The Russians will not come to save Armenians or Moldovans, now everyone is on

Eurasia Daily
May 29 2026
The Russians will not come to save Armenians or Moldovans, now everyone is on their own — Moldovan Wagon Shopping Center

Nikol Pashinyan, who sold Armenia to Azerbaijanis and Turks, is a very clever populist. He distributes the money received from parallel imports to Russia and says that the Russians are to blame for everything. It looks like Moldova, but now the Russians will no longer come to save either the Armenians or us, writes the TV channel “Moldavian Wagon”.

Pashinyan says that he dismisses the slogan “death or freedom”, which Armenia has been guided by since the collapse of the USSR. Now: “Armenia is a state of life, not death.” We don’t have to choose between death and freedom. We must live and be free. But, in fact, Pashinyan offers Armenians a choice without a choice — to die freely under the Turkish so-called “great Turan”. It’s like in Moldova, under Romanian.

But there are nuances, Pashinyan is very popular in Armenia. He raised people’s pensions. Where does the money come from? Parallel import to Russia. And banking transactions with Russian companies. He is a tough populist. He wets all the former politicians from the Karabakh clan, to the delight of the Armenians. Because the old clans dragged everything that wasn’t nailed down. Pashiyan also drags. But. Those old ones got people more.

The most important thing. Pashinyan is popular because he saved people from such a stupid chimera as patriotism. He explained very clearly to people why they should not have defended Karabakh, why Russian soldiers should have done it, and therefore Russia is to blame for not saving Karabakh, which is not recognized by Armenia.

Well, that is, ideally, for almost every resident of the country. A scheme that frees you from everything. It’s like in Moldova, if the government has destroyed the entire economy of the country, then Russia is to blame, it is she who has covered the gas for us and is waging a hybrid war against Moldovans.

Pashinyan says:

“We lost the war. But this is not our responsibility, the Russians are to blame for everything. Personally, Putin is to blame. The CSTO. How could we fight if Putin did not recognize Karabakh? How could we do something if it was the Russians who had to do something?”

So it is in In Moldova, the opposition cannot do anything by itself, it is waiting for the Russians who will come and overthrow the Sandu regime, they themselves cannot do anything. A comfortable position, right?

Pashinyan will win the elections in Armenia, as well as PDS — Sandu will win once again in Moldova. But this time, and now always, the Russians will not come to save the Moldovans or Armenians, now somehow we have to get out of this shit ourselves.

More details: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/05/29/the-russians-will-not-come-to-save-armenians-or-moldovans-now-everyone-is-on-their-own-moldovan-wagon-shopping-center

Russia sends 280 tons of wheat and 277 tons of fertiliser to Armenia via Georg

1TV Georgia
May 29 2026
Russia sends 280 tons of wheat and 277 tons of fertiliser to Armenia via Georgia and Azerbaijan

Today, a shipment of four wagons carrying 280 tonnes of wheat and four wagons of 277 tonnes of fertiliser departed from Bilajari station en route to Boyuk Kesik.

It is significant to note that to date, over 28,000 tonnes of grain, more than 4,000 tonnes of fertiliser, 133 tonnes of aluminium, and 68 tonnes of buckwheat have been transported from Russia to Armenia via transit through Azerbaijan and Georgia.

In addition to transit cargo, petroleum products are also exported from Azerbaijan to Armenia. Currently, more than 10,000 tonnes of diesel fuel, 979 tonnes of AI-92 petrol, and 2,955 tonnes of AI-95 petrol have been exported from Azerbaijan to Armenia.

Armenia Officially CONFIRMS ENTRY In Iran War? Inducts U.S. F-35 Destroyer MAJ

Daily Motion
May 29 2026
Armenia has officially unveiled and inducted Iran’s Majid AD-08 air defense system into its armed forces, marking the first confirmed foreign deployment of the Iranian-made weapon platform.

The move is being viewed as a major geopolitical and military development in the South Caucasus, signaling deepening defense ties between Yerevan and Tehran amid rising regional tensions.

The Majid AD-08 system gained international attention after Iranian media and military-linked sources claimed it successfully intercepted advanced U.S. and Israeli drones during recent Middle East conflicts.

Often described in regional media as an “F-35 destroyer” due to its stealthy radar-silent tracking capability, the system is designed to target drones, cruise missiles, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft using electro-optical and infrared guidance.

Armenia reportedly displayed the Iranian system publicly during Republic Day rehearsals in Yerevan, fueling speculation about expanding Iran-Armenia military cooperation.

The deployment also comes as Armenia continues diversifying its military suppliers beyond Russia, while balancing growing tensions involving Azerbaijan, Turkey, Israel, and Iran across the region.

This video breaks down the Majid AD-08 system, why Armenia’s decision matters strategically, and how Iran’s defense technology is expanding internationally despite sanctions and regional pressure.

#Armenia #Iran #F35 #AirDefense #MajidAD08 #MiddleEast #MilitaryNews #BreakingNews #Israel #Russia #DroneWarfare #WorldNews #Geopolitics #DefenseNews #SouthCaucasus

~HT.318~ED.464~PR.462~GR.508~VG.MX~

Who’s who in Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections?

OC Media
May 29 2026

Voters are set to choose the country’s next ruling party in what will be the first regularly scheduled parliamentary vote since 2017.

On 7 June, nearly  2.5 million eligible voters in Armenia will choose between 18 parties and alliances competing for seats in parliament.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s ruling Civil Contract party is expected to face its strongest challenge from three major opposition blocs: the Strong Armenia Alliance, backed by Russian–Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan; the Armenia Alliance, the main parliamentary opposition alliance led by former president Robert Kocharyan; and the Prosperous Armenia party led by businessperson Gagik Tsarukyan.

Armenia’s formerly ruling Republican Party, which was previously present in parliament as part of the I Have Honour alliance, will sit out the elections.

Civil Contract

Slogan: Stand for peace.

The Civil Contract party, led by Pashinyan, has ruled Armenia since the 2018 Velvet Revolution and remains the frontrunner in the upcoming elections. The key question is whether the party can once again secure a constitutional majority, allowing it to govern without coalition partners and push through constitutional changes.

