Smart divorce with Russia: what price will Armenia pay

FAKTI, Bulgaria
May 15 2026

Despite the pro-Western rhetoric of Pashinyan’s team, the numbers show that since 2018, Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia has not only not decreased, but has increased several times

Vladimir Putin offered Armenia a “smart divorce”: he put the country before a choice between the Eurasian Economic Union and the EU. What does this mean for Yerevan? What would be the price of “separation” from Russia?

Vladimir Putin’s proposal for a “smart divorce” with Armenia sounded like an ultimatum, putting the country’s leadership before a difficult choice: whether to maintain its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union or finally turn to the EU.

Many in Armenia perceived Putin’s words as increasing pressure on Yerevan and as a clear sign that the times of backroom diplomacy and tacit compromises are over.

End of the nuances and shadow of Ukraine

Although Armenia continues to participate in all integration associations under the auspices of Moscow, it has long since distanced itself from Russia. Yerevan has taken a course of rapprochement with Brussels and openly declared its intention to join the EU, including inscribing this in legislation. In Yerevan, this process is called “diversification”, while for Moscow it is a geopolitical turn.

The catalyst for the sharp intensification of the Kremlin’s rhetoric was two unprecedented diplomatic events for the region: the meeting of the European Political Community (EPC) held in Yerevan in early May and the EU-Armenia summit. Moscow was particularly irritated by the fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was also present at the ENP forum.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reaction was not long in coming – he suggested that Yerevan hold a referendum on joining the EU. And in the event of choosing the European vector – “intelligent and mutually beneficial divorce”, which was accompanied by the following unambiguous hint: “We see what is happening now in Ukraine. But how did it all start? With Ukraine’s attempt to join the EU”.

Let us recall that a month earlier, at a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the Russian president stated that Armenia’s parallel membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the EU is incompatible. The prime minister replied that future participation in both blocs would be impossible, but for the time being there is compatibility. And when the time comes for the final choice, the decision will be made by the Armenian people.

“Interstate relations are not a marriage”

Yerevan reacted with restraint to Moscow’s proposal for a “smart divorce”, trying to reduce tension. Prime Minister Pashinyan said that for the authorities, the issue of choosing between the EEU and the EU is not on the agenda. He rejected the metaphor of “divorce”, emphasizing that in interstate relations Armenia is guided by interstate logic and remains a full member of the EEU.

At the same time, Pashinyan acknowledged the existence of “discomforts” in relations with Russia, calling them part of the “inevitable transformation”. The election program of the ruling “Civil Contract” party before the parliamentary elections on June 7th states that Yerevan intends to continue to develop “mutually beneficial and constructive cooperation” with Moscow.

The leader of the opposition bloc “Armenia” Robert Kocharyan, who has a reputation for long-standing friendly relations with Vladimir Putin, called the policy of the Armenian authorities dangerous and noted that playing with the EU could lead to Russia “losing patience”. He reminded that the socio-economic well-being of a huge number of citizens critically depends on relations with Russia.

Will Armenia withstand a rupture with Russia?

Despite the pro-Western rhetoric of Pashinyan’s team, the numbers show that since 2018, Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia has not only not decreased, but has increased several times. Trade and especially exports to Russia have increased many times, while supplies to EU markets have decreased by five percent. Experts estimate that the loss of the Russian market will be a “severe shock” for the country.

In addition, Armenia is currently practically totally dependent on Russian gas. Its only alternative is the Iranian pipeline, which is also owned by the Russian “Gazprom”. But the quantities supplied by it cover only 15-17 percent of consumption.

Are the claims about the destructive consequences exaggerated?

Armenian economist Hayk Gevorgyan uses mathematical arguments to refute claims about the destructive consequences of the separation between Armenia and Russia. “Russia’s share in Armenia’s foreign trade is 35 percent, and the remaining 65 percent falls on other countries, including the EU. Therefore, the negative effect of leaving the EEU can only affect this one-third.” The expert also emphasizes that a large part of this 35 percent is re-export, which does not affect GDP.

