Armenia at a crossroads: Elections, peace, and the limits of international gua

Commonspace.eu
May 27 2026

This commentary was prepared by Mr Narek Minasyan for the 8th issue of the Armenia Election Monitor 2026 newsletter.

Less than a week remains until Armenia’s parliamentary elections. The campaign is in full swing, political forces are attacking one another in increasingly harsh terms, investigations into hybrid attacks against Armenia appear almost daily, and statements interfering in Armenia’s internal affairs continue to come from Moscow.

The June 7 elections are arguably the most geopolitically significant in Armenia’s modern history. Their outcome will shape the country’s trajectory for years. Campaign narratives suggest that Armenian voters will effectively answer several strategic questions: whether to continue normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey or revise existing understandings; whether to deepen ties with the EU or strengthen dependence on Russia; whether to continue democratic reforms or return figures associated with the previous political system.

According to an IRI survey conducted in mid-May, Armenians’ top concerns are national security and border issues, the economy and unemployment, and peace. Unsurprisingly, the Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization process has become the central issue of the campaign. Against this backdrop, political and expert circles are again debating the idea of “guaranteed peace” and international security guarantees.

The debate is not new. Since the launch of peace treaty negotiations in 2022, the Armenian government has repeatedly emphasized the need for “international support” and “international legitimacy.” At the time, negotiations were mediated simultaneously by the EU, Russia, and the United States, while Nagorno-Karabakh had not yet been emptied of its Armenian population.

However, after the involuntary displacement of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians amid the inaction of Russian peacekeepers and the weak international response, official Yerevan gradually revised its approach. The idea of external guarantors increasingly appeared unrealistic, and the negotiation process became more bilateral in nature.

Today, the ruling “Civil Contract” party argues that peace has effectively been established and is now entering a phase of institutionalization. According to this view, lasting peace depends less on outside guarantees than on creating a mutually beneficial system between the parties.

Opposition forces, likely to cross the electoral threshold, argue the opposite. Former president Robert Kocharyan has stated: “Peace does not depend on Nikol Pashinyan, Civil Contract members, Robert Kocharyan, Trump, or anyone else. Guaranteed peace means the application of international mechanisms, beyond Aliyev’s will,” Kocharyan stated.

Narek Karapetyan of the “Strong Armenia” party argues: “Our peace treaty must have more than one guarantor. Having more than one guarantor is the only serious guarantee of long-term peace. Paper is a highly variable thing in negotiations with the Turks, while guarantors are constant,” Karapetyan said.

Gagik Tsarukyan, leader of the “Prosperous Armenia” party, has emphasized: “All the preconditions exist. We need to reach agreements with 3–5 powerful states. There must be connections, familiarity, and relationships in order to have guaranteed peace, so that not even a fly can pass through our territory,” Tsarukyan emphasized.

Yet these forces present the idea of “international guarantees” largely without specifics. No detailed roadmap has been proposed explaining how such guarantees would function in practice, what mechanisms would enforce them, or how violations would be punished. In many cases, arguments rely more on references to political connections or negotiating skills than on concrete institutional proposals.

Without entering the election debate itself, the issue of international guarantees nevertheless deserves sober analysis. History offers examples where external guarantees contributed to stabilization and trust-building, such as in Cyprus or Bosnia and Herzegovina. But there are also notable failures — from Srebrenica to Syria. Perhaps the clearest example is the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, under which Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Two decades later, Russia violated those commitments and launched a full-scale war against Ukraine.

Peace agreements do not function in a vacuum. Their durability depends on the broader balance of power and the state of international relations. The key question, therefore, is not whether international guarantees are desirable in theory, but whether they are realistic under current geopolitical conditions.

Several factors complicate the discussion.

First, the post–World War II international order is steadily eroding. Principles such as territorial integrity and the non-use of force have repeatedly been violated without effective collective response — in Armenia, Ukraine, Syria, and elsewhere. Under such conditions, reliance on external guarantees has obvious limits.

Second, advocates of “guaranteed peace” rarely explain how such a system would operate. Under what mandate would guarantors act? What mechanisms would enforce compliance? What happens if guarantors fail to fulfill their commitments? Without answers, discussions about guarantees risk becoming political slogans rather than policy proposals.

Third, the question of potential guarantors remains unresolved. Russia, the United States, the EU, and even China are sometimes mentioned, but involving multiple guarantors is difficult even theoretically amid rising global tensions. There is also a risk of repeating the experience of the OSCE Minsk Group, whose effectiveness was ultimately paralyzed by geopolitical rivalries.

In practice, apart from Russia, no major power has expressed readiness to assume a direct guarantor role in the Armenia–Azerbaijan process. Yet Moscow’s credibility as an impartial guarantor has been seriously undermined by recent developments and by its increasingly visible preference for Azerbaijan, driven by Baku’s greater geopolitical and economic importance.

Finally, one essential reality is often overlooked in Armenian debates: a peace treaty is a bilateral agreement. If Azerbaijan rejects external involvement, international guarantees cannot become a reality. Baku’s recent rhetoric strongly suggests opposition to any third-party role. Moreover, if Armenia attempts after June 7 to reintroduce the issue of guarantors, Azerbaijan may interpret it as an attempt to revise already agreed principles and derail the process itself.

Under current global conditions, the classical model of “international guarantees” functions only in a very limited way. Rather than pursuing externally guaranteed peace, it may be more realistic to focus on confidence-building measures, monitoring mechanisms, and direct reciprocal obligations capable of making renewed conflict increasingly costly for both sides.

Source: Mr Narek Minasyan is an associate expert at the Armenian Council, where he focuses on global and regional security issues.  

https://www.commonspace.eu/commentary/armenia-crossroads-elections-peace-and-limits-international-guarantees

Armenia’s election: Voters to decide on Pashinyan’s peace agenda

Chatham House, UK
May 27 2026

Armenians face a febrile campaign but feel the benefits of improved security since hostilities with Azerbaijan ended.


Laurence Broers

Associate Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme

On 7 June Armenia will hold one of its most pivotal elections since regaining independence in 1991. The vote arrives as the country is poised between a painful redefinition of its identity and a still uncertain horizon of opportunity.  

In 2023 Armenia definitively lost the territory of Mountainous Karabakh to Azerbaijan. The struggle to control the region was a driving force of Armenia’s 1990s national independence movement, and its loss deprived Armenian nationalism of a key foundation. Yet the loss of Karabakh has also loosened Russian control over Armenian foreign policy, demonstrating Moscow’s declining power in the South Caucasus and the limits of its patronage.  

Under the banner of a ‘Real Armenia’ – rather than one with ambitions for wider borders – incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party are campaigning for a final peace accord with Azerbaijan. They hope to end four decades of conflict with a final renunciation of territorial claims and Armenia’s integration into regional connectivity. Pashinyan has also recalibrated Armenia’s foreign policy with a widely discussed ‘pivot’ to the West – a move which has led to warnings of a ‘Ukraine scenario’ from Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The opposition to Pashinyan includes blocs seeking to rehabilitate ties with Russia, and smaller parties with little chance of passing the threshold to enter parliament. Polls put Civil Contract ahead of its nearest rival, the ‘Strong Armenia’ bloc led by Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, with a plurality of voters onside.

Many voters remain undecided. But in a mid-May poll, 45 per cent of these said they believed Armenia is moving in the right direction. Despite well-founded fears over information manipulation from abroad, Pashinyan’s progress is unlikely to be halted.

A public endorsement of peace

At a White House summit in August 2025 the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers initialled – but did not sign – a peace agreement in the presence of President Donald Trump. There have been no military fatalities since February 2024, and Azerbaijan and Turkey have both taken steps towards dismantling their long-standing blockade of Armenia.

