Among the many unintended consequences of President Donald Trump’s disastrous decision to launch a war on Iran is the delaying of the so-called Caucasus Corridor, known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). The project was supposed to bring peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have been at war on and off for nearly 40 years.
This may turn out to be a blessing in disguise. In a region where Western-backed megaprojects have become major targets for Iranian attacks, abandoning the corridor may have been the best thing that could happen to Armenia.
The project in question — a transportation link through southern Armenia to the Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchevan and Turkey – was hailed as a decisive geopolitical break of the South Caucasus with Russian and Iranian influence. Pundits flattered Trump’s ego by promoting it as a stepping stone for the Nobel Peace Prize for the American president.
There has been reason for skepticism about these claims from the start. Last year, I argued in these pages that “peace requires more than diplomatic theater; it demands difficult compromises that have so far been absent. Until then, the promise of stability remains a mirage.”
Indeed, reality proved far messier than Trump’s vanity play. The signing ceremony in the White House in August 2025, involving Trump and the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, did not usher in a peace agreement. Talks stalled as Azerbaijan insisted on changes to the Armenian constitution that would formally and permanently forsake Armenia’s claims on Nagorno-Karabakh, a region largely populated by ethnic Armenians prior to an Azerbaijani military campaign in 2023.
The corridor, meanwhile, has increasingly drifted into irrelevance. The agreement stipulated that the corridor would be managed by a joint Armenian-American company based in Armenia. But the company was never established, and the contract was never signed. Consequently, all the other building blocks – funding, security, cross-border and transit modalities – were never put in place.
Now, with the war on Iran consuming the Trump administration’s bandwidth, the project languishes. “Obviously, TRIPP isn’t a high priority with the U.S. administration, at least today,” Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan admitted in March. “Unfortunately, there is a high probability that this will affect the time frame.”
But here’s the rub: the project’s unraveling has spared Armenia from becoming entangled in Iran’s expanding definition of legitimate retaliatory targets.
Because when war broke out with Iran, neighboring countries hosting American infrastructure — military bases, substantial business presence — became such targets, as Iran warned they would.
That threat doesn’t just concern the obvious candidates in the Persian Gulf, such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In early March, Iranian-launched drones struck targets in Nakhchevan, Azerbaijan, including its airport, wounding four civilians. Tehran has always been highly suspicious of Baku’s close security ties with Israel, even accusing it of permitting Israel to use its air space in attacking Iran.
Moreover, Iran has long suspected Baku of supporting Azeri irredentism in Iran, which has 15 to 20 million residents of Azeri descent. A number of hawkish, U.S.-based think tanks have promoted such a policy. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev himself occasionally seemed to flirt with the idea, positioning himself as the leader of all Azeris in the world, including those in Iran.Among the many unintended consequences of President Donald Trump’s disastrous decision to launch a war on Iran is the delaying of the so-called Caucasus Corridor, known as the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). The project was supposed to bring peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have been at war on and off for nearly 40 years.
This may turn out to be a blessing in disguise. In a region where Western-backed megaprojects have become major targets for Iranian attacks, abandoning the corridor may have been the best thing that could happen to Armenia.
The project in question — a transportation link through southern Armenia to the Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchevan and Turkey – was hailed as a decisive geopolitical break of the South Caucasus with Russian and Iranian influence. Pundits flattered Trump’s ego by promoting it as a stepping stone for the Nobel Peace Prize for the American president.
There has been reason for skepticism about these claims from the start. Last year, I argued in these pages that “peace requires more than diplomatic theater; it demands difficult compromises that have so far been absent. Until then, the promise of stability remains a mirage.”
Indeed, reality proved far messier than Trump’s vanity play. The signing ceremony in the White House in August 2025, involving Trump and the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, did not usher in a peace agreement. Talks stalled as Azerbaijan insisted on changes to the Armenian constitution that would formally and permanently forsake Armenia’s claims on Nagorno-Karabakh, a region largely populated by ethnic Armenians prior to an Azerbaijani military campaign in 2023.
The corridor, meanwhile, has increasingly drifted into irrelevance. The agreement stipulated that the corridor would be managed by a joint Armenian-American company based in Armenia. But the company was never established, and the contract was never signed. Consequently, all the other building blocks – funding, security, cross-border and transit modalities – were never put in place.
