2004 — Metekhi Sheraton is hosting the
two days conference of the South Caucasian Media, which has been
initiated by the OSCE mission representatives in Georgia.
Over 50 journalists from Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are
participating in the conference dedicated to the discussion of
the issues on free media, slander and offense and the appropriate
legislative base in these countries.
The conference was opened by the representative of the OSCE mission to
Georgia Roy Reeve and the deputy foreign affairs minister of Georgia
Kote Kavtaradze.

PRESS OFFICE
Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern)
630 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Contact: Jake Goshert, Coordinator of Information Services
Tel: (212) 686-0710 Ext. 60; Fax: (212) 779-3558
E-mail: [email protected]
Website:
October 25, 2004
___________________
IN MIDWEST, PRIMATE HIGHLIGHTS SUCCESSFUL MINISTRIES OF DIOCESE
By Jake Goshert
The programs and ministries provided by the Diocese of the Armenian
Church of America (Eastern) touch each Armenian differently.
For Mike Tootooian, a parishioner at the St. Gregory the Illuminator
Church of Chicago, IL, a Diocesan-sponsored pilgrimage in 2001 — “In
the Footsteps of St. Gregory the Illuminator” — brought on stronger
feelings for his heritage.
“That was an inspiring trip that got me back to my roots. I actually
now can see where my ancestors came from, where my grandparents were
born, the long road they traveled to get here to America,” said
Tootooian, a second-generation American. “It inspired me to become more
involved and know more about my past.”
With a deeper commitment to his culture, his faith, and his church,
Tootooian this year helped organize a reception at the Union League Club
in downtown Chicago on October 15, 2004, to kick-off the Archbishop’s
Annual Appeal 2004.
SHOWING SUCCESS
Though it is the main annual fund-raising effort of the Eastern Diocese,
the Archbishop’s Annual Appeal is about more than money. It’s primary
purpose is to expand the understanding of the role the Diocese has in
supporting the parishes and the Armenian-American community.
Through events, like the inaugural reception in Chicago, the Primate and
Diocesan leaders are meeting with faithful to speak about the successes
of the Diocese’s ministries and programs, and the efforts that
strengthen local parishes and individual families.
“It’s natural for people to be more attached to their own local church
as opposed to the bigger organization, because people have more
day-to-day contact with their own local church than with the Diocese,”
Tootooian said. “But it’s important to support both. You need the
umbrella organization. The Diocese has to make it clear just what they
can offer and what they can do to help you: to show they can offer
things that the local parishes can’t individually.”
Some of the successful Diocesan efforts funded through the Archbishop’s
Annual Appeal include:
* Spiritual growth among Armenians of all age-groups, exemplified by the
record number of seminarians studying at St. Nersess Seminary;
* An ever-growing college ministry program, which has reached out to
students from schools in New England, New York, and the Midwest, and is
reaching even further through it’s newly launched website,
;
* The growth of the Diocesan website, which is a tool used by Armenians
around the world to educate their children — and themselves — in the
faith and heritage of the Armenian Church;
* A focused effort to provide support and ideas to local parish leaders,
to help each parish become a vibrant anchor for the local Armenian
community;
* Providing expanded, multi-media resources specifically tailored for
local Armenian School and Sunday School teachers, to provide them with
better tools to teach our children.
“The Diocese is doing a lot to connect each and every Armenian family to
their faith and heritage,” said Archbishop Khajag Barsamian, Primate of
the Eastern Diocese. “Together our dedicated Diocese and active local
parishes are building a bright future for our beloved church. We want
everyone to know that our Diocese’s ministries and programs are here to
meet the challenges of today, and to provide the foundation for our
community’s tomorrow.”
YOU CAN HELP
The continued growth of the Armenian Church in America can only be
assured with the support of every Armenian family. From attending
services weekly, to serving as stewards and leaders of their parishes,
to supporting the Archbishop’s Annual Appeal, every Armenian has a role
to play.
Donations to the Archbishop’s Annual Appeal support the Diocese’s
efforts to provide parishes with tools and resources. While some people
are able to make large donations, most of the support for the
Archbishop’s Annual Appeal comes from everyday people giving what they
can to support things such as youth ministry programs, outreach to new
immigrant communities, and Christian and Armenian-language educational
programs for both children and adults.
