‘Father’ exhibit to make US debut at Armenian Museum. When it opens

Tambiyan Samvel
Wicked Local, MA
May 15 2026
Beth McDermott
Wicked Local
May 15, 2026, 
The Armenian Museum of America in Watertown is set to debut an exhibition called “Father,” featuring the work of internationally acclaimed artist Diana Markosian.

The exhibition, which will run from May 29 through Sept. 13, offers an intimate look into themes of family, memory and identity, according to a community announcement.

Markosian, who immigrated to the United States at age 7, uses photography, archival materials, video and text to document her emotional journey to reconnect with her estranged father.

Curated by Anahit Gasparyan, the exhibition is co-produced by Les Rencontres d’Arles and Foam, Amsterdam, and sponsored by the JHM Charitable Foundation, according to the announcement.

“By placing her own journey alongside her father’s parallel, unseen search, Markosian reveals how identity is shaped as much by loss and distance as by presence and reunion,” curator Anahit Gasparyan said in a statement. “‘Father’ offers a powerful meditation on the complexities of family and the enduring search for connection, inviting audiences to reflect on their own histories and relationships.”

The exhibition’s opening will include a private member preview (RSVP required via Eventbrite) at 6 p.m. on Thursday, May 28, in the museum’s Adele and Haig Der Manuelian Galleries, 65 Main St., Watertown, according to the announcement. The event will feature a conversation between Markosian and Gasparyan, followed by a reception.

The exhibition marks the US debut of “Father,” which has previously been recognized with the Madame Figaro Prize at the Rencontres d’Arles in 2025. Markosian’s work has been showcased at international institutions and is held in prominent public and private collections.

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Armenia’s 2026 vote: A referendum on peace and sovereignty?

Chakhmakhchian Vatche
Commonspace.eu
May 15 2026

This commentary was prepared by Ms Eleonora Sargsyan for this issue of the Armenia Election Monitor 2026 newsletter. The full issue can be accessed here.

On 7 June 2026, Armenians will go to the polls in parliamentary elections that are formally domestic, but politically much larger than that. Nineteen political forces – seventeen parties and two alliances – are competing in the race. Yet the real contest is not only between parties. The 2026 elections are not only a domestic contest over power, but a referendum-like moment on Armenia’s geopolitical orientation, peace agenda, and democratic resilience.

At the heart of this election are three larger questions: whether a post-war society can resist the political instrumentalization of fear; whether a small state can reclaim agency after years of strategic dependence; and whether, after repeated rupture and loss, Armenia can still define its future beyond trauma. In this sense, the election is not only about who governs Armenia next. It is about the political direction through which Armenia will try to govern itself after war, displacement, and the collapse of old security assumptions.

These are Armenia’s third parliamentary elections since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, following the early elections of 2018 and 2021. That matters. For the first time in years, Armenia is not going to elections only because of the immediate crisis – revolution in 2018, post-war political breakdown in 2021 – but in a moment when the country is trying to define a new strategic direction. The vote is therefore less about routine government change and more about whether Armenia’s post-2018 democratic project can survive the pressures placed on it: defeat, displacement, polarization, foreign interference, and the daily political temptation to turn fear into votes.

The central divide in this election is not left versus right. Nor is it simply traditional “government versus opposition.” It is between those who see Armenia’s future through the lens of sovereignty, diversification, and difficult peace, and those who continue to speak from within the political vocabulary of dependency, grievance, and managed insecurity.

For decades, Armenia’s security and regional posture were built around Russia. But after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, which resulted in a devastating Armenian defeat, and especially after Azerbaijan’s 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh and the involuntary displacement of its Armenian population, that architecture no longer carries the same political meaning. For many Armenians, dependence on Moscow is no longer seen as security, but as vulnerability. The question is therefore not simply whether Armenia should be “pro-Russian” or “pro-European.” The deeper question is whether Armenia can build a more sovereign foreign policy after years of strategic dependence.

This is why foreign policy has become central to the electoral discourse. The ruling Civil Contract party has positioned itself around European integration, diversification of partnerships, and normalization with neighbors. Armenia’s hosting of the European Political Community summit and the first EU-Armenia summit in Yerevan in May 2026 were not merely diplomatic ceremonies. They were symbols of a state attempting to move closer to Europe and away from an exclusively Russia-centered orbit.

The reaction from Moscow has been telling. Russia has accused Armenia of being drawn into the EU’s “anti-Russian orbit,” a formulation that reveals how Armenia’s attempt at diversification is interpreted by its former security patron: not as sovereign choice, but as disloyalty. This is precisely why the election matters beyond Armenia. A small state trying to reduce dependency is rarely allowed to do so quietly.

The election is also taking place under the shadow of hybrid threats and foreign interference. The EU has moved to support Armenia, in response to the Armenian government’s request, in countering hybrid threats and foreign information manipulation ahead of the elections, including through a rapid-response expert team. But foreign interference does not work in a vacuum. It feeds on domestic mistrust, polarization, and unresolved trauma. Armenia’s democratic vulnerability is therefore not only external. It is also internal: a political environment in which fear, grief, and insecurity can easily be instrumentalized.

The second major axis of the election is Armenia’s peace agenda.

At first glance, this part of the election may appear to present voters with a stark choice between peace and war: between the government’s normalization agenda with Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and a more nationalist, security-first politics on the other. This framing is politically powerful because it speaks directly to the trauma of recent years. These elections are being held after two devastating military defeats and the involuntary displacement of more than 100,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. In such a context, one might have expected revanchist politics to dominate. Several opposition actors appeared to assume exactly that: that anger over defeat, dissatisfaction with the government, and anxiety about concessions could be converted into support for a harder nationalist line against Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization.

But the campaign has revealed a more complicated reality.

