‘You have to be ready for war’: Legacy of limbo in Armenia after loss of Nago

Irish Times
May 17 2026

‘You have to be ready for war’: Legacy of limbo in Armenia after loss of Nagorno-Karabakh

A lightning quick offensive in 2023 saw Azerbaijan take control of the disputed region in a devastating blow to Armenia

Jack Power in Yerevan, Armenia

There’s a thick smell of incense in the air. It’s a Sunday morning and grieving mothers and fathers are bringing fresh flowers to the graves of sons who were killed in Armenia’s 35-year conflict with Azerbaijan.

In Yerablur military cemetery, high above the Armenian capital city, Yerevan, the dates on the headstones chart a history of the fighting for the disputed mountainous region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Rows and rows of Armenian soldiers killed during the first war, which lasted from 1988 to 1994, are buried here one after the other.

Walk on a little farther and you begin to pass all the graves of the men who died during a 44-day war launched by Azerbaijan in 2020.

A final, lightning quick offensive from Azerbaijan in 2023 took control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, a devastating blow to Armenia, which forced 100,000 ethnic Armenians living in the enclave to flee their homes, possibly never to return.

One mother, Albina, explains how her 19-year-old son was killed by a grenade in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020. “This is my son,” she says, resting her hand on the tombstone and wiping away tears. He was the youngest of three boys. “Every day we come to Yerablur,” she says.

The long uphill road to the military cemetery is called the Alley of Glory. Nearly all the tombstones include large pictures of the deceased in military uniform. Some show the soldiers holding Kalashnikovs or other rifles.

There are a lot of young faces. Above them flutter Armenian flags flying from tall poles posted beside every second or third grave.

Two brothers, both born in 1994, are buried in one plot together. The first was killed in the 2020 war and the other in 2023.

Nearby a father slowly unpacks a red plastic shopping bag, taking out a brush to clean the grave of his son, a casualty in 2020. “Nineteen years old,” he says, shaking his head.

Lots of the graves have small stands where families can burn incense when they visit. The father pulls out a small blowtorch to light some, before he begins carefully cleaning the headstone.

A priest – Armenia is a predominantly Christian country – is leading a large group in prayer.

One elderly couple is tending to the grave of their son who was killed in the first war three decades ago. He was 25 years old.

His mother takes a trowel to a flower bed that borders the plot, while his father sweeps away stray leaves. They spend the entire afternoon here.

A landlocked country of about three million people, Armenia is bordered by oil-rich Azerbaijan to the east, and another old foe, Turkey, to the west.

It’s a cloudy day but you can still make out the snow on Mount Ararat, the huge mountain that dominates the southwestern skyline beyond the Armenian capital.

Symbolically important to Armenians, the mountain lies in present-day Turkey, a daily reminder of the country’s history as a small piece on the geopolitical chessboard of the South Caucasus.

The territory was ceded in a 1920 treaty negotiated by Moscow that settled the borders of the republic of Turkey and the three then-Soviet republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

When the Soviet Union began to break up, rising tensions between Armenian and Azerbaijani communities led to the first Nagorno-Karabakh war.

A push to unify Armenia and the large population of ethnic Armenians in the border region, internationally recognised as Azerbaijan, unleashed a surge in ethnic violence in the late 1980s that escalated into a vicious years-long conflict between the neighbouring countries.

Armenian forces successfully established control of the enclave and several surrounding Azerbaijan districts before Russia brokered a ceasefire in 1994.

Hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Azerbaijanis were displaced from their homes, and forces on both sides were accused of committing atrocities and massacres.

Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh set up a self-declared breakaway republic, Artsakh, which governed the enclave until 2023.

The uneasy ceasefire was tested at times by clashes and skirmishes, including four days of fighting in 2016, until an attack by Azerbaijan in September 2020 saw the resumption of full-scale hostilities.

“In 2020, when the war started, we had our place in the line and we went there,” says Harut Mnatsakanyan (33), who fought in a local unit assisting the Armenian army, alongside his older brother.

“I was born in 1992 during the first Artsakh war, so all my father’s generation was fighting,” he says. “I was married in 2016 and in 2020 I had two children when they started the war,” he says.

Mnatsakanyan, a political science graduate, had worked as a senior official in a regional province in the unrecognised Artsakh administration.

When he was 18 he completed two years of mandatory military service so he knew how to fight.

His unit was initially posted to a northern part of the front line, but was soon redeployed to the Shushi region where the fighting was heavier. “It was the most difficult part of the war,” he explains. “We did what we needed to do.”

Azerbaijan, with the support of Turkey, utilised a technological advantage on the battlefield to devastating effect, deploying waves of killer drones to push Armenian and local Artsakh forces backwards and reclaim a lot of territory lost in 1992.