“The Diocese does so much to keep the flames of our faith burning, from
helping educate our youngsters to providing leadership training to our
parishes,” said Oscar Tatosian, a member of the Diocesan Council and one
of the organizers of the Chicago reception. “It’s important that
everyone support these efforts to whatever level they can, by giving to
the Archbishop’s Annual Appeal.”
In the next few weeks, members of the Armenian-American community will
be receiving letters from the Primate highlighting the success of the
Diocese’s ministries and programs, and asking them to support the
Archbishop’s Annual Appeal 2004.
Receptions like the one in Chicago have also been set for Boston on
December 1, the New York City region on December 2, and New Jersey on
December 10. Receptions are in the planning stages for Detroit,
Philadelphia, and Florida.
For more information or to contribute today, contact the Diocese of the
Armenian Church of America (Eastern) by e-mailing
[email protected]; calling (212) 686-0710; or writing 630 Second
Ave., New York, NY, 10016.
Learn more about the Diocesan ministries and the Archbishop’s Annual
Appeal 2004 by going online to the Diocese’s website,
–10/25/04
E-mail photos available on request. Photos also viewable in the News
and Events section of the Eastern Diocese’s website,
PHOTO CAPTION (1): Archbishop Khajag Barsamian, Primate of the Eastern
Diocese, with Diocesan Council member Oscar Tatosian and Fr. Aren
Jebejian, pastor of the St. Gregory the Illuminator Church of Chicago,
IL, during a reception in Chicago inaugurating the Archbishop’s Annual
Appeal 2004.
PHOTO CAPTION (2): The Primate gathers on Friday, October 15, 2004,
with leaders from the Chicago-area parishes at the Union League Club in
downtown Chicago to launch the Archbishop’s Annual Appeal 2004.
# # #

Zoo cries foul after elephant deaths
By the BBC’s Habib Beary
BBC News
October 25, 2004
Komala was a darling of one of India’s oldest zoos.
But the seven-year-old elephant calf died in agony after what officials
at Msyore zoo in southern India are calling a conspiracy by insiders.
They suspect she could be the latest victim of poisoning by disgruntled
employees, and, perhaps, a persistent campaign to discredit the zoo for
reasons unknown.
Two elephants and an endangered lion-tailed macaque died in similar
circumstances in August.
“This is shocking,” the zoo’s director, Manoj Kumar, told BBC News
Online, as officials began an inquiry on Monday.
‘Negligence’
Karnataka state’s Chief Minister, Dharam Singh, said he wanted a
detailed investigation.
We suspect foul play. All the deaths could be due to poisoning Zoo
director Manoj Kumar
“The truth should come out. Officials have to be alert. There seems to
be negligence.”
The 110-year-old zoo in Mysore is home to 1,100 animals.
Komala, described as attractive and playful, was due to have flown to
Armenia as a gift from Indian President APJ Abdul Kalam – she had been
handpicked for her pleasing features, officials say.
Doctors battled for hours to save her on Friday, but in vain.
“It is really unfortunate. The elephant was to fly out on 14 October but
we could not get a confirmed cargo booking,” said Mr Kumar.
“The next date fixed was 30 October but destiny had other plans.
“We suspect foul play. All the deaths could be due to poisoning. We have
taken the help of the police to catch the guilty.”
He said Komala had died despite tight security arrangements following
the deaths of the two other elephants, Ganesha and Roopa, and the
lion-tailed macaque in August.
The latter was a “breeder” on loan from a zoo in Madras as part of the
lion-tail monkey conservation programme.
Zoo authorities called in the police after preliminary investigations
revealed foul play.
Officials say Ganesha and Roopa had acute haemorrhagic enteritis and
respiratory distress caused by zinc phosphide, normally used as poison
for rodents.
Security revamp
This is not the first time animals have died mysteriously in captivity
in Mysore, leading some to believe there is a plot to damage the
state-run zoo’s reputation – although it is not clear why anyone would
want to do so.
An inquiry last year found foul play in injuries suffered by Meena, a
popular chimpanzee.
She died after an unsuccessful operation on her arm, which had been
crushed by a sliding door.
Two emus from Australia also died in suspicious circumstances.
Closed circuit television is among the measures planned by the zoo
authorities to monitor the movement of its feeding staff.
“Security is being revamped but I will not reveal the details,” said Mr
Kumar.