Some of the most prominent critics of the government’s peace agenda have softened their language. Samvel Karapetyan – the biggest opposition power – whose political project has been highly critical of the current peace process and has often appealed to a more security-first and nationalist reading of Armenia’s post-war situation, has more recently stated that he is not against peace, but supports a different kind of peace – a “strong” peace, not a “weak” one. A similar recalibration can also be observed in the rhetoric of Robert Kocharyan and other opposition actors, who criticize the government’s approach to negotiations but increasingly avoid presenting themselves as openly anti-peace.

This rhetorical adjustment should not be dismissed as a technical campaign maneuver. It reveals something politically important: even those who built much of their appeal by attacking the peace process appear to recognize that Armenian society is not simply asking for revenge, isolation, or permanent mobilization.

This may be one of the most underread dynamics of the 2026 elections. Public demand for peace exists, but it is not a naive demand. Armenian society is not asking for peace as a slogan, nor for normalization at any cost. Many citizens remain deeply distrustful of Azerbaijan’s intentions. Many are uncomfortable with concessions. Many feel that the government’s communication on Nagorno-Karabakh, loss, and normalization has often been abrupt, technocratic, or emotionally insufficient. But this does not mean that the electorate is ready to embrace a politics of permanent confrontation.

The opposition’s partial rhetorical softening suggests that explicitly anti-peace or revanchist messaging has limited appeal beyond its core base. Recent voter behavior in the Armenian Election Study, published by EVN Report, points to a fragmented opposition field and an improved position for the incumbent party, while also showing that voters remain focused on security, the economy, and the country’s overall direction. In other words, the public mood is not reducible to either enthusiasm for the government or rejection of peace. It is more pragmatic, more cautious, and perhaps more mature than many political actors assumed.

This is where the government’s peace agenda is both strong and vulnerable. It is strong because the alternative offered by much of the opposition remains vague. “Strong peace” sounds compelling, but it often avoids the harder questions: strong through which alliances, which security guarantees, which regional strategy, which economic model, and with what relationship to Russia after the failure of Russia-centered security?

But the government is vulnerable because peace cannot be sustained through geopolitical logic alone. For peace to become politically durable, it must be translated into public confidence: protection of border communities, meaningful security guarantees, economic opportunity, justice-sensitive language around displacement, and a political narrative that does not make people feel that their grief is being rushed or dismissed. Peace cannot be only a state strategy. It must become socially legible.

This election is therefore not a simple choice between peace and war. It is a struggle over the meaning of peace itself. Is peace merely the absence of war? Is it regional connectivity and open borders? Is it a security arrangement? Is it reconciliation? Or is it a fragile political process vulnerable to sabotage, maximalist demands, and external manipulation? The party that defines peace most convincingly may define Armenia’s politics well beyond election day.

A gender lens exposes a democratic deficit in this election. None of the 19 political forces has a woman as its lead candidate. Not one. In a country with gender quotas and a visible generation of women leaders in civil society, media, and public life, this absence is striking.

It also shows the limits of formal inclusion. Armenia’s quota system has helped increase women’s numerical representation, but parties still rarely place women at the center of political authority. Women are included because the law requires inclusion; they are not yet trusted, in sufficient numbers, with the symbolic and strategic leadership of political forces. The result is a familiar pattern: women are present enough to satisfy the rules, but absent where power is most visibly concentrated.

This matters especially in an election shaped by peace, displacement, security, and sovereignty. These are deeply gendered issues. Women are among the displaced, the caregivers, the border community residents, the civil society leaders, the local peacebuilders, the voters, and the targets of political harassment. Yet they are largely absent as the principal narrators of the country’s future. The continued online and offline harassment of women politicians is not simply a women’s rights issue; it is a democratic resilience issue.

For international observers, Armenia’s 2026 elections should therefore be read on several levels at once. At the institutional level, they are a test of the country’s post-2018 democratic trajectory. At the geopolitical level, they are a contest over sovereignty and orientation. At the regional level, they will shape the future of Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization and South Caucasus connectivity. At the societal level, they will show whether fear, trauma, and insecurity can be transformed into a mandate for peace rather than a return to siege thinking.

The most important question is not only who wins. It is what kind of politics becomes legitimate through the vote.

If Armenian voters reward forces that keep the country on a democratic, sovereign, and peace-oriented path, even with criticism, caution, and demands for greater security, this will signal something important. It will show that after war, displacement, and strategic disappointment, Armenian society is not choosing denial or revenge as its political horizon. It is choosing difficult pragmatism.

That choice should not be romanticized. Armenia’s peace agenda is fragile. Its European path is contested. Its democracy remains vulnerable to polarization, foreign interference, and public distrust. But the fact that peace remains politically viable after everything Armenian society has endured is itself significant.

Armenia’s 2026 elections are therefore about more than power. They are about whether a post-war society can resist the politics of fear; whether a small state can reclaim agency after dependency; and whether, after a history of rupture, Armenia can still choose a future larger than its trauma.

Source: Ms Eleonora Sargsyan is an Armenian peacebuilding practitioner and development professional with experience in women, peace, and security, youth engagement, and Armenia-Azerbaijan dialogue initiatives. Her work focuses on gender-responsive peacebuilding, democratic resilience, and inclusive approaches to regional normalization in the South Caucasus. For more information, we invite you to check her LinkedIn.

https://www.commonspace.eu/commentary/armenias-2026-vote-referendum-peace-and-sovereignty

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Russian Disinformation Network Manufactures Fake News Campaign About an Armeni

Jirair Kafian
United 24 Media
May 15 2026
May 15, 2026 14:00Updated May 15, 2026 14:34

 3 min read
Authors
Dariia Mykhailenko

A Russian-linked disinformation network has begun circulating a coordinated series of social media videos promoting narratives about a possible future war between Armenia and Russia, according to investigative reporting by the outlet Agentstvo. Novosti. on May 13.

The activity, documented by researchers, reportedly began two months before Russian leader Vladimir Putin publicly compared the events in Armenia and Ukraine. and involved at least 20 fabricated video clips distributed by accounts linked to Russian state influence operations.

The first video, published on March 6, falsely imitated reporting from the Institute for the Study of War, claiming that a potential electoral victory by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan would trigger a conflict with Russia.