As for the sale of agricultural products, Gevorgyan notes that the sector is modernizing and exports can be reoriented to Europe and other countries, as is already the case. The expert told DW that due to Armenia’s membership in the EEU, it has to buy some goods from Russia at very high prices – such as sugar, while outside the economic bloc this would be possible at much lower prices.

Commenting on gas dependence, Gevorgyan expressed doubts that Moscow would sharply raise prices, since the internal distribution is carried out by the Russian company “Gazprom Armenia” itself. “The presence of “Gazprom” in Armenia is a rather important detail for Russia itself, and it is unlikely that the decision to double or triple the price will be made easily. If the price jumps by a few percent, Armenia will already have to reconsider its own relations with “Gazprom”, he says.

Therefore, the expert believes that the catastrophic scenarios are greatly exaggerated, and Yerevan also has potential alternative solutions – neighboring countries Iran and Azerbaijan, which also produce gas.

Bitter church row divides Armenia ahead of elections

EurActiv
May 15 2026

For months, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has called for the removal of the church’s leader

Walking through the grounds of Armenia’s most sacred church, 37-year-old worshipper Nara Sargsyan spoke in hushed tones as she criticised her government’s attacks on the clergy.

“I don’t support their position on the church. I don’t support it at all,” she told AFP, as priests walked around the neatly-cut grass of the Etchmiadzin Cathedral behind her.

For months, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has called for the removal of the church’s leader, Catholicos Karekin II – one of his most prominent critics – alleging that he fathered a child against his vow of celibacy.

Security forces in the South Caucasus country last year detained more than a dozen clergymen, including influential Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, as well as billionaire opposition figure Samvel Karapetyan, accusing some of them of plotting to overthrow Pashinyan – charges they reject.

The arrests have rattled Armenia, a deeply Christian nation of three million people bordering Iran and Turkey, and put Pashinyan on a collision course with one of the country’s most venerated institutions ahead of elections in June.

“Government agencies are making unnecessary statements, interfering unnecessarily, and making obscene remarks about the Catholicos,” said Sargsyan, who works as an academic.

“After recent clashes, the Catholicos’s role has become even stronger, his patriotism and love for the people have become even more noticeable.”

The Catholicos called on Pashinyan to resign following Armenia’s military defeat to Azerbaijan in 2020, while Archbishop Galstanyan led mass street protests against Pashinyan’s rule four years later.

When asked about divisions in Armenian society, priests at the church sided with their leadership.

“The church is that link which embraces everyone in a warm hug,” said Hovhanes Avetisyan, a deacon from the city of Armavir.

“Our aims are always constructive: not to repay evil with evil, but instead to sow love and preach peace.”

Trading barbs 

Pashinyan and his supporters suggest the church is aligned with Russia, and that the opposition would lead Armenia into another war with Azerbaijan.

The opposition accuses Pashinyan of democratic backsliding and attempting to dismantle the church’s independence.

The government has also accused the church of corruption, and says it is in need of reform, an assertion the church has called a pretext to take it over.

Pashinyan rose to power on the back of a 2018 popular revolution, and has often portrayed himself as a man of the people.

But his popularity has waned in recent years, following a string of military defeats against neighbouring Azerbaijan.

Only around 20 percent of Armenians trust the 50-year-old, although that is still higher than any other politician in the post-Soviet country, a poll conducted in February by the International Republican Institute showed.

‘Political prisoner’

After billionaire opposition leader Samvel Karapetyan – a major donor to the church – was arrested on suspicion of plotting a coup, his nephew Narek Karapetyan took the mantle of running his election campaign.

He told AFP that his uncle was now a “political prisoner” and accused the government of persecuting religious leaders.

“This year, last year, it was a terrible time for our democracy,” Narek Karapetyan said. “We have clerics, we have archbishops in jail.”

“They said that there are some issues in our state policy that are not right. And they were taken to jail.”

Pashinyan denies Armenia has political prisoners and in April suggested Samvel Karapetyan – who holds Russian, Cypriot and Armenian citizenship – was a “foreign agent”.