Now, with the war on Iran consuming the Trump administration’s bandwidth, the project languishes. “Obviously, TRIPP isn’t a high priority with the U.S. administration, at least today,” Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan admitted in March. “Unfortunately, there is a high probability that this will affect the time frame.”
But here’s the rub: the project’s unraveling has spared Armenia from becoming entangled in Iran’s expanding definition of legitimate retaliatory targets.
Because when war broke out with Iran, neighboring countries hosting American infrastructure — military bases, substantial business presence — became such targets, as Iran warned they would.
That threat doesn’t just concern the obvious candidates in the Persian Gulf, such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In early March, Iranian-launched drones struck targets in Nakhchevan, Azerbaijan, including its airport, wounding four civilians. Tehran has always been highly suspicious of Baku’s close security ties with Israel, even accusing it of permitting Israel to use its air space in attacking Iran.
Moreover, Iran has long suspected Baku of supporting Azeri irredentism in Iran, which has 15 to 20 million residents of Azeri descent. A number of hawkish, U.S.-based think tanks have promoted such a policy. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev himself occasionally seemed to flirt with the idea, positioning himself as the leader of all Azeris in the world, including those in Iran.
This backdrop provides a context for Tehran’s skeptical attitude regarding TRIPP from the outset. Iran has long seen the project as designed to entrench the U.S. presence on its northern border and cut off Iran’s border with Armenia, its only friendly northern neighbor.
The current war, not unexpectedly, has exacerbated Tehran’s fears of encirclement. While the Nakhchevan drone incident was promptly downplayed through diplomatic channels between Baku and Tehran, it highlighted the fragility of a regional architecture based on Iran’s exclusion.
Had TRIPP infrastructure actually been built through Armenia’s southern region, it would have been a tempting target for Iran’s formidable missile and drone arsenal. Armenia would have found itself caught between Iranian retaliation and Azerbaijani ambitions – with the Turkish border still closed, and relations with Russia in tatters.
TRIPP’s failure may therefore be Armenia’s greatest strategic stroke of luck. From Tehran’s perspective, there was nothing worth attacking – except, perhaps, the U.S. embassy, but Iran has not stepped up the escalation ladder to that point, yet.
One should not conclude that the risk is over, however. Pashinyan is as committed as ever to TRIPP, which he sees as a fundamental pillar of Armenia’s pro-Western pivot. Facing a critical election next month, his hosting last week of the summit of the European Political Community – a loose network of European states whose membership transcends the EU – should boost his standing. Western leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron and even the Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, descended on Yerevan in a show of support for Pashinyan.
While TRIPP is a U.S.-led rather than a European Union-led project, the European leaders endorsed it as a means to anchor Armenia in the “Western camp.” Besides this, they have little more to offer than vague recognition of Armenia’s “European aspirations.” Other nations that have trodden this path — like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia — have wound up with little to show in terms of real deliverables on what matters, namely, actual membership in the EU, a security umbrella, and economic opportunities.
Pashinyan may be on course to win the elections. However, not everybody in Armenia is convinced of the strategic wisdom of the Western pivot. Narek Karapetyan, an opposition leader, struck a dissenting note this week. Speaking from Meghri, a critical cog in the proposed project, he noted that “the TRIPP route runs 30-40 meters from the Iranian border.”
“Over the past two months, we have seen Iran attack U.S. military bases in various countries,” Karapetyan said. “What will happen in the future if their relations deteriorate and only an American company remains here?”
This may sound alarmist as TRIPP, in theory, has no military or security dimension. But the project’s very vagueness creates a dangerous strategic ambiguity. If attempts to revitalize it are undertaken, an Iranian threat could be used to justify its securitization.
It is true that Armenian leadership was careful to communicate with Tehran on TRIPP, and bilateral relations have been generally friendly, even under Pashinyan. But the war has changed Iran’s calculus. Absent a diplomatic deal with the U.S., Iran, under a much more hardline, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-dominated leadership, will regard any U.S.-led regional architecture as a direct threat to its interests. And with Trump himself declaring the ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran “on life support” and thundering new threats against the Islamic Republic, the resumption of active hostilities cannot be excluded.
TRIPP’s failure to launch rendered Armenia invisible. And invisibility, in the shadow of a great power war, is its own kind of salvation.