On March 24, pro-Kremlin accounts released 12 additional videos alleging that Pashinyan had reached a secret agreement with French President Emmanuel Macron, in which electoral support would be exchanged for a confrontation with Moscow. The same narratives also claimed that France had sent military instructors with experience from the war in Ukraine and provided Armenia with €50 million in weapons funding.

Researchers noted that in early April, four further fabricated videos were published featuring actors from the US television series The Office, including David Koechner, Andy Buckley, Melora Hardin, and Kate Flannery. The actors were shown urging viewers not to vote for Pashinyan. The videos were reportedly created using the Cameo platform, with parts of the audio potentially generated using artificial intelligence.

The final video identified in the campaign appeared on May 11, alleging the presence of NATO instructors in Armenia and claiming that Pashinyan intended to provoke a conflict with Russia after elections.

In addition to video content, fabricated covers purporting to be from French media outlets such as Libération, Ouest-France, and Actu were circulated on March 24, promoting similar claims about an alleged Armenia–France agreement.

Alongside the Armenia-focused campaign, researchers previously identified a separate wave of fabricated content attributed to pro-Iranian propaganda channels, which has been spreading disinformation about alleged Iranian strikes on Ukrainian territory.

The video, widely circulated online and shared on April 30 by an account linked to commentator activity associated with Sprinter Press Agency, claims that Iran targeted what it describes as “Ukrainian intelligence hubs.” The narrative alleges that these facilities were involved in operations against Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

The footage references Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Dnipro as locations of the purported strikes. However, investigators note that the visuals used in the video are not authentic and were generated using artificial intelligence, rather than depicting real events on the ground.

Also read

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‘Use longer and give new life’: introducing circular economy in Armenia

Emil Lazarian
JAM News
May 15 2026
  • Gayane Asryan
  • Yerevan

In recent years, Armenia has taken active steps towards transitioning to a circular economy. Its goals are primarily environmental, although the model also promises economic benefits.

A circular economy replaces the “use and throw away” approach with the idea of “use for as long as possible and give a new life”. The model could help Armenia:

  • reduce environmental harm,
  • improve the efficiency of resource use,
  • create new economic opportunities,
  • strengthen the country’s competitiveness in the context of the green transition.

The “green transition” refers to a global strategy aimed at building a sustainable, environmentally friendly economy with low carbon emissions. Its main goal is to limit climate change, reduce CO₂ emissions and prevent environmental degradation through green technologies, renewable energy sources and greater energy efficiency.

In Armenia, the green transition follows EU standards.

In simple terms, a circular economy is a system in which used resources become useful again instead of turning into waste. Materials and products that may seem no longer needed gain a second life.

Various grant programmes, funded mainly by the EU, aim to help Armenia create conditions in which goods and services stay in circulation for as long as possible. The goal is to produce less waste and reduce the use of new resources.

These projects bring together government institutions, NGOs, businesses and organisations working in economic development.

Armenia has limited natural resources and relies heavily on imported raw materials. As a result, a circular approach could help reduce dependence on resources and strengthen the economy’s resilience.

At present, most attention centres on local small and medium-sized enterprises. Experts believe these businesses have strong potential to move towards a circular model.

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A successful business story

Alvina Pirumyan’s guesthouse in Vayots Dzor Province has become well known. Visitors value not only the hosts’ hospitality, but also the business model behind it.

Pirumyan says she has followed the principles of a circular economy since launching the business. It all began when she decided to give a second life to a small rural house inherited from her parents.

As a biology teacher, she believes people should treat resources with care, use them efficiently and avoid harming the environment.

“Many years ago, long before I imagined leaving school and starting a business, I attended a training session. They explained that when creating a business, financial resources matter less than making thoughtful use of what you already have. That idea stayed with me for many years,” she says.

Savings of just one million drams ($2,700), together with an old but well-equipped house inherited from her parents, made her think about ways to earn a higher income.

“My husband and daughter strongly supported me when I decided to start a business. Each of them took on a specific role. My husband cleared out all the old items from the basement and attic and began giving them a second life. My daughter applied for small grants. Thanks to those, we bought a high-capacity water heater, a freezer and created a small greenhouse.”

According to Alvina, over the past seven years their guesthouse has grown into a profitable business. She can now host up to ten guests at a time, offer locally produced food and organise agritourism experiences.

“We added another 500 square metres of land to the 1,000 square metres around the house. We created a plot where we grow fruit trees, cucumbers, tomatoes, peppers and beans. Foreign visitors are very interested in how we grow, harvest and use all of this,” Alvina says.

She explains that they bought only bed linen and two frying pans for the guesthouse. Everything else already came with her father’s house: dishes, tablecloths, jugs, a record player, lampshades and a library of old books.

“Our guests are impressed by the atmosphere. It is an unusual experience for them. They enjoy the old but well-preserved interior. Tourists also really like the fruit and vegetables grown on our land.

They see how we irrigate the soil using recycled household water. That is one example of the circular approach people talk about so much today.”

Environmental challenges drive the shift towards a green economy

Yervand Mnoyan carried out his first study on introducing a circular economy in Armenia eight years ago. He now works with international organisations as an independent consultant, assessing opportunities and prospects linked to the green transition in developing countries.

He says Armenia has enormous untapped potential compared with many other countries:

“The problem in our country is not resources or resource management. The main issue is limited awareness and a lack of institutional capacity. However, in recent years we have seen noticeable changes under the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between Armenia and the EU. Those changes include progress towards the green transition and the circular economy.”

According to Mnoyan, attention now focuses more on assessing Armenia’s opportunities and long-term potential. He expects many pilot programmes to emerge across different sectors.

“Small and medium-sized businesses have the greatest potential. These programmes started with them. Large companies can, to some extent, introduce innovative approaches into their operations. They can reduce energy and water consumption and return some waste into circulation through recycling.

Small and medium-sized businesses have limited financial resources. International experience could therefore prove especially valuable for them.”