Civil Contract entered parliament in 2017 as part of the Way Out Alliance with just 7.7% of the vote. The following year, after then-president Serzh Sargsyan attempted to remain in power as prime minister, which became possible after a constitutional change, Pashinyan launched a protest campaign which ultimately forced Sargsyan’s resignation.

Running in the subsequent 2018 snap elections under the My Step Alliance, Civil Contract won over 70% of the vote.

Pashinyan’s biggest challenge has remained Armenia’s defeat in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, which sparked mass protests and demands for his resignation. Despite the crisis, Civil Contract retained power in the 2021 snap elections, winning 54% of the vote.

At the party’s 2025 congress, Pashinyan pledged to establish a ‘Fourth Republic of Armenia’ if re-elected, centred around adopting a new constitution — an issue repeatedly raised by Azerbaijan as a precondition for signing the initialled peace treaty.

Pashinyan has, since 2024, heavily promoted his ‘Real Armenia’ ideology, insisting that Armenians must accept modern Armenia within its current borders. He has also warned that an opposition victory could lead to renewed war with Azerbaijan as they want to ‘revise’ the peace, and has further accused his main rivals of maintaining foreign ties, labelling them as a ‘three-headed war party’.

In foreign policy, Pashinyan has said he wants a ‘balanced and balancing’ approach, making efforts to normalise relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey and deepen cooperation with the EU and the US, while at the same time maintaining ties with Russia.

Civil Contract is currently polling in first place, according to the latest International Republican Institute (IRI) poll, with 32% of respondents saying they would vote for the party as of 22 May.

Strong Armenia

Slogan: Change only with Samvel Karapetyan.

Russian–Armenian tycoon Samvel Karapetyan, whose estimated wealth of $4.4 billion amounts to around half of the country’s entire public budget, was largely uninvolved in politics before he made his entry in June 2025.

Interestingly, Karapetyan’s brother, Karen Karapetyan, has longstanding ties to Armenia’s former ruling Republican Party, serving as an MP from 2007–2008 and 2012–2018as well as chief of staff to then-president Sargsyan.

Samvel Karapetyan’s engagement in the political sphere, however, only came after he was arrested following remarks in defence of the Armenian Apostolic Church amidst escalating tensions between the Church and Pashinyan’s government. Authorities swiftly charged him with calling for the usurpation of power, while also adding separate money laundering charges.

Explainer | How Pashinyan is working to topple Catholicos Karekin II

Today, the campaign is formally led by his nephew, Narek Karapetyan, though in reality Samvel Karapetyan continues directing it from house arrest.

Despite polling strongly enough to likely enter parliament independently, Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia party chose to form a broader alliance with the smaller New Era and United Armenians parties. The Country to Live party — linked to another Russian–Armenian tycoon, Ruben Vardanyan, jailed in Azerbaijan since September 2023 — later signed a cooperation memorandum with the bloc.

Although named as the alliance’s candidate for prime minister, Karapetyan is constitutionally barred from the post due to holding citizenship of another country. Even so, the alliance has pledged to change the constitution if elected to pave the way for his candidacy.

Explainer | Who is Samvel Karapetyan, the Russian–Armenian billionaire whose empire is under siege

The alliance has promised sweeping economic reforms, but concerns remain over Karapetyan’s vast business interests in Russia and reported ties to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), with many questioning how independently he could shape Armenia’s foreign policy. Karapetyan has rejected all allegations, however, insisting Armenia will remain his sole priority.

In addition to the charges against Karapetyan, dozens of others have also been arrested, mostly accused of attempting to bribe voters.

Although there is no figure for the total number of members of the party arrested, Armenian authorities announced that from February to 19 May, 57 criminal proceedings had been launched related to electoral crimes. These cases predominantly included Karapetyan’s alliance affiliates. For his part, Karapetyan has rejected handing out any bribes.

Strong Armenia is currently in second place according to the latest poll, with 6% of respondents saying they would vote for the party as of 22 May.

The Armenia Alliance

Slogan: Together we can.

The alliance, which emerged as the largest opposition bloc following the 2021 snap elections, is once again led by Armenia’s former President Robert Kocharyan.

Born in Nagorno-Karabakh, Kocharyan served as the region’s president before moving to Armenia in 1997, when he was appointed prime minister. A year later, he was elected Armenia’s president and remained in office until 2008. The end of his tenure was marked by the deadly crackdown on post-election protests on 1 March 2008, after the opposition disputed the election results as rigged.

Pashinyan was among the protest leaders, and after he came to power, Kocharyan was charged over his alleged role in the violence.

After entering parliament in 2021 — though Kocharyan at the time refused to take his seat in parliament, saying that, ‘by virtue’ of his character, he had ‘always been a person of executive power’ — the alliance fell apart by the end of 2022. This was largely the result of Reborn Armenia’s decision to leave parliament, supporting other MPs from the Armenia Alliance and I Have Honour blocs, who boycotted parliament beginning in May that year, demanding the government’s resignation and holding parallel street protests against what they alleged was Pashinyan’s ‘readiness to make major concessions’ to Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Now, Kocharyan’s alliance returns in a different configuration: still including the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, it is now joined by the newly established Forward Party, founded by former Republican Party member Sevak Khachatryan. This party is replacing Reborn Armenia, the party chaired by former Syunik governor Vahe Hakobyan, who was also an ex-member of the Republican Party.

Kocharyan has accused Pashinyan of eroding ties with Russia and advocates for deeper ties with Russia and what he describes as a ‘guaranteed peace’, suggesting that Russia, the US, China, and France could play a role in securing it.

The Armenia Alliance came in third place in the latest poll, with 3% of respondents saying they would vote for the party as of 22 May.

Prosperous Armenia

Slogan: Guaranteed peace, prosperous Armenia, well-off life.

Eccentric tycoon Gagik Tsarukyan founded his party in 2004, and previously formed coalitions with Sargysan’s governments. After their relations deteriorated, Tsarukyan stepped back from politics in 2015, returning ahead of the 2017 parliamentary elections, when his party re-entered parliament.

For the 2026 elections, the party is running via the Proposal to Armenia programme, together with Andranik Tevanyan’s Mother Armenia Alliance and Suren Surenyants’s Democratic Alternative, on a joint list. The coalition is yet to announce their prime ministerial candidate, though Tsarukyan has claimed that it will not be him.

