11:10,
STEPANAKERT, APRIL 30, ARMENPRESS. 3 new cases of coronavirus (COVID-19) have been confirmed in the Republic of Artsakh in the past 24 hours, bringing the total number of confirmed cases to 2,667.
52 coronavirus tests have been carried out on April 29, the ministry of healthcare of Artsakh said.
Currently, 20 infected patients receive treatment in hospitals.
On April 19 the vaccinations against COVID-19 have launched in Artsakh.
Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan
Armenia’s second President Robert Kocharyan says the defeat in the recent 44-day war in Artsakh seems to have been “planned”.
At a meeting with his supporters on April 26, he said many questions about the war will get answers after the snap parliamentary elections in June.
“I got the impression that it was a planned defeat. We need to understand what the motivation was, who planned it and who carried out this planned defeat,” he said.
Kocharyan believes Armenia should not have suffered a defeat in the war. He noted that on the 3rd or 4th day of the war he saw that there was a serious problem.
“The state did not take over the management of the war. This is the biggest problem. No army can fight for more than a week. As a matter of fact, in the event of such wars the army, according to estimates, can hold out for 5-7 days. During this time, the replenishment of the army begins. And the first big problem was this; the army took the first big blow, but it was necessary to carry out other processes to continue it; state efforts, rear work, replenishment of the army, mobilization, competent resource management … This simply did not happen,” the ex-president.
According to him, in the first 4-5 days of the war, Armenia was not in a bad situation.
“The enemy [Azerbaijan] had advanced some 3-4 km in the south and nearly 5 km in the north. After that, the state had to enter the game with might and main, but it did not and the retreat began. At the moment I do not have answers to many questions, I think we will receive answers after June 21,” Kocharyan emphasized.
12:19,
MARTAKERT, APRIL 27, ARMENPRESS. Azerbaijan pulled back its troops near the Nor Ghazanchi village in Martakert region after having advanced its positions for 400 meters, the Martakert regional governor Hayk Bashkhyan told ARMENPRESS.
He confirmed that the Azeri troops had indeed moved forward for 400 meters in the direction of Nor Ghazanchi, but on April 27 they retreated to their starting positions as a result of the Artsakh President Arayik Harutyunyan’s interference and negotiations of the Defense Army and the Russian peacekeepers.
President Harutyunyan’s spokesperson Lusine Avanesyan confirmed that the Azeri troops pulled back as a result of the implemented “relevant work”.
Reporting by Van Novikov
Editing and Translating by Stepan Kocharyan
Armenia will appoint a Trade Attaché to Iran. The Armenian government adopted a relevant decision today.
The establishment of an Armenian trade attaché in Iran will allow to more effectively represent the economic interests of the Republic of Armenia in various spheres related to economic cooperation, to facilitate the implementation of trade and economic cooperation by Armenian-Iranian economic entities, as well as to support the activation of business initiatives between the two countries.
The creation of a post of trade attaché will enable him to receive more operative information on the economic situation in Iran, the legislation regulating the sphere of foreign economic activity, as well as to provide similar information about Armenia to the interested bodies of Iran.
One of the main responsibilities of the trade attaché is to participate in business forums organized on the ground, to present the business environment in Armenia, to provide relevant information to Iranian entrepreneurs interested in investing in Armenia, to companies, etc.
According to the RA Statistical Committee, Armenia’s trade turnover with Iran in 2020 amounted to $ 400.2 million. Exports from Armenia to Iran amounted to $ 84.8 million, and imports from Iran to Armenia amounted to $315.4 million.
The issues of establishing a joint ventures or branches of Iranian companies in Armenia are currently being discussed by both sides.
In these processes, it is important to eliminate transport barriers and take joint steps to facilitate financial transfers.
With Ukraine the guinea pig for Russian information warfare, the Kremlin has spread dezinformatsiya to European countries and the United States with implications for modern warfare.
Azerbaijan has pursued a pro-Western multi-vector foreign policy balancing integration and cooperation with NATO and the pursuit of good relations with Russia. Baku’s relations with the Kremlin were, therefore, never as cold and brittle as those encountered by Georgia and Ukraine whose territories were invaded by Russia in 2008 and 2014 respectively.