The expert believes Armenian entrepreneurs, like the wider public, currently need greater knowledge about applying circular economy principles. He points to fashion, tourism and the food industry as examples.

“I have seen old items gain a second life in the fashion industry in European countries. But that requires knowledge, technological solutions and access to markets.

“I think we need to talk about change through real examples of success. I am confident Armenia is ready for such a green transition.”

He says waste management and waste sorting are not abstract ideas. In his view, they give old products a second life, expand the ways they can be used and reduce the environmental damage caused by excessive production.

One of the ongoing programmes

The regional EU4Green Recovery East programme runs across Eastern Partnership countries with financial support from the EU. The initiative aims to improve economic efficiency and environmental sustainability by promoting circular economy approaches.

As part of the project, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) supports solutions in Armenia that encourage efficient use of resources, reduce waste and increase opportunities to reuse materials in production processes. The programme focuses especially on sectors where circular approaches could have the greatest impact.

An important part of this work involves developing systems to manage industrial waste. Specialists are also carrying out industrial waste mapping. This will help identify what types of waste different regions of the country produce, in what quantities and how those materials could serve as new resources.

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Armenian grape farmers revive ancient vines on mountain slopes

Elizabeth Jabejian
May 15 2026

“We must know how to extend the life of vineyards.”

by Brooklyn Smith

High in the Vayots Dzor province, Armenian grape farmers are reviving an ancient winemaking tradition. They may be helping both rural communities and mountain ecosystems in the process.

Across vineyards that are about 3,600 to 5,250 feet above sea level, farmers are bringing back native grape varieties. And they’re using organic practices that support healthier soil and local biodiversity to rebuild the wine economy, according to Mongabay. 

This comeback is especially striking because Armenia is not rebuilding just any wine industry.

In 2007, archaeologists uncovered what is widely considered the world’s oldest known winery. As Mongabay detailed, they found it in a cave complex in Vayots Dzor, dating back roughly 6,000 years. 

But during the 20th century, Soviet agricultural policy prioritized brandy production, and many grape varieties once used for wine disappeared from local cultivation.

Now, wineries including Trinity Canyon Vineyards are working to reverse that loss. Founded in 2013, Trinity Canyon grows grapes on natural mountain plateaus, where Armenia’s rocky terrain makes conventional vineyard layouts difficult.

The result is what the winery describes as “vertical viticulture.” Elevation shapes nearly everything from soil and climate to harvest timing. That challenge could ultimately become one of Armenia’s biggest strengths in a warming world.

Since 2012, researchers at the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia have collected and sequenced more than 3,400 grape samples. Their goal has been to preserve the country’s native varieties and identify which can best tolerate climate stress. 

“Winemaking wasn’t so popular in Armenia when we began this process,” Kristine Margaryan, head of the Laboratory of Plant Genomics at the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, told Mongabay.

Temperatures in Vayots Dzor have already increased by about 1.3 to 1.4 degrees Celsius, or 2.3 to 2.5 degrees Fahrenheit, over the last century. That means agriculture in the region may eventually need to move even farther uphill.

To plan for that future, researchers partnered with Maran Winery to establish Armenia’s first high-altitude vineyard at 6,824 feet. 

Early findings suggest many native Armenian grapes perform well there, while Western European varieties struggle. That could give local growers an important advantage as they search for crops suited to a changing climate.

For local communities, that matters far beyond what ends up in a wine glass.

A more resilient grape industry can support jobs, preserve regional farming knowledge, strengthen tourism, and keep more economic activity rooted in rural areas. It can also help protect cultural traditions tied to Armenia’s landscapes, dialects, and foodways.

Instead of using synthetic fertilizers, the team at Trinity Canyon plants cover crops to improve soil health and support local biodiversity. It also avoids pesticides and herbicides when possible and maintains buffer zones near neighboring farms to reduce contamination.

That kind of farming can create better habitat for beneficial insects and other wildlife while easing chemical pressure on surrounding land.

“We must know how to extend the life of vineyards,” declared Zaruhi Muradyan, CEO of the Vine and Wine Foundation of Armenia. “Various measures like specific irrigation methods, non-drip systems, and air circulation can help mitigate the negative effects, but we must be prepared.”

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Verelq: The “Armenia” bloc is starting fact-finding activities before the election

Jalatian Sonya

The “Armenia” bloc is launching a fact-finding campaign on cases of electoral coercion.


The statement released by the alliance, in particular, states: “Information has been received that employees of state and local government bodies are being forced to vote for the ruling party in the June 7 elections under threat of dismissal.


In order to organize this process more efficiently and create the impression of control, employee lists are compiled.


The “Armenia” alliance is conducting fact-finding activities to uncover and prevent similar crimes.


Given the bias observed in legal processes, we ask whistleblowers, if possible, to collect evidence of the violation: data revealing the identity of the persons making the threats, as well as information recorded by video recording devices.


We emphasize that using the influence conferred by official authority to force someone to vote is a crime, punishable by imprisonment for a term of four to eight years. We call on officials to refrain from criminal acts.


At the same time, we remind voters that the election is secret, and violating that secrecy is a crime. No one has the right and cannot control your vote.


The legal hotline number is: +374 95 273399 /WhatsApp, Telegram, Viber




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Asbarez: After Uproar, Pashinyan Claims He Ordered ‘Dismissal’ of Educators

Hunanian Jack
by Asbarez Staff

 

 May 14, 2026

 

in Armenia, Featured Story, Latest, News, Top Stories

Schoolchildren in Aparan heading to a pro-Pashinyan election rally


Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan claimed on Thursday that he had ordered the dismissal of four school principals after an uproar erupted when teachers and schoolchildren attended his election rally on Wednesday.

The incident, which took place in Armenia’s Aragatsotn Provice on Wednesday was observed by the Akanates monitoring group, which reported what it said were election violations in a detailed report.

Pashinyan claimed he told the four school officials to resign, “pending an inquiry.”