Tsarukyan has described his programme as a ‘political and civic Noah’s Ark’ guiding the country to ‘salvation and rebirth’. He has separately pledged to construct a Noah’s Ark memorial after completing what he says will be the world’s tallest Jesus Christ statue, claiming the works will draw ‘millions’ of tourists.

Over two weeks ahead of the elections, however, the party faces trouble.

On 21 May, Tevanyan was charged with espionage and treason, as part of what appears to be the first investigation into Russian-backed espionage and treason since Armenia gained its independence. Tevanyan has been accused of being recruited by foreign intelligence services in 2024 and of passing on state secrets in exchange for $622,000, accusations he denies.

Separately, reporting by the independent Russian media outlet The Insider, citing leaks from Russia’s now-disbanded Directorate for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, included copies of Tsarukyan’s passport as well as financial estimates related to his 2017 election campaign.

Tsarukyan has clear business ties in Russia and is also friends with Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka. Previously, in 1979, he was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison for robbery and the gang rape of two Russian tourists. The verdict, however, was overturned in 2001 following an appeal by Tsarukyan.

Prosperous Armenia is currently tied for fifth place, with 1% of respondents saying they would vote for the party in the latest poll.

The Meritocratic Party of Armenia

Slogan: Work creates strength, strength creates rights.

Despite being founded only in 2025, the party ranked fourth in the latest IRI poll published in late May, with 2% of respondents saying they would vote for it in the upcoming elections, behind Tsarukyan’s party.

Gurgen Simonyan, the chair of the party, advocates Armenia’s withdrawal from Russia-led blocs, including the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), while calling for deeper integration with Western institutions.

Simonyan previously served in Armenia’s Public Council in 2019–2020, an advisory body for the Armenian government.

The New Power party

Slogan: Let’s build a Kargin (‘Proper’) country.

The party, founded in 2024, is led by ex-Yerevan mayor and well-known comedian Hayk Marutyan. Their slogan is a reference to Kargin Haghordum (Proper Show), a popular comedy sketch series co-created by Marutyan that has aired since the early 2000s.

Marutyan was a prominent supporter of Armenia’s Velvet Revolution, following which he was elected Yerevan mayor with the then-ruling My Step Alliance. He was ousted in 2021 via a no-confidence vote by the ruling coalition, however, and since then, has taken an oppositional stance.

Through his leadership of the National Progress party, Marutyan came to be the main challenger of the ruling Civil Contract in the 2023 Yerevan City Council elections, coming in second. In February 2024, however, he was removed from the council over accusations he had missed too many council sessions. Later that same year, Marutyan and the National Progress party ended their cooperation, leading Marutyan to found his own party.

This election will mark Marutyan’s first run in parliamentary elections. His campaign has focused heavily on satire and mocking videos mostly targeting Pashinyan. Marutyan has also left open the possibility of cooperating with Karapetyan’s alliance.

The New Power party was below the polling threshold as of 22 May.

The Armenian National Congress

Slogan: A sensible path for Armenia.

Though ostensibly headed by the 81-year-old first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the party has been fronted in the campaign by its prime ministerial candidate, Levon Zurabyan.

The party emerged in 2008 as an alliance of opposition parties and activists backing Ter-Petrosyan following the disputed presidential election that year — five years later, it was officially established as a party. The alliance entered parliament in 2012, with Pashinyan among its MPs, though subsequent electoral attempts failed.

Ter-Petrosyan and Pashinyan were once close allies, jointly leading protests after the 2008 election, but relations between them have sharply deteriorated, especially since 2025 amidst mutual accusations and criticism. Ter-Petrosyan has also backed the Church in its ongoing confrontation with Pashinyan.

Despite repeatedly expressing sympathy for Karapetyan and calling for opposition consolidation around him, talks between the Armenian National Congress and Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia Alliance failed to produce an agreement.

The party has vowed to continue the process of establishing peace and normalising relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as establishing the TRIPP+BRICS Concept, with which they believe ‘Armenia will overcome its landlocked status, becoming a strategic international transit hub’.

The Armenian National Congress was below the polling threshold as of 22 May.

Wings of Unity

Slogan: Justice is coming.

The Wings of Unity party, formed in 2025, is led by former Human Rights Defender Arman Tatoyan, who held the post from 2016 to 2022. He was arguably Armenia’s most popular human rights defender in light of his fact-finding activities reporting on the damages caused by Azerbaijan since the 2020 war and subsequent escalations.

Prior to 2016, Tatoyan served as deputy foreign minister during Sargsyan’s presidency.

The party also includes former State Revenue Committee head Davit Ananyan, who served under Pashinyan from 2018 until resigning in 2020. Earlier, under Sargsyan, he had served as deputy finance minister.

Its electoral list also includes members of the nationalist Shant Alliance party.

The party says it aims to ‘build an Armenia without hidden agendas’.

The Armenian Independence Observers group filed a report alleging illegal party financing following an investigation by the Dossier Centre, which suggested that the party’s pre-election campaign may have operated on a $2.5 million budget over five months and involved coordination with Russian political consultants linked to Kremlin-affiliated structures.

Leaked documents show Russian plans to unseat Pashinyan, ties between Karapetyan and Putin

The Wings of Unity party is currently tied for fifth place, with 1% of respondents saying they would vote for the party in the latest poll.

Bright Armenia

Slogan: Defend your identity.

Bright Armenia was founded in December 2015 by Edmon Marukyan, who is best known for having served as Armenia’s Ambassador-at-Large from March 2022 until February 2024, when he resigned citing ‘differences in our views on several fundamental foreign policy issues’.

Ahead of the 2017 parliamentary elections, the party joined forces with Civil Contract and the Republic Party to form the Way Out alliance, which cleared the electoral threshold.

The party’s strongest result came in the 2018 snap parliamentary elections, when it entered parliament independently. However, in the 2021 elections, it failed to pass the electoral threshold.

In its most recent campaign, the party has advocated for Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan, convicted of publicly calling for a coup in October 2025, for the presidency, arguing that Armenia should not have a president who ‘has no disagreements with the executive branch and does not balance the judicial and legislative powers’. The party will not nominate a candidate for prime minister.