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy was rewarded last year when Russia resisted intervening in defense of its proxy state and Armenia suffered a crushing defeat in the Second Karabakh War. Russia intervened only at the last minute by inserting itself as a “peacemaking” force in the separatist enclave in Karabakh. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia invaded respectively to defend South Ossetian and Donbas separatists.
Nevertheless, Russia’s understanding of hybrid warfare includes the weaponization of information, a factor that was vividly seen ahead of its occupation of Crimea. With Ukraine the guinea pig for Russian information warfare, the Kremlin has spread dezinformatsiya to European countries and the United States with implications for modern warfare.
Russian information warfare is targeting Baku with six dezinformatsiya themes.
The first is a product of Russia’s long-standing conviction, pre-dating Vladimir Putin, of its Eurasian neighbors. The Kremlin has always viewed only itself as possessing true sovereignty and the former non-Russian republics of the USSR as “artificial” states with non-existent sovereignty. Russian great power nationalism only views great powers such the United States, China, and itself as possessing sovereignty.
Russian great power nationalism has long viewed Ukraine as an “artificial state”; Putin first claimed this in the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. The Kremlin’s view of the non-Russian states of Eurasia as “artificial” denies them sovereignty and their independence in 1991 was an “accident.” Armenia and Azerbaijan are part of “historic Russia” and, therefore, within the Kremlin’s sphere of influence.
The second describes Azerbaijan as a puppet state of the West or “puppet client systems.” Pro-Western states in Eurasia are encouraged to become independent of the Kremlin’s sphere of influence as part of Western-inspired conspiracies to make Russia look weak by surrounding her with “unfriendly” states.
Related to this theme is dezinformatsiya about the West in the Second Karabakh War. Azerbaijan allegedly received “instructions” from Washington over how to conduct its policies towards Karabakh. The West wanted war in the South Caucasus and its intelligence services fomented the Second Karabakh War. The British pushed Turkey into supporting Azerbaijan as part of an age-old “Anglo-Saxon” struggle against Russia, repeating typical tropes from Russian Eurasianists who believe Russia and Western civilizations are in constant conflict.
The goal was to distract from Russian support for President Alexander Lukashenko, who was faced by Belarusian protests, and from military operations in Syria. Propaganda claims that the West does not like the presence of Russian “peacekeepers” and is intent on provoking Azerbaijan and Armenia into discrediting and breaking the ceasefire.
Russian dezinformatsiya shows the Jekyll and Hyde view of Turkey. On the one hand, the Kremlin sees it as advantageous to encourage a rebellious, dissident Turkey within NATO. On the other hand, Turkey’s growing influence in the South Caucasus and greater Middle East is viewed as a potential threat, which is reflected in dezinformatsiya claiming Turkey is the main beneficiary from Azerbaijan’s military victory.
Ukraine is allegedly offering to give Crimea to Turkey in return for Turkey providing the same kind of military assistance as it had given to Azerbaijan. Ukraine is warned Turkey has territorial claims on Crimea, which is rather odd as it is under occupation by Russia. Turkey and Ukraine are “at war” with Crimea’s residents. Russia’s xenophobia over this reflects the Kremlin’s concern at Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s unveiling of a “Crimean Platform” initiative to lobby internationally against Russia’s occupation.
Russian dezinformatsiya is full of warnings that Ukraine is planning to use Turkish tactics and military equipment, which allegedly was the most significant factor in Azerbaijan’s victory, to attack pro-Russian separatists in the eastern Ukrainian region of the Donbas. With the Russian military buildup on Ukraine’s border in full swing, Russian dezinformatsiya is warning Kyiv is preparing a “Karabakh scenario” for the Donbas.
The third is a product of the first and second themes which denies the ability of countries with no sovereignty to win military victories. Russian dezinformatsiya is replete with claims foreign mercenaries—Chechens, ISIS, Ukrainians, Turkish—contributed to Azerbaijan’s military victory. Kyiv allegedly trained “militants” and “nationalists” for the Second Karabakh War. In a repeat of allegations made during the 2008 Georgian-Russian War, Ukrainian arms were allegedly sent to Azerbaijan. The most explosive falsehood in Russian dezinformatsiya is that the United States and Ukraine supplied chemical weapons to Azerbaijan, which Zelenskyy dismissed as “fake news.”