Eldar Mamedov
Eldar Mamedov is a Brussels-based foreign policy expert and Non-resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute.This backdrop provides a context for Tehran’s skeptical attitude regarding TRIPP from the outset. Iran has long seen the project as designed to entrench the U.S. presence on its northern border and cut off Iran’s border with Armenia, its only friendly northern neighbor.
The current war, not unexpectedly, has exacerbated Tehran’s fears of encirclement. While the Nakhchevan drone incident was promptly downplayed through diplomatic channels between Baku and Tehran, it highlighted the fragility of a regional architecture based on Iran’s exclusion.
Had TRIPP infrastructure actually been built through Armenia’s southern region, it would have been a tempting target for Iran’s formidable missile and drone arsenal. Armenia would have found itself caught between Iranian retaliation and Azerbaijani ambitions – with the Turkish border still closed, and relations with Russia in tatters.
TRIPP’s failure may therefore be Armenia’s greatest strategic stroke of luck. From Tehran’s perspective, there was nothing worth attacking – except, perhaps, the U.S. embassy, but Iran has not stepped up the escalation ladder to that point, yet.
One should not conclude that the risk is over, however. Pashinyan is as committed as ever to TRIPP, which he sees as a fundamental pillar of Armenia’s pro-Western pivot. Facing a critical election next month, his hosting last week of the summit of the European Political Community – a loose network of European states whose membership transcends the EU – should boost his standing. Western leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron and even the Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, descended on Yerevan in a show of support for Pashinyan.
While TRIPP is a U.S.-led rather than a European Union-led project, the European leaders endorsed it as a means to anchor Armenia in the “Western camp.” Besides this, they have little more to offer than vague recognition of Armenia’s “European aspirations.” Other nations that have trodden this path — like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia — have wound up with little to show in terms of real deliverables on what matters, namely, actual membership in the EU, a security umbrella, and economic opportunities.
Pashinyan may be on course to win the elections. However, not everybody in Armenia is convinced of the strategic wisdom of the Western pivot. Narek Karapetyan, an opposition leader, struck a dissenting note this week. Speaking from Meghri, a critical cog in the proposed project, he noted that “the TRIPP route runs 30-40 meters from the Iranian border.”
“Over the past two months, we have seen Iran attack U.S. military bases in various countries,” Karapetyan said. “What will happen in the future if their relations deteriorate and only an American company remains here?”
This may sound alarmist as TRIPP, in theory, has no military or security dimension. But the project’s very vagueness creates a dangerous strategic ambiguity. If attempts to revitalize it are undertaken, an Iranian threat could be used to justify its securitization.
It is true that Armenian leadership was careful to communicate with Tehran on TRIPP, and bilateral relations have been generally friendly, even under Pashinyan. But the war has changed Iran’s calculus. Absent a diplomatic deal with the U.S., Iran, under a much more hardline, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-dominated leadership, will regard any U.S.-led regional architecture as a direct threat to its interests. And with Trump himself declaring the ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran “on life support” and thundering new threats against the Islamic Republic, the resumption of active hostilities cannot be excluded.
TRIPP’s failure to launch rendered Armenia invisible. And invisibility, in the shadow of a great power war, is its own kind of salvation.
Eldar Mamedov is a Brussels-based foreign policy expert and Non-resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute.
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Hospitality & Catering News
May 18 2026
May 18, 2026
Mövenpick Hotels & Resorts brings its spirit of joyful reconnection to Armenia with the opening of Mövenpick Yerevan, the brand’s first address in Armenia. Located in the heart of the capital, the 127-room hotel blends Swiss heritage with the warmth of Armenian tradition, offering a welcoming setting for guests to come together and experience the city’s rich cultural landscape.
Founded in 1948 as a culinary pioneer in Switzerland, Mövenpick has grown into a global hospitality brand rooted in generosity, conviviality and the simple pleasure of shared moments. Today, the brand continues to bring people closer together through moments of joyful reconnection, offering elevated yet approachable experiences across more than 140 hotels worldwide. The opening of Mövenpick Yerevan marks another important step in the brand’s ongoing expansion across Europe, with other recent entries in Greece and Belgium, as well as upcoming openings in Montenegro, Croatia and beyond.