“We will conduct an internal inquiry, and if turns out that there was an illegal order [by them,] they will definitely be sacked,” he told reporters.

In its extensive report, Akanates noted that its observers recorded on-site that principals and teachers from several schools in Aparan and nearby settlements participated in Civil Contract’s campaign during working hours.

“Of particular concern is that, under direct instructions from school administrations and teaching staff, students were taken out of classes in order to welcome the Prime Minister and ensure participation in the campaign event,” the report said.

“The students were also reportedly provided with ‘mandatory instructions in advance regarding their appearance, clothing, and even hairstyles, being urged to wear braids,” the report added.

“In some cases, observers ‘personally witnessed’ how the school principals and teachers, via phone calls, issued ‘loud and strict instructions’ demanding that children’s participation be ensured in ‘a mandatory and organized manner,” the Akantes group said.

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Trump’s Corridor in South Caucasus Nine Months On: Vagaries and Vulnerabiliti

Emil Lazarian
by Contributor

 

 May 15, 2026

 

in Commentary, Latest, Op-Ed, Top Stories

BY HRAIR BALIAN

On 8 August 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration at the White House establishing the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity. The agreement aimed to open a corridor linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s southern Syunik region, with reciprocal connectivity benefits for Armenia.

The corridor concept has deep roots — over a century of Azerbaijani and Turkish ambitions for unbroken land connectivity between their two countries, with Armenia as the geographic obstacle. The modern impetus came from Article 9 of the November 2020 ceasefire ending the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. For years, negotiations deadlocked over naming rights, jurisdiction, and control. The TRIPP deal broke that impasse by having Armenian officials retain legal border control while a private third-country company conducts checks — an idea previously floated under earlier administrations but given new branding and White House fanfare by Trump’s team.

Crucially, TRIPP has already achieved something underappreciated: it deferred Azerbaijan’s otherwise imminent military seizure of the corridor. President Aliyev had openly warned the corridor would be established “whether Armenia wants it or not.” U.S. engagement postponed that threat indefinitely.

What Was Agreed — and What Was Not
Nine months in, the most striking feature of TRIPP is how little has been operationally resolved. A January 2026 TRIPP Implementation Framework established a “TRIPP Development Company” — 74% U.S.-owned, 26% Armenian — to develop 43 kilometers of rail, road, fiber optic, and energy infrastructure through Syunik over an initial 49-year term. But the TIF is notably thin: no construction timetable, no dispute resolution mechanism, and — most strikingly — an explicit disclaimer that it imposes no legal obligations on either the U.S. or Armenia.

The security architecture is also ambiguous. Armenia formally retains sovereignty, but private contractors may assume day-to-day security responsibilities. The use of a U.S. intermediary company between Armenian and Azerbaijani customs officials is the central innovation — but the ongoing U.S.–Israel war against Iran makes deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border highly problematic.

Sovereignty erosion risks lurk in the Special Purpose Vehicles to be created under the development company. History consistently shows that states lose effective control of transit infrastructure not because they lack legal authority, but because exercising it becomes prohibitive once commercial and arbitration structures are in place.

Winners and Losers
Azerbaijan is the clearest winner: it obtains the direct Nakhchivan link it has sought since 2020, without military action. Turkey’s pan-Eurasian strategic ambitions are advanced. The U.S. gains a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, mineral access, and a signature foreign policy achievement.

Armenia’s gains are conditional and asymmetric. It faces a structural reciprocity gap: Azerbaijani cargo and passengers will enjoy privileged transit through Armenia, but Armenian cargo and passengers have no equivalent guarantees through Azerbaijan. Yerevan interprets “reciprocal benefits” to mean comparable access through Azerbaijani territory; Baku interprets it as overall mutual benefit — not identical arrangements. No mechanism currently exists to enforce Armenian reciprocal access, and no timeline has been committed to by Baku.

Armenia’s financial returns — a 26% equity stake, customs duties, and fees — are mentioned but not quantified. Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has stated plainly: if the railway section to Gyumri is not included, TRIPP loses its relevance. The financial model only functions if Armenia becomes a genuine east–west transit hub, not merely a service corridor for Azerbaijan.

Structural Choke Points
Two structural vulnerabilities could derail the entire project.

First, Armenia’s railway network has been under a 30-year concession to South Caucasus Railway, a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways, since 2008. Russian Railways is in severe financial crisis ($51 billion in debt), and mandatory investment commitments have remained largely on paper. Pashinyan has formally requested Moscow to accelerate restoration of the Soviet-era rail segment foundational to TRIPP and has threatened to withdraw that segment from the concession if Russia fails to deliver. Armenia could legally do so, but the geopolitical complexity of compelling Moscow is considerable.

Second, TRIPP is legally entangled with a peace treaty that has been initialed but not signed. Azerbaijan insists Armenia remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which mentions Nagorno-Karabakh, before signing. Baku itself maintains constitutional provisions that imply claims to Armenian territory without acknowledging their controversial nature. Full border demarcation is years away, and the entire TRIPP corridor runs through this non-demarcated zone. The draft peace agreement contains no reference to the rights of displaced Karabakh Armenians, or the 19 Armenian hostages held in Azerbaijani jails.

The Missing Half: Turkey
TRIPP’s full economic promise to Armenia cannot be realized while the Turkish border remains sealed after 33 years. Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has been explicit: the Kars–Gyumri railway is not a footnote to TRIPP — it is its western terminus. In April 2026, Turkish and Armenian officials met in Kars to establish a joint working group on reopening the line, but Turkey’s position remains that normalization awaits a signed Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement. Turkey is also constructing a parallel railroad on its territory. Armenia is the structurally weakest of the three parties in this triangular relationship.

The EU’s Absence
TRIPP is a bilateral deal witnessed by a U.S. president, not a multilateral framework — which structurally sidelines the European Union despite its deep strategic interest in the Middle Corridor’s success. The EU has welcomed the project rhetorically and is investing in Armenia through separate instruments (Resilient Syunik, Global Gateway) but is not a co-investor in TRIPP’s governance structure.