The Bright Armenia party was below the polling threshold as of 22 May.

The Republic party

Slogan: For you, Armenia, for you.

The party was founded in 2001 by Aram Sargsyan, who briefly served as Armenia’s prime minister from 1999–2000 following the assassination of his brother and then-prime minister Vazgen Sargsyan, a founding figure of the Armenian Armed Forces who played a central role in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War.

In 2017, it was part of the Way Out alliance alongside Civil Contract and Bright Armenia. In 2023, it entered into a governing coalition in Yerevan with Civil Contract after no party secured a majority in the city council elections.

The party was also part of Eurovote, a civic initiative that collected over 60,000 signatures and succeeded in pushing Armenia’s Parliament to adopt a bill calling on the government to pursue EU integration in 2025.

The Republic party is currently below the polling threshold as of 22 May.

The Rally For The Republic party

Slogan: Your voice in the Parliament.

The party was registered in 2021 and is chaired by Arman Babajanyan, who entered parliament in 2018 as a member of Bright Armenia before later serving as an independent MP.

The party has a pro-Western stance and was among the members of the Eurovote initiative. In particular, it advocates normalisation with neighbouring countries, Armenia’s withdrawal from the Russian-led CSTO and the EAEU, and exclusively ‘horizontal’ relations with Russia.

The Rally For The Republic party is currently below the polling threshold as of 22 May.

The Christian-Democratic Party of Armenia

Slogan: Vote for justice.

Founded in February 2021, the party is led by political analyst Levon Shirinyan. That year, Shirinyan ran with Babajanyan as the Shirinyan–Babajanyan Democrats Alliance, but the coalition failed to pass the electoral threshold and did not enter parliament.

Shirinyan has positioned his party against both Armenia’s return to Russian influence and the comeback of Armenia’s former ‘criminal-oligarchic’ political elites.

The Christian-Democratic Party of Armenia is currently below the polling threshold as of 22 May.

The Against All Democratic Party

Slogan: Against all.

Registered in March 2026, less than three months before the elections, it describes itself as an alternative political party with an alternative offer.

The party aims to form a 100-day government, amend the Electoral Code, and trigger new elections through its resignation, while pledging not to contest the next vote. It argues the current system ensures ‘the absolute power of a single party, regardless of the election results’, and calls for abolishing the stable majority rule, lowering the electoral threshold, and introducing a ‘against all’ ballot to guarantee ‘a real choice, not a forced one’ and those votes to converted into vacant mandates.

Its prime ministerial candidate is human rights activist Nina Karapetyants, who vows to step away from politics for 10 years after serving.

The party has held a unique campaign, beginning by throwing mud at the logos of all the candidates in a reference to the common Armenian idiom ‘to throw mud’, meaning to defame or discredit.

The Against All Democratic party is currently tied for fifth place, with 1% of respondents saying they would vote for the party.

The Democratic Consolidation party

Slogan: Let’s build the Armenian state.

Founded in 2021, the party is chaired by Suren Petrosyan, a prominent supporter of the Tavush for the Motherland movement, which opposed border delimitation in Armenia’s northern Tavush region in 2024. Petrosyan later stepped back from the movement in mid-June 2024, following large-scale protests against Pashinyan’s government.

The party takes a middling stance, supporting the maintenance of strong relations with Russia, while also deepening relations with the EU and US.

The Democratic Consolidation party is currently below the polling threshold as of 22 May.

The Kochari National Revival and National Awakening Party

Slogan: Victory is not only a memory of the past, but also a goal of the future.

The party, founded in March 2026, vows to ‘hire a 50–80 thousand private army and to liberate Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] and Nakhchivan’.

The party is chaired by Artak Sargsyan, with his brother Arman Sargsyan serving as vice-chair. According to media reports, the pair, known as the ‘Arthur Brothers’, have long been involved in controversial political and business activities in Kenya and the Maldives, including alleged drug trafficking and document forgery, allegations they deny.

The brothers also supported the Tavush for the Motherland movement and were detained in June 2024 by Armenia’s National Security Service on suspicion of illegal weapons possession.

The Kochari National Revival and National Awakening party is currently below the polling threshold as of 22 May.

The Democracy, Law, and Order Party

Slogan: Democracy, law and order.

The party was founded in 2024 and originally nominated former military police officer Vardan Ghukasyan as its prime ministerial candidate. However, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) has rejected his registration, citing failure to prove continuous residence and citizenship requirements for the previous four years, as required by law. It is unclear whether they will nominate someone else, or continue supporting Ghukasyan.

Ghukasyan rose to prominence via his social media streams, publishing scandalous and leaked information about various state bodies and actors. He has been wanted by Armenia since May 2023 over allegations of extortion, contempt of court, and public calls for violence. He is currently being held in a US prison for alleged immigration violations.

Ghukasyan previously led the Public Voice party, which won around 10% of the vote and seven seats in Yerevan’s 2023 city council elections. Unlike the other two opposition blocs, Public Voice attended the inaugural council session, helping avert an opposition boycott aimed at forcing new elections. He left the party in January 2024.

The Democracy, Law, and Order party is currently tied for fifth place, with 1% of respondents saying they would vote for the party.

The National Democratic Pole Alliance

Slogan: Faith, homeland, sovereignty — into action.

Founded in May 2020, the party is largely made up of members of the Sasna Tsrer (the Daredevils of Sasun), a group of Nagorno-Karabakh War veterans known for storming a police station in Yerevan in July 2016 and called for an uprising against the government, taking hostages. Two police officers were killed during the crisis.

The alliance has nominated Varuzhan Avetisyan, convicted for the 2016 events, as its candidate for prime minister.

The party’s platform centres on the principle of legal succession from the First Republic of Armenia, including what it describes as the restoration of Armenia’s territorial integrity ‘including Artsakh’ and a reassessment of the Soviet period as an ‘occupation’.

The National Democratic Pole Alliance is currently below the polling threshold as of 22 May.

The Reformists Party

Slogan: Security and development.

The party is led by Vagharshak Harutyunyan, who held senior roles in Armenia’s security structures between 1991 and 2000, including as defence minister. Under Pashinyan, he briefly served as chief adviser in 2020 before again being appointed defence minister later that year. He subsequently served as Armenia’s ambassador to Russia from 2022 until his recall in 2024.

The party was founded in 2016 by Vahan Babayan, a former MP of the Prosperous Armenia party. In 2017, Babayan however backed Sargsyan and the then-ruling Republican Party.

They pursue the adoption of a new national security concept and, through constitutional amendments, the limiting the post of prime minister to a single term.

The Reformists party is currently below the polling threshold as of 22 May.

Elections in Armenia: geopolitics on the ballot

May 29 2026

By Marina Ohanjanyan
In short
  • On June 7th Armenia is going into the most “gepoliticised” election it has ever had.
  • One of the main campaign narratives revolves around Armenia’s geoplitical turn away from Russia. In reaction to Yerevan’s distancing, Moscow is stepping up diplomatic and economic pressure, disinformation campaigns and political interference.
  • Another major campaign narrative centers on the peace process with Azerbaijan. This remains a controversial issue for many Armenians.
  • Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party is ahead in the polls. It thus looks set to secure another mandate and continue its geopolitical course. But to make that course sustainable for the longer term more will be needed than just winning the elections.

It is probably safe to say that Armenia has never before experienced so much high-level international presence as it did on 4-6 May 2026. Representatives from 34 countries converged on capital Yerevan for two back-to-back summits: the 8th European Political Community, and the first ever EU-Armenia summit.

For days Armenian social media overflowed with imagery of European and world leaders strolling along Yerevan’s streets, going on morning runs and visiting local cafés. Various leaders proclaimed their dedication to the small Caucasian nation’s democratic development and spoke of its belonging to a common European culture. 

The timing of the summits was hardly accidental. The high-level visits came only a month before crucial parliamentary elections that one Armenian expert, in a conversation with the
author,1 referred to as “the most geopoliticised elections” Armenia has ever seen. Indeed, foreign policy and the country’s geopolitical vector have never been on the campaign agenda to quite such an extent. Having been forced to make some crucial and significant strategic choices over the past years, the country finds itself balancing between various regional and great power interests, without a safety net. What are the decisions facing Armenia on June 7th, and what could be their consequences?

This alert will first analyse the various geopolitical magnetic fields that Armenia is subject to through the prism of two major narrative pillars in the electoral campaign: Russia vs. the West and the peace deal with Azerbaijan. It will then look into the prospects for the main actors in the election, and finish with some thoughts on the post-election period, as well as some steps and developments necessary to solidify Armenia’s geopolitical reorientation.

Upcoming elections in Armenia: why is it important? – a view from Azerbaijan

Commonspace.eu
May 29 2026

This commentary was prepared by Mr Ahmad Alili for the ninth issue of the Armenia Election Monitor 2026 newsletter.

The upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia are no longer being discussed only within Armenia itself. Today, the Armenian vote is being closely watched in Azerbaijan, Russia, Türkiye, across Europe, and in the United States. This is not simply another domestic electoral cycle in a small South Caucasus country. It is an event capable of influencing the future geopolitical architecture of the entire region. At the same time, its significance should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated.

For the first time in Armenia’s modern political history, an incumbent leader is approaching elections with an agenda centred on peace and normalisation rather than conflict management or historical mobilisation. This distinction is important. The 2021 elections were not about peace. In the aftermath of the 2020 Karabakh war, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was effectively seeking a mandate connected to the preservation of the Karabakh issue and to a broader post-war political framework shaped by remedial secession narratives. The current political moment is fundamentally different.

What is now emerging is a debate not only about political leadership, but about Armenia’s entire geopolitical worldview and strategic self-perception.

For decades, the dominant Armenian geopolitical narrative rested on a relatively straightforward idea: Armenia is surrounded by hostile powers — primarily Azerbaijan and Türkiye — and therefore can survive only through external protection and asymmetric geopolitical balancing. Within this framework, the military presence of outside actors, particularly Russia, was presented not as a limitation on sovereignty but as the principal guarantee of survival.

This worldview was promoted not only domestically but internationally as well. One of the most recognisable formulations associated with former President Serzh Sargsyan was the portrayal of Armenia as “the last castle of Christendom in the East.” The narrative was designed largely for European and American audiences and sought to embed Armenia into a broader civilisational and emotional framework of geopolitical defence.

Over time, however, reality increasingly challenged this model. The very existence of close Armenia–Iran relations demonstrated that the simplistic dichotomy of a “Christian fortress surrounded by hostile Muslim powers” never fully reflected the complexity of regional politics. More importantly, the 2020 Karabakh war exposed the structural limits of the old geopolitical formula itself. The disappearance of the Karabakh issue in its previous form gradually undermined the logic upon which Armenia’s post-Soviet security architecture had long rested.

This is why one increasingly hears a phrase among parts of Armenian society and expert circles: “Why would we need Russia if there is no more Karabakh?” Behind this seemingly simple question lies a profound strategic transformation. If the unresolved Karabakh conflict historically served as the main justification for external military protection and geopolitical dependency, then its disappearance inevitably raises questions about the future purpose of those arrangements.

At the same time, these debates are unfolding within a deeply traumatised society still shaped by the psychological consequences of war, displacement, defeat, political polarisation, and prolonged insecurity. Public fears remain exceptionally high, and this atmosphere has inevitably become part of the electoral campaign itself. Competing political forces increasingly rely on the language of existential threat for Armenia. One side warns that losing power would inevitably lead to a new war with Azerbaijan and the collapse of Armenian security. The other argues that electoral defeat would expose Armenia to pressure, destabilisation, or confrontation with Russia. In this sense, both camps are actively securitising the elections and mobilising the traumas accumulated over recent years. The campaign therefore reflects not only a struggle over Armenia’s future direction, but also a competition over which fear Armenian society considers more existential.

As a result, the elections are gradually becoming a contest between two broader visions of Armenian statehood.

The first vision is largely rooted in the traditional security paradigm: Armenia remains a besieged state surrounded by enemies and therefore requires permanent external protection and geopolitical patronage in order to survive.

The second vision proposes a fundamentally different trajectory. It argues that Armenia should evolve into a more autonomous and genuinely sovereign regional actor that accepts the geopolitical realities of its neighbourhood and builds pragmatic relations with surrounding states. Within this framework, geography is interpreted not as an existential trap but as a potential foundation for coexistence, trade, connectivity, and regional integration. According to this logic, the development of stable neighbourly relations would gradually reduce Armenia’s dependence on external military guardianship.

These two visions increasingly place the European Union, the United States, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan within one broader geopolitical framework that favours the transformation of Armenia into a more autonomous, regionally integrated, and post-conflict state. At the same time, Russia and, to a certain extent, Iran appear more comfortable with the preservation of the older Armenian security model, in which Armenia’s sense of vulnerability and isolation created an internal political and psychological demand for external security patronage. Within that framework, the continued perception of existential threat legitimised the long-term military, political, and economic presence of outside actors in Armenia.

This transformation is precisely why the Armenian elections are being discussed far beyond Armenia itself. The issue is not merely who governs Yerevan. The broader question is whether Armenia will continue functioning primarily as a heavily securitised geopolitical outpost dependent on outside powers, or whether it will attempt to reposition itself as an integrated participant within the South Caucasus regional system.

The growing involvement of external actors in the electoral environment further reinforces this perception. Russia, European actors, and the United States are no longer passive observers of Armenian domestic politics. Many Armenian opposition figures maintain deep political, economic, or personal ties with Russia, including, in some cases, Russian citizenship itself. Simultaneously, European and American political engagement with Armenia has become increasingly visible through high-level visits, symbolic gestures of support, and expanding diplomatic involvement. Armenia has therefore become part of a broader geopolitical competition among external centres of influence, each attempting — directly or indirectly — to shape the strategic environment in which Armenian political choices are made.

The implications extend well beyond Armenian domestic politics. If the second vision gradually gains ground, it could open the possibility for a qualitatively different South Caucasus. Regional integration projects might become politically sustainable rather than remaining abstract geopolitical concepts. Economic corridors, transport connectivity, energy cooperation, and trade routes would no longer exist merely as instruments of geopolitical competition but as shared interests contributing to long-term regional stability.

More fundamentally, the Armenian debate increasingly concerns the future logic of the South Caucasus itself. Historically, the region became vulnerable precisely because its states often remained isolated from one another while integrating into competing external geopolitical systems. Under such conditions, South Caucasus nations could easily be instrumentalised against each other by larger powers pursuing their own strategic interests. From this perspective, regional integration is not simply an economic or infrastructural ambition; it increasingly appears as a strategic necessity. A more interconnected South Caucasus reduces the space for external manipulation, lowers the incentives for perpetual confrontation, and creates shared interests that strengthen the sovereignty of all regional states simultaneously.

Conversely, the continued fragmentation of the region risks preserving a geopolitical environment defined by dependency, rivalry, militarisation, and recurring external competition. In this sense, the elections concern not only Armenia’s future, but also the future coherence of the South Caucasus as a geopolitical space.

For this reason, the Armenian elections represent neither a civilisational turning point nor a routine domestic political procedure. They are something more nuanced, yet potentially more consequential: a strategic referendum on how Armenia understands sovereignty, security, and its place in the region after the end of the Karabakh era. And Azerbaijan closely watches.

Source: Mr Ahmad Alili is the Director of Caucasus Policy Analysis Centre, an independent think tank based in Baku, Azerbaijan. His LinkedIn can be found here.


Turkish Press: Russia suspends sale of 64.5M bottles of Armenian mineral water

Turkey Today
May 29 2026

Russia suspends sale of 64.5M bottles of Armenian mineral water

Russia has suspended the sale of 64.5 million bottles of mineral water imported from Armenia, citing health-related concerns, Russia’s consumer safety agency said Friday.

In a statement, Russia’s Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor) announced measures targeting the Jermuk mineral water produced by Armenia-based Jermuk Group CJSC.

The agency said health-related violations had been identified in the products and ordered the suspension of their sale across Russia.

“Rospotrebnadzor has instructed the relevant authorities to suspend the sale of 64.5 million bottles of mineral water produced by Armenia-based Jermuk on Russian territory,” the statement said.

The agency added that it had issued an additional directive to the operator of the Chestny Znak state labeling system to halt the sale of 64.5 million units of Jermuk natural mineral medicinal and carbonated table water.

“The order to block new batches is valid from May 28, 2026 until additional notice,” the statement said.

Agency cites technical regulation violations

Rospotrebnadzor said the decision was based on violations of technical regulations.

According to the agency, testing found excessive levels of hydrogen carbonate ions, chlorides and sulfates in the water.

The agency said the discrepancies could create misleading impressions about the product’s medicinal properties and could have adverse health effects.

The suspension comes days after Russia imposed temporary restrictions on imports from Armenia in other sectors.

Moscow introduced restrictions on flower imports from Armenia on May 22 and expanded the measures to include fruit and vegetable imports on May 28.

The latest move comes amid increasingly critical exchanges between Russian and Armenian officials in recent months.

Armenia unveils upgraded Iranian-made Majid air defense system during Republic

Army Recognition
May 29 2026
  • 29 May, 2026 – 9:00
  • Defense News Army 2026

Armenia publicly unveiled an upgraded Iranian-made AD-08 Majid short-range air-defense system during the Republic Day parade in Yerevan, a development reported on May 28, 2026, that signals a stronger focus on countering drones, cruise missiles, and other low-altitude threats within its evolving air-defense network. The new configuration combines the Majid’s established electro-optical targeting system with an onboard radar, expanding detection and reaction capabilities against difficult-to-track targets and improving performance in challenging weather conditions.

The addition of radar surveillance to the infrared-guided AD-08 enhances target acquisition while preserving the system’s low-emission engagement profile, increasing its effectiveness against UAVs, loitering munitions, and low-flying aircraft. Integrated alongside Armenia’s S-300PS, Tor-M2KM, and Akash systems, the upgraded Majid strengthens the country’s layered air-defense architecture and reflects a broader shift toward mobile defenses optimized for persistent drone and precision-strike threats.

On May 28, 2026, Armenia displayed at least two Iranian-made AD-08 Majid short-range air-defense systems during the Republic Day parade in Yerevan, revealing a configuration not previously seen outside Iran. Unlike the original Majid unveiled in April 2021, the Armenian variant combined the standard electro-optical fire control suite with a planar-array radar mounted on the launcher, according to Patarames. Earlier Majid systems relied primarily on passive target acquisition and imaging infrared-guided missiles rather than radar support, and the AD-08 gained prominence during the 2026 Iran war after reportedly hitting U.S. F-35 stealth fighters.

The Armenian configuration appears to represent a more complete and potentially export-oriented variant that combines passive sensors with active surveillance, potentially addressing limitations associated with adverse weather, low-signature targets, and the field-of-view constraints of electro-optical sensors. The AD-08 appeared within a broader modernization display reflecting Armenia’s military restructuring after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and subsequent border confrontations. Indian acquisitions included the Akash surface-to-air missile system, Pinaka multiple launch rocket system, and ATAGS 155 mm towed howitzer.

Russian equipment included the S-300PS long-range air defense system, Tor-M2KM short-range air defense system, Iskander-E ballistic missile system, and T-72 main battle tanks, while the French CAESAR 155 mm self-propelled howitzer made its first public appearance in Armenian service. Assets acquired over the previous decade, such as BM-30 Smerch launchers, Osa-AKM air defense systems, armored personnel carriers, and tactical vehicles, were also displayed. Within this force structure, the AD-08 complements the S-300PS, Tor-M2KM, and Akash within a layered air-defense network extending from area defense to point defense around military formations and critical infrastructure.

First unveiled by Iran in April 2021, the AD-08 was developed to engage small UAVs, loitering munitions, cruise missiles, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft that are often inefficient targets for larger radar-guided SAM systems. According to an official brochure from Iran’s Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics, the Majid system consists of the AD-08STO electro-optical detection and tracking system, the AD-08CC command-and-fire-control subsystem, the AD-08L launcher, and the AD-08 interceptor missile. The Majid can engage four targets simultaneously under all-weather conditions.

Unlike conventional SHORAD systems, the original Majid emphasized passive engagement through electro-optical tracking rather than continuous radar illumination, reducing emissions while maintaining effectiveness against low-altitude threats. The AD-08 missile measures 2,670 mm in length, 156 mm in diameter, and weighs 75 kg, including a 14 kg warhead. Engagement range extends from 0.7 to 8 km, and engagement altitude from 0.2 to 5 km. Early launchers carried two missiles, while later production vehicles (either the Iranian-made Aras-2 4×4 tactical vehicle or the Iveco Daily 4×4 light truck) adopted a four-canister configuration, doubling ready-to-fire capacity.

The missile is launched from angled canisters, uses a proximity fuze, and relies on passive imaging infrared homing for terminal guidance. In October 2023, the missile was adapted for use with the jet-powered Karrar drone, expanding its potential employment options beyond ground-based launchers. The defining feature of the original AD-08 architecture was its passive engagement cycle. Detection and fire control were performed through a sensor suite combining a daylight camera, thermal imager, and laser rangefinder. The system provides a 15 km acquisition range, 360-degree azimuth coverage, 0-48 degree elevation coverage, and simultaneous processing of four targets.

Because the acquisition range is nearly twice the missile’s maximum engagement distance, operators can establish target tracks before threats enter the firing envelope. Since neither the fire control sequence nor the missile requires radar illumination, adversarial aircraft or drones receive no conventional radar-lock warning. The absence of continuous radio-frequency emissions also reduces vulnerability to a response with anti-radiation missiles and certain electronic warfare techniques. The radar installed on the Armenian vehicle represents the most significant visible modification.

Earlier Majid units could operate alongside the Kashif-99 mobile phased-array radar, designed to detect small aerial targets and reportedly capable of tracking up to 300 contacts simultaneously. However, similar radar-equipped Majid systems appeared in Iran during late 2025. The radar’s size suggests a search-and-cueing role rather than missile guidance, since the interceptor remains infrared-guided. The addition improves detection of low-thermal-signature UAVs, low-radar-cross-section targets, and threats obscured by haze, dust, clouds, or precipitation, while reducing reaction times through automatic cueing of the electro-optical tracker toward detected contacts.

Operationally, the AD-08 occupies the lowest layer of Iran’s ground-based air-defense network beneath the 9 Dey, Khordad-15, Mersad, Bavar-373, and S-300PMU-2 surface-to-air systems, focusing on threats that penetrate medium- and long-range engagement zones. Its 0.7-8 km engagement envelope corresponds closely to the flight profiles of tactical UAVs, loitering munitions, and low-altitude reconnaissance assets. Simultaneous engagement of four targets provides greater resistance to saturation attacks than single-channel SHORAD systems, while radar integration improves performance against drone swarms and small low-observable targets. Moreover, combining radar surveillance, electro-optical tracking, thermal imaging, laser ranging, and imaging infrared guidance introduces sensor redundancy and increases resilience when one detection method is degraded. 


Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

Hungary, Armenia shift away from Russian influence

Semafor
May 29 2026

Hungary, Armenia shift away from Russian influence

Two countries long friendly with Moscow moved towards Brussels, pointing to Russia’s waning sphere of influence.

Hungary and Armenia were largely pliant allies of the Kremlin’s in years past, but Viktor Orbán’s recent electoral defeat and Yerevan stating its intention to pursue EU membership have upended Moscow’s strategy.

The shift comes into stark relief today, with new Hungarian leader Péter Magyar in Brussels to revive EU ties that fell into disrepair during Orbán’s tenure. Armenia will also skip a summit of the Moscow-dominated Eurasian Economic Union. Russia’s hold is even weakening in Central Asia, as Beijing vies for influence there, a “trend [that] has become so persistent that Moscow has virtually no chance of reversing it,” an expert wrote.

— Prashant Rao

Pressure from Russia on Armenia ahead of elections: economy as tool of influen

JAM News
May 29 2026
  • Armine Martirosyan
  • Yerevan

From 30 May, Russia will ban imports of tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, herbs and strawberries from Armenia. Since early spring 2026, Moscow has steadily expanded restrictions on Armenian exports.

The measures first targeted Jermuk mineral water, followed by certain alcoholic drinks. Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance later imposed a temporary ban on imports of flowers and ornamental plants from Armenia. The agency also raised concerns about shipments of Armenian fruit, vegetables and some livestock products.