He has pledged to renounce his non-Armenian citizenships to be eligible for office in the June elections.

‘The church needs reform’ 

Pashinyan kicked off his election campaign in the city of Gyumri in April, smiling for selfies with supporters and playing the drums on stage.

He was surrounded by a large security detail, which did not allow AFP reporters to approach him.

His supporters have rallied behind his campaign on the church.

“The majority of the people believe that our Apostolic Holy Church needs reform,” said Milena Aslanyan, a 27-year-old linguist and Pashinyan supporter.

“This is not convenient for the so-called opposition forces because these forces were sent by another country,” she said, in an apparent reference to Russia.

Norayr Saakyan, a 55-year-old shoemaker wearing a hat bearing the logo of Pashinyan’s re-election campaign, was also critical of the church.

“Some priests portray themselves as saints, but we see they are not,” he said.

“Nikol Pashinyan is simply pointing this out.”

(cm)

Russia Says Armenia Risks Losing EAEU Benefits

Eurasia Review
May 15 2026

By PanARMENIAN

Armenia could lose all privileges it currently enjoys within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union, the EAEU, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said.

“We have relations with Armenia, and those relations are close and allied. However, at the same time, they are complicated. Given how the West is trying to pull Armenia — along with some other CIS members — into its orbit and sever Armenia’s mutually beneficial economic, trade and investment ties with its partners in the CIS and the EAEU,” he said, according to RIA Novosti.

Lavrov stressed that relations between Moscow and Yerevan will be discussed at the Eurasian Economic Union summit scheduled for late May in Kazakhstan. At the same time, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had earlier stated that he would be unable to attend the meeting because of the election campaign.

“That would, of course, be regrettable, because this is a good opportunity to discuss the issues that remain unresolved,” the minister added.

Earlier, the Russian president repeatedly stressed that Armenia has the sovereign right to choose its partners, but at the same time cannot belong to both the EU and EAEU customs unions. He also recalled that Armenia has received substantial benefits from membership in the Eurasian Economic Union in areas such as agriculture, manufacturing, migration and customs duties.

Pashinyan Says Armenia’s Nuclear Plant Decision Will Be Based on Economics, N

Sight Line
May 15 2026

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Armenia’s decision regarding the type of future nuclear power plant it will build will be based on economic considerations rather than political preferences.

Speaking to journalists during a “Civil Contract” campaign event in Yerevan, Pashinyan stated that Armenia is evaluating proposals from multiple countries, including Russia, the United States, France, South Korea, and China.

“This is not a political choice for us; it is an economic issue. Armenia will work with whichever country offers the best proposal,” Pashinyan said.

According to the prime minister, Armenia’s growing solar energy sector reduces the need for a traditional 1,000-megawatt nuclear plant. Instead, the government is focusing on the possibility of constructing a modular nuclear power station.

“We are currently focused on and want to have a modular nuclear plant because, if necessary, additional power units could later be constructed,” he explained.

Pashinyan emphasized that modular nuclear plants are considered significantly safer than traditional reactors and are designed to avoid disasters similar to the Chernobyl disaster.

“The most important issue for us is that a modular plant cannot lead to an accident like the one at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. In the event of an accident at a modular station, it is considered a localized incident, and neighboring communities would not need to be evacuated,” he said.

The prime minister also noted that Russia has developed its own modular nuclear technology in the form of a floating nuclear power plant currently operating at sea.

“When the proposals are submitted, we must first evaluate the technology and then the pricing. Even in the case of a nuclear plant, we do not want to make a political choice. This is an economic issue, and we want to guarantee the long-term sustainability and profitability of the project for Armenia,” Pashinyan added.

Earlier, Armenian Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure Davit Khudatyan had stated that Armenia’s future nuclear power plant would be modular.

Modular nuclear power plants represent a new generation of nuclear energy facilities that differ from traditional plants in size, construction methods, and operational flexibility.