“We lost people, too many,” Mnatsakanyan says. “I lost my own brother.”

His brother, Gurgen, had left cover to help two wounded Armenian soldiers. “After five minutes he hadn’t come back,” Mnatsakanyan recalls.

So he went out after him. He found his brother, shot in the side, near the two other soldiers he had run out to help.

“It was a difficult position, so nobody, and especially not an ambulance, could come,” he says. “I say: it’s my own brother. I have to save him.

“He couldn’t breathe, the blood was coming into his lungs … I could not stop the bleeding. So I dragged him, something like 800 metres, maybe one kilometre”.

Mnatsakanyan managed to help his brother into the back of a military jeep. “Before we got him to the hospital we lost him. He was 30 years old, married with two children,” he says. “We lost many people that day.

“It’s not a time to cry, it’s no time for emotion, or to grieve. You have to fight for you, for your country and for your friends,” he says.

After Azeri forces captured the strategically important city of Shushi, a ceasefire was negotiated by Russia, which committed to station peacekeepers in the region to guarantee the truce.

On the final day of the war Mnatsakanyan’s unit captured two Azerbaijani troops. “The other soldiers wanted to kill them, but we didn’t let them, because I think that you have the time for war, and also we have the time for life, for peace,” he says.

When he returned home after the war, the grief properly hit. “You don’t understand many things in the moment,” he says.

He thinks about his brother’s children who had lost their father and feels responsible. “I called him and asked him to join our group … My mother tells me that he’s your big brother and it was his decision to fight,” he says.

“Every day of course you remember him. I remember when I was small and he’d take me on his bicycle and go around our home, how we would swim together, play together. There’s not a day when it isn’t difficult,” Mnatsakanyan says.

“We cannot take flowers to his grave, his body is buried in Nagorno-Karabakh.”

In September 2023, after blocking off a land route bringing supplies from Armenia to the enclave, Azerbaijan launched another attack.

The offensive swept across the region, forcing the surrender and collapse of the Artsakh administration in a matter of days. The entire population of 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled, turning entire cities and villages into ghost towns.

“It is very painful,” says Irina Arakelyan, a refugee from Nagorno-Karabakh who has settled in Yerevan.

It was difficult to come to terms with the reality she might never be able to go back. “Accepting that fact, it would mean death,” she says.

A cultural centre in Yerevan run by an artist, Lilit Melikyan, turned into a muster point for arriving refugees.

Sitting in a workshop filled with traditional Armenian dresses, scarves and ceramic pots, Melikyan says the small centre had opened its doors to an earlier wave of refugees during the 2020 war. “There were a lot of people fleeing Artsakh overnight, 170 families appeared at the door asking, asking for help,” she says.

Volunteers collected and sorted donations of clothes for the women and children. “All these people … They were in their slippers and pyjamas,” she says.

A call went out across Armenia’s huge diaspora network in Russia, Europe and elsewhere asking relatives and friends to donate what funds they could to help.

The centre put on classes teaching embroidery, design, knitting and craftwork. “I’ll give you clothes or food [and] it’s enough for you for a day or two, but when you are given a skill it provides a way for you to make a living,” she says.

The vast majority of the previous wave of refugees had returned to Nagorno-Karabakh when the 2020 ceasefire bedded down.

But Melikyan realised after Azerbaijan’s absolute victory in 2023, there was little prospect of the hundred thousand displaced refugees seeing their homes again.

“We provided accommodation for families and then immediately, from the next day we started offering training,” she says. “We understood there will be no way back.”

“I don’t see any possibility of return,” says Tigran Grigoryan, who runs the Regional Center for Democracy and Security think tank.

“I think most of them do understand that it’s not possible to go back … The only realistic and reasonable scenario is to help people integrate in Armenia,” he says.

Speaking from a small basement office in Yerevan, Grigoryan, who is from Nagorno-Karabakh himself, describes the current truce as a “victor’s peace” weighted to favour Azerbaijan.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine created a “power vacuum” in the South Caucasus that Azerbaijan successfully took advantage of, he says.

Grigoryan, who served on Armenia’s national security council, says the failure of Russian peacekeepers to intervene during the 2023 offensive did lasting damage to ordinary Armenians’ trust in Russia, their old ally. “Azerbaijan chose the timing very, very well,” he says.

Since then things have shifted towards diplomatic and political channels.

Last August there was a real breakthrough that optimists hoped might finally draw a line under the 35-year conflict and normalise Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s authoritarian president Ilham Aliyev signed a joint declaration in the White House, at the urging of US president Donald Trump, billed as a precursor to a peace agreement.