Aron Libinson, Vice President of Operations, New East Accor, said: “Armenia is an exciting and fast-growing destination, and we are delighted to introduce Mövenpick to Yerevan. With this opening, we bring a hospitality experience rooted in generosity, where thoughtful details, shared moments and a strong sense of place come together to create something truly meaningful for our guests .”
Situated close to many of Yerevan’s cultural and historical landmarks, the hotel reflects a calm design approach, shaped by natural light and balance. Mövenpick Yerevan offers a range of modern rooms and suites, including Junior Suites, spacious apartments and a Presidential Suite with panoramic city views. Many rooms offer private balconies and dedicated workspaces, catering to both leisure and business travellers.
The hotel’s dining offering includes Le Pont, a signature restaurant where French culinary traditions meet local Armenian flavours, creating a menu rooted in both technique and regional character. Guests can also enjoy the Mövenpick Café, inspired by the brand’s Swiss heritage, serving coffee, chocolate and light dishes in a relaxed setting.
For moments of wellbeing, the hotel offers a tranquil spa that promotes rest and renewal. Wellness facilities include a spa with a hammam, dry sauna and a range of treatments designed to promote relaxation and wellbeing, as well as a fully equipped gym.
The hotel also caters to meetings and gatherings, with three meeting rooms equipped with modern audiovisual technology, providing flexible spaces for small conferences, workshops and intimate events, each designed to foster meaningful moments of reconnection between colleagues or loved ones.
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The Holy See, Vatican
may 18 2026
ADDRESS OF POPE LEO XIV
TO HIS HOLINESS ARAM I, CATHOLICOS OF THE ARMENIAN APOSTOLIC CHURCH
OF THE HOLY SEE OF CILICIA (LEBANON), AND ENTOURAGE
Monday, 18 May 2026
[Multimedia]
________________________
Your Holiness, dear Brother,
“Grace to you and peace from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ!” (Eph 1:2) With the greeting of the Apostle Paul, I welcome Your Holiness and the distinguished members of your delegation at the start of your visit to the Church of Rome.
Could there be a greater spiritual bond between our Churches than the Apostle Paul of Tarsus, born in Cilicia, the place of your See, and who received the crown of martyrdom here in Rome? To Saint Paul, the Apostle par excellence of communion between the Churches, I entrust your pilgrimage to Rome. But how can I fail to mention also the great saints of the Church who worked for Christian unity? My thoughts turn to Saint Nerses the Gracious, Catholicos of Cilicia, who may be regarded as a pioneer of ecumenism – and whose recent inclusion in the Roman Martyrology is a further example of that “ecumenism of the saints” which already unites our Churches.
Located at the crossroads of different peoples and cultures, the Catholicosate of the Holy See of Cilicia has long been characterized by its ecumenical vocation, particularly with regard to the Church of Rome. This special relationship between our Churches, which was particularly intense in the Middle Ages, saw new developments in the 20th century and especially after the Second Vatican Council.
I am mindful that your venerable predecessor, Catholicos Khoren I, was the first primate of an Oriental Orthodox Church to visit Rome after the Council, as early as May 1967. Yourself, Holiness, stand out for your tireless ecumenical zeal, both locally, as one of the founders of the Middle East Council of Churches, and internationally within the World Council of Churches, where you have held prominent positions.
I am deeply grateful for your efforts to foster relations with the Catholic Church and for your closeness to the Church of Rome, which you visited for the first time as Catholicos during the Week of Prayer for Christian Unity in January 1997, and which you have honoured with your presence on numerous occasions since then.
I thank you in particular for your personal commitment to promoting theological dialogue between our Churches, which has been taking place since 2003 within the framework of the Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue between the Catholic Church and the Oriental Orthodox Churches. This dialogue, which benefits from the valuable contribution of Armenian delegates, has already published three significant documents on the nature and mission of the Church, on communion in the early Church and on the sacraments. I sincerely hope that, despite recent difficulties, this dialogue will continue with renewed vigour, for there can be no restoration of communion between our Churches without unity in faith.
Your presence among us brings to mind the beloved country from which you come and which I had the joy of visiting last December. This land of Lebanon, so dear to my heart, which for so long has shown the whole world that it is possible for people of diverse cultures and religions to live together as one nation, continues to face severe trials. At a time when the unity and integrity of your country are once again under threat, our Churches are called to strengthen the fraternal bonds that unite not only Christians amongst themselves, but also with their brothers and sisters from other communities in their shared homeland. Your Holiness, I assure you of my daily prayers and of the deep concern I feel for the people of Lebanon and for the Churches of the Middle East, to which you will devote a conference during your stay in Rome.
In these days leading up to the Solemnity of Pentecost, as we prepare to relive the mystery the miracle of the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the nascent Church, I am grateful to be able to pray after this meeting, together with Your Holiness, to the Spirit, Lord and Giver of life, that He may grant us the gift of unity, bestow upon us enduring peace, and renew the face of the earth.
https://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiv/en/speeches/2026/may/documents/20260518-chiesa-armena.html
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Institut Montagne
May 18 2026
Author
Sossi Tatikyan
International Relations and Security Analyst
This first part of a two-part series on Armenia’s foreign policy examines three major European diplomatic events held in Yerevan, which signal a shift in foreign policy for a country still reeling from the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. How is Armenia’s rapprochement with Europe taking shape? How might it serve as an asset for the EU in the Caucasus, even as Azerbaijan remains a key gas supplier? What role can France play?
The convergence of three major diplomatic events in Yerevan-the summit of the European Political Community (EPC), the first-ever Armenia-EU summit, and the state visit of French President Emmanuel Macron from May 4th to 6th -marks a moment of exceptional geopolitical density. This alignment is a rare coincidence of multilateral and bilateral engagements that together signal both a transformation in Armenia’s foreign and security policy trajectory and a recalibration of Europe’s role in the South Caucasus.
The presence of approximately 45-50 leaders-including non-EU European states such as the United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland, and EU institutions-anchored the summit within the broader European security agenda. The participation of Prime Minister Mark Carney-marking Canada’s first-ever participation in the EPC-as well as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte further underscored the platform’s gradual expansion beyond a strictly European framework, positioning it as an emerging bridge between European and wider Euro-Atlantic political and security coordination.
EPC as a Platform for Diplomatic Engagement and Signaling
By the time of the Yerevan summit, the EPC had evolved into a forum where multiple layers of European politics intersect-Ukraine, the Middle East, energy diversification, connectivity, and resilience against hybrid threats. Beyond its institutional framing, the Yerevan summit created a space for intensive bilateral engagements reflecting broader geopolitical dynamics across Europe and its periphery. The presence of leaders shaping Europe’s response to the war in Ukraine anchored the summit in the continent’s central security challenge while enabling coordination beyond formal negotiation frameworks. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy engaged directly with European partners to secure continued political, military and financial support in an ongoing conflict.
As host, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held a series of bilateral meetings, including with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, reinforcing Armenia’s effort to recalibrate its foreign policy orientation. The attendance of Albin Kurti, despite the absence of Armenia’s formal recognition of Kosovo as an independent state, and his bilateral meeting with Prime Minister Pashinyan-following several high-level meetings in recent years-reflects a level of political engagement that amounts, in practice, to de facto recognition.
The summit also created opportunities for renewed engagement among actors whose interactions have been strained in recent years. The participation of Irakli Kobakhidze in a European summit, including his meeting with President Zelenskyy, signaled a cautious re-engagement following a period of strained relations with both the EU and Ukraine. During his visit to Brussels in March 2026, PM Pashinyan urged EU officials to re-engage with Georgia, underscoring that Armenia’s European trajectory is closely tied to Georgia as its primary gateway to Europe. The presence of Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her meetings drew protest from Minsk.
The presence of Cevdet Yılmaz, Vice President of Türkiye-in a format typically reserved for heads of state and government-reflected the sensitivity of Turkish-Armenian relations and the lack of full normalization, which remains contingent on developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations.
The presence of Cevdet Yılmaz, Vice President of Türkiye-in a format typically reserved for heads of state and government-reflected the sensitivity of Turkish-Armenian relations and the lack of full normalization, which remains contingent on developments in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. Latest steps-including the announcement of cooperation for the restoration of the Kars-Gyumri railway and progress on the reconstruction of the Ani bridge-point to movement in Türkiye-Armenia engagement. Finally, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev’s participation by videoconference pointed to the unfinished Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, which precluded his in-person attendance in Yerevan.