Source: Massispost

Armenia Turns Toward Europe, Marking A New Chapter For Peace

May 15 2026

Armenia Turns Toward Europe, Marking A New Chapter For Peace

On May 5, 2026, Armenia hosted its first ever summit with the European Union in Yerevan, a historic moment for the small Caucasus nation as it moves away from Russia and toward Europe. According to A.P. News, the two sides signed a connectivity partnership covering transportation, energy, and digital links, with E.U. investments expected to reach 2.5 billion euros. Hosting both the 8th European Political Community summit and the E.U-Armenia summit back to back sent a clear message about where Armenia is headed.

Leaders on both sides were openly enthusiastic about these new developments. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Europe is ready to invest in Armenia’s energy, digital economy, and trade infrastructure, with the goal of turning Armenia into “a motor of growth” for the region (A.P. News). European Council President António Costa called the summit a firm signal of the E.U’s commitment to bringing Armenia and its people closer to the Union. Back in Yerevan, Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Abisoghomonyan described the partnership as “closer than ever,” reflecting a positive relationship (Armenpress).

What makes this development important is how Armenia is approaching it. Rather than a military focused approach, it is pursuing diplomacy, economic ties, and democratic reform. As stated by Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, E.U. engagement is “much more prudent and much more productive” than U.S. involvement because it is less likely to antagonize Russia (A.P. News). Armenia is also building relationships with Japan, South Korea, and China. Giragosian described this as moving “beyond the black and white zero-sum game paradigm,” which is exactly the kind of approach needed by the international community. 

However, it is important to note that Armenia’s shift did not happen overnight. For decades, the country was deeply tied to Russia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union. That relationship fell apart in 2023 when Azerbaijan reclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh and Russian peacekeepers stood by and watched. Giragosian called it a “belated demonstration that Russia is dangerously unreliable as a partner” (A.P. News) Since then, Armenia has frozen its membership in the Russian-led security bloc, joined the International Criminal Court, and in 2025, passed a law declaring its intention to seek E.U. membership. According to the European Council, a partnership agreement between Armenia and the E.U. has been in force since 2021, and visa liberalization talks began in 2024.

The road ahead is not without obstacles for Armenia. Putin has warned Armenia it cannot belong to both the E.U. and the Russian-led economic union, where it currently gets heavily discounted gas (A.P. News). Azerbaijan remains a source of tension, as just before the summit, its parliament voted to suspend cooperation with the European Parliament while protesters outside the venue demanded the release of Armenian prisoners still held there. Nevertheless, despite these real and serious issues, Armenia is showing that it can choose a path built on diplomacy and peace rather than dependency and militant force.

https://theowp.org/armenia-turns-toward-europe-marking-a-new-chapter-for-peace/

Echoes of 1915: Why the Armenian Genocide Still Matters Today

UCSF – May 15 2026

Tuesday, May 19, 2026

Anush Margaryan

I am a descendant of a survivor of the Armenian Genocide. I grew up surrounded by fragments of this history through my grandparents’ stories and documentaries about survival, loss, and resilience. My great-grandparents survived so that I could be here today, carrying forward the life, memory, and identity they nearly lost. 

Every year on April 24, Armenians worldwide mourn the 1.5 million people who were killed, displaced, and erased from their ancestral homeland. This day is not only about mourning loss. It is also a reminder of the strength of a nation that, despite attempts to silence it, continues to carry its history, culture, and identity with pride.

The Armenian Genocide refers to the systematic killing and forced deportation of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire beginning in 1915. An estimated 1.5 million Armenians were killed, and hundreds of thousands were forced from their homes through mass violence and death marches into the Syrian desert. Entire communities were destroyed, and survivors were scattered across the world, forming a global Armenian diaspora that continues to preserve cultural memory across generations.

Today, the genocide is widely documented and recognized by many historians and countries. However, some, including the Republic of Turkey, continue to reject the term “genocide.” This ongoing denial makes remembrance and education especially important, as recognition of history is essential in preventing future atrocities.