“Nine months later, few are as happy,” says Benyamin Poghosyan, a senior researcher at the Applied Policy Research Institute in Armenia. The two countries had entered a sort of “no peace, no war” holding pattern, he says.

Azerbaijan wants Armenia to make certain changes to its constitution before Baku signs a peace deal.

Pashinyan appears willing to make constitutional amendments, though that hinges on him returning to government with a large majority following elections next month.

“If I would go to Las Vegas and bet, I would bet that probably this ‘no war, no peace’ situation will continue at least for one, two years probably,” Poghosyan says.

“There will be no peace agreement signed and ratified, probably there will be no border openings between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Armenia and Turkey,” he says. That would leave things in a precarious, perhaps volatile, situation, says the analyst.

Below all that high politics, Mnatsakanyan is trying to build a new life in Yerevan with his wife and four young daughters.

“The two big sisters, they remember Artsakh,” he says. “I don’t want to traumatise them, but when they ask something, we show and tell them,” the former soldier says.

What does he think about the chances for a peace that lasts? “We can resolve the problem without war, but I think you have to be ready for the war, if you want the peace, you have to be ready for war”.


Early Ties with Asia Minor — Plans for a Hungarian–Armenian Alliance in 1218

Hungarian Conservative
May 17 2026

hen we think of Hungarian–Armenian relations, we tend to think primarily of the Armenians who settled in historical Hungary, particularly in Transylvania, since the 17th century. Yet these ties date back to the Middle Ages. On the occasion of the 2022 anniversary of the Golden Bull—one of the most important documents of Hungary’s historical constitution—there was much discussion of King Andrew II’s crusade.

In 1217 he became the only Hungarian monarch to lead a crusade to the Holy Land, from which he returned in early 1218.[1] Ahead of his army, the king travelled to Tripoli at the end of 1217 for a family event—specifically, the wedding of Bohemond IV, Prince of Antioch (1201–1216, 1219–1233), and Melisende, sister of King Hugh of Cyprus (r. 1205–1218). Andrew’s family ties entitled him to make this visit, as he was a cousin of the Prince of Antioch; Andrew’s mother, Agnès d’Antioch, was the daughter of the well-known crusader leader Renaud de Châtillon and Constance of Antioch.

It cannot be ruled out that King Andrew travelled by ship from Antioch to an Armenian port, and from there to Tarsus, the birthplace of the Apostle Paul, or perhaps further on to Sis, the capital of the Armenian Kingdom. The Crusader army certainly reached Cilicia—that is, Lesser Armenia—by land.

In the Middle Ages, there were in fact two Armenias: in addition to the territory known today, Armenian principalities began to emerge by the 1070s in the southeastern coastal region of present-day Türkiye, in the area of ancient Cilicia. From these, Prince Ruben (r. 1080–1095), founder of the Rubenid Dynasty, established Lesser Armenia, which lasted until 1375.

On his return journey from the Holy Land, the Hungarian king engaged in a remarkable amount of diplomatic activity. He behaved as one would expect from the head of a European middle power: he held talks with the leaders of the states he passed through, formed alliances, and forged diplomatic ties. His plan may also have been encouraged by the political détente among the countries of the region—the Latin Empire of Constantinople, Orthodox Byzantine Nicaea, and the Seljuk capital, Konya. As a result, from 1213/14 onward, the overland route through Asia Minor reopened and became safe.

‘[The Hungarian king] behaved as one would expect from the head of a European middle power’

In the Armenian city of Tarsus (today’s Mersin, Türkiye), King Andrew betrothed the only child of King Leo of Armenia (Levon the Magnificent I of Metsagorts, r. 1187–1219), Isabella (Zabel, 1215–1252), to his son, Prince Andrew (1210/12–1234). The bride’s lineage must have been attractive; Isabella’s mother was the daughter of the King of Cyprus and the Queen of Jerusalem.

Coins of King Leo I of Armenia PHOTO: Wikipedia

To this day, Hungarian historians remain baffled by the fact of the engagement. Most attribute this to the Hungarian king’s recklessness and haste, finding no serious motive behind the marriage plan.

In reality, by the early 13th century, the Kingdom of Armenia—which had become independent from the Byzantine Empire—had emerged as a significant factor on the political map of the Middle East and Asia Minor.[2] On the throne sat Leo, the kingdom’s founder, who by the 13th century had turned his country into a major hub of international trade, with its ports visited by both Venetian and Genoese ships.