Taken together, these interactions illustrate how the EPC operates not only as a symbolic gathering, but as a functional diplomatic space where multiple tracks of engagement-security coordination, political signaling, and regional dialogue-intersect. This dimension is essential for understanding its growing relevance in a fragmented geopolitical environment.
From Prague and Granada to Yerevan: EPC Role for Armenia
The Prague summit-the first meeting of the European Political Community-marked a turning point. Held just weeks after Azerbaijan’s major September 2022 offensive against Armenia within its internationally recognized borders, it hosted the quadrilateral meeting between Nikol Pashinyan, Ilham Aliyev, Emmanuel Macron, and Charles Michel, reaffirming mutual recognition of territorial integrity. It also led to the deployment of a short-term EU CSDP civilian monitoring mission, which later evolved into the European Union Mission in Armenia (EUMA).
The second-Granada summit in 2023 took place after the September 2023 military takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan, which was criticized by French leadership, as well as by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. In response French Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Catherine Colonna’s announcement about the decision to start defence cooperation with Armenia during her visit to Yerevan, Baku did not attend the meeting. Granada meeting consolidated European political support for Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while Azerbaijan subsequently sidelined France and the EU from the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process.
In his opening remarks in the Yerevan meeting, Nikol Pashinyan highlighted the role of EPC in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process, and described peace between the two countries as effectively established. In his speech by videoconference, Ilham Aliyev underlined Azerbaijan’s steps toward enabling trade with Armenia, including the lifting of restrictions on transit cargo. At the same time, he harshly criticized a European Parliament (EP) resolution adopted days earlier on democratic resilience in Armenia. While its main purpose is to express support for Armenia ahead of the June 2026 parliamentary elections and to address foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), implying Russian influence, it also reaffirmed support for the rights and return of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, called for the protection of Armenian cultural and religious heritage by Azerbaijan, and demanded the release of Armenian detainees. Aliyev accused the EP of “obsession” with Azerbaijan, applying double standards and attempting to sabotage the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process-rhetoric that functions as part of broader cognitive warfare to legitimize the actions leading to the abolition of Nagorno-Karabakh and to deflect international criticism-and announced the suspension of all relations between Azerbaijan’s parliament and the EP. While Nikol Pashinyan did not respond in his capacity as host and chair of the session, Roberta Metsola defended the legitimacy and independence of the EP.
As a small state, Armenia used the opportunity to enhance its agency and visibility by hosting a high-level multilateral forum.
The Yerevan summit marked a qualitative shift in Armenia’s positioning. As a small state, Armenia used the opportunity to enhance its agency and visibility by hosting a high-level multilateral forum. It moved beyond being primarily an object of diplomacy to becoming a platform for European political dialogue. The fact that the summit was held despite the ongoing conflict in neighboring Iran also reflected a degree of confidence among European leaders that Armenia was a sufficiently stable and secure venue for such a high-level political forum.
Armenia-EU Relations: A Pragmatic Path to Integration
The first Armenia-EU summit, held immediately after the EPC summit, gave political and strategic structure to a relationship that has been deepening in recent years. The adoption of the parliamentary bill launching Armenia’s EU integration process in its National Assembly in spring 2025, followed by agreeing on the EU-Armenia Strategic Agenda in December 2025, provided a framework for advancing Armenia’s European aspirations.
This evolution has accelerated since 2022, as EU engagement in Armenia extended into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework. This was first reflected in the deployment of EUMA and further reinforced by assistance under the European Peace Facility (EPF). A recent step came in April 2026 with the decision to establish a new EU civilian mission-the EU Partnership Mission in Armenia (EUPM)-focused on strengthening Armenia’s resilience to hybrid threats, including cyberattacks and foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI).
The summit resulted in a comprehensive 44-point Joint Declaration covering the main areas of Armenia-EU partnership, from political dialogue and support for Armenia’s sovereignty to economic cooperation, connectivity, and people-to-people ties. Progress on visa liberalisation-reflected in the first report under the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan-signaled tangible movement toward closer integration with the European space.