This unprecedented progress remains provisional. Signing the agreement depends on Armenia’s adoption – at Azerbaijan’s insistence – of a new constitution with all references to Mountainous Karabakh removed. Adopting a new constitution will require a separate referendum after the election.

That makes this election effectively a preliminary referendum on the terms Pashinyan has negotiated and the trajectory he plans for Armenia.

Armenians certainly sense the improvement in security after a decade of near-continuous frontline violence, including defeat to Azerbaijan in 2020’s war, an Azerbaijani offensive on Armenia’s territory in September 2022, and Baku’s military incorporation of Karabakh in September 2023. The need to come to lasting terms with Baku is widely recognized. But the loss of Karabakh has left severe fractures in Armenia’s body politic.

These have surfaced during the campaign in unfortunate and ominous ways. Pashinyan has had a series of vitriolic encounters on the campaign trail with citizens challenging his peace narrative. And a video of masked men threatening violence against him has circulated online. Such threats are not taken lightly in a country that has witnessed repeated political violence, including the assassination of an entire tier of leadership in 1999’s parliament shooting.

Meanwhile, many in civil society are uncomfortable with what they see as an attempt by the government to enforce amnesia about the loss of Mountainous Karabakh and the mass displacement of its population. Indeed, some claim that government rhetoric spills into hate speech towards former Karabakh Armenians. Pashinyan and his supporters, however, see such claims as masking resistance to the terms of the peace with Azerbaijan.

This febrile atmosphere adds to accumulating worries over Armenia’s democratic trajectory, as polarization shapes an ‘all or nothing’ attitude to political allegiance. The tone of exchanges between the prime minister and a growing number of constituencies – parts of the opposition, the Armenian Apostolic Church and Karabakh Armenians – is fuelling concerns about the direction of Armenia’s political culture.

For example, in a heated exchange on the campaign trail, Pashinyan asked a Karabakh Armenian refugee why he was still alive, implying he should have stayed and died in Karabakh. The man was later arrested on a charge of hooliganism. Such demarches do not bode well for the stability of any future agreement.  

Even if ‘Real Armenia’ is accepted as a geopolitical reality, how it is going to deal with displaced Armenians and the legacy of Karabakh remains an open question – one that must ultimately be decided by Armenians themselves.  

A ‘pivot to the West’, or to the world?

Armenia’s geopolitics unfortunately work against a measured discussion of its democracy.

The 2018 ‘Velvet Revolution’ that swept Pashinyan to power consciously defined itself as a purely domestic affair, leaving Armenia’s alliance with Russia intact. But the final loss of Karabakh in 2023 released Pashinyan from the need to uphold this alignment. At the same time, it solidified the opposition’s belief that rapprochement with Moscow is the only way to prevent further calamity.

Much has been made of Armenia’s ‘pivot’ to the West. Indeed, many recent outcomes would have been unimaginable a few years ago, when the country was often perceived as a submissive Russian client.

The more that Europe sees Armenia as vulnerable to Russian pressure, the easier it will be to overlook shortcomings in Pashinyan’s democratic record.

Notably, the US has become a key peace broker, through the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) – a planned trade, communications and energy transit route running across southern Armenia between Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhchivan. Yerevan also hosted a European Political Community summit, alongside the first ever EU-Armenia summit, a few days before the election campaign began. Warm rhetoric of Armenia’s ‘European choice’ dominated the airwaves.  

Yet ‘pivots to the West’ also carry risks for Armenia’s democracy. The more that Russia perceives Armenia as a liability in a poaching game with the EU, the more it will commit to the rules of that game. That is risky for Armenia, given its significant dependencies on Russia for energy and food supply, and still substantial remittances from Armenian migrant workers in Russia.

Conversely, the more that Europe sees Armenia as vulnerable to Russian pressure, the easier it will be to overlook shortcomings in Pashinyan’s democratic record in hopes of upholding the ‘Western candidate.’

A choice between Russia and the West is also a reductive way of viewing of Armenia’s foreign policy options. Multipolarity is inherent to the South Caucasus, and increasingly evident in the foreign policies of its states. All three of the South Caucasus countries are converging on omni-alignment, seeking to become nodes in wider Eurasian connectivity flows.

Armenia has been upgrading its relations in multiple directions, including with the Gulf states, South Asia and China. And important ties with Russia remain: Yerevan’s membership of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is a dead letter and unlikely to be revived. But its membership of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) still affords real benefits. And Russia remains Armenia’s single largest export market.

Polls show a majority of citizens in favour of Armenian EU membership. But that goal remains distant: Armenia’s membership of the EAEU, Georgia’s stalled EU candidacy, and the EU’s own preoccupation with the candidacies of Ukraine and Moldova are crucial structural constraints that should be remembered when talking about the current scope of any ‘pivot’ West.

With enlargement not on the table for now, Europe can help Armenia with quiet, consistent support, strengthening its institutions and the understanding that binary choices reduce Yerevan’s leeway.

Pashinyan’s ‘Real Armenia’ campaign implies an inevitable reckoning with the country’s geopolitics and capacities. An antagonistic political culture and a reductive approach to the country’s foreign policy choices could still undermine this painful yet necessary agenda.

Russia warns Armenia it could end cheap fuel supplies if Yerevan stays on EU c

Reuters
May 27 2026
By Andrew Osborn and Lucy Papachristou

, opens new tab

  • Moscow tells Armenia: stop EU push or lose cheap energy
  • Warning comes ahead of closely watched election
  • Armenia is deepening ties with EU and U.S.
  • Armenia says it hasn’t received warning letter
MOSCOW, May 27 (Reuters) – Russia said on Wednesday it had warned Armenia it would suspend or terminate the supply of cheap oil, gas and rough diamonds to the South ‌Caucasus country if Yerevan pressed ahead with its bid to join the European Union.
Moscow issued the warning ahead of a parliamentary election on June 7 with opinion polls giving the Civil Contract party of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan – who has forged a warmer relationship with the West to Moscow’s irritation – a comfortable lead over pro-Russian rivals.
“The Russian Embassy has officially forwarded a letter…stating that if the process of accession to the EU continues, the Russian side will suspend or unilaterally terminate the Agreement on Cooperation in the Supply of Natural Gas, Petroleum Products and Rough ⁠Diamonds,” Maria Zakharova, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, told the RIA news agency.
Armenia, a landlocked nation of around 3 million, has traditionally had close ties to Russia and is a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union.
It hosts Russian military bases and is heavily dependent on Moscow for energy, with 82% of its gas last year coming from Russia, according to the Interfax news agency.
Pashinyan told an election rally that Armenia had no intention of leaving the Eurasian Union and that membership of the body was compatible with the country’s bid to join the EU.
“For now, Armenia can be a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and proceed with reforms to achieve European standards. We are on this path,” Russian news agencies quoted him as saying.
“When the time comes to make a choice, we will make a choice. We must have an alternative so that no one can say of Armenia — who needs it, ‌where ⁠is it heading?”
Ties with Moscow have grown increasingly rancorous since Azerbaijan retook its breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, prompting a mass exodus of ethnic Armenians despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers.
Pashinyan, who accused Russia at the time of failing to protect his country, has since sought to deepen ties with Brussels and Washington and has suspended Armenia’s participation in a Russian-led regional defence bloc.