This is a missed opportunity. The EU brings deep experience in cross-border infrastructure governance through TEN-T and Global Gateway, large-scale financing capacity through the EIB and EBRD, and institutional continuity that does not depend on any single leader’s attention span. A 2026 European Commission study found the TRIPP route would cut travel times by up to 25% compared with the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railroad — meaning Brussels has already done the technical homework. A U.S.–EU co-management model — with Washington providing political guarantee and security, and Brussels providing bulk financing, technical governance, and institutional continuity — could address TRIPP’s two most glaring vulnerabilities: its dependence on Trump personally, and the absence of legally binding commitments.

The Iran Variable
The U.S.–Israel war against Iran is simultaneously strengthening TRIPP’s strategic rationale and threatening its physical implementation. With Hormuz shipping disrupted and Iran’s transit role compromised, the Middle Corridor’s value has sharply increased — cargo takes 12–15 days via the corridor versus 40 days by sea. But deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border is now difficult; site survey visits have already been postponed; and the commercial companies the U.S. hoped to attract are reassessing security risks. The same small U.S. team — led by Steve Witkoff — responsible for TRIPP is now primarily consumed by the Iran crisis.

Meanwhile, Russia is capitalizing on regional uncertainty. Azerbaijan is hedging — Aliyev recently visited Georgia to signal the Tbilisi route remains viable — and there are signs of Kremlin optimism that the Iran war has at least temporarily buried TRIPP.

Conclusion: A Corridor Without a Foundation?
TRIPP has achieved real, if fragile, results: it has substituted for a Russian-controlled corridor, deferred Azerbaijani military pressure on Syunik, and initiated the first genuine normalization of Armenian Azerbaijani relations in a generation.

But the project is built on compounding fragilities. Nine months in, not a single meter of construction has occurred on Armenian soil. There is no signed peace treaty, no finalized operating company contract, no resolved Russian railway concession, and now a war literally across the border. The governing Implementation Framework explicitly disclaims legal obligation on either party — an extraordinary admission for a project of this scale.

Armenia’s structural position remains asymmetric. It provides the territory, absorbs the sovereignty risk, hosts U.S. security personnel near the Iranian border, and depends on political processes entirely outside its control — a signed peace agreement, an open Turkish border, Azerbaijani reciprocity — for the promised dividends to materialize. Azerbaijan gets its corridor. Turkey gets its logistics hub. The U.S. gets its minerals and its trophy deal. Armenia gets a conditional promise and a 49-year commitment.

The deeper question TRIPP poses has not changed since 8 August 2025: is this a genuine crossroads of peace, or a corridor for everyone else’s prosperity? The answer lies in the details that remain stubbornly unresolved — the security contract, the railway concession, reciprocal access, the Armenian hostages in Azerbaijani jails, and the Turkish border sealed for 33 years.

Hrair Balian, JD, DoL, has served in leadership positions at the UN, OSCE, the International Crisis Group, and The Carter Center, working on conflict transformation in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, North & South Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East & Africa. He has served as Adjunct Professor at Emory University, School of Law.



BY HRAIR BALIAN

On 8 August 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration at the White House establishing the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity. The agreement aimed to open a corridor linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s southern Syunik region, with reciprocal connectivity benefits for Armenia.

The corridor concept has deep roots — over a century of Azerbaijani and Turkish ambitions for unbroken land connectivity between their two countries, with Armenia as the geographic obstacle. The modern impetus came from Article 9 of the November 2020 ceasefire ending the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. For years, negotiations deadlocked over naming rights, jurisdiction, and control. The TRIPP deal broke that impasse by having Armenian officials retain legal border control while a private third-country company conducts checks — an idea previously floated under earlier administrations but given new branding and White House fanfare by Trump’s team.

Crucially, TRIPP has already achieved something underappreciated: it deferred Azerbaijan’s otherwise imminent military seizure of the corridor. President Aliyev had openly warned the corridor would be established “whether Armenia wants it or not.” U.S. engagement postponed that threat indefinitely.

What Was Agreed — and What Was Not
Nine months in, the most striking feature of TRIPP is how little has been operationally resolved. A January 2026 TRIPP Implementation Framework established a “TRIPP Development Company” — 74% U.S.-owned, 26% Armenian — to develop 43 kilometers of rail, road, fiber optic, and energy infrastructure through Syunik over an initial 49-year term. But the TIF is notably thin: no construction timetable, no dispute resolution mechanism, and — most strikingly — an explicit disclaimer that it imposes no legal obligations on either the U.S. or Armenia.

The security architecture is also ambiguous. Armenia formally retains sovereignty, but private contractors may assume day-to-day security responsibilities. The use of a U.S. intermediary company between Armenian and Azerbaijani customs officials is the central innovation — but the ongoing U.S.–Israel war against Iran makes deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border highly problematic.

Sovereignty erosion risks lurk in the Special Purpose Vehicles to be created under the development company. History consistently shows that states lose effective control of transit infrastructure not because they lack legal authority, but because exercising it becomes prohibitive once commercial and arbitration structures are in place.

Winners and Losers
Azerbaijan is the clearest winner: it obtains the direct Nakhchivan link it has sought since 2020, without military action. Turkey’s pan-Eurasian strategic ambitions are advanced. The U.S. gains a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, mineral access, and a signature foreign policy achievement.

Armenia’s gains are conditional and asymmetric. It faces a structural reciprocity gap: Azerbaijani cargo and passengers will enjoy privileged transit through Armenia, but Armenian cargo and passengers have no equivalent guarantees through Azerbaijan. Yerevan interprets “reciprocal benefits” to mean comparable access through Azerbaijani territory; Baku interprets it as overall mutual benefit — not identical arrangements. No mechanism currently exists to enforce Armenian reciprocal access, and no timeline has been committed to by Baku.