A genocide left unpunished is a genocide at risk of being repeated. When justice is denied, and truth is obscured, history does not remain in the past, but it continues into the present. For many Armenians, this is not distant history. In 2023, over 100,000 Armenians were forcibly displaced from their homes in Artsakh following months of blockade, violence, and a humanitarian crisis. For many, it felt like an echo of the displacement their great-grandparents once survived. Families were once again separated from their ancestral lands, carrying forward a history of loss and resilience.

Remembering April 24 is not only about honoring those who were lost in 1915. It is also about recognizing ongoing struggles, standing against denial, and reaffirming the responsibility to speak out against injustice wherever it occurs. By learning and teaching others, we ensure that these histories are not forgotten, and that “never again” is not just a phrase we repeat, but a responsibility we uphold.

Sports: Rangers ‘interested in Armenia international star’ on books of Premie

The Sun, Scotland
May 15 2026

Rangers ‘interested in Armenia international star’ on books of Premier League club ahead of summer transfer rebuild
Ryan Rowe , Senior Online Sports Journalist

RANGERS are reportedly interested in Armenian wonderkid Finn Gergusyan.

The 18-year-old was born in England but represents Armenia, where his father is from.

He featured for Armenia at youth level but was fast-tracked into the senior squad earlier this year.

Gergusyan is currently on the books at Sunderland and has 35 goal contributions over the last two seasons with the Black Cats‘ youth teams.

He is a Sunderland fan having grown up in County Durham and this past season he scored 13 goals in 29 appearances, adding a further three assists.

Last season he notched 12 goals and seven assists across 31 matches.

The striker is out of contract at the Stadium of Light in the summer and according to the Sunderland Echo, Rangers have lodged an interest in acquiring his services.

Sunderland are understood to have opened talks with Gergusyan but the Wearside club face competition from several EFL clubs as well as Gers.

Gergusyan, who can also play on the right wing, is unlikely to feature regularly for Sunderland at the moment in the Premier League with several more experienced players ahead of him.

Netherlands international Brian Brobbey joined the club for £21.6m last summer, with Eliezer Mayenda and Wilson Isidor also among the goals.

Head coach Regis Le Bris can also call upon Nilson Angulo, Bertrand Traore and Chemsine Talbi in wide areas.

Wingers Romain Mundle and Jocelin Ta Bi, who were linked with Rangers and Celtic respectively this season, are also part of the first team squad at the club.

Eurovision 2026: Israeli broadcaster sparks social media backlash over Armenia

Eurovision Sun
May 16 2026

The Israeli state broadcaster is facing criticism online after showing Armenia and Azerbaijan under the same flag during Tuesday night’s Eurovision Song Contest semi-final.

During the live broadcast on Kan 11, a graphic displaying the participating countries mistakenly used the Azerbaijani national flag to represent both Azerbaijan and neighbouring Armenia.

The incident quickly triggered a wave of controversy across social media platforms, with viewers accusing the broadcaster of insensitivity given the complex political history between the two South Caucasus nations.

Because of these highly strained relations, as well as Israel’s close cooperation with Azerbaijan, many online users interpreted the graphic as a deliberate political statement aimed at undermining Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

However, it is also possible that the incident was simply the result of a mistake rather than a deliberate political statement.

Given the tight deadlines and fast-paced nature of live television production, the graphic may have been created in error during the design process. Fans are now waiting to see whether the broadcaster or production team will respond to the controversy.

Turkish Press: ‘Armenia is looking for ways to breathe’

Turkey – May 16 2026

MASIS KÜRKÇÜGIL ON TURKEY-ARMENIA RAPPROACHMENT

“Armenia holds no trump card for either regional or international policy. Consequently, rather than pursuing a balancing act, it is seeking ways to breathe. The cost of Russian influence has been heavy,” says Kürkçügil.

As cards are being reshuffled around the world, Pashinyan certainly intends to slowly untie the moorings without a complete break. However, it must be acknowledged that the maneuverability of a small and poor country, especially in such a world, is not easy at all.

Bureaucratic preparations for the start of direct trade between Turkey and Armenia were completed as of May 11, as part of steps taken within the framework of the normalization process ongoing since 2022.

Technical and bureaucratic work continues regarding the opening of the common border between the two countries.

With the new regulation, it has become possible for goods going from Turkey to Armenia via a third country, or arriving via the same route, to have their final destination or point of origin written as “Armenia/Turkey.”

Masis Kürkçügil, a Armenian writer and publisher from Turkey, emphasized that the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations should now be read not only on the level of bilateral relations but through the power balances in the South Caucasus.

According to Kürkçügil, the closure of the border and the freezing of relations between the two countries were directly linked to the Karabakh issue. Kürkçügil says that today, conditions have “changed radically” due to both Russia’s weakening regional influence following the invasion of Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s strengthening position on the ground.

‘A result of Karabakh resolution in favor of Azerbaijan’

How do you assess the commencement of direct trade between Turkey and Armenia and the ongoing technical preparations for opening the border? On the one hand, this is a process that has been on the agenda for years; but how might the taking of concrete steps this time affect the regional balance of power in the South Caucasus? And in your view, in what ways does the current stage differ from previous normalization efforts?

The closure of the border was a decision taken by Ankara regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. Considering the internal unrest in Azerbaijan, Russia’s undisputed power in

the region, and other factors at the time, conditions today have changed radically. Russia, particularly due to its quagmire in the invasion of Ukraine, has severely damaged its military prestige. In contrast, Azerbaijan has begun to assert its influence in the region with the support of Israel and Turkey. Armenia, on the other hand, is ultimately a small and impoverished country. Additionally, there remains an unresolved power struggle between the pro-Russian faction and the current administration, which seeks to act more independently.

The opening of the border is a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue being resolved in the manner desired by the Aliyev administration. Ankara was already conducting its relations with Armenia entirely under Baku’s shadow. The Karabakh issue has been resolved. Armenia, feeling trapped, is trying to catch its breath.

Is is truly ‘normalization’?

How might progress in Turkey-Armenia normalization affect Azerbaijan’s regional position and its relations with Armenia? Are the boundaries of normalization still defined along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border?

With Iran being weakened by U.S. imperialism, Azerbaijan may feel even more empowered. After all, its ally is Israel! Turkey-Armenia normalization is entirely dependent on Baku’s will. To what extent can the opening of the border be considered “normalization”? This is debatable. Of course, the fundamental issue lies in the relationship between Baku and Yerevan. From the very beginning, Ankara has not harbored any intention of acting as an independent variable or a mediator or facilitator. For Turkey, there is no issue under discussion other than the “genocide” issue. Of course, millennia-old Central Asian dreams may sound appealing; but much has changed in those lands since the 1990s.

For many years, Armenia was viewed as a country dependent on Russia in the areas of security, border control, energy, and the economy. How does the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations and Armenia’s increased engagement with the West challenge Russia’s traditional role in the South Caucasus?

Just how much security this provides became clear when 120,000 people were forced to flee from Nagorno-Karabakh. Energy dependence is quite serious; Armenia meets two-thirds of its needs from Russia, and Russian “influence” is widespread. On the other hand, compared to, say, Azerbaijan or a number of countries with a similar history, politics in Armenia is relatively more reasonable. It’s not even necessary to describe the Azerbaijani regime.

Armenia has a peculiar diaspora. It thus has direct ties to the West. Despite having no colonial past, it is among the Francophone nations. In other words, its relationship with the West is, in a sense, inevitable—it is already a de facto reality. Most of its population is already in the diaspora. Especially after independence, due to poverty, nearly half of the population at that time scattered to the four corners of the world in search of work. Armenia’s remaining under Russian influence holds significance for Russia’s regional hegemony; but the cost of this has begun to weigh heavily on Armenia. Of course, Russia’s traditional role in the South Caucasus also grants it a natural right to this. It is certain that this will be used not for the benefit of the region’s peoples, but for the Russia envisioned by Putin. While one might say it has returned to Georgia, it is important to remember that behind Russia’s influence in the region, the local oligarchs are deeply intertwined with Russia.

‘Seeking ways to breathe’

How do the multifaceted relations that Armenia has developed simultaneously with Russia, Iran, Turkey, the U.S., and the EU point to a “policy of balance” that goes beyond traditional alliance patterns? In this context, how should we interpret the strategic orientation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s administration?

Armenia holds no trump card for either regional or international policy. Consequently, rather than pursuing a balancing act, it is seeking ways to breathe. The cost of Russian influence has been heavy. It must be noted immediately that Pashinyan did not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; he opposed it. In contrast, the Nagorno-Karabakh administration at the time supported the invasion. Indeed, when Putin condemned Zelenskyy’s participation in the European Political Community meeting with a fury that defied diplomacy, Pashinyan reiterated this stance. Economic difficulties do not allow for an immediate severing of old ties, but these old economic ties are not lifting Armenia out of poverty either.

On another front, how might the tensions Pashinyan faces domestically with church circles and certain nationalist actors affect this search for a new direction in foreign policy?

There is no point in drawing a distinction between domestic and foreign policy. Unlike many leaders in the region, Pashinyan is not from the old state apparatus or the military; he came to power backed by a significant popular movement and strong social support. The church, and especially former Karabakh-based leaders, along with the oligarchs, operate primarily under Moscow’s shadow.

As the cards are being reshuffled worldwide, Pashinyan naturally intends to loosen the ropes gradually without making a complete break. However, one must acknowledge that the maneuvering capacity of a small and impoverished country—especially in such a world—is by no means easy. 

About Masis Kürkçügil

A member of the ’68 generation, writer, and publisher.

He completed his secondary education at Feriköy Armenian Middle School and Taksim Atatürk Boys’ High School. He graduated from the Faculty of Economics at Istanbul University. He founded Köz Publications and published the magazine Sürekli Devrim.

He taught Statistics and Economics at the Edirne State Academy of Engineering and Architecture. He served as the history coordinator for the Yurt Encyclopedia. He lived in France as a refugee for six years.

He served on the executive committee of the United Socialist Party (1994–1996). He was among the founders of the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) and served as its deputy chairperson.

He continued his work by publishing the Yeniyol journal and serving as the director of Yazın Publications.

Author of the books “The Boiling Veins of Latin America,” “From Revolution to Revolution: Bolivia,” and “Hugo Chávez and Revolution Within the Revolution.”

Born in İstanbul in 1947. 

Criminal cases, insults and claims of foreign control: Armenia’s pre-election

OC Media
May 15 2026

As the first week of Armenia’s official pre-election campaign period draws to an end, tensions have intensified, with further criminal charges on vote-buying allegations and insulting political rhetoric, including accusations of candidates being governed from abroad.

On Thursday, Armenian authorities announced three separate criminal cases and multiple arrests, two of which were related to alleged vote-buying.

As part of one case, an unclarified number of members and affiliates of former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance members were arrested in Spitak, Lori province.

Authorities alleged that the head of the alliance’s local office provided charitable assistance while a legislative ban on charity activity was in force ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for 7 June. The same individual, together with others, is also accused of having ‘hindered the free exercise of the electoral right of a resident of the same region, which was manifested by the threat of violence against the latter’.

It was the first such criminal case against the Armenia Alliance, which rejected the allegations, calling the case ‘not a legal process, but another cheap attempt to obstruct the normal functioning of our structures’.

The alliance also said that ‘through such methods, the authorities are trying to create an atmosphere of fear’, describing Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government as an ‘authoritarian regime’.

Separately, Armenian police reported that a man was arrested in Yerevan on Wednesday while handing over ֏50,000 ($135) to another person as an alleged electoral bribe. Authorities did not disclose which political party the case was affiliated with.

In another case, Armenian authorities arrested and launched an investigation against one man after he posted an online address on Tuesday containing insults directed at Pashinyan. A criminal case was opened under charges of public speech aimed at inciting or propagating hatred, discrimination, intolerance, or hostility.