The fourth is Russia’s intense dislike of color revolutions. These are viewed as fake popular uprisings engineered by British intelligence agencies, U.S. embassies, and the European Union to weaken Russian influence in Eurasia and distract it from Belarus, Syria, and elsewhere. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is the “Armenian Navalny,” Russia dezinformatsiya says, showing how Russia remained suspicious of him after he came to power in 2018 in a color revolution. Armenia was defeated because the color revolution weakened the Armenian state.
Russia’s view of Pashinyan as a “Western puppet” is typical of the way it saw Ukrainian Presidents Viktor Yushchenko and Petro Poroshenko, Moldovan President Maia Sandu, and Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili in a similar manner. Brought to power by Western conspiracies, they and Pashinyan were viewed as doing the bidding of Western geopolitical interests in Russia’s backyard. These are “geopolitical, geoeconomics, ideological and information struggles are carefully planned by US strategists and set in motion to liberate the post-Soviet space from Russia’s influence.”
With Russian dezinformatsiya alleging the United States spent one billion dollars on Armenia’s 2018 color revolution, it is, therefore, not surprising the Kremlin has always been cool towards Pashinyan. Russia’s distrust of Pashinyan may have assisted Azerbaijan’s victory by Russia withholding military support from Armenia in the hope he would be toppled.
The fifth is how Russia understands the West. The creation of an Eastern Partnership for former Soviet republics in 2010 transformed Russian geopolitical thinking into also viewing the European Union as a geopolitical rival. Over the last decade, the Kremlin has been perturbed by more than NATO. Russian dezinformatsiya views the Eastern Partnership as a means to weaken Russia by denying what the Kremlin demands to be recognized as its exclusive sphere of influence
According to Russia, the Eastern Partnership is a means whereby the West is transforming former Soviet republics into puppets, colonies, and sources of raw materials. Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan are allegedly “second class” countries in the Eastern Partnership with Ukraine and Georgia presumably first class.
After Putin’s re-election in 2012, the Kremlin pressured Armenia and Ukraine to withdraw from the Eastern Partnership and join its alternative CIS Customs Union. Armenia withdrew from European integration and, together with Belarus, joined Putin’s pet project, the Eurasian Economic Union, as it was renamed in 2015. Only Russia can guarantee Armenian statehood, the Kremlin repeatedly says. Ukraine resisted in the bloody Euromaidan Revolution and together with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova stayed on course with European integration.
The last theme is rooted in historical Russian anti-Semitism. This is rather odd because anti-Semitism is absent from Azerbaijan and the country has a close strategic and military alliance with Israel.
Russia is allegedly the main target of “Jewish-Masonic globalist forces,” a conspiracy uniting the fake Protocols of the Elders of Zion from the late nineteenth century with Russian Black Hundred anti-Semitism and twenty-first-century leftist anti-globalists.
Hungarian Jewish oligarch and philanthropist George Soros is a traditional target of populist-nationalist anti-Semitism in Russia, Hungary, and Poland. The “Pro-Turkish” Soros is seeking to install his own president of the Nagorno-Karabakh separatist state and destroy Armenia, according to Russian dezinformatsiya.
Turkey and Azerbaijan are assisting the “world conquest” by these dark forces by implementing the program of “Jewish-Masonic forces” who are creating a “suffocating circle around Russia,” the main enemy of “Globalists.” These utterly bizarre claims are given extra spice by adding the pop singer Lady Gaga is the ally of “transnational centers” and “occultists-globalists” behind the Turkish-Azerbaijan War. They claim that Lady Gaga allegedly warned Armenians nine days before of the upcoming Second Karabakh War.
Russian dezinformatsiya is an outgrowth of Russian state policy in a country where the media is tightly controlled. These six themes are, therefore, reflective of the Kremlin’s view of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Eurasia more broadly, and the West. Russian dezinformatsiya shows how Russia is uncomfortable with Azerbaijan’s military victory and Turkey’s growing influence in the South Caucasus, two factors which Washington should use to its advantage by renewing its presence in the region.
| The National Interest
Taras Kuzio is a professor at the Department of Political Science, National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy. His fourth book on the war, Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War is to be published by Routledge.
Park dedicated to memory of fallen heroes of Artsakh opened in Cyprus
15:51,
YEREVAN, APRIL 10, ARMENPRESS. A small park dedicated to the memory of heroes fallen at the recent Artsakh war has opened in Cyprus, Greek City Times reports.
The initiative belongs to the members of the Cypriot party Movement of Solidarity led by party leader Eleni Theocharous.
The ceremony was also attended by members of the Armenian community of Cyprus.
Editing and Translating by Aneta Harutyunyan
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Moscow, Russia April 7, 2021. Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via REUTERSREUTERS
MOSCOW (REUTERS) - Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on Wednesday appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin to help with the release of prisoners of war who were captured during fighting with Azeri forces during last year's Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Pashinyan, who travelled to Moscow to meet the Russian leader, also said that he hoped Armenia would be able to acquire large quantities of Russian vaccines against COVID-19.
(Reporting by Vladimir Soldatkin; Writing by Alexander Marrow; Editing by Kevin Liffey)
Participants of a women's protest action initiated by the VETO opposition movement on Wednesday marched from Yerevan’s Charles Aznavour Square to the government building, which was guarded by numerous police officers.
Police were standing in several rows at the entrance to the government building.
One of the protesters said, addressing police: “You ensure the safety of persons subjected to Turkey, do you consider yourself a man? We urge you to open the entry for us, otherwise we will do it ourselves."
Afterwards, the women tried to break through the police cordon, but a scuffle erupted, as police did not allow them to approach the entrance to the building. Protesting women also started throwing eggs towards the government building.
Police officers started to detain women protesters.
The Yerevan Court of General Jurisdiction on Tuesday ruled to end the criminal prosecution against Armenia’s former Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan under Article 300.1 of the Criminal Code due to the lack of corpus delicti.
Judge Anna Danibekyan presiding over the trial also lifted a signature bond as a measure of restraint on Ohanyan, as well as the attachment of his movable and immovable property and assets.
The ruling came after Armenia’s Constitutional Court declared Article 300.1 concerning “overthrow of the constitutional order” unconstitutional and invalid on 26 March, stating it runs counter to Articles 78 and 79 of the Constitution dealing with the principles of proportionality and certainty.
The court also ruled to drop charges against former President of Armenia Robert Kocharyan, former Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization Yuri Khachaturov and former Deputy Prime Minister Armen Gevorgyan prosecuted under the same article of the penal code.
Kocharyan’s lawyers had filed a motion to the court to end the criminal proceedings citing the Constitutional Court ruling, which was strongly opposed by the trial prosecutors at the April 2 hearing.
As mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia has sought to maintain influence in Azerbaijan and Armenia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In pursuing a strategy based on balancing competing Armenian-Azerbaijani interests over the disputed territory, Moscow is able to wield leverage in the South Caucasus without antagonising either Baku or Yerevan. However, the Turkish intervention on the issue in 2020 in full support of Azerbaijan tilted the power-balance of the conflict and cemented Ankara as a new security actor in the region.
A political environment now exists in which a lasting settlement over Nagorno-Karabakh can take shape. The terms of the November ceasefire forced the issue of the OSCE Minsk Group commitment on the return of land currently under Armenian control to Azerbaijan. Turkey is also in a position to address Yerevan’s interests as the Russian-brokered accord stipulates infrastructure development in the Lachin corridor, which links Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh. The potential for regional security as a result means that the European Union has an opportunity to advance its renewable energy transition and energy diversification policy.
Since the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh escalated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has sought to strike a neutral position on the issue in order to maintain influence in the South Caucasus. In striving for closer relations with Moscow as an independent country, a notion exists among the Azerbaijani elite that it can elicit Russian assistance to force Armenia to end the conflict. As for Armenia, the threat of crisis escalation over Nagorno-Karabakh means that it is kept within Russia’s orbit since Yerevan is reliant on Moscow for its security.
This balancing strategy, while far from resolving the conflict, enables the Kremlin to preserve its influence in Azerbaijani and Armenian affairs. Threats to Armenia’s security had supposedly been mitigated once it became a founding member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) in 1994. The scale at which Yerevan attaches importance to its strategic alliance with Russia in such an organisation is seen in its withdrawal from EU Association Agreement talks in 2013 and subsequent accession to the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia can rely on Armenia remaining a loyal security partner in the region since Yerevan has the understanding that Moscow would deploy troops to defend it.
On the other hand, Azerbaijan’s strategic location on the Caspian Sea and its richness in gas supply lead Russia simultaneously to play to Baku’s interests. Even with the security guarantee that came with membership of the CSTO, Armenia became increasingly frustrated with fellow alliance members selling arms to Azerbaijan (which does not participate in the CSTO) and failing to react to episodes of conflict along its eastern border. Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is also able to keep dialogue open with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, in reiterating that Armenian involvement in the mutual defence pact only covers an attack on undisputed territory.
It is not unreasonable to suggest that the ceasefire in November reflects Russia’s strategy of maintaining influence in both Armenia and Azerbaijan through playing to their competing interests over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Although omitting a definition of the status of the disputed territory itself provides no basis for a long-term resolution, the accord serves to legitimise Russia’s military presence in the region. In keeping potential alive for crisis escalation, the deal allows Moscow to continue wielding influence while avoiding the issue of not being able to use the pretext of defending pro-Russian separatists as is the case in other post-Soviet territorial clashes.
Despite the justification that is given for peacekeeping, the obligations that boots-on-the-ground carry mean Putin’s divide-and-rule strategy will be hard to sustain. For instance, a deadline for control of the Kalbajar region to be passed from Armenia to Azerbaijan was pushed back by ten days to resettle the local Armenian population. There is also no guarantee that the peacekeeping mission will be renewed after the end of its five-year term as either Yerevan or Baku can withdraw their consent. It is clear that a reliable stability guarantor cannot be found in Russia.
However, in seeking to establish itself as a regional power, Turkey capitalised on the Kremlin’s disinterest in genuine conflict resolution and emerged as a new security actor in the South Caucasus as a result. In giving its full support behind Azerbaijan, Ankara skilfully put an end to the stalemate that had long-favoured Russian interests without falling into a direct confrontation with Moscow.
Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, took the decision to provide Baku with senior military advisory personnel and unmanned aerial vehicles. Even while assisting forces opposed to Moscow in Libya and Syria, interference on this level in a strategically-important area of the former Soviet Union had potentially devastating consequences for Turkish-Russian relations. Yet geopolitical dividends have been paid. Ankara’s intervention resulted in an outcome that aligned with the notion of a multipolar international system Putin espoused at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. The established ceasefire terms following the swift Azerbaijani victory forced the issue of the elusive implementation of the Madrid Principles that were agreed in 2009 by the OSCE Minsk Group, which Russia co-chairs along with France and the United States.
This new dynamic in the territorial dispute means that scope now exists for a long-term settlement. While restoring Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, the accord also stipulates an opening up of communications and new infrastructure in the Lachin corridor, which links the disputed territory with Armenia. Ankara is in a strong position to lead such a rapprochement with Yerevan. Erdoğan has shown willingness in the past to confront sensitive issues surrounding the deaths and deportations of Armenians under the Ottoman Empire. For all the damage that will come to diplomatic relations with Yerevan from fully-backing Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Turkish president is shrewd enough to use pragmatism where necessary to achieve his foreign policy ambitions.
The prospect of security in an otherwise conflict-prone environment makes Turkey increasingly important to EU interests, particularly in renewable energy and energy diversification.
As part of the European Green Deal, the conclusions on climate and energy diplomacy adopted by the Council of the European Union aim to accelerate the global energy transition and strengthen the energy security of the EU and its partners. One of the key challenges facing Brussels in this effort is the primary use of coal for power consumption in south-eastern Europe. If the EU takes the initiative on the emerging security configuration in the South Caucasus, a solution may be found in cooperation with Ankara.
Turkey successfully diversified its energy imports to include liquified natural gas (LNG), which makes the country a vital renewable energy source for mainland Europe. Maintaining Turkