An international group of researchers has launched the Artsakh Displacement and Identity Project, a new study examining the long-term social, cultural, and identity-related consequences of the displacement of Armenians from Artsakh following the 2020-2023 conflict and the events of September 2023.

The full academic title of the study is:
The Fate of the Population Expelled from Artsakh: Subethnic Continuity, Identity Formation, and Forced Displacement.

The project focuses on how forced displacement affects community cohesion, identity formation, and cultural continuity among displaced Artsakh Armenians now living in Armenia, Russia, and the United States.

The study is led by:
• Tessa Hofmann, Dr. phil. (Germany)
• Lilia Arakelyan, PhD (United States)
• Hanna Samir Kassab, PhD (United States)

The research will include 80-100 qualitative interviews with displaced Artsakh Armenians, along with consultations with specialists in migration studies, human rights, political anthropology, and cultural heritage.

The project examines questions of identity preservation, adaptation, intergenerational cultural transmission, and the effects of geographic dispersion after the loss of territorial continuity.

According to the researchers, the study is among the first English-language projects to examine the displacement of Artsakh Armenians through the framework of subethnic continuity and identity transformation.

The six-month project will result in a research report, analytical materials, and multilingual public resources intended for academic, educational, and community use.

The research team welcomes contact from universities, research institutes, community organizations, and individuals working in related fields. Displaced Artsakh Armenians interested in participating in interviews are encouraged to contact the project team.

Research Coordination
Artsakh Displacement and Identity Project

By Badmakagh

Despite the fact that during the First World War the Allied Powers—

England, France, and the USA—called the Armenian nation their ‘little ally,’

after their victory in the war they refused for many months to recognize the

Republic of Armenia as a reality. They dragged out this recognition for nearly

two years, until the beginning of 1920. Finally, on January 19, 1920, the Allied

Supreme Council came to the conclusion to recognize the Republic of

Armenia.

On January 19, 1920, the Allied Supreme Council finally decided the

following:

1. That the government of the Armenian state is recognized as a de facto

(actual) government.

2. That this recognition does not predetermine the issue of the future

borders of that state.12

This very belated decision of the Allies, which took place on January 19,

1920 in Paris, where they were discussing the situation in Transcaucasia as the

Russian Red Army advanced toward the region, can be explained as a political

move to win the favor of the Republic of Armenia and to push it into fighting

against Bolshevik Russia. Otherwise, this very delayed recognition could not be

explained.

Four days later that joyful news finally reached Yerevan. The best

account of the Armenian people’s rejoicing was given by Simon Vratsian, who

among other things relates the following, “On January 23 the news of

recognition was received in Yerevan and spread through society with lightning

speed. Within an hour the entire city was already on its feet. At 3 o’clock a

huge crowd gathered in front of the city governor’s building; the army also

came with its band. Governor A. Shahkhatuni delivered an enthusiastic speech

about the significance of the day and proposed that everyone kneel in honor of

the martyrs of Armenia’s freedom. The army and the many thousands of

people, as one, silently went down on their knees. Then the army and the

11

. Kevork Mesrop, Armenian History, Volume 1, page 225, in Armenian language.

12

. M. S. Karapetian, Armenia in the Years 1912-1920, Yerevan, Zangak, 2003, page

272, in Armenian language.

Page 9 of 13public, with music, proceeded toward the Parliament, where from the balcony

President Av. Sahakian delivered an emotional speech.”

From there, the crowd moved toward the government building and held

enthusiastic demonstrations. During Prime Minister A. Khatissian’s speech,

cannon fire announced the joyful news to the people. Afterwards, the army—

cavalry and infantry—accompanied by the band, marched solemnly through

the streets of Yerevan under the people’s jubilant applause. The city had taken

on a festive appearance: houses and shops were decorated with flags and

carpets. In the evening there was a fireworks display, while from the station

the armored train ‘Azadamart’ illuminated the city”.13

After the recognition by the Allied Supreme Council, other governments

in turn adopted the same decision: the United States on January 26, France,

Great Britain, and Italy on January 28, Japan on March 7, and so on….

By Robert O. Krikorian, PhD,

Keghart

When Armenia declared independence in 1991, it was greeted with jubilation and deep unease both in Armenia and in the various Armenian Diaspora communities. This was understandable given that Armenia was engaged in a life-or-death struggle with Azerbaijan over Artsakh; its previously integrated Soviet economy was in shambles; and its lack of independent statehood for over 600 years (with the notable exception of the short-lived Republic of Armenia 1918-1920).

The odds seemed stacked against the fledgling republic, yet there was also optimism. Many believed that the suppressed talents of Armenians, inside and outside of the homeland, would be harnessed for the good of the country and would lay the foundations of a stable democratic state. These hopes, sadly, have proven unfulfilled as of yet.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, the absence of administrative cadres experienced in democratic governance severely hampered attempts to build a strong and stable state. And while Western aid was forthcoming, it often only addressed the symptoms plaguing the Armenian body politic, not its root causes.

Combined with the legacy of entrenched corruption, and the burdens of war, refugees, and earthquake reconstruction, Armenia has been unable to overcome these legitimate institutional challenges and is struggling to survive in a very rough geopolitical neighborhood.

If we use the common definition of a failed state as a sovereign country whose central government has lost effective control over its territory and can no longer provide fundamental security, maintain the rule of law, or deliver basic public services to its citizens, today’s Armenia is edging dangerously close to fulfilling these criteria.