Leo took advantage of the country’s exceptional geostrategic position: to the West, it served as the gateway to the Middle East. Leo consciously integrated Western, Frankish-style elements into his government and drew closer to the Latin kingdoms of the Holy Land. His soldiers were present at the siege of Acre and assisted King Richard the Lionheart of England in the conquest of Cyprus.

Frankish culture exerted a significant influence on Armenian secular society, though it is difficult to assess the extent and effectiveness of its reception. Leo remained tolerant toward the Latin Christian Church and even formally accepted the union with the Church. The Armenian prince requested a crown from the German emperor, whereupon in 1197 the imperial chancellor brought two crowns, one for the Cypriot ruler Aimery and the other for Leo.

‘Leo took advantage of the country’s exceptional geostrategic position: to the West, it served as the gateway to the Middle East’

Leo was crowned within the framework of a great ceremony on 6 January 1198, in the Cathedral of Saint Sophia in Tarsus—now the Great Mosque—in the presence of the Syrian Jacobite Patriarch and the Greek Metropolitan of Tarsus. The church became the site of the coronations of Armenian kings. For the ceremony, Nerses of Lambron, Archbishop of Tarsus, translated the Latin coronation liturgy into Armenian.

A unique ceremony took place, as while Leo was crowned and anointed with holy oil by Catholicos Gregory VI, head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the imperial regalia were presented on behalf of the emperor by Archbishop Konrad of Mainz, German Archchancellor and papal legate. At the same time, Leo was also crowned with a crown sent by the Byzantine Emperor Alexios III Angelos, which only served to reinforce the prestige of the new kingdom. With this act, the third Latin kingdom in the Holy Land was established, alongside Jerusalem and Cyprus.[3]

It is no coincidence that the Hungarian Holy Crown is often cited as a parallel to the dual Armenian coronation; King Béla III of Hungary had transformed it into its present form a few years earlier—perhaps as early as 1182—on the occasion of his son’s first coronation. At that time, an 11th-century Byzantine crown with Greek inscriptions, which was in the Hungarian treasury, was supplemented with crown bands bearing Latin inscriptions, the so-called Latin Crown.[4] The motivation in Hungary may have been the same as in Armenia: in territories bordering the Byzantine Empire, such a crown could signify legitimacy and, in the event of a weakening of Byzantine power, provide a legal basis for independence.

The main problem during Leo’s reign was the issue of succession to the Principality of Antioch. Raymond-Roupen, the son of Raymond of Antioch and Alice of Armenia and Leo’s nephew, was crowned ruler of Antioch in 1216, but was driven from the throne three years later, thwarting the Armenians’ plan to extend their power to Antioch. The war of succession, which began in 1201 following the death of Bohemond III, Prince of Antioch, lasted for nearly a quarter of a century.

Leo the Magnificent of Armenia PHOTO: Wikipedia

Leo was a shrewd politician who formed marital alliances with numerous rulers. Through his second marriage, he became the son-in-law of Aimery, King of Cyprus; his daughter from his first marriage, Rita (Stephanie of Armenia), married John of Brienne, King of Jerusalem; and his niece, Philippa, married Theodore I Laskaris, Emperor of Nicaea, though she was sent home in 1216. Leo won the friendship and support of both the Knights Hospitaller and the Teutonic Knights by granting them significant territories.

Thus, King Andrew arrived in Armenia just at the perfect time, as his kinship with the princes of Antioch—and, through them, with the Armenian dynasty—fit perfectly into King Leo’s plans. Moreover, Andrew was related to both the former Emperor of Constantinople and the current Latin Emperor. Leo rightly counted on the diplomatic support of the highly respected Hungarian king. This was facilitated by the fact that he had made his daughter his sole heir, which was made possible by Armenian canon law, which allowed for the transfer of royal power also to a female heir in the absence of a male heir.

King Andrew, of course, may have miscalculated and been overly impressed by the wealth and cultural vibrancy of the Kingdom of Cilicia. In preparation for the marriage, Andrew was likely accompanied by Armenians on the overland route he chose for his return journey, led by Chamberlain Jocelyn. Andrew could not have foreseen that Leo would die a year later, in 1219, which would cause serious domestic political instability. As a result, the Hungarian–Armenian marriage never took place, and Prince Andrew never made it to Armenia.

Leo’s daughter, Isabella, was subsequently given in marriage to Philip, son of Bohemond IV, Prince of Antioch, but their joint reign lasted only a short time. Philip not only looked down on Armenian church rituals, but his favouritism toward Latin nobles also outraged the Armenian nobility. Philip was stripped of his throne by the nobles, imprisoned, and died in captivity, perhaps as a result of poisoning. It is possible that the same fate would have befallen the Hungarian prince as well.