Infrastructure and regional links have become more structured, culminating at the summit in the Armenia-EU Connectivity Partnership. It provides a framework for cooperation in transport, energy, digital technologies, and modernisation of border crossing points. The initiative was accompanied by the call for investments in Armenia and the signing of letters of intent to deepen cooperation with Armenian companies and foundations. It also positioned Armenia within the EU’s Global Gateway approach, linking it more directly to European markets and infrastructure networks, and strengthening its economic integration. In her remarks, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen highlighted Armenia’s potential to become a “key regional transport hub,” linking Europe with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. She also underlined that EU-Armenia cooperation “is grounded in common values, a shared vision for the South Caucasus, and full respect for sovereign choices.”
Armenia’s European trajectory is approached pragmatically: even if EU membership is not ultimately granted, alignment with European standards is itself presented as a strategic gain for Armenia.
Taken together, these developments point to the consolidation of a multidimensional partnership through which Armenia is moving closer to the EU across political, economic, and institutional domains. As Pashinyan has suggested, Armenia’s European trajectory is approached pragmatically: even if EU membership is not ultimately granted, alignment with European standards is itself presented as a strategic gain for Armenia.
France’s Strategic Role in Armenia’s Sovereignty and Europeanization
The state visit of Emmanuel Macron to Armenia, in parallel with the EPC and Armenia-EU summits, underscored France’s central role in advancing Armenia’s sovereignty and European trajectory. It formalized the Armenia-France Strategic Partnership that had, de facto, already taken shape since the end of 2023.
Before that point, the relationship rested primarily on political, cultural, and humanitarian ties. Between 2020 and 2023, France assumed a leading diplomatic role for support to Armenia in multilateral forums. In the United Nations Security Council, it consistently raised issues related to Armenia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as humanitarian access, the rights and security of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. France also played an important role within European frameworks in advancing support for Armenia, including his initiation of the quadrilateral EU-France-Armenia-Azerbaijan meeting on the margins of the EPC meeting in Prague, which led to the deployment of EUMA.
A qualitative break occurred after the collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh, when France became the first EU and NATO member state to provide armaments to Armenia, formally still a CSTO member. This step constituted important support for Armenia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and defence. The French defence support to Armenia has combined deliveries of military equipment-including Bastion armored vehicles, Thales GM radars, and CAESAR self-propelled artillery systems-with institution-building through training, military education, and advisory support. It extends beyond immediate capability support to the longer-term modernization of Armenia’s defence sector, building deterrence by increasing the cost of potential military offensives against Armenia and reducing Armenia’s security dependence on Russia.
The strategic partnership declaration signed on 5 May 2026 translated these developments into a structured and forward-looking framework. It institutionalizes regular high-level political and security dialogue, consolidates defence cooperation through defence technologies, innovation, and cyber defence. Beyond defence, the partnership extends into other high-technology sectors-including artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and semiconductors. It also encompasses connectivity and infrastructure projects, most notably components of the strategic North-South regional transport corridor with a potential to connect Europe to India through Armenia and Georgia, and an essential tunnel in Armenia’s Syunik region. At the political level, Macron framed Armenia as moving “towards Europe” and emphasized that Armenia can rely on France, signaling both political alignment and strategic intent.
A qualitative break occurred after the collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh, when France became the first EU and NATO member state to provide armaments to Armenia.
Symbolic dimensions of the visit also reinforced this partnership. Macron’s three-day stay was marked not only by formal meetings but also by visible public engagement-walks in Yerevan and Armenia’s second city Gyumri, participation in cultural events, direct interaction with citizens, and unprecedented performance of Charles Aznavour’s songs while Armenian PM played drums during the official dinner. This reception reflected the depth of France’s soft power alongside its growing security role in Armenia and underscored that the partnership rests not only on strategic interests, but also on a strong societal and cultural foundation.
Public perceptions of the France-Armenia partnership vary in Armenia between inflated expectations and critical narratives. Radical pro-European voices portray France as a potential security guarantor, while pro-Russian and Euro-sceptic circles blame France for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and dismiss its role as illusory. The government and pro-European experts maintain a pragmatic view, seeing France as a key partner in strengthening Armenia’s sovereignty and deterrence.
The formalization of the strategic partnership consolidates an already established trajectory. France thus stands out among European actors as Armenia’s key bilateral partner and a principal driver of its integration with Europe.
Europe’s Balancing Act: From Yerevan to Baku
The visits to Baku by Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, following the Yerevan meetings, underscore Europe’s attempt to balance between its diverging priorities and interests.