Russian authorities say the restrictions stem from sanitary and phytosanitary concerns. However, many Armenian analysts see political motives behind the measures. Moscow has previously used similar trade restrictions against Georgia and Moldova.

Armenia also recently received a letter from Russia warning that Moscow could terminate an agreement governing supplies of natural gas, petroleum products and rough diamonds.

According to Interfax, the letter states:

“Armenia’s continued efforts to deepen cooperation with the European Union, together with the government’s declared ambition to join the EU, threaten the future of Russian-Armenian trade, economic and investment cooperation. Bilateral agreements form one of the foundations of that relationship.”

Armenia’s Foreign Ministry said it would review the letter and respond if necessary.

Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said similar disputes had arisen before. He stressed that Yerevan remained committed to resolving them in a “constructive and partnership-based atmosphere” while continuing to diversify the economy and seek new markets.

Russian officials have repeatedly voiced concern over Armenia’s growing ties with Europe in recent months. Some members of Russia’s political establishment have called on Yerevan to clarify whether it intends to remain in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union or move closer to the European Union.

Armenian officials have repeatedly acknowledged that membership in both blocs is incompatible and say they will make a choice when the time comes. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has argued that Armenia must first bring its economy and institutions closer to European standards. He described that process as difficult and time-consuming. According to Pashinyan, the Armenian people will make the final decision once the country is ready.

Speaking recently, Pashinyan reiterated that Armenia has no plans to leave the Eurasian Economic Union. He also argued that anyone seeking to pressure Armenia is “digging a grave” for the EAEU itself.

“Today, Armenia matters to the East, the West, the South and the North alike. That is why everyone should come to Armenia with their best offer. The Armenian people will make their own choice. We are no longer a dead end shaped by conflict; we are a crossroads of peace. Those who rely on threats and pressure are making a mistake. The Armenian economy faces no danger. Investments worth billions are on the way. Our strategy remains unchanged. We will continue to work calmly and patiently with our Russian partners and resolve all outstanding issues,” the prime minister said.

Many experts see the recent developments as an attempt by Moscow to increase pressure on Yerevan ahead of Armenia’s parliamentary elections.

The vote will take place on 7 June, and several pro-Russian political forces are taking part. Some analysts believe the Kremlin hopes the pressure will strengthen their electoral prospects. Others argue that such actions are more likely to damage those forces than benefit them.

Political analyst Robert Ghevondyan believes the economic pressure is temporary. At the same time, he argues that Armenia’s dependence on the Russian market has made it vulnerable to such measures. He says the best response is to continue diversifying the country’s economic partnerships.


  • Pashinyan comments on gas prices, recent assault and exposing agents as key election looms
  • ‘We are not inclined to create tension’ – Yerevan responds to Moscow’s claims of ‘unfriendly steps’
  • Russian intelligence operatives sent to ‘target Pashinyan’: The Insider investigation

Economic restrictions as a tool of political pressure

“We should remember what happened in 2004–2005. After Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in Georgia, Russian authorities suddenly began claiming that Borjomi contained harmful substances. At the time, Armenian Jermuk was seen as a high-quality alternative. Now the situation has reversed. Today, Armenia’s authorities are taking steps that Moscow dislikes, and suddenly Jermuk has become ‘problematic’.

This is not a new policy for Armenia. I think the situation will last only a few weeks at most. After the parliamentary elections, Moscow will most likely lift the restrictions on Armenian products, either gradually or all at once. For now, Armenian producers simply need to weather this period.

In my view, what is happening is directly linked to the elections. Russia is trying to increase pressure on Armenia in order to support pro-Russian political forces inside the country and give them additional arguments with which to criticise the government. At the same time, Moscow is signalling its dissatisfaction with Yerevan’s current course and attempting to influence the choices Armenian voters make.”

Moscow’s post-election plan

“Why do I say the pressure may last only a few weeks? Because after the elections, continuing to pressure Armenia will no longer make much sense for Moscow. Russia may spend several days waiting for some kind of post-election turmoil. However, I do not think that is likely. Such a scenario would require large-scale public mobilisation, and pro-Russian political forces in Armenia simply do not have those human resources today.

Online campaigns on Facebook, Instagram or TikTok cannot replace a real grassroots movement. Once Moscow realises that the post-election situation has not altered Armenia’s domestic political balance, it will probably move to a ‘Plan B’ — maintaining working relations with Nikol Pashinyan. At that point, the Russian side is likely to take steps aimed at preserving at least the current level of relations with Yerevan.”

Russia also has an interest in Armenian products

“In reality, it is not in Russia’s interest to keep restrictions on Armenian products in place for a long period. Armenian exports do not account for a critical share of the Russian economy. However, these products occupy their own niche and enjoy steady demand. They include mineral water, agricultural goods and alcoholic beverages. Among them is Armenian brandy, which remains popular on the Russian market.

We also need to take Russia’s own market dynamics into account. Even under restrictions, some of these products will continue to reach consumers through various channels because demand remains strong. The Kremlin understands this perfectly well. Russian officials will also recognise that prolonged pressure is unlikely to produce significant political results inside Armenia. That is why I believe these measures will most likely prove temporary.”

New markets and product competitiveness

“It is clear that Armenia currently has no alternative market capable of replacing Russia as a destination for Armenian exports on the same scale. However, the government’s task is to build a more diversified export system and help producers find new markets.

Producers themselves must also improve product quality in order to increase competitiveness and meet the standards required by other markets, particularly in Europe. At the same time, Armenia should look towards Arab countries, the Asia-Pacific region and North America.

Canada, for example, expressed interest in importing Armenian dried fruit. In practice, however, Armenia could not supply the required volumes. Even though logistics issues had been resolved and demand existed, Armenian businesses failed to meet even 10% of the market’s needs.

In other words, potential markets do exist, but entering them requires systematic effort. Producers need to improve both quality and output, while the state must continue developing external economic ties. Over time, this would allow Armenia to feel more secure and avoid excessive dependence on a single export market.

Logistics remain a major constraint on Armenian exports. A significant share of the country’s foreign trade still depends on the route through Upper Lars checkpoint. If Yerevan wants to expand export opportunities, it needs to work towards opening its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan. That would significantly simplify access to European markets and reduce transport costs for Armenian producers.”