Story from BBC NEWS:

Hellenic Resources Network
Turkish Press Review, 04-10-25
THE US ELECTIONS AND TURKEY BY YASEMIN CONGAR (MILLIYET)
Columnist Yasemin Congar comments on Turkey and next week’s United
States presidential elections. A summary of her column is as follows:
“My personal views coincide with Turkey’s official preference, a
high-level Turkish bureaucrat told me during a recent chat. His words
implied that both he and Ankara want US President George W. Bush
to win the elections. Ankara of course cannot adopt an ‘official’
stance on this issue. However, the observations of a high-level
official familiar with both countries are noteworthy.
I don’t think his stance coincides with the Turkish public’s
preferences. In fact, the majority of the world seems to favor Democrat
Senator John Kerry winning, along with our people. I don’t believe it
is mistaken to argue that there is a strong anti-Bush feeling behind
this wish, rather than a pro-Kerry stance. But how can we explain why
Ankara is close to the Bush administration while the Turkish nation
wants him to get his walking papers? I believe that there are three
main reasons: First of all, Ankara fears that a Kerry administration
might support the idea of partitioning Iraq. In addition, Kerry
is likely to back the Armenian lobbies, advocating that Turkey be
punished over the so-called Armenian genocide. Finally, bureaucrats
see ties between Ankara and Washington improving over Bush’s term,
despite a number of problems of late.
Personally, I do believe that a Kerry administration would see
through significant economic and social changes domestically and give
Washington a chance to repair its image internationally. However, no
matter who is elected, the next president will face a host of problems
concerning Iraq and terrorism. Both candidates have underlined that the
US mission in Iraq must be completed, clearly expressing that American
troops leaving the country immediately is a non-starter. However,
Kerry wants to transform the Iraqi issue into an international one
by organizing an international summit to discuss it as the world’s
common problem.
As a matter of fact, there are no major differences of opinion between
Bush and Kerry on the issues of Iraq’s territorial integrity. We know
that neither Bush nor Kerry favor the establishment of a Kurdish state
in the region. However, I know that some people from both US Republican
and Democratic circles believe that Iraq’s territorial integrity cannot
be protected and so a Kurdish state will be formed sooner or later.
Kerry and Bush have agreed that any possible Iraqi scenario should be
realized under conditions which would ease Turkey’s concerns on the
issue. Both Republicans and Democrats believe that Turkey cannot be
allowed to hold unilateral military operations in northern Iraq no
matter what happens there.
In brief, I believe that Washington will adopt a similar stance in
the future no matter who wins. Both candidates are expected to favor
a Turkey establishing close relations with the Baghdad administration
or any other possible federal formation in the north.
We’ll discuss other points later.”

NTV MSNBC, Turkey
25 Oct. 2004
Human Right Report may end up in court
The controversial report by the Prime Ministry’s Human Rights Advisory
Board was rejected by senior officials, who denied it was commissioned
by the government.
October 25– A report on ethnic minorities in Turkey released by an
advisory body linked to the office of the Turkish Prime Minister may
end up in the courts, with a member of the Human Right Advisory Board
saying he had applied for the authors to be prosecutors.
Fethi Bolayir a member of the board on Monday said the report attacked
the national and spiritual values of the republic. Bolayir, who is also
the chairman of Social Thinking Association, described the report as a
“a document of treason” and called for legal action to be taken against
those involved in preparing it.
The report, issued last week, said that there should be greater
recognition given to ethnic minorities in Turkey. Currently, only three
ethnic minorities are officially recognised in Turkey, these being
those of the Jewish, Armenian and Greek communities.
Bolayir said the report disregarded the Laussane Treaty, the
international treaty that set out the status of minorities in Turkey.
Bolayr said some of the articles in the report were treasonous.
“If this report that suggests that unchangeable articles of the
constitution be changed over its limiting of minority and cultural
rights is not a document of treason then what is it?” he said.
He underlined his organisation supported getting rid of
injustice, corruption and poverty but not the division of the Turkish
Republic.
Bolayr said that the board had more than 30 members and seven
including himself voted against the report. He added that changes were
made in the section covering minorities without the information of the
members meant that an abuse of office and breaching of confidence has
also been committed.
Although the government officials denied having anything to do
with the report the chairman of the board, Ibrahim Kaboglu, said that
report had been submitted to the Prime Ministry.

Heritage.org, DC
25 Oct. 2004
U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation After Beslan
by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D.
On September 1, 2004, the first day of school, a multiethnic group of
over 30 radical Islamist terror­ists, including two female suicide
bombers and some Chechens, took more than 1,000 children, teachers, and
parents hostage in Beslan, North Ossetia. The ter­rorists deployed
explosives around the school, hang­ing them from basketball hoops in
the gym, where most of the children were held. This was the fifth
mas­sive hostage-taking event in Russia since 1995, and it ended in
tragedy. Shamil Basaev, leader of the radical Islamist wing of the
Chechen separatist movement, has taken responsibility for the
massacre.1
In the aftermath of Beslan, the U.S. should empha­size to the Russian
people, President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian government that the
two countries are facing the same enemy. The U.S. should increase
outreach in the battle for Russia’s hearts and minds, paying particular
attention to the younger genera­tions of Russian citizens.
In addition to these public diplomacy efforts, Pres­idents Putin and
George W. Bush should hold an anti-terrorism summit in the near future
to hammer out a joint anti-terrorism action plan. The two coun­tries
should expand security cooperation in anti-ter­rorist force structure;
command, control, and communications; and on techniques for dealing
with hostage situations. The U.S. and Russia should expand the range of
joint programs designed to pre­vent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) to terrorist organizations, going beyond the
current Nunn-Lugar funding.
However, even though the two countries face a common threat, the U.S.
does not have to agree to Russia’s policies toward its neighbors. The
U.S. should support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
post-Soviet states, and it should not remain silent if democracy in
Russia is rolled back. Instead, Washington should develop programs that
support growth of the nonprofit/nongovern­ment sector, promote the rule
of law, and help to advance transparent, participatory, and democratic
governance in Russia. The U.S. should also expand support of the
independent media in all forms, including print, broadcasting, and
Internet.[1]
Beslan: Russia’s 9/11
The Beslan tragedy shook Russia on a scale comparable to how September
11 affected the United States. Terrorists subjected the children and
other hostages to unspeakable abuses, deny­ing them water and food,
killing some at random, and forcing many children to drink urine.[2]
Europe has not seen such cruelty since the Nazi atrocities during World
War II and Stalin’s genocidal exile of nations to Siberia and Central
Asia.
After two days, the terrorists triggered an explo­sion in the gym, and
many children ran from the building. The terrorists opened fire,
shooting and killing hostages. Russian special forces and the armed
local population attempted a rescue, but the death and destruction of
that day speaks clearly of a monumental security failure.
Heart-wrenching scenes of small bodies in tiny coffins and parents
breaking down in grief at their children’s graves shocked the world.
Many Rus­sians watched the crisis on television, tears pour­ing down
their cheeks.
Security Failures
The systemic failures of the policy and security apparatus that failed
to stop the atrocities in Beslan were immediately obvious to Russian
and Western observers. The Russian intelligence networks–run by the
military, internal security forces, and the Ministry of Interior police
in the North Caucasus– failed to identify preparations for the attack
or pro­vide timely intelligence that would have allowed the terrorists
to be intercepted en route to the school.
Nor was Beslan an isolated incident: A few days prior to Beslan, two
female suicide bombers destroyed two Russian airliners in flight, and a
Moscow metro station and a bus stop were bombed.
The failure of the rescue operation was also obvious. The top military
commander indicated that “there was no planning to rescue hostages” and
disclosed that 48 hours after the school was seized, the main special
forces were training 30 kilometers away.[3] Even if negotiations were
under­way, a rescue force should have been on location and ready to
respond at any moment. Further­more, the rescuers had only two or three
armored personnel carriers to use as shields in approaching the
building. As a result, the special forces were pinned down by the
terrorists’ heavy fire.
The terrorists were permitted to dictate the oper­ational tempo. They
imposed the rescue timing by setting off the explosives and put up a
stiff resis­tance that lasted for 10 hours, from 1 p.m. to 11 p.m.,
when most of them were finally killed. Spo­radic fire continued until 4
a.m. of the next day.[4]
Because the building was rigged with explo­sives, the only chance to
save the children if nego­tiations failed would have been to overwhelm
the terrorists in a massive, precise surprise attack, which would take
out most of the perpetrators in the first few minutes. Such an
operation could have used advanced technology, such as night vision
goggles, stun grenades, body armor, and incapacitating gas. Nothing of
the kind happened.
Roaming Locals. Appallingly, the security forces failed to remove
hundreds of armed locals from the scene. This failure to establish and
enforce a police perimeter allowed civilians to interfere with the
rescue attempt. It placed both the hostages and rescuers in their
crossfire and exposed civilians to terrorists’ weapons fire, lead­ing
to entirely avoidable civilian casualties. Fur­thermore, some
terrorists were allowed to break out of the building, and they engaged
in firefights until the next morning.
The Russian anti-terrorist forces were woefully unprepared. Beslan was
Russia’s fifth massive hos­tage situation, with over 1,000 hostages;
yet Rus­sian security forces demonstrated that they had learned little
from the debacles of Budennovsk, Pervomaysk, and Kizlyar in the 1990s
and from Dubrovka in 2002. They did not wear modern Kevlar helmets or
even bulletproof vests in some cases, and the elite Alfa and Vityaz
units lost 10 men–their largest losses in post-Soviet history.
Failures of Policy and Leadership
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the Yeltsin and Putin
administrations have failed to reform the Soviet-era security services
and the Ministry of Interior police forces, which in turn failed to
prevent or adequately respond to the Beslan hostage situation. These
are still quasi-total­itarian political control and crime fighting
organi­zations, rife with corruption, as has been acknowledged by
President Putin as well as other senior Russian officials.[5] They are
simply inade­quate to the task of confronting modern local and global
terrorism.
Despite the recent terrorist attacks on Russia, President Putin is
ambiguous about Russian coop­eration with the West in fighting
terrorism. After the tragedy, Putin repeatedly bemoaned the pass­ing of
the Soviet “great power,” but he also recog­nized that Soviet ideology
suppressed numerous real ethnic conflicts.
Putin accuses Western intelligence services of maintaining contact with
the Chechen rebels. Clearly, he believes that the U.S. and other
West­ern powers support anti-Russian Chechen forces in an effort to
keep Russia pinned down and “involved in its own problems.”[6] After
all, Great Britain and the U.S. have granted political asylum to some
Chechen leaders.
Putin could have also mentioned the fundrais­ing activities conducted
in the West by radical Muslim groups to aid the “jihad” in
“Chechni­stan.”[7] Such activities have been going on in Great Britain
and the U.S. for years but now seem to be coming to an end (although
fundraising for Chechnya is continuing in the Middle East and
throughout the Muslim world without interference). In this regard,
Putin’s criticism may be legitimate in view of the Beslan atrocities
and Basaev’s own admission that he received money from abroad and, if
offered, would have taken money from Osama bin Laden.[8]
As an intelligence professional, Putin should appreciate the difference
between information gathering and operational support. Instead, he is
apparently convinced that the West is preoccupied with creating an
irritant for Russia. In an earlier speech to the nation, Putin went
even further, say­ing that foreign powers are interested in
dismem­bering Russia and neutralizing it as a nuclear power;[9] he
ignored, however, the much greater issue of the global Islamist
networks supporting the Chechen extremists.
Still, Putin left enough common ground to infer that continuing
cooperation with the West in the war on terrorism is possible. He sent
a clear mes­sage that entrenched bureaucracies on both sides of the
Atlantic hamper U.S.-Russian security coopera­tion. He also said that
President Bush is a “good, decent man,” “a reliable and predictable
partner,” and someone he can “feel as a human being.”[10] He also
stated that terrorist attacks in Iraq are aimed at achieving President
Bush’s electoral defeat.[11]
Thus, despite his vocal reservations concerning the West, Putin sent a
message to the Western leadership. Putin presented himself as open to
anti-terrorism cooperation, indicating that security “professionals” on
both sides are in contact and recognizing that Cold War sentiments
still exces­sively influence the bureaucracies on both sides of the
Atlantic.[12] Putin is no doubt aware of shared risks of terrorists
gaining access to weapons of mass destruction.[13]
New Challenges
While President Putin appears to understand the threat of global
terrorism, Russia’s security apparatus does not seem to grasp
sufficiently the challenge of the jihadi menace. This is an enemy
different from the Cold War threats of “Western imperialism” and
internal political opposition. Externally, Soviet foreign intelligence
fought the Cold War against the U.S. and its European allies while,
domestically, the secret police were posi­tioned to ruthlessly suppress
any political dissent among the unarmed population through
intimida­tion and incarceration.
Ethnic and religious unrest, however, is endemic to the territory of
the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, as prolonged guerrilla warfare
during the 18th-20th centuries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Western
Ukraine, and Baltic states demonstrates. In particular, ethnic-based
warfare and insurgency have hardly been new to the Caucasus–north and
south–for the past two centuries.
A Missed Chance. President Putin has admit­ted that the first Chechen
war, unleashed by the Yeltsin administration in the fall of 1994, in
which 80,000-100,000 people were killed and over 100,000 became
internally displaced, was an error.[14] After the Russian army’s defeat
in Chech­nya, Moscow granted the rebel region quasi-inde­pendence in
1996.
Sadly, however, “independent” Chechnya turned into a disaster for its
own people. Armed gangs and clans ran wild. Radical Sunni (called
Wahhabi or Salafi) clerics imported from Saudi Arabia have established
Islamic religious courts in the society, which had previously practiced
a rather lax version of Sufi Islam.[15] Public hangings have become
commonplace. Thousands have been kidnapped for ransom. Slave markets
have appeared. Oil has been stolen from pipelines, pipelines sabotaged,
transit trains from Russia shot at, and passengers robbed. Trafficking
in drugs, arms, and other contraband is rampant.
The Wahhabi presence, including ties with al-Qaeda terrorists, has
increased, strengthening the leadership of radical Islamists such as
Shamil Basaev. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s second in
command, spent six months in Chech­nya setting up training camps and
preparing for jihad. The Russian security services even arrested
al-Zawahiri, but unaware of his identity eventually let him go.
The Second Chechen War. The second Chechen war began in 1999 when a
radical Chechen faction commanded by Shamil Basaev invaded the
neighboring republic of Daghestan. Bombings of apartment buildings in
Moscow and Volgodonsk, in which over 300 people died, greatly escalated
matters. Basaev and the radical faction he leads do not hide their
geopolitical ambitions of establishing a caliphate from the Black Sea
to the Caspian. Russia responded with a World War II- style invasion of
Chechnya, which resulted in mas­sive destruction and heavy civilian
casualties.
The second Chechen war bolstered Putin’s pop­ularity and facilitated
his election to his first term in office in March 2000, but it also
left lingering problems. Tens of thousands of Chechen civilians were
displaced, killed, or wounded. After Beslan, however, Putin refused to
discuss the problems. Further, he asserted that the Chechen war had
nothing to do with the hostage taking in Beslan. The Russian president
offered no criticism of com­mand, control, and leadership failures or
of doctri­nal and organizational lapses in fighting the terrorist war
in the Caucasus and Russia.
Today, political, economic, social, cultural, reli­gious, and
“hearts-and-minds” issues desperately need attention throughout the
Northern Caucasus. President Putin understands this, at least to some
degree. However, it remains to be seen whether the newly installed
nationalities minister Vladimir Yakovlev, former mayor of St.
Petersburg and a political enemy of Putin,[16] and the newly appointed
Governor-General of the Northern Cau­casus Dmitry Kozak, a Putin can-do
confidante and former Cabinet secretary, are up to the demanding tasks
involved.[17]
To address today’s threats, Russia needs to rethink and revamp its
anti-terrorism approach, learn lessons from other countries and
conflicts, and establish new security structures that are capa­ble of
dealing with 21st century terrorism. In such a predicament, one would
think that Russia would not look for adventures in the “near abroad”
(the other former Soviet republics) and would leave recent democratic
achievements intact.
Prisoner of the Caucasus
However, in the days before and after Beslan, Putin and his inner
circle overtly questioned the sovereignty of Georgia and her
post-Soviet bor­ders. Putin said, “When the Soviet Union col­lapsed, no
one asked the Ossetians and the Abkhaz whether they want to stay in
Georgia.”[18] Russia is also staunchly opposing the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe’s plan for a peaceful settlement of
the crisis in Transdniester, a secessionist region in Moldova.
The message is loud and clear: Post-Soviet bor­ders are no longer
sacrosanct. Furthermore, in 2001, the Duma quietly adopted a
constitutional mechanism for incorporating foreign lands and countries
into the Russian Federation.
In Georgia, Russian arms, Transdniester and Cossack volunteers, and
Russian peacekeepers under the umbrella of the Commonwealth of
Inde­pendent States have been deployed in South Osse­tia and Abkhazia.
Russian gunboats have entered Georgian territorial waters without
authorization. One even had ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky on
board. Zhirinovsky was delivering the gunboat as a gift to the Abkhaz
separatist lead­ership.[19] Such events do not happen without the
permission of Putin’s administration.