In Baku, Meloni focused on consolidating Italy’s Strategic Partnership with Azerbaijan, centered on energy cooperation through the Southern Gas Corridor-particularly the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)-as well as trade and defence-industrial cooperation. While France’s engagement with Armenia is both strategic and value-based, Italy’s engagement with Azerbaijan is primarily shaped by energy security and trade transactional interests. These approaches do not necessarily contradict one another, but reflect distinct natures of partnerships.
Kallas addressed EU-Azerbaijan relations with a focus on energy, reaffirming Azerbaijan’s role as a key gas supplier to Europe, including expanded deliveries to Germany and Austria. Discussions also covered regional communications toward Central Asia, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), and establishment of economic and trade ties between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Although the EU’s role in the Armenia-Azerbaijan process has been constrained by Azerbaijan’s efforts to sideline it as a mediator, the EU continues to encourage the finalization of the peace process and connectivity in the South Caucasus. Besides, Azerbaijan is expected to host a future EPC meeting in 2028.
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News.am, Armenia
May 18 2026
There are 2,483,520 voters on the current voter register of Armenia.
According to the Electoral Code of Armenia, on the 30th, 20th, and 10th day before the voting day during the National Assembly (NA) elections, the state administrative body authorized by the government to maintain the state population register publishes the total number of voters included in the voter register of Armenia, also indicating the number of voters by location, voters of preferred location, and voters without registration, the Migration and Citizenship Service of Armenia reports.
Accordingly, as of the 20th day before the NA elections to be held on June 7, the total number of voters included in the voter register of Armenia was 2,483,520, of which the number of voters included in polling stations by location is 2,925, and the number of unregistered voters is 69.
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News.am, Armenia
May 18 2026
Armenia premier loses his temper, starts shouting: I will take off your masks, stuff in appropriate place
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who months ago had lost his temper in the Yerevan subway, attacked a former Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) resident woman, calling her an “escapee from Artsakh,” and then apologized for his unruly behavior, on Monday proved that he does not regret what he had done and continues to treat former Artsakh residents as escapees.
During the ruling party’s election campaign in Arabkir district of Yerevan, Candidate of Medical Sciences, obstetrician-gynecologist Arpine Soghoyan, sister of Lieutenant Colonel, Doctor Hrant Papikyan who went missing during the 44-day war in 2020, approached him and said that Pashinyan had stolen her homeland.
It took Pashinyan several minutes to lose his balance. He shouted endlessly, making threats against the former presidents of Armenia Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, as well as Strong Armenia bloc PM candidate Samvel Karapetyan, and Prosperous Armenia Party leader Gagik Tsarukyan. Moreover, he specifically targeted ex-President Robert Kocharyan as an Artsakh resident, although the woman had not shown in any way what her political preferences were.
“I will remove the mask of those who speak with a Karabakh accent. Rob’s brats, Serzh’s brats, Gago’s brats, Kaluga’s [i.e. Samvel Karapetyan] brats, I will remove the mask of you all, stuff in the appropriate place,” Pashinyan shouted.
The woman accused Pashinyan of surrendering Artsakh to Azerbaijan and becoming the cause of the death of thousands of Armenian youth.
Pashinyan did not come to his senses even after the woman clearly stated why the loss of Artsakh was especially difficult for her: she noted that her brother is a high-ranking officer who is missing.
But Pashinyan did not calm down, the woman tried to leave, but Pashinyan pulled her by the hand and brought her back, demanding that she listen to him. The ruling party supporters did everything they could to prevent the woman from saying what she wanted, they pulled her by the hand, and they drowned her voice with shouts.
“Those masked people who speak with a Karabakh accent are the escapees. They fled the war, they abandoned our children. I will make Rob, Serzh, and the one from Kaluga stoop too,” Pashinyan shouted.
Even after the woman left, Pashinyan did not calm down, he was already looking at the video camera, shouting, and making threats against the oppositionists.
It is noteworthy that Pashinyan made at least two obvious manipulations in this incident, indicating that the woman in front of him was allegedly from Artsakh, while the woman later said in an interview with us that she was from Yerevan and had been living in Arabkir district for 30 years. In addition, Nikol Pashinyan had declared the woman a supporter of Robert Kocharyan, while she had not shown in any way who she supported.
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