Pashinyan orders dismissal of four school principals for letting teachers and students attend Civil Contract rally

On Thursday, Pashinyan praised Armenia’s law enforcement agencies for ‘effectively combating’ electoral bribery.

The following day, as part of a trend over recent months, more arrests of Russian–Armenian tycoon Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia Alliance members or affiliates were reported.

‘Lackey’ rhetoric and claims of external control

Beyond the detentions, Kocharyan, in a heated exchange on Thursday called Pashinyan a ‘lackey’. Pashinyan later used the same term in his response.

Kocharyan claimed that no one in Armenia’s history had previously spoken ‘against [national] identity and the Church’ — ‘Hey [you] lackey, what do you have against it? What is forcing you? In all seriousness, why are you hurting an entire nation? For whom?’, Kocharyan asked.

Armenian Church condemns ruling party programme envisioning removal of Catholicos Karekin II

He went on to suggest that Pashinyan is being externally controlled.

‘My impression is that there is some kind of remote control, and a chip in [Pashinyan’s] head, and that head is being controlled by that remote control from somewhere — not from Armenia for sure. Now, this person, in my view, has become like [Azerbaijani President Ilham] Aliyev’s lapdog’, Kocharyan said.

He further argued that such rhetoric was a response to Pashinyan ‘exceeding the limit’ in his statements.

Earlier on Thursday, Pashinyan stated that Kocharyan should be imprisoned for the bloody crackdown of anti-government protests in March 2008, which occurred while Kocharyan was in office, leaving 10 people dead. In turn, Kocharyan accused Pashinyan of being an ‘instigator and [the] main person responsible’ for those events.

Kocharyan further alleged that with three former Nagorno-Karabakh presidents imprisoned in Azerbaijan, Pashinyan had been instructed, via the ‘remote control’, to imprison a fourth one, Kocharyan, in Armenia.

Before moving to Armenia, Kocharyan served as President of Nagorno-Karabakh from 1994 to 1997.

‘Kocharyan said that the word lackey is accepted in the Civil Contract party. That is correct, because when we talk about him, that is exactly the word we use — lackey’, Pashinyan said in his response via a Facebook video on Thursday evening.

In another video, he challenged Kocharyan to write the word ‘identity’ live on air, in what appeared to be a jab at Kocharyan’s language skills.

Pashinyan and opposition resort to personal insults ahead of elections

‘Western Azerbaijan’ vs Union State

Karapetyan, whose Strong Armenia Alliance is expected to be the main challenger to Pashinyan’s Civil Contract in the upcoming elections, also claimed on Thursday that Armenian border villages have been depopulated due to demographic trends. He further alleged that 300,000 Azerbaijanis would be settled in Armenia in the event of Pashinyan’s re-election.

The claim of the Azerbaijani settlement in Armenia has become a recurring talking point among Karapetyan and other opposition figures. In turn, Pashinyan has dismissed the allegations, calling them a ‘lie’.

‘Such an issue has never been on our agenda with Azerbaijan, nor on our broader international agenda. These people are now spending millions of dollars to create and inject this agenda into the political life of the Republic of Armenia. Only foreign spies operate in this way’, Pashinyan said on Friday.

Aside from the politicians’ statements, AI-generated videos have also circulated online, including claims that under Pashinyan’s re-election, Armenia would become ‘Western Azerbaijan’, or under opposition rule, Armenia would enter a ‘union state’ with Russia and Belarus.

In recent years, Azerbaijan has launched a campaign centred around the concept of ‘Western Azerbaijan’ — a term that refers not to its own territory, but to some, or all of the Republic of Armenia.

EXCLUSIVE: Azerbaijan’s ‘Western Azerbaijan’ campaign exposed in leaked documents

For ease of reading, we choose not to use qualifiers such as ‘de facto’, ‘unrecognised’, or ‘partially recognised’ when discussing institutions or political positions within Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia. This does not imply a position on their status.

https://oc-media.org/criminal-cases-insults-and-claims-of-foreign-control-armenias-pre-election-campaign-heats-up/