Russian citizenship and passports, freely distrib­uted to the
secessionist populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, undermine the
national iden­tity of the Abkhaz and Ossetians as citizens of Georgia,
while these separatist elites benefit from contraband trafficking and
are supported with secret Moscow-based funds.[20] Plans have even been
laid to reopen a railroad line from Sochi to Abkhazia without Tbilisi’s
agreement.[21]
The Russian leadership seems to have a blind spot. By trying to pull
South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Moscow’s orbit, the Kremlin may be
inadvert­ently strengthening the case of Chechen separatism.
Border Revisions? Since 1992, Moscow has supported sundry
separatists–from Transdniester to Abkhazia and South Ossetia to
Nagorno-Kara­bakh–for a reason. These moves open the door to revising
other borders, especially in areas heavily populated with Russian
speakers, such as northern Kazakhstan, Transdniester, and eastern
Ukraine.
Russia may also support border revisions in such areas as
Nagorno-Karabakh, which could have unpredictable consequences for the
10-year- old Armenian-Azerbaijani cease-fire. Border revi­sions can be
held over the heads of uncooperative neighbors like the sword of
Damocles. Interna­tionally, this can become a powder keg. Under­mining
the territorial integrity of Russia’s neighbors is unacceptable to the
U.S. and the European Union, and it is dangerous to Russia itself.
The Kremlin Response After Beslan
Crying over the phantom pains of empire will not protect Russia from
terrorism. Instead of revamping, retraining, and reorganizing Russia’s
anti-terrorist and security services, Putin has opted for a massive
re-centralization of power–despite an outcry from the Russian liberal
elites.[22] In doing so, he is taking the country on a path
remi­niscent of the Soviet and czarist eras.
Specifically, on September 13, 2004, Putin announced the following
measures ostensibly to ensure that Russia is effectively governed:
Regional leaders will no longer be elected by a popular vote. Instead,
regional legislatures will approve nominees submitted by the president.
All Duma deputies will be elected through party lists in single-seat
constituencies.
A “public chamber” will be established to pro­vide public oversight of
the government, par­ticularly of law enforcement and security agencies.
Voluntary people’s patrols, ubiquitous in the Soviet era, will be
established and will work in tandem with police to ensure that public
order is re-established.
A special federal commission will be set up to oversee the North
Caucasus issues.
The government will re-establish a new Minis­try for Regional Policy
and Nationalities.
The government will elaborate a system of responses to thwart terrorist
threats.[23]
Putin is essentially rebuilding the Soviet state security apparatus and
applying the 19th century Russian imperial model to a 21st century
state that is riddled with terrorism and corruption. For example, there
are also plans to the reintroduce police-issued residence permits,
similar to the Soviet-era propiska, to control internal movement of the
population.[24]
These measures are unlikely to provide an effec­tive antidote to
expanding terrorism in the North Caucasus and Russia, and they reverse
democratic achievements of the 1990s. Nostalgia for the Soviet past may
beget new authoritarianism, as former Presidents Boris Yeltsin and
Mikhail Gorbachev warned in interviews on September 16, 2004.[25]
Reverting to the Past? Putin’s decision to nom­inate governors, doing
away with their election, will not only dilute Russia’s developing
democracy. It will effectively end administrative ethnic auton­omy,
which was adopted by the Bolsheviks after the 1917 coup.
The number of regions–“federation subjects” as they are called in
Russia–is likely to be reduced through constitutional changes from 89
to about 30. However, in the 21st century, it is extremely dif­ficult
to govern a country that spans 11 time zones from one political center.
The information overload and corruption may become severe enough to
slow the pace of economic growth. Putin may have to abandon his
proclaimed goal of doubling Russia’s gross domestic product by
2012.[26]
It is also counterproductive to undermine the connection of voters and
their elected representa­tives by abandoning the single-district system
and shifting to elections by party lists.
Establishing an unelected and disempowered “public chamber” to
supervise the security services will not solve Russia’s flagging
anti-terrorism conundrum. There is no substitute for effective civilian
control by the legislative and civilian exec­utive branches. Nor are
additional bureaucratic offices, such as the new Ministry for Regional
Pol­icy and Nationalities, likely to resolve the systemic problems of
the Northern Caucasus.
What Should Be Done
In pursuing the global war on terrorism, the U.S. should attempt to
accomplish a number of policy objectives with regard to Russia:
Keeping Russia as a friendly partner in the anti-terrorism coalition;
Cooperating with Moscow to prevent the pro­liferation of weapons of
mass destruction, especially preventing terrorists from acquiring such
weapons;
Shoring up Russia as a reliable supplier of oil and gas to the world
market, in addition to the Persian Gulf states, and keeping the
Rus­sian energy sector open to U.S. and Western investment;
Supporting the territorial integrity and inde­pendence of the
post-Soviet states of Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia;
and
Developing the forces of democracy in Russia, especially supporting
civil society and free media.