Armenia’s financial returns — a 26% equity stake, customs duties, and fees — are mentioned but not quantified. Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has stated plainly: if the railway section to Gyumri is not included, TRIPP loses its relevance. The financial model only functions if Armenia becomes a genuine east–west transit hub, not merely a service corridor for Azerbaijan.

Structural Choke Points
Two structural vulnerabilities could derail the entire project.

First, Armenia’s railway network has been under a 30-year concession to South Caucasus Railway, a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways, since 2008. Russian Railways is in severe financial crisis ($51 billion in debt), and mandatory investment commitments have remained largely on paper. Pashinyan has formally requested Moscow to accelerate restoration of the Soviet-era rail segment foundational to TRIPP and has threatened to withdraw that segment from the concession if Russia fails to deliver. Armenia could legally do so, but the geopolitical complexity of compelling Moscow is considerable.

Second, TRIPP is legally entangled with a peace treaty that has been initialed but not signed. Azerbaijan insists Armenia remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which mentions Nagorno-Karabakh, before signing. Baku itself maintains constitutional provisions that imply claims to Armenian territory without acknowledging their controversial nature. Full border demarcation is years away, and the entire TRIPP corridor runs through this non-demarcated zone. The draft peace agreement contains no reference to the rights of displaced Karabakh Armenians, or the 19 Armenian hostages held in Azerbaijani jails.

The Missing Half: Turkey
TRIPP’s full economic promise to Armenia cannot be realized while the Turkish border remains sealed after 33 years. Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has been explicit: the Kars–Gyumri railway is not a footnote to TRIPP — it is its western terminus. In April 2026, Turkish and Armenian officials met in Kars to establish a joint working group on reopening the line, but Turkey’s position remains that normalization awaits a signed Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement. Turkey is also constructing a parallel railroad on its territory. Armenia is the structurally weakest of the three parties in this triangular relationship.

The EU’s Absence
TRIPP is a bilateral deal witnessed by a U.S. president, not a multilateral framework — which structurally sidelines the European Union despite its deep strategic interest in the Middle Corridor’s success. The EU has welcomed the project rhetorically and is investing in Armenia through separate instruments (Resilient Syunik, Global Gateway) but is not a co-investor in TRIPP’s governance structure.

This is a missed opportunity. The EU brings deep experience in cross-border infrastructure governance through TEN-T and Global Gateway, large-scale financing capacity through the EIB and EBRD, and institutional continuity that does not depend on any single leader’s attention span. A 2026 European Commission study found the TRIPP route would cut travel times by up to 25% compared with the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railroad — meaning Brussels has already done the technical homework. A U.S.–EU co-management model — with Washington providing political guarantee and security, and Brussels providing bulk financing, technical governance, and institutional continuity — could address TRIPP’s two most glaring vulnerabilities: its dependence on Trump personally, and the absence of legally binding commitments.

The Iran Variable
The U.S.–Israel war against Iran is simultaneously strengthening TRIPP’s strategic rationale and threatening its physical implementation. With Hormuz shipping disrupted and Iran’s transit role compromised, the Middle Corridor’s value has sharply increased — cargo takes 12–15 days via the corridor versus 40 days by sea. But deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border is now difficult; site survey visits have already been postponed; and the commercial companies the U.S. hoped to attract are reassessing security risks. The same small U.S. team — led by Steve Witkoff — responsible for TRIPP is now primarily consumed by the Iran crisis.

Meanwhile, Russia is capitalizing on regional uncertainty. Azerbaijan is hedging — Aliyev recently visited Georgia to signal the Tbilisi route remains viable — and there are signs of Kremlin optimism that the Iran war has at least temporarily buried TRIPP.

Conclusion: A Corridor Without a Foundation?
TRIPP has achieved real, if fragile, results: it has substituted for a Russian-controlled corridor, deferred Azerbaijani military pressure on Syunik, and initiated the first genuine normalization of Armenian Azerbaijani relations in a generation.

But the project is built on compounding fragilities. Nine months in, not a single meter of construction has occurred on Armenian soil. There is no signed peace treaty, no finalized operating company contract, no resolved Russian railway concession, and now a war literally across the border. The governing Implementation Framework explicitly disclaims legal obligation on either party — an extraordinary admission for a project of this scale.

Armenia’s structural position remains asymmetric. It provides the territory, absorbs the sovereignty risk, hosts U.S. security personnel near the Iranian border, and depends on political processes entirely outside its control — a signed peace agreement, an open Turkish border, Azerbaijani reciprocity — for the promised dividends to materialize. Azerbaijan gets its corridor. Turkey gets its logistics hub. The U.S. gets its minerals and its trophy deal. Armenia gets a conditional promise and a 49-year commitment.

The deeper question TRIPP poses has not changed since 8 August 2025: is this a genuine crossroads of peace, or a corridor for everyone else’s prosperity? The answer lies in the details that remain stubbornly unresolved — the security contract, the railway concession, reciprocal access, the Armenian hostages in Azerbaijani jails, and the Turkish border sealed for 33 years.

Hrair Balian, JD, DoL, has served in leadership positions at the UN, OSCE, the International Crisis Group, and The Carter Center, working on conflict transformation in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, North & South Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East & Africa. He has served as Adjunct Professor at Emory University, School of Law.



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Student Essay Contest Winners from Uruguay and Armenia Awarded Los Angeles Vis

Talar Tumanian
by Contributor

 

 May 15, 2026

 

in Latest, News, Top Stories

(l to r) Taguhi Papyan (teacher-Armenia), Ruzanna Nikoghosyan (student-Armenia), Luciana Van Horenbeck (student-Uruguay), Lucia Cruz (teacher-Uruguay) at the Charter High School


LOS ANGELES — High school students Ruzanna Nikoghosyan of Armenia and Luciana Van Horenbeck of Uruguay recently returned to their home countries after their first visit to Los Angeles. The visit was their First Place prize awarded to them as the winners of a joint Uruguay-Armenia essay contest on the theme of the Armenian Genocide.