RUBIO VISITS YEREVAN

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Yerevan on Tuesday and signed a strategic partnership agreement in a sign ⁠of warming ties, and Armenia last year adopted a law launching its EU accession process.
Moscow, which argues that membership of the EU would be incompatible with Armenia’s membership of the Eurasian Economic Union, this month accused Armenia of being drawn into what it described as the EU’s “anti‑Russian orbit” and of providing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy with “a platform for ⁠anti-Russian remarks.”
The cooperation agreement which Russia is saying it may end allows Armenia to buy oil, gas and rough diamonds free of export duties and on vastly preferential terms.
Moscow said its letter of warning was sent by Russian Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev to the Armenian Territorial Administration ⁠and Infrastructure Ministry.

Armenia’s tilt to the EU, Tsivilev wrote, was “inconsistent with the nature of the partnership between the governments and economic entities of our countries,” according to a text of the letter published by Russia’s Kommersant newspaper.

The Armenian ministry told state media on Wednesday it had received no such letter from Tsivilev.Armenia’s tilt to the EU, Tsivilev wrote, was “inconsistent with the nature of the partnership between the governments and economic entities of our countries,” according to a text of the letter published by Russia’s Kommersant newspaper.
The Armenian ministry told state media on Wednesday it had received no such letter from Tsivilev.

Armenia’s East-West Choice and the Shadow of War

May 27 2026
Armenia’s East-West Choice and the Shadow of War
Like many of Russia’s neighbors, Armenia’s voters face a choice between Brussels and Moscow, 
but with the added shadow of the territorial losses.
a:hover]:text-red” st1yle=”text-align:center;box-sizing:border-box;border-width:0px;border-style:solid;border-color:currentcolor;font-size:1.125rem;line-height:2rem”>By Nicole Monette

Armenians will vote on June 7 to decide if Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party should extend their eight years in power. Seen as the pro-West, pro-European option, a victory for Pashinyan is likely to deepen Yerevan’s ties with the West and shift it away from Russia.

The premier has “framed his campaign around a peace agenda, presenting Armenia as a country moving toward normalized relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey while deepening cooperation with the US and the European Union,” said Professor Emil Avdaliani, a research fellow at the Turan Research Center. “Government figures say an opposition victory could increase the risk of renewed conflict with Azerbaijan.” 

And that conflict weighs heavily on the race. It is the first national election since the traumatic loss of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan in 2023, after more than three decades of on-and-off conflict. It was an event that sent shockwaves through the country and prompted around 100,000 Armenian residents of the territory to flee to Armenia.

There were protests on the streets of Yerevan demanding the prime minister’s resignation and accusing him of failing to protect the enclave’s ethnic Armenians. But, while some voters remain angry at Pashinyan’s role in events, they also know Moscow did nothing to help, either in 2023 or before that in 2020, despite its (disputed) treaty commitment to aid Armenia in a conflict.

Nagorno-Karabakh, known as Artsakh to Armenians and an ancient territory of their history, was part of the Azerbaijani SSR during the Soviet era. It automatically became part of the newly independent Azerbaijan when the Caucasus gained independence in 1991.

Armenia then took control — though not legal possession — in 1993 during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. That held until September 2023, when Azerbaijan seized the territory by force. Moscow offered no help and criticized Armenia, blaming the loss on Yerevan’s turn to the West and its increasingly provocative behavior toward Russia.

June’s election will provide an opportunity for voters to register their judgment on Pashinyan’s handling of the events of 2023 and Armenia’s international ties.

While Yerevan’s cooperation with the EU has increased since 2020, the majority of voters “favor pragmatic engagement with both the West and Moscow,” the German Marshall Fund said in a briefing.

Pashinyan and his party have argued that reduced dependence on Russia, diversified foreign partnerships, and closer ties to the EU will strengthen Armenia’s independence and sovereignty. That shift was underlined by events in early May, when European leaders held two high-level meetings in Yerevan.

“The deterioration of relations with Russia has unsettled many Armenians, who still view Moscow as Armenia’s principal security provider,” Avdaliani said. However, Civil Contract’s position as the party of peace with Azerbaijan has “practical appeal in a region already shaped by multiple wars and security shocks,” he added.

Strong Armenia, the main opposition party led by Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire, has portrayed the election as a struggle between pro-Western and pro-Russian camps. Pashinyan has avoided presenting the vote as a referendum on Armenia’s tilt to the West, but polling shows it is on voters’ minds.

“Nearly 73% of Civil Contract supporters identify as Western-leaning, while a similar share of Strong Armenia supporters describe themselves as pro-Russian,” Avdaliani said. But many Armenians have “not forgotten or forgiven Russia’s dismissal of its appeals for help during and after the second Nagorno-Karabakh war,” he added.

A poll in April showed 33.6% backing Pashinyan’s Civil Contract, with 11.4% saying they would vote for Strong Armenia. A further 15% of votes were spread across other opposition parties, while 34% refused to answer and 14% said they didn’t know which party they would back.

Pashinyan looks likely to be helped by the fragmentation of the opposition vote. The survey’s finding that 41% believe Armenia is heading in the right direction, compared to 33% who think it is not, should also work in his favor.

But the massive 48% of voters who haven’t yet decided or wouldn’t say how they will vote will be keenly courted by both sides in the closing weeks of the campaign. They will also be targeted by voices from Moscow and Brussels. (Whether many bother to vote is another issue — turnout in the 2021 election was just 49%).

While Nagorno-Karabakh makes the election more complex than simply a decision over which direction the country should lean (all elections are local, after all), it is the bottom line of their two choices, Russia or the West, a recurring theme among Russia’s neighbors.

Nicole Monette is a CEPA Editorial Intern and a graduate of New York University with master’s degrees in journalism and European & Mediterranean Studies.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

https://cepa.org/article/armenias-east-west-choice-and-the-shadow-of-war/

Will Armenia–Azerbaijan peace spell the end of Georgia’s transit monopoly?

OC Media
May 27 2026

Georgia’s transit monopoly is eroding, yet the region’s future may largely depend on cooperation, not competition

For decades, Georgia operated as a solid transit route, largely due to its location, as well as pure luck. Unresolved neighbourhood conflicts, leading to closed borders, and weak infrastructure elsewhere left little alternative: goods moving between Central Asia, Russia, Turkey, and Europe passed through Georgian roads, railways, and ports almost by default.

Yet now, as new corridors, a fragile Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, and disruptions through Iran are reshaping logistics across the region, Georgia’s role is changing. The question is no longer who controls regional transit, but whether the region’s smaller states can coordinate well enough to compete at all.

While the shift is unlikely to eliminate Georgia’s importance, it threatens the passive advantages on which its transit dominance has long depended. The question facing Tbilisi is therefore strategic rather than existential: can Georgia remain the South Caucasus’ preferred corridor once it is no longer the only viable one?

Shifting cargo flows

Despite the concern, at a recent regional transport conference in Yerevan, many analysts argued that predictions Georgia would ‘lose everything’ were exaggerated. In many ways, geography, infrastructure, and existing trade networks still strongly favour Georgia over its neighbours. Yet some cargo flows are already beginning to shift.

Armenia imports 400,000–450,000 tonnes of grain annually from Russia, shipments that have increasingly begun moving through Azerbaijan’s rail network, bypassing Georgia’s Upper Lars corridor (though still travelling briefly through Georgia by rail for the final leg of the journey, for now). For grain transportation alone, Georgia receives only minimal transit revenue because of the relatively short transit distance involved. The greater concern is whether this trend could similarly expand to Armenia’s higher-value cargo — liquid gas, fertilisers, and petroleum products — using the same alternative route through Azerbaijan.

Armenia to receive third batch of wheat through Azerbaijan

‘The Georgian government appears to believe that the proposed TRIPP corridor and the Middle Corridor will complement one another. I am not convinced that will be the case’, transport corridor analyst Paata Tsagareishvili told OC Media. ‘As soon as the corridor becomes operational, Azerbaijan is likely to act very aggressively, while Armenia remains less prepared. In such a scenario, Georgia could lose up to 2 million tonnes of cargo annually — roughly 15–17% of total transit volumes.’

Tsagareishvili implied that Azerbaijan would effectively control the ‘tap’ of regional cargo flows, and could direct freight traffic toward whichever route best served its own strategic interests — either through TRIPP or Georgia.

The figures are significant, though far from catastrophic. In the first quarter of 2026, Georgia’s rail network transported 3 million tonnes of cargo. More than half of this was transit shipments, with petroleum products the single largest freight category.

As Tsagareishvili has emphasised, while there was a clear growth in transit post-2023 — in large part due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — this war-driven surge could not be sustained.

The data reflects both Georgia’s continued importance and its underlying vulnerability. Much of the country’s transit economy remains concentrated in a narrow set of cargo flows that could gradually diversify toward competing routes if regional connectivity improves.

Armenia’s ambitions collide with infrastructure reality

For years, Armenia has tried to position itself within emerging Eurasian transport networks, including the North–South Transport Corridor and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Recent disruptions through Iran have sharpened those discussions — and exposed the gap between aspiration and reality.

Before the escalation of the Middle East crisis, a substantial portion of Chinese cargo entered Armenia through Iran, arriving in the port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf before heading north to the Meghri–Nordooz crossing. Those flows have now largely rerouted through Georgian ports. In April, Georgia responded to the increased traffic by launching a new Poti–Tbilisi Dry Port logistics route, allowing Armenian freight forwarders to collect containers in Tbilisi rather than travelling to Poti directly.

The episode illustrates both the opportunity Armenia senses and the constraints it faces. For one, the country’s railway network — operated under concession by Russian Railways since 2008 — remains slow.

‘In practice, no real unblocking of transport communications has occurred so far’, Laura Sarkisyan, a journalist and founder of the Telegram channel Armenian Crossroads tells OC Media. ‘Yerevan has the desire and intention’, she says, ‘but the ball is now in Baku and Ankara’s court. Without their political will, no unblocking will happen no matter how hard Yerevan tries.’

At the centre of the dispute is a proposed railway route through southern Armenia along the Iranian border. The line largely follows Soviet-era infrastructure along the River Araks through mountainous terrain where alternative alignments are technically difficult and prohibitively expensive. Much of the existing infrastructure — bridges, tunnels, utilities — no longer meets modern standards and would require extensive reconstruction before international freight could use it.

Timing is also critical. Turkey is already building the Nakhchivan–Kars railway segment on its side of the border. If Ankara completes its section before Armenia modernises its own, Armenia risks becoming a marginal transit link rather than a central one — with transit revenues potentially falling five-fold and only a fraction of its territory actively integrated into the route.

The geopolitical stakes extend well beyond logistics. A fully operational corridor linking Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Turkey would reduce dependence on both Russian and Iranian transit while deepening east–west connectivity.

‘Armenia’s population has not yet recovered from the war and the forced exodus from Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh]’, Sarkisyan said, her perspective underscoring the widely held understanding that, in the wake of the conflict, Armenia can no longer depend on Russia for either security guarantees or economic stability.

‘We are still living with a post-war syndrome, even if it may not always be visible on the surface’, she added.

A new Gyumri Dry Port project near the Turkish border — now involving Hamburg Port management — could become a significant logistics hub linking Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan if the Armenia–Turkey border reopens. That would strengthen Armenia’s position in regional trade, but it would also draw cargo away from Georgian road corridors. More competition, less complementary — unless the two countries choose a different approach.

Turkish rail routes open for Armenian cargo

Competition vs collaboration

Regional analysts increasingly argue that treating transit as zero-sum is strategically self-defeating. The South Caucasus as a whole competes against larger, better-funded corridors elsewhere in Eurasia. Internal fragmentation — overlapping projects, political rivalry, and inconsistent regulation — could weaken every country’s position, not just the losers of any given bilateral dispute.

‘The Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor should not be understood as an infrastructure project confined to a single country, but as a complex, interconnected chain spanning Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and onward to Europe’, Lekso Aleksishvili, the CEO of the Policy and Management Consulting Group (PMCG), tells OC Media. ‘Without strong integration among participating countries — on customs, logistics, digitalisation, and regulatory frameworks — bottlenecks emerge at every border, undermining both efficiency and competitiveness’, he says.

That logic applies directly to Georgia and Armenia. Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has pushed back against narratives that frame Armenia as a rival corridor to Georgia, arguing that outside forces are deliberately trying to drive a wedge between Yerevan and Tbilisi. Despite this, however, the risk of rivalry is real regardless of who is promoting it.

Historic first: Armenia to receive Azerbaijani fuel via Georgia

Georgia may need more than inertia: infrastructure investment, stronger logistics policy, deeper EU integration, and active economic diplomacy could all help the country remain competitive. For Armenia, hurdles remain surrounding control of its rail network, a need for major tunnel projects, and a politically fraught normalisation process — hurdles it must overcome all while managing an uncertain relationship with both Baku and Tehran.

As former central banker and economist Roman Gotsiridze puts it, Armenia needs road and railway modernisation and Georgia needs the Anaklia port project — in other words, ‘we need to rely on ourselves’.

Speaking to Imedi on 24 May, Georgian Economy Minister Mariam Kvrivishvili insisted that the Anaklia Port remained on track, adding that 2029 would remain the target for completion — a claim disputed by many local experts and opposition figures.

‘First they said 2028, then 2029, even 2032, which was later retracted’, Gotsiridze notes. ‘Highly unlikely, as the land infrastructure projects are not even underway.’

For many observers, however, neither Armenia nor Georgia can succeed by treating the other as an obstacle.

Aleksishvili says that Georgia did not truly build its role as a transit hub, it just happened.

‘These two neighbours [Armenia and Azerbaijan] were at war — what should we do now, tell them why are you at peace?’, he says.

Now, the peace process (which Tbilisi publicly supports) is slowly removing the conditions that made its transit advantage possible. But can Georgia stay competitive on its own merits, rather than relying on regional instability?

Most experts give a straight forward answer: Georgia needs to step up. It needs to complete major projects like Anaklia, push faster toward EU integration, and treat proximity to Europe as a practical tool rather than an abstract goal.

And as Georgia’s advantage from regional conflicts fades, what may matter more now is no longer what its neighbours fail to do, but what Georgia itself manages to build.

[Ukrainian] OPINION: Rubio’s Yerevan Visit: What Washington Said, and What It

Kyiv Post, Ukraine
May 27 2026

OPINION: Rubio’s Yerevan Visit: What Washington Said, and What It Left Unspoken

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s brief stop in Yerevan signaled support for Armenia’s sovereignty without openly endorsing any candidate before the election. By focusing on concrete agreements, Washington denied Moscow an easy propaganda weapon.

By Sevinj Osmanqizi

The South Caucasus has long been treated by the Kremlin as its exclusive geopolitical backyard – a region where even modest dissent can bring swift retaliation.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s arrival in Armenia – the first visit by America’s top diplomat to the country since 2012 – represents a direct challenge to Russian intimidation.

Rubio’s meeting with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan produced a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Charter, alongside a framework agreement for the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), a key transit corridor connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through southern Armenia.

By anchoring Washington directly to the economic and logistical future of the South Caucasus, the US is undercutting Moscow’s regional security monopoly.

Moscow claims TRIPP runs counter to Armenia’s interests and instead promotes its own Meghri corridor concept, which envisages stationing Russian FSB personnel along the route.

The timing says it all

Rubio’s plane touched down in Yerevan less than two weeks before Armenia’s high-stakes June 7 parliamentary elections. In the vote, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s reformist government faces a well-funded push from pro-Russian opposition factions seeking to drag Yerevan back into Moscow’s orbit.

For months, Russia has engaged in an overt campaign of intimidation to force Armenia into submission. Since Pashinyan began freezing Armenia’s participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and pivoting toward Western partnerships, Moscow has actively intensified its political and economic pressure over the Pashinyan administration.

Most recently, Moscow issued blatant threats of economic warfare, warning that it could drastically hike natural gas prices if Armenia continues on its path toward Euro-Atlantic integration. At the same time, Russian regulators have found a range of Armenian imports – from vegetables to flowers and alcoholic beverages – supposedly unfit for the Russian market. In practice, such measures appear designed to frighten Armenian businesses and increase pressure on voters ahead of the election.

Against this backdrop of economic blackmail, Rubio’s visit sends a clear message: Armenia is no longer standing alone.

The Aug. 8, 2025 Washington peace summit brokered by US President Donald Trump fundamentally ruptured Moscow’s long-standing role as the region’s indispensable arbiter. The TRIPP agreement, advanced further by Rubio during this visit, provides a Western-mediated blueprint for regional connectivity.

Rather than allowing Russian FSB border guards to control transit routes through southern Armenia – a condition Moscow has long demanded – the US-backed framework affirms Armenian sovereignty.

As Rubio noted in Yerevan, building these economic linkages allows Armenians to pursue prosperity independently.  

Absent from Rubio’s narrative

The visit also revealed something important in what Rubio did not say.

Washington avoided the usual language of “democracy promotion” and instead focused on concrete economic and security deliverables.

Second, Rubio’s messaging avoided placing Armenia’s future entirely inside a Brussels-centered frame. By emphasizing direct US-Armenian cooperation and the US-brokered TRIPP initiative, Washington kept itself at the center of the South Caucasus diplomatic architecture. It also avoided handing Moscow an easy propaganda line that Armenia was being pulled wholesale into a Western bloc on the eve of a sensitive election.

Third, the visit avoided the “color revolution” trap. An open endorsement of Pashinyan’s government so close to the June 7 vote would have armed pro-Russian forces with claims of US interference. 

The Ukraine factor

The geopolitical theater surrounding the 8th European Political Community (EPC) summit in Yerevan earlier in May escalated dramatically with President Volodymyr Zelensky’s surprise arrival. Appearing alongside Armenia’s leadership, Zelensky prompted a furious response from the Kremlin.

Speaking at an emergency session of Russia’s Security Council, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu angrily denounced the gathering, claiming that Zelensky was “threatening Moscow from Yerevan,” which remains, on paper, a member of the Russia-led CSTO.

Armenia’s decision to host the wartime leader of Russia’s main military adversary shows that Yerevan now treats its CSTO obligations as effectively dead.

The Putin-Pashinyan confrontation

The structural break between Moscow and Yerevan was laid bare weeks earlier during a rare and tense face-to-face meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Nikol Pashinyan at the Kremlin.

Putin issued a blunt televised warning about Armenia’s deepening integration with Brussels. He stated that Armenia could not simultaneously remain in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and pursue the European Union’s customs framework, threatening an economic cutoff that could affect billions of dollars if Yerevan changes course.

This explosive Kremlin backdrop reveals why Rubio’s arrival in Yerevan – even for just a few hours, without leaving the airport – was so critical. 

By granting a 49-year infrastructure lease to a US-controlled corporation, Yerevan is seeking to ensure that its sovereign choices are backed for decades to come.


Armenia’s Rare Earth Gamble: Corridor Diplomacy Meets Great Power Competition

Rare Earth Exchanges
May 27 2026
Armenia’s Rare Earth Gamble: Corridor Diplomacy Meets Great Power Competition

Highlights

  • Armenia and the US announced a sweeping strategic partnership under the TRIPP framework, including critical minerals and rare earth cooperation agreements.
  • Armenia lacks large-scale rare earth separation, metallization, and magnet manufacturing infrastructure, making commercial viability uncertain despite geological potential.
  • Key deposits linked to copper, molybdenum, and iron ore systems show promise, with byproduct metals like gallium, indium, and rhenium adding strategic value.
  • Significant foreign capital, exploration, permitting, and advanced processing technology would be required before Armenia becomes a meaningful rare earth market participant.
  • Armenia’s near-term value lies in geopolitical positioning within Eurasian corridor competition rather than immediate industrial rare earth output.

Armenia and the United States announced a sweeping new strategic partnership this week, including agreements tied to the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), critical minerals cooperation, and rare earth development. For casual readers, the message is simple: Washington and Yerevan want deeper economic ties, new trade corridors, and future cooperation on strategic minerals. But for serious rare earth investors, the more important question is this: does Armenia actually possess meaningful rare earth leverage—or is this largely geopolitical signaling?

The Corridor Is Real. The Minerals Are Less Certain.

The transportation and geopolitical logic behind TRIPP is credible. Armenia occupies strategically sensitive terrain between Europe, Central Asia, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Washington increasingly seeks alternative Eurasian trade corridors that reduce dependency on both Russian and Chinese influence. But the rare earth portion of the announcement deserves caution.

Armenia has known mineral resources, including copper, molybdenum, and polymetallic deposits. Yet no globally significant rare earth industrial ecosystem currently exists there. No major separation capability. No metallization infrastructure. No magnet manufacturing base.

That omission matters enormously.

The Fine Print Beneath the Diplomacy

The announcement uses sweeping language: “critical minerals,” “processing,” “strategic partnership,” and “unprecedented opportunities.”

But investors should distinguish memorandums from industrial execution. Rare earth supply chains are not built through diplomatic ceremonies alone. They require solvent extraction systems, chemical supply chains, environmental permitting, downstream manufacturing, power infrastructure, technical labor, and long-term customer qualification.

The deeper significance here is geopolitical. Washington increasingly recognizes that critical minerals are becoming instruments of statecraft. Armenia may prove strategically useful as part of broader Eurasian corridor competition. But at present, this looks far more like early-stage positioning than a transformative rare earth breakthrough. The map may matter before the mine does.

National Profile

Armenia possesses potentially meaningful reserves of rare earth elements and critical minerals, though much of the country’s strategic mineral promise remains underexplored and commercially immature. Key deposits are associated with Armenia’s existing copper, molybdenum, and iron ore systems, particularly the Kaputan iron ore deposit near Abovyan, where some Russian researchers have claimed rare earth concentrations potentially significant on a global scale.

Armenia also hosts valuable byproduct metals including gallium, indium, selenium, tellurium, bismuth, and rhenium—materials increasingly important for semiconductors, defense systems, electronics, and AI-related hardware manufacturing. Recognizing this strategic potential, the United States and Armenia recently signed a framework agreement focused on cooperation in the extraction and processing of critical minerals and rare earths, signaling growing Western interest in diversifying supply chains away from China and Russia.

Still, investors should approach the narrative cautiously. Armenia does not currently possess a developed rare earth industrial ecosystem. The country lacks large-scale separation capability, metallization infrastructure, alloy production, and magnet manufacturing capacity—the true downstream bottlenecks that dominate modern rare earth supply chains. Geological potential alone does not guarantee commercial viability. Considerable foreign capital, exploration work, permitting, infrastructure upgrades, environmental management, and advanced processing technology would be required before Armenia could emerge as a meaningful participant in global rare earth or critical mineral markets. At present, Armenia’s greatest value may be geopolitical positioning and long-term strategic optionality rather than immediate industrial output.

Armenia Upcoming Parliamentary Elections: Candidates and Risk Scenarios

Special Eurasia
May 27 2026

Armenia Upcoming Parliamentary Elections: Candidates and Risk Scenarios

Executive Intelligence Snapshot

Armenia will hold the next parliamentary elections in June 2026. This event might become decisive for the country’s political future for the next five years.

The results of the votes depend on the Armenian public opinion’s valuation of Nikol Pashinyan’s policy following the loss of the Nagorno-Karabakh and the launch of the peace process with Azerbaijan.

The central question is whether the current government will retain its Western‑leaning course or whether opposition forces, many of which advocate revisiting key decisions of recent years, will gain enough support to redirect Yerevan’s strategic orientation.

Context

The Armenian Central Election Commission (CEC) set the country’s parliamentary elections on 7 June 2026 and officially approved 19 parties and alliances. According to the polling, current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, leader of the ruling Civil Contract party, remains the main favorite of the 2026 parliamentary election. His party has been in power since 2018, following mass anti-government protests that brought down the Republican-led government and elevated Pashinyan to office.

Although his popularity declined after Armenia’s loss in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Pashinyan remains a strong candidate supported by his party that officially nominated him for another term as prime minister.

However, he still faces a significant challenge from opposition blocs. At least three other political forces are also considered likely to enter parliament and potentially participate in coalition-building: the Prosperous Armenia party led by businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, the Armenia Alliance headed by former president Robert Kocharyan, and the newly created Strong Armenia bloc associated with billionaire Samvel Karapetyan.

Former President Rober Kocharyan led the main opposition to the current government. He has strongly criticised Prime Minister Pashinyan over the loss of the Nagorno-Karabakh and the peace process with Azerbaijan. Opposition forces argue that the current government has weakened Armenia’s security, made excessive concessions, and significantly distanced the country from Russia in foreign policy. However, the opposition remains fragmented and faces challenges in uniting around a single political agenda despite growing dissatisfaction with the government.

Another notable party is the Strong Armenia party led by Samvel Karapetyan. While Samvel Karapetyan formally leads the party, Armenia’s Constitution bars dual citizens from serving in parliament or becoming prime minister, making him ineligible because he holds Russian, Cypriot and Armenian citizenship. As a result, even though Samvel Karapetyan has announced that he is renouncing his Russian and Cypriot citizenship, for now his nephew Narek Karapetyan heads the party’s electoral list and has taken on a prominent public role in the campaign, acting as one of its main representatives.

However, Narek Karapetyan’s candidacy has recently faced controversy after local authorities brought criminal charges alleging that he concealed information related to foreign citizenship, accusations that could affect his political future and eligibility, though the case remains ongoing. Samvel Karapetyan himself is also under house arrest and faces multiple criminal charges, including alleged tax evasion, embezzlement of property, money laundering, and public calls for the seizure of power and the overthrow of the constitutional order.

Why Does It Matter?

The June 2026 parliamentary election will likely determine Yerevan’s geopolitical direction, foreign policy, and the future of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process after the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. The outcome of the vote will function as a popular opinion on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s rule and his strategy of pursuing normalisation with Azerbaijan, deeper cooperation with Europe and the United States, and a gradual reduction of dependence on Russia.

Because Armenia occupies a strategic position in the South Caucasus between Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and Asia, its foreign policy choices affect regional trade and transport corridors. Armenian officials argue that if peace with Azerbaijan is secured and borders reopen, the country could turn its geography into a strategic advantage by becoming a short bridge connecting Europe with Central Asia, India, China, and other Asian markets, in addition helping strengthen the country’s economy, sovereignty, and long-term stability.

By contrast, much of the opposition – including parties associated with former political elites and the new Strong Armenia bloc linked to businessman Samvel Karapetyan – advocates a more Russia-oriented foreign policy and a harder line on regional security. The election also matters for Armenia’s energy security because the country depends heavily on low-priced Russian natural gas for heating, electricity, and industrial production.

The Kremlin recently warned that if Armenia moves further away from Moscow and toward Europe, it could lose access to discounted gas prices, which could increase energy costs and put pressure on the economy and households.

The election therefore has implications not only for domestic politics but also for whether Yerevan maintains its westward shift or reorients itself toward Moscow.

Outlook

Current polling and analyst assessments suggest that Pashinyan’s ruling party, Civil Contract, is the most likely to win, though without an overwhelming mandate or constitutional supermajority. If Pashinyan wins, Armenia would likely continue pursuing a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, closer ties with the European Union and the United States, and cautious diversification away from Russian security dependence, while also facing domestic backlash from the opposition supporters and continued pressure from Moscow, which could include limits on preferential gas prices and other economic measures.

If opposition forces perform strongly or form a governing coalition, Armenia could possibly slow or partially reverse Western integration, seek better relations with Russia, and adopt a tougher stance toward Azerbaijan, though coalition fragmentation could create instability. Such a shift would drastically affect the peace agreement with Azerbaijan, and, according to Prime Minister Pashinyan, could lead to a war.

At present, the most probable outcome appears to be a weakened but still leading Pashinyan government rather than a full opposition takeover.

Written by

  • Ekaterina Petrichenko

    Intern at SpecialEurasia. She is an undergraduate student pursuing a bachelor’s degree in International Relations and Italian Studies with a minor in Economics at Connecticut College, where she is completing her third year. Her academic interests include international affairs, economics, security studies, human rights, and political analysis. She has experience supporting nonprofit and advocacy work in Washington, D.C., where she contributed to research and analysis related to human rights and international justice, while also assisting in the organisation of meetings and engagement with members of Congress and policy stakeholders. She speaks Russian, English, and Italian..

All operations on Armenia: Russia’s influence machine targets the vote

Institute for Strategic Dialogue
May 27 2026

All operations on Armenia: Russia’s influence machine targets the vote

Joseph Bodnar and Simona N.

Executive Summary 

Multiple Russian information operations are converging on Armenia in an apparent attempt to influence parliamentary elections on 7 June, mainly by undermining the candidacy of current Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Some of the highest profile and prolific Russian aligned actors have spent months attacking Pashinyan and his allies. These actors have used a wide range of tactics, including creating sites for fabricated media outlets, impersonating genuine outlets and journalists, and relaying content through influencers and seemingly unconnected sites. So far, they have received millions of views on X, and they are only likely to escalate their activities in the run up to and following the elections.  

This Dispatch examines Storm-1516, the Russian Foundation to Battle Injustice and Operation Overload, three Russian state-sponsored or aligned operations targeting Armenia. Additional threat actors are likely conducting complementary efforts, including the organization behind the Doppelganger operation, according to a UK government policy paper. The activity comes as Armenia approaches a pivotal election likely to pit pro-European and pro-Russian political visions against one another. It also continues Russia’s long-running effort to manipulate Armenian politics to advance Moscow’s regional interests.

Key findings   

  • Since early 2025, Armenia has been a persistent target of Russian information operations despite Moscow’s attention being divided across multiple global conflicts. These information operations are likely to escalate as Armenia’s parliamentary elections approach 7 June. These operations have gained millions of views and largely sought to undermine Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan through impersonation tactics and false narratives, such as claims that Pashinyan is anti-Christian and involved in a range of criminal activities, from running brothels to trafficking drugs and organs.   
  • Storm-1516, arguably Russia’s most impactful information operation, targeted Armenia more than any other country between April 2025 and April 2026, according to ISD data. The operation used faux news and activist websites, impersonated real outlets and journalists and laundered narratives through X influencers and seemingly unconnected sites (including one Chinese state media site). These narratives received millions of views on X, prompting at least one public response from the Armenian Prime Minister’s office.   
  • False narratives promoted by the Russian Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI), an organization founded by late Wagner group leader Yevgeny Prighozin, received millions of views. Between April 2025 and April 2026, R-FBI has published more than a dozen articles attacking Pashinyan and those close to him. Most content was republished by a small group of pro-Russia sites and amplified by many of the same X influencers used in Storm-1516 operations.  
  • Operation Overload, a long-running operation aligned with Russian interests, has impersonated more than 50 organizations and individuals in videos that spread false narratives about Armenia this year. Between 1 January and 7 May, 2026, ISD’s dataset of approximately 500 Operation Overload posts across several platforms showed Armenia was the third most targeted country, behind only Ukraine and France. While the operation’s use of bots makes its impact difficult to measure, it has prompted a public response for the press secretary for Armenia’s prime minister and has had isolated moments of virality in past campaigns targeting Western countries. 

Methodology  

This Dispatch includes data on covert and overt messaging campaigns targeting Armenia that are attributed to or aligned with the Russian government. Data collection periods varied across threat actors because systematic monitoring began at different times based on when each actor was incorporated into the research effort. Additionally, while ISD’s datasets are robust and provide representative samples, they should not be considered exhaustive. It should also be noted that actors beyond those detailed in this Dispatch are reportedly targeting Armenia, including operations such as Doppelganger. ISD analysts used social listening, data analysis and domain analysis tools to conduct this research. The sections below provide brief descriptions of each threat actor and ISD’s data collection methodology, followed by detailed analyses of their activity targeting Armenia. 

Armenia in the eye of the Storm-1516 

Background on Storm-1516 

Storm-1516, also known as Neva Flood, is a Russian state-sponsored information operation. According to a German intelligence assessment, the operation is tied to Russian military intelligence, the Moscow-based Center for Geopolitical Expertise think tank and the Double-Headed Eagle movement, financed by Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev.  

Clemson UniversityMicrosoft, the Gnida Project, the French government agency VIGINUM and others have detailed Storm-1516’s tactics. To identify its narratives, ISD drew from these studies to develop a list of the operation’s attributes, including the use of CopyCop sites and a network of influencers on X.  

Between August 2023 and April 2026, ISD analysts collected data on roughly 200 campaigns. ISD’s database has more than 30 instances of operations targeting Armenia since April 2025.  

Storm-1516 activities targeting Armenia 

Armenia was the most frequently targeted country in Storm-1516 activity between April 2025 and April 2026, with more than 30 recorded campaigns. The operation used faux news and activist websites, impersonated real media outlets and journalists and laundered content through Chinese state media, Turkish news sites and influencers on X. Storm-1516’s narratives received millions of views on social media, prompting public responses from the Armenian Prime Minister’s press secretary.  

Many of Storm-1516’s false claims portray Pashinyan as a criminal and anti-Christian. The operation’s first Armenia-focused narrative in April 2025 used a video in which an allegedly underage girl accuses Pashinyan of rape. Subsequent narratives alleged Pashinyan ran brothels, bought mansions in Canada and France and used his office to enrich his family. Storm-1516 has also promoted claims that Pashinyan burned crosses, refused to allow a statue of Jesus to be built and approved an LGBTQ+ parade. The operation also targeted Pashinyan’s wife, accusing her of stealing money from a children’s cancer fund. These narratives are consistent with past Russia-aligned campaigns targeting leaders such as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Emmanuel Macron, which seek to discredit political figures through allegations of corruption and moral degeneracy.  

Image 1 (left): Storm-1516’s first campaign targeting Armenia, which featured a video of a woman accusing Pashinyan of rape. Image 2 (right): Storm-1516 campaign accusing Anna Hakobyan, Pashinyan’s wife, of stealing millions from charity.

Storm-1516 also has sought to strain Armenia’s relationships with neighboring states and international partners. The operation promoted claims that Turkish entities were draining Armenia’s gold reserves, receiving its water and taking control of its electricity networks. Several Storm-1516 narratives also aimed to foster hostility between Armenia and France, one of Baku’s partners on the world stage: this included claims Pashinyan had cut corrupt deals with a French businessman and allowed France to dump nuclear waste in Armenia. By contrast, Storm-1516 devoted comparatively less effort to stoking historic animosity between Armenia and Azerbaijan, though it promoted at least one narrative aimed at doing so.  

 The operation has used a wide range of tactics to spread its narratives. Roughly a dozen claims in ISD’s dataset were seeded on fabricated media websites known as “Copy Cop” websites, a network of sites the EU attributed to a former Florida deputy sheriff who now supports Storm-1516 activities. Many were designed to resemble generic Armenian news platforms using domains such as armeniadaily[.]org and armenianinsider[.]am. Other Copy Cop websites were built to resemble international outlets. One site, timescanada[.]ca, used the identities of real Canadian journalists. In another case, two Copy Cop sites were pitted against each other to advance a narrative: a website for a fabricated Armenian activist group was set up to denounce reporting by a fake French news outlet. 

Image 3 (left): Copy Cop site called Armenia Daily used by Storm-1516
Image 4 (right): Chinese state media outlet CGTN Turk laundering Storm-1516 claim

Storm-1516 also laundered Armenia-focused content through third-party outlets. Chinese state media outlet CGTN Turk published two articles linked to the operation, the first time a Chinese state-controlled entity has been used to launder content for the Russian operation. CGTN Turk removed both articles shortly after publication. Storm-1516 also placed articles on several Turkish websites, including ODA TVsoL Haber and Evrensel 

Influencers on X played a central role in amplifying Storm-1516 videos and articles. ISD found more than 1,600 posts from roughly 1,000 accounts that shared links to Storm-1516 content targeting Armenia. Thirty-six of those accounts had 100,000 or more followers, and approximately 150 of them had over 10,000 followers. Those accounts cater to a wide range of audiences, including supporters of QAnon, US President Donald Trump and Iran.Accounts overtly affiliated with Chinese and Russian state media also shared the content, as did a small network of accounts that researchers with ties to a Belarusian state-linked operative.  

Russian Foundation to Battle Injustice fights for falsehoods 

Background on R-FBI 

The Russian Foundation to Battle Injustice (R-FBI) is a “fake human-rights defence NGO created in March of 2021 by Wagner group founder Yvgeny Progozin” according to the EU, which sanctioned the organization in 2025. Clemson UniversityVIGINUM and others have demonstrated R-FBI’s involvement in Storm-1516 operations.  

However, in 2025, ISD analysts observed R-FBI running its own distinct campaigns. Unlike Storm-1516, R-FBI makes a limited effort to conceal the origins of its content. Its videos bear its logo; while other sites frequentlyrepublish its material, they generally credit R-FBI as the original source. Given this distinction, ISD began tracking R-FBI as a separate operation.  

ISD identified one R-FBI video and more than a dozen articles targeting Armenia, most of which were promoted by a network of influencers on X. 

R-FBI activities targeting Armenia  

R-FBI’s posts have received millions of views promoting false narratives about Armenia, often adopting similar tactics to Storm-1516. As with the other information operation, the Armenian Prime Minister’s press secretary has rebuked claims that originated from R-FBI.  

Between April 2025 and April 2026, R-FBI published more than a dozen articles attacking Pashinyan, his family and members of his party. These articles depict Pashinyan as a corrupt tyrant who is increasingly hostile to the Armenian Church. R-FBI has accused Pashinyan of trying to “eliminate political rivals before elections” and putting opposition figures in “concentration camps.” R-FBI has further alleged that Pashinyan traffics drugs and organs, as well as allowed Western pharmaceutical companies to experiment on Armenian women and children. All of these are narratives have, to some extent, also been used by Russian threat actors to denigrate Ukrainian President Zelensky.   

Image 5: R-FBI article republished by VT Foreign Policy and posted by X influencer

A small cluster of pro-Russia sites republished R-FBI’s articles targeting Armenia, enabling them to reach wider audiences. VT Foreign Policy, a site formerly known as Veterans Today that has ties to Russian intelligence-run sites, republished many R-FBI articles. The London Times, which poses as a local media outlet but regularly launders Storm-1516 content and Russian state media, circulated verbatim R-FBI articles as well. Additionally, the Azerbaijani site Haqqin repeatedly cited Storm-1516’s content.  

On top of working with ideologically aligned sites, R-FBI’s attacks on Pashinyan and his government used many of the same X accounts that circulated Storm-1516’s narratives to advance its claims. Roughly 50 accounts that shared Storm-1516 links also shared R-FBI links, suggesting the operations draw from the same pool of influencers. These influencers include accounts such as DangerousThinkgDarrenPlymouth and TheSavior (all of which appeared on Bloomberg‘s May 2026 list of “top X accounts spreading Storm-1516 disinformation.”) Researchers, including those at Clemson University, have previously reported on R-FBI’s connection to Storm-1516.  

Image 6 (left): Video with R-FBI logo shared on X
Image 7 (right): R-FBI article republished by VT Foreign Policy and shared on X

Between April 2025 and April 2026, more than 1,100 X accounts shared links to R-FBI’s Armenia-focused articles or articles that republished R-FBI’s content verbatim. Many of those accounts have large followings. More than 60 accounts had more than 100,000 followers, and more than 150 accounts had more than 10,000 followers. Tapping into this influencer network enabled R-FBI’s content to reach millions on X. The mostviewed post, which accused Pashinyan of selling organs to France, was viewed more than 5.7 million times. Multiple posts alleging Pashinyan and other Armenian officials were pedophiles also reached more than a million views.  

Operation Overload impersonates celebrities and media outlets 

Background on Operation Overload   

Operation Overload, also known as Matryoshka and Storm-1679, is a Russian-aligned operation that impersonates credible sources to sow confusion and distrust in Western institutions. It posts manipulated videos and images, often branded with stolen media logos, across X, Bluesky, TikTok and Telegram. The operation also directly contacts researchers and fact checkers, likely to distract them from other investigations or to generate coverage that increases its perceived influence.  

ISD has monitored Operation Overload since 2024. In 2025, we published multiple pieces on its activity. ISD analysts use a range of indicators to identify Operation Overload posts, such as short videos with logos from reputable organizations and posts that tag media outlets, research institutions and political figures accounts.   

The operation often relies on bots to artificially inflate its engagement metrics and rarely gains engagement from real users. Although the operation does not appear particularly impactful, we are detailing its campaign against Armenia to demonstrate the breadth and diversity of pro-Russia operations seeking to influence the upcoming elections. 

From January 1 to May 7, 2026, ISD collected approximately 500 posts on X, Bluesky, TikTok and Telegram attributed to Operation Overload. More than 100 of those posts targeted Armenia.  

Operation Overload activities targeting Armenia 

In ISD’s sample, Operation Overload targeted Armenia more frequently than any country except Ukraine and France. In an apparent effort to lend credibility to false claims, these posts included videos that impersonated more than 50 organizations and individuals, including media outlets, government agencies, private companies and celebrities. Much of the Armenia-focused content sought to discredit Pashinyan by undermining public trust in his leadership. Given Operation Overload’s consistent and well-documented use of bots to artificially inflate engagement metrics, it is difficult to assess the reach of its campaign.  

Roughly 60 percent of posts targeting Armenia directly name “Pashinyan” or “Prime Minister” in their text, indicating that the operation’s primary intent is to damage his credibility ahead of the election. The true figure is likely higher as many posts attached videos that focused on Pashinyan without referring to him by name in the post text itself. ISD’s sample found narratives from Operation Overload accusing Pashinyan of election riggingcorruptioncensorship and catering to foreign interests over those of Armenians. The operation also spread false claims about Pashinyan’s personal life, alleging his wife was having an affair and that he was hiding a cancer diagnosis. 

Image 8 (left): Operation Overload post on X containing videos with the logos of Bellingcat and Euronews
Image 9 (right): Operation Overload post on X containing a video with real footage of an actor

Beyond Pashinyan, Operation Overload focused heavily on Armenia’s relationship with France, depicting Paris as the foreign hand steering Armenia into war with Russia and silencing Pashinyan’s critics. Other posts attacked Armenia’s Olympic team, claimed the country was a “sex hub for homosexual paedophiles,” and spread false statistics about Europeans being opposed to Armenia’s accession to the EU.  

Nearly all Operation Overload posts included videos designed to appear as though they were made by trusted organizations or high-profile individuals. During the reviewed timeframe, Armenia-focused content impersonated more than 50 entities. Roughly two dozen videos used authentic footage of celebrities paired with apparent AI-generated audio to falsely depict them disparaging Pashinyan. During a two-day period in April alone, the operation produced nine videos featuring different celebrities “urging Armenians not to let Pashinyan win.” The campaign also impersonated at least 20 media organizations, with Politico appearing most frequently in our sample. Intelligence agencies from the United Kingdom and France, along with companies such as Netflix and OpenAI, were also impersonated. 

Given the operation’s systemic use of bots to artificially inflate engagement metrics of its content, it is difficult to assess Operation Overload’s impact. Historically, its reach has been limited. However, the operation’s persistent appropriation of logos belonging to credible news organizations and institutions, alongside its impersonation of well-known public figures, risks damaging the reputations of those entities and eroding public trust in authentic sources of information. 

The groundwork is laid for election interference 

Russia state-sponsored and aligned operations have spent months spreading false narratives about Pashinyan, laying the groundwork for an election interference campaign meant to undercut his re-election chances and advance those of more pro-Russia candidates. In addition to being persistent, these operations have used a wide range of sophisticated tactics to make their fabricated claims appear genuine and to ensure they are seen by a wide audience. They have created faux local and international news sites, impersonated real news outlets and journalists and relayed content through influencers and third-party sites.  

The scale and complexity of these operations underscore the importance Russia assigns to Armenia’s upcoming election. These efforts also reflect the Kremlin’s effort to preserve leverage over Armenia’s political trajectory asits influence is increasingly contested, with public support growing in Armenia for closer integration with the EU. In this context, Armenia’s election is not only a domestic political contest. This election is also a test of whether Russian influence can still meaningfully shape the foreign policy orientation of countries in its immediate neighbourhood. 


Moscow Warns Armenia Could Lose Cheap Fuel Over EU Path

Modern Diplomacy
May 27 2026

Russia announced that it would stop supplying cheap oil and gas to Armenia if the country continues its efforts to join the European Union.

Russia announced that it would stop supplying cheap oil and gas to Armenia if the country continues its efforts to join the European Union. This warning came just before the June 7 election, where Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party leads in the polls. Maria Zakharova from the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that a letter had been sent officially warning of the suspension of agreements on the supply of natural gas, petroleum, and diamonds if Armenia proceeds with EU membership.

Armenia, a landlocked nation of about 3 million people, has historically been close to Russia, relying heavily on it for energy—importing 2.7 billion cubic meters of gas last year, with 82% from Russia. However, relations have weakened as Armenia has sought closer ties with the West. Recently, U. S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Yerevan and signed a strategic partnership agreement, alongside Armenia’s law to begin the EU accession process.

With information from Reuters