To advance these policy objectives, the Bush Administration should:
Emphasize to the Russian people, President Putin, and the Russian
government that Russia and the U.S. are facing the same enemy, which
threatens their national survival, their peoples, and their most
cherished values. Presidents Bush and Putin should hold an
anti-terrorism summit in the near future to hammer out a joint
anti-terrorism action plan. In view of Beslan, President Bush should
order a review of U.S. policies on asylum for Chechen lead­ers, Chechen
fundraising in the U.S., and the U.S. intelligence community’s contacts
with Chechen rebels.
Increase U.S. outreach in the battle for Russia’s hearts and minds,
paying particular attention to the younger generations of Russian
citizens. Cold War paranoia still permeates the Russian elites. The
U.S. Embassy in Moscow is already busy reaching out to Russia’s media,
think tanks, and government offices, but more needs to be done on the
public diplomacy front.
Expand security cooperation in anti-terrorist force structure, command,
control, and com­munications and on techniques for dealing with hostage
situations. The Trubinkov-Armit­age Group run by the U.S. Department of
State and the Russian Foreign Ministry could coor­dinate cooperation. A
joint project, such as neutralizing Shamil Basaev and his
organiza­tion, could be undertaken cooperatively. On the U.S. side,
participants might include the Departments of State, Defense, and
Homeland Security and the CIA. On the Russian side, participating
offices might include the Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal
Security Service, Emergency Situations Ministry (Russian FEMA), and
Alfa and Vityaz units.
Cooperate with Russia, if it so desires, in strengthening transparency
and civilian con­trol of the Russian security services. This can be
accomplished through expanded contacts between the Duma, the Council of
the Federa­tion, and the U.S. Congress. Congress and the Pentagon, as
well as think tanks, could con­duct a series of seminars discussing the
U.S. experience in this field in Moscow.
Develop a range of joint programs that reduce WMD and terrorist threats
to both countries, going beyond the current Nunn-Lugar fund­ing which
focuses on storage, safety, and secu­rity. Such programs should
actively prevent WMD proliferation to non-state actors. As both
countries have an interest in strategic arms reduction and ballistic
missile defense, such cooperation can help to transcend Cold War fears.
The U.S. and Russia should inten­sify cooperation on joint ballistic
missile defense and aggressive non-proliferation to help further reduce
Cold War sentiments.[27]
Support the sovereignty and territorial integ­rity of all post-Soviet
states. Expand coopera­tion with these countries via NATO’s Partnership
for Peace and bilateral military-to-military ties, exchanges,
train-and-equip pro­grams, and (where necessary) limited troop
deployment. Maintain and expand dialogue with Moscow over contentious
issues, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the U.S.
presence in Central Asia.
Develop programs that support freedoms of the press and of political
organizations, feder­alism and local self-governance, growth of the
nonprofit/nongovernment sector, and the rule of law and promote
transparent, participatory, and democratic governance in Russia. This
can be accomplished through joint activities involving political
parties, their institutions, and other nongovernmental organizations,
such as the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic
Institute, and the National Endowment for Democracy in the U.S. and the
Moscow Helsinki Group, Interna­tional Memorial Society, and Glasnost
Defense Foundation in Russia. The U.S. should also expanding support of
the independent media in Russia in all forms, including print,
broad­casting, and Internet.
Conclusion
The U.S. faces a delicate and difficult policy challenge after Beslan.
President Putin is taking Russia in the direction of greater
centralization, which he believes will make Russia more secure and make
it into a greater power. An authoritarian Russia, lacking democratic
checks and balances, is likely to pursue a regional and even global
foreign policy that increases friction with the United States, its
vital interests, and its allies.
The U.S. should do its best to encourage democracy, political
pluralism, and media free­doms and dissuade Moscow from becoming
increasingly authoritarian or expansionist. It should support Russia’s
weaker neighbors, their independence, and their territorial integrity.
At the same time, the U.S. should avoid an unnecessary confrontation
with Russia while shoring up and expanding U.S.-Russian cooperation in
the global war on terrorism.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in Rus­sian and Eurasian Studies
in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
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