The Genocide Education Project arranged the educational portion of the itinerary, March 7 to 13, partnering with the contest organizers, the Armenian General Benevolent Union of Uruguay, the National Public Education Administration of Uruguay, and the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute in Armenia. 

Ruzanna Nikoghosyan Luciana Van Horenbeck

Javier Polatian, Director of Educational Affairs of AGBU Uruguay, led the delegation, which also included the students’ teacher-escorts, Taguhi Papyan (accompanying Ruzanna) and Lucia Cruz (accompanying Luciana).

The winners visited numerous educational institutions, engaging in meaningful exchanges and participating in classroom projects with their counterparts at public and Armenian schools, university Armenian programs, and cultural and advocacy institutions. They discussed themes of personal identity, memory, genocide denial and resistance, Armenian history, and current events.

Ruzanna Nikoghosyan discussed her discovery of her family’s story of survival during the Armenian Genocide. She said she had long been troubled by her grandfather’s inexplicable refrain, “Ani, so close, but so far away.” One day, standing on the banks of the Arax River and admiring the ancient city of Ani through barbed wire and with Turkish military watchtowers separating her from the city, she understood her grandfather’s meaning. She returned to her village and learned her family’s history, albeit with some mysteries still to be uncovered.

Contest winners and teachers with Maggie Goschin, Dir. Ararat Eskijian Museum, and Javier Polatian, AGBU Uruguay Dir., Educational Affairs

Luciana Van Horenbeck, whose essay addressed Armenian Genocide resistance through art, told U.S. students how she found refuge, comfort, and strength in the poems of Silva Kaputikyan, Vahan Tekeyan, and Moughegh Ishkhan. She said she believes the poems and the continued use of the Armenian language are forms of resistance and cultural preservation.

Christina Chiranian, GenEd’s Educational Programming Assistant who teaches history at Sylmar Charter High School, organized the trip’s educational itinerary. She said her students were extremely enthusiastic about meeting Ruzanna and Luciana. “Yesterday’s guest speakers were amazing!” wrote one student, “I loved hearing about how language can be a form of resistance! It was cool to see how students do the same things we do in different countries… especially hearing it in Spanish from the visitors from Uruguay. It was an experience I’ll never forget.”

The teacher-escorts learned about educational methods in the U.S. “I thought that non-Armenians wouldn’t care about the Armenian Genocide,” said Papyan, “But here are ‘odar’ students not only learning, but excited and wanting to learn about Armenians.”

Students with their teachers and Polatian at the office of CA State Assemblyman John Harabedian

The essay contest was initiated in 2024 by Uruguay’s National Administration of Public Education in cooperation with the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU). Participants must conduct research and submit an argumentative essay supported by evidence under the mentorship of a teacher. Finalists give an oral defense of their essays before the winners are chosen.

Contest leader Javier Polatian expressed his satisfaction with the contest’s trip results, saying, “GenEd is behind the real success of this trip. There was a perfect balance between higher education, public schools, Armenian schools, cultural organizations, and political organizations. It was all so perfect.”

Edita Gzoyan, who co-led the contest program on behalf of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, expressed satisfaction with the growing partnership between organizations in Uruguay, Armenia, and the U.S. “We all believe deeply in the power of genocide education to connect young people, strengthen historical understanding, and promote responsibility toward the prevention of future atrocities,” said Gzoyan.

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Asbarez: New Novel ‘Never Hide from the Devil,’ Tells Armenian Tale of Courag

Emil Lazarian
by Contributor

 

 May 15, 2026

 

in Books, Latest, News, Top Stories

Inspired by a true story of resistance during the Armenian Genocide, this stirring coming-of-age novel is a parable of courage and impossible choices in the midst of unimaginable horror.

The government wants them dead.

Fourteen-year-old Suren Simonian, an Armenian, lives as most boys his age do in the city of Van, eastern Anatolia. He goes to school, gawks at boys’ fistfights, and does his best to avoid the Turkish gendarmes. Most days, he spends with his Turkish best friend, Hamza.

But in spring 1915, rumors spread through Van of Turkish massacres of Armenian villages. Now Turkish troops have massed outside Van with one goal—to exterminate the city’s Armenians.

As Suren struggles to understand what it means to be a man, he knows one thing for sure: When everything you’ve known and loved is at stake, the only answer is to fight back. You can never hide from the devil.

In a Starred Review, Kirkus Reviews writes the novel is “heart-wrenching, thought-provoking, and painfully timely.”

Dr. Khatchig Mouradian, Columbia University, author of “The Resistance Network” says, “The horrors perpetrators commit are only half the story of genocide. The other half is the resistance of its victims. N.T. McQueen delivers a powerful novel of courage and defiance in the face of annihilation.”

Marsha Skrypuch, author of “Making Bombs for Hitler” and the “Kidnapped from Ukraine” trilogy said its “written with short and compelling chapters, this novel plunges the reader with authenticity into this little-known act of defiance during the 20th century’s first genocide.”

Eric Z. Weintraub, author of “South of Sepharad” wrote: “Through the eyes of a young boy, McQueen crafts a devastating and unforgettable portrait of the 1915 Defense of Van—a story of resilience against impossible odds that delivers the history of the Armenian Genocide to a new generation.”

N.T. McQueen

N.T. McQueen is an avid writer and dedicated college lecturer. With a master’s degree in fiction from California State University, Sacramento, McQueen has brought unique perspectives on human nature to readers in his captivating novels “Never Hide from the Devil“ (Cennan, 2026), “The Cry of Dry Bones“ (2021), and “Between Lions and Lambs“ (2011). His writing has been featured in North American Review, Stonecoast Review, Entropy, Sunlight Press, Atticus Review, Dappled Things, Grief Digest Magazine, and Foreword Magazine. He lives in California with his wife and daughters and enjoys fishing, traveling, and a tasty cup of coffee. The novel is now available from Cynren Press.

Support IALA’s work by purchasing it at their Bookshop.org storefront.

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