‘The Hungarian Armenian marriage never took place, and Prince Andrew never made it to Armenia’

Andrew likely envisioned a Hungarian empire, an ‘archiregnum Hungariae’, which would, above all, establish a strong, closely knit confederation in the Balkans and Asia Minor. We do not view the king’s 1219 letter to the pope as a pitiful explanation or defence at all, but rather as a boast. According to this, King Andrew boasted that everyone from Armenia to Bulgaria was his relative, and that even the Seljuk sultan was not averse to a dynastic alliance and baptism. As he writes:

Even if we returned against our will out of better judgment, during our fortunate return journey, we did no less good for the Holy Land than if we had remained around Jerusalem. For Leo, the renowned king of Armenia, wishing to gain greater strength through the union of our peoples to break the constant attacks of the neighbouring Turks, gave his daughter in marriage to our son…

One argument in favour of the plan’s deliberate nature is that, as he continued his journey, Andrew married Maria (Maria Laskarina, 1206–1270), the daughter of Theodore I Laskaris, the Greek Emperor of Nicaea (r. 1205–1221), to his son Béla (later King Béla IV), and betrothed Maria’s daughter to the Bulgarian Tsar Ivan Asen (r. 1218–1241). Apart from the Armenian betrothal, the marriages were consummated, and the Bulgarian wedding took place in 1221.

The king’s aforementioned letter to the pope reveals that the Hungarian king planned to marry his niece to the Seljuk Sultan Kaykaus I of Rum (r. 1211–1220). In the letter, Andrew wrote that ‘during our mission, the Seljuk sultan of Iconium [that is, Kaykaus I] also sent us an envoy, who said that if any of our daughters or relatives were to marry him, he would renounce his unbelief, convert to Christianity, and be baptized.’ This may be an exaggeration, but it is a fact that the sultan indeed reached out to the Crusaders, and in 1218, he even attacked the Ayyubid territories in Syria.

The Hungarian policy of ‘opening to the East’ around 1200 may have been the legacy of King Béla III, who was raised in Byzantium during his youth, as symbolized by the Holy Crown, which was assembled from Greek and Latin components. Among King Béla’s sons, Emeric (r. 1196–1204) assumed the title of King of Serbia in 1201, and as Prince Andrew, he took the title of King of Galicia and Volhynia in 1205. From the 1250s onward, Andrew’s son, Béla IV, styled himself King of Bulgaria.

The Habsburg rulers then held these titles until the end of World War I. King Andrew, of course, could not have known about the approaching Mongol armies, which not only reached Hungary by 1241 but also made Armenia a Mongol vassal in the 1240s. In fact, it was the Mongols who ruined Andrew II’s diplomatic masterpiece.


[1] Pál Engel, The Realm of St Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary 895–1526, London, 2001, p. 91.

[2] Mack Chahin, The Kingdom of Armenia: A History, London-New York, 2013, chapter 2/3.

[3] Ioanna Rapti, ‘Featuring the King: Rituals of Coronation and Burial in the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia’, in Alexander Beihammer, Stavroula Constantinou, and Maria Parani (eds), Court Ceremonies and Rituals of Power in Byzantium and the Medieval Mediterranean, Leiden, 2013, pp. 291–335.

[4] Endre Tóth, The Hungarian Holy Crown and the Coronation Regalia, Budapest, 2021.


‘On his return journey from the Holy Land, [King Andrew II] engaged in a remarkable amount of diplomatic activity. He behaved as one would expect from the head of a European middle power: he held talks with the leaders of the states he passed through, formed alliances, and forged diplomatic ties…As a result, from 1213/14 onward, the overland route through Asia Minor reopened and became safe.’

 

 

 

 

 

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The second Session of the Vietnam-Armenia Intergovernmental committee and Rela

May 17 2026

From May 14 to 15, 2026, Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Phan Thi Thang led a Vietnamese delegation to attend the second session of the Vietnam-Armenia Intergovernmental Committee on Economic, Trade, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, along with related sideline events, in Yerevan.

On May 15, 2026, in Armenia, Deputy Minister Phan Thi Thang and Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan co-chaired the plenary session of the second meeting of the Vietnam – Armenia Intergovernmental Committee on Economic, Trade, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation.

The Vietnamese delegation included representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Health; leaders of several units under the Ministry of Industry and Trade; the Vietnamese Trade Counsellor in Russia concurrently accredited to Armenia. 

The Armenian side included the Deputy Minister of High-Tech Industry, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Armenia to Vietnam, and representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Economy, Finance, High-Tech Industry, Health, Education, Science, Culture and Sports, and Internal Affairs.

The second session of the Vietnam-Armenia Intergovernmental Committee took place nine years after the first meeting held in 2017. Both sides assessed that the second session plays a particularly important role in opening up cooperation opportunities in trade, investment, economy, construction, healthcare, and many other fields of mutual interest.

In his opening remarks, Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan stated that political and diplomatic relations between Vietnam and Armenia have developed very positively and hold strong prospects for the future. He emphasized that the bilateral intergovernmental cooperation mechanism and the Free Trade Agreement between Vietnam and the Eurasian Economic Union (VN-EAEU FTA), of which Armenia is a member, will serve as an important foundation for the two countries to promote comprehensive cooperation and achieve broader goals set by their governments and peoples.

Deputy Minister Phan Thi Thang expressed sincere appreciation for the thoughtful preparations and warm hospitality extended by the Armenian side to the Vietnamese delegation. She noted that ahead of the meeting, the Vietnamese government delegation had held meetings and working sessions with Armenian agencies, leaving the delegation with highly favorable impressions of Armenia’s people, investment environment, and development potential.

During the session, both sides conducted a comprehensive review of the implementation of bilateral cooperation activities in recent years. Against the backdrop of steadily developing political and diplomatic ties, bilateral trade turnover between 2021 and 2025 increased more than 50-fold, from USD 11 million in 2021 to USD 564 million in 2025. 

In particular, the VN-EAEU FTA, signed on May 29, 2015 and entering into force on October 5, 2016, has created strong momentum for trade cooperation between Vietnam and the Eurasian Economic Union in general, and between Vietnam and Armenia in particular.

However, both sides acknowledged that bilateral economic and trade cooperation, despite positive progress, still falls short of the countries’ potential, needs, and strong bilateral relations. Bilateral trade currently accounts for only 1.6% of Armenia’s total import-export turnover and 0.06% of Vietnam’s. The main reasons include limited mutual understanding among businesses and high transportation and logistics costs. Both sides agreed that, for Vietnam, Armenia is not merely a market of three million people but also a gateway to the EAEU market and neighboring countries. For Armenia, Vietnam serves as a gateway for Armenian enterprises to access ASEAN markets and other markets linked through Vietnam’s free trade agreements.

In addition to traditional areas of cooperation, the two sides exchanged views on new cooperation orientations in fields of mutual interest, including industry, agriculture, transport, defense, science, information technology, healthcare, culture, sports, tourism, education, and training. Notably, the two sides also discussed emerging areas aligned with global trends aimed at enhancing national competitiveness and integration into global supply chains, such as artificial intelligence and innovation. Expanding the scope of bilateral cooperation, they noted, would help boost the economic scale of both countries while contributing to a more balanced trade relationship.

At the session, Deputy Minister Phan Thi Thang proposed that the two sides align cooperation orientations by leveraging one side’s strengths and the other’s needs and aspirations, focusing on several key areas.

First, both sides should promote exchanges of delegations at all levels to strengthen connectivity and support businesses in sectors where the two economies have complementary strengths.

Second, the two countries should continue coordinating closely to effectively implement the VN-EAEU FTA and address obstacles arising during the agreement’s implementation in order to maximize its benefits.

Third, the two sides should facilitate market access for key agricultural products of both countries.

Fourth, cooperation in science and technology should be enhanced, particularly in information technology, innovation, digital transformation, and artificial intelligence, sectors where Armenia has strengths and Vietnam has strong development demand. The Vietnamese side also expressed strong interest in cooperating to establish innovation technology centers in Vietnam based on Armenia’s renowned TUMO Center for Creative Technologies model.

Fifth, in education and training, a traditional and effective area of cooperation between the two countries for many years, both sides expressed interest in effectively implementing the education cooperation agreement signed in 2019, considering the signing of an agreement on mutual recognition of diplomas, and strengthening exchanges of lecturers and students.

Sixth, the two countries should intensify the organization of cultural and artistic activities on the occasion of major national celebrations in order to strengthen people-to-people exchanges.

At the conclusion of the session, Deputy Minister Phan Thi Thang and Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan signed the minutes of the second session of the Vietnam-Armenia Intergovernmental Committee on Economic, Trade, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation in the presence of representatives from ministries and agencies of both countries, as well as Armenian media organizations.

Earlier, on May 14, 2026, Deputy Minister Phan Thi Thang held meetings with Babken Tunyan and Arman Khojoyan.

During the meetings, both sides assessed that Vietnam – Armenia relations have recorded positive developments since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1992. The two countries have built a relationship of political trust through exchanges and high-level visits, notably the official visit to Vietnam by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in 2019, the official visit to Vietnam by Armenian National Assembly Speaker Alen Simonyan in November 2024, and the visit to Armenia by Chairman of the Vietnamese National Assembly Tran Thanh Man in April 2025. These visits were seen as clear evidence of the determination of the two countries’ senior leaders to elevate bilateral relations to a new level. The two countries have also maintained close coordination and mutual support at international forums.

Leaders of Armenian agencies and ministries affirmed their commitment to actively coordinating and supporting the implementation of measures aimed at enhancing economic, trade, investment, and scientific-technical cooperation in a practical and effective manner, commensurate with the longstanding traditional friendship between the two countries.

Pashinyan says Armenia does not need external guarantors for peace with Azerba

Politics15:33, 16 May 2026
Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said he does not see the need for an external guarantor mechanism to ensure the peace established between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Speaking during an election campaign event in Yerevan, Pashinyan, the leader of the Civil Contract party, argued that past reliance on security guarantors and formal defense arrangements had proven unreliable.

“Today there are political forces saying that we should have guarantors. We have lived in such a system, when we had a de jure binding legal contractual framework, when we had security guarantors who were supposed to ensure our security. But one of those security guarantors, in fact, made a very open and transparent statement while on an official visit to Baku—I am referring to the President of Belarus—saying that he participated in the preparatory work for the 44-day war. That person was one of our security guarantors, a member of the CSTO. And to keep stepping on the same rake every time is simply unacceptable. Ultimately, we must overcome the cycle in which we allow others to use us against others and then discard us,” Pashinyan said, adding that this is the most important historical-political change.

Published by Armenpress, original at 

Pashinyan outlines government stance on border delimitation, refugee issues

Politics16:31, 16 May 2026
Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has reiterated his administration’s policy regarding the delimitation process with Azerbaijan as well as matters pertaining to refugees.

Speaking at a campaign event for the Civil Contract party, Pashinyan was asked by a citizen about the issue of the so-called enclaves.

“We ourselves have an issue—Artsvashen is sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia, and we cannot renounce it; we cannot say that Artsvashen does not exist. As a result of delimitation, we must find solutions for what we are going to do. The conflict has been overcome; now, as a result of delimitation, we must address its final consequences. We have recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan on the same basis on which they have recognized our territorial integrity,” Pashinyan said.

Pashinyan also addressed a citizen’s question regarding the return of refugees.

“As much as we talk about refugees from Baku, Karabakh, Sumgait, Nakhchivan , and so on, the essence of the strategic deal is this: the two countries focus on their internationally recognized territories, the people of Karabakh settle here, and our other refugee brothers and sisters settle here, and we focus on the Republic of Armenia, closing the pages of the logic of being a wanderer, a migrant. The same applies to Azerbaijan,” Pashinyan said.

Pashinyan is leading the ruling Civil Contract party in the June 7 parliamentary elections.

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Deputy FM, CoE Human Rights Commissioner discuss Armenia’s democratic reforms,

Politics17:04, 16 May 2026
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Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Abisoghomonyan met with Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe Michael O’Flaherty on the margins of the 135th Session of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE.

According to a readout issued by the foreign ministry, the parties praised the effective cooperation between Armenia and the Council of Europe.

The Deputy Foreign Minister reaffirmed Armenia’s commitment to implementing an ambitious agenda of democratic reforms and presented the steps being undertaken by the Armenian government, including in the field of human rights protection.

The parties also touched upon programs aimed at addressing the long-term needs of Armenian refugees from Karabakh, emphasizing in this context the importance of ensuring their continuity.

Views were also exchanged on the latest regional developments. The need for further institutionalization of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan was underscored, along with the importance of addressing existing humanitarian issues.

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Armenpress: Armenian Deputy FM stresses democratic reforms, election integrity

Politics17:30, 16 May 2026
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At the 135th session of the Committee of Ministers in Chișinău, Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Robert Abisoghomonyan said the Council of Europe must strengthen its capacity to address emerging threats, enhance early response mechanisms, and support member states in implementing ongoing democratic reforms.

He noted that the meeting is taking place at a time when democracies are facing serious challenges, including in societies where democratic norms had long been considered irreversible.

“These discussions are especially relevant for Armenia as we continue advancing democratic reforms and deepening cooperation with our European partners,” Robert Abisoghomonyan said. He noted that just 10 days earlier, Yerevan hosted the European Political Community Summit and the first-ever Armenia-EU Summit, describing them as important milestones in strengthening Armenia’s partnership with the European Union based on shared democratic values and reforms. He also praised the active participation of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe in the events held in Yerevan, including remarks delivered alongside the Prime Minister of Armenia and the President of France at the opening of the Yerevan Dialogue conference.

Deputy FM Abisoghomonyan noted that parliamentary elections will be held in Armenia on June 7, adding that the country is approaching the process with a full commitment to democratic standards by ensuring transparency, pluralism, and the free _expression_ of the will of citizens.

“However, we must be honest about the dangers facing us,” Abisoghomonyan said, warning that foreign interference, disinformation campaigns, and systematic manipulation of the information space directly undermine democratic institutions and public trust. He stressed that these threats are real, targeted, and ongoing, adding that no democracy today is immune to coordinated attempts to distort public debate and weaken confidence in institutions.

In this context, he said, the adopted decision on foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is particularly relevant and timely.

“Fully aware of these challenges, the Armenian government remains committed to conducting the electoral process in line with our obligations and democratic standards, and we will take all necessary measures to safeguard the integrity of the elections,” he said.

According to Abisoghomonyan, peace and stability in the region remain among Armenia’s top priorities.

“In this context, we welcome the recognition by the Committee of Ministers of the peace established in our region following the meeting held in Washington on August 8, 2025, and emphasize the importance of further strengthening and institutionalizing it,” he said.

Abisoghomonyan noted that the process requires continued efforts aimed at building trust, including by addressing humanitarian issues, ensuring regional connectivity, promoting dialogue, and establishing predictable and lasting stability in the region. He also thanked Moldova’s presidency for its work.

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Verelq: Lies are the only program thesis, Aliyev’s support is the only supporter

This government is losing before everyone’s eyes. In Yerevan, Gyumri, Vanadzor, all marzes, villages. The government does not have the support of any social class. Even the effect of pre-election health insurance is weakening.
 
The government has nothing to offer the people, the society, the voters. No plan, no project. It is only a threat and an insult. Armenia has never had such unspeakable power. Even in 2021, they were still saying something: de-occupation of Artsakh, self-determination, etc., although later they did the complete opposite. In 2021, at least they cheated on love, now they don’t even have the desire to do so.

Lies are the only program thesis, Aliyev’s support is the only supporter.

In just the first week of the campaign, this picture becomes obvious. In the 2-3 weeks, this situation will become more visible to everyone, and the “neutral-observer” voter will take the side of the 3-4 transitory forces of the opposition.
 
The opposition has several simple problems. increase the targeted dialogue with different layers of society, explain the risks and present their own plans to neutralize them. And of course, one should not make obvious gross mistakes.
 
The government does not have the resources to strengthen itself. Objectively, it does not have. He can insult harder, threaten harder, but it is not clear at what expense he can strengthen his position. If he goes to gross violations or prohibitions against any of the forces, it will make the situation worse. Of course, he still has the Moldovan, Romanian, or Nicolaian scenario in mind.
 
Everyone is preparing for a good change
 
The mechanism of election fraud and abuse of administrative and power resources is still working with great momentum, creating the technical conditions for falsifying the elections in front of everyone. Schools swept away by rallies, tired employees of state and community structures, small-scale public servants devoted to the propaganda of the authorities with all their might, “favors” done to voters at the expense of the state budget and state debt. In the next 1-2 weeks, the news and atmosphere of the changes will also reach them. The collective opposition will contribute to this inevitable process with its restraint and confidence.
 
The last temptation of the power that sees its defeat can be the unbridled use of the force component. And that is where it is important for the officials of the power structures to understand that they will personally pay the price for such expensive services rendered to the outgoing authorities, spoiling the precious years of their lives. And it is worth thinking carefully before making illegal orders, because they will be the last orders of these authorities.
 
At the last stage, of course, the security forces will also see that the process of formation of a new solid government is taking place in Armenia at the most peaceful, most legal and most important moment.
 
Vahe Hovhannisyan




Verelq: What is the law for Nikol Pashinyan?

So, the Prime Minister of Armenia actually “distributes” driver’s license according to the logic of de facto election bribery. In order to get the votes of those who have been deprived of driving license, Nikol Pashinyan initiates some option where a person can restore the right without an examination. The law in Armenia requires examination, but for Nikol Pashinyan, what is the law, or what is changing the law?


Let me repeat, we live in a hybrid authoritarianism regime, which in the event of Pashinyan’s victory in the parliamentary elections, will quickly turn into classical authoritarianism.


Moreover, it is not just a question of inclinations. It is only under these conditions that Nikol Pashinyan can smoothly realize everything that constitutes the framework of Azerbaijan’s demands towards Armenia and Nikol Pashinyan’s political commitment to its implementation. Nikol Pashinyan should replace everything with his words in order to be able to fulfill that commitment.


Analyst Hakob Badalyan




CC: Pashinyan Refuses to Cut Cake in shape of Armenia