Armenia no longer has effective control over its territory. This does not refer to the devastating loss of Artsakh and ethnic cleansing of its indigenous inhabitants, but rather the Azerbaijani occupation of sovereign, internationally recognized Armenian territory. The current regime has done little to reverse this occupation and instead reverts to obfuscation or denial. In addition, there is the real threat that Armenia will lose even more sovereign territory if the ill-conceived TRIPP is pushed through.

In terms of providing fundamental security for the people of Armenia, the current regime abdicated this responsibility with the handover of Artsakh. Furthermore, it has failed to learn any lessons from this defeat and instead has taken steps that undermine the readiness and effectiveness of the armed forces. The government’s argument that Armenia is better off without Artsakh is transparently false, as any passing glance at a map will show.

The rule of law in Armenia is regularly ignored and has been weaponized in an unprecedented display of abuse of power. Arbitrary detention, fabricated legal cases, unlawful persecution of the opposition, and the national church are not only ongoing but have increased in intensity in the run-up to the June elections.

In an overtly propagandistic show, the regime recently invited European interference in Armenia’s domestic politics to allegedly prevent Russia from doing the same. The government has failed to explain what makes European interference any less destabilizing than Russian interference. It was obviously a pre-election ploy that the EU was more than happy to participate in for its own interests, not Armenia’s.

But not to be outdone by the EU, the Trump administration sent Secretary of State Marco Rubio to Yerevan for a one-hour visit as a tacit show of support for the current regime. It is certainly not a coincidence that the visit comes just days ahead of the elections. The United States for its own interests needs a compliant government in Armenia and cannot afford to have the incumbent lose.

In neither case did the Europeans or Americans question the current regime about its increasing abuse of power and obvious democratic backsliding.

Regarding the delivery of public services in Armenia, the current regime hasn’t provided meaningful employment or basic social services to those in need. The steady assault on small and medium enterprises has weakened the middle class, while taxation and arbitrary government “inspections” are used as levers of control. And Armenia’s rural situation is teetering on the brink of disaster, both economically and demographically.

Of course, many of these problems predate the current regime but the seeming obsession with non-productive activities like persecuting the Armenian Apostolic Church, restricting discussion of the Armenian Genocide, and undermining the pillars of Armenian national identity instead of focusing on the basic needs of the people has only exacerbated longstanding problems. Pensions remain low, unemployment remains high, yet the police and security forces keep getting raises, most likely to ensure their loyalty.

Given such a scorecard, what is to be done? And by whom? The simple, but not simplistic, answer is to harness the untapped potential of the various Armenian Diaspora communities. It is only through the jointly organized and focused efforts on state building that we can bring Armenia back from the brink of state failure.

The only fully committed entity that Armenia can count on is the Armenian Diaspora. Why? Because we are not friends, we are family. This statement is not naive optimism but is based on observable behavior. We have already proven our commitment to the well-being of Armenia. Diaspora’s multidimensional generosity has been a hallmark of our relationship to the homeland.

For the first time in modern Armenian history, there is a Diaspora with deep roots and connections to an independent Armenian homeland. Family ties, business ties, and cultural connections bring hundreds of thousands of Diaspora Armenians to Armenia every year. These ties hold the keys to a renewed Armenia.

Unfortunately, however, we must acknowledge the failure of successive Armenian governments to effectively harness the experience, expertise, and resources of Diaspora communities. Yes, Diaspora communities have given their money, time, and expertise to Armenia since the beginning of statehood, but these efforts need coordination at the state level. We are now long past the time when such efforts should be undertaken only by individuals and/or organizations. These efforts need pan-Armenian coordination and strategic planning.

The most basic question is what kind of Armenia do we want? We all have opinions, certainly, but do these opinions align with the strategic necessity of building a strong state with equally strong institutions? And who is to determine these priorities?

These priorities can be determined by an ongoing structured strategic dialogue between the Republic of Armenia and the various Diaspora communities. It is time to fundamentally rethink the structure of Armenia-Diaspora relations. The current structure of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs is both inadequate and divisive. Selective access is not the road to success. Picking winners and losers and selectively determining who is “worthy” of government attention only leads to alienation and despondency. Lack of tolerance for differing Diaspora views and lack of understanding of local conditions are inexcusable 35 years after independence.

Constructive criticism is the hallmark of a strong body politic, both in Armenia and in the Diaspora.

Until the current regime abolished it, Armenia had a Ministry of Diaspora Affairs. Today’s conditions call for either its reestablishment or perhaps the creation of a special Department for Diaspora Affairs within the Foreign Affairs Ministry. But whatever path is chosen, every Armenian embassy and consulate should have officials whose job it is to reach out and coordinate all pan-Armenian efforts. Relations with the Diaspora must be made a top priority instead of the afterthought that they are today. Nothing less than the future success of Armenia depends upon it.

Creating the transnational civil society space to have a meaningful dialogue on those issues of pan-Armenian interest, such as economic development, national security, and national identity, is an imperative if we want to reverse the trajectory of state decline before it turns into irreversible state failure. 

*****

Dr. Robert O. Krikorian retired from the Department of State after more than two decades as an intelligence analyst and senior adviser. He began his State Department career as a diplomatic historian, focusing on the practical and policy-relevant applications of historical knowledge. He earned a Bachelor’s Degree from Clark University, a Master’s Degree from The George Washington University and received his PhD in History and Eurasian Studies from Harvard University, where he also taught courses on Russian and Middle Eastern History. In addition, he has taught at the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University and has lectured to hundreds of diplomats at the State Department Foreign Service Institute as part of their training for postings in the South Caucasus and elsewhere. Dr. Krikorian has written and presented extensively on the modern history and politics of Armenia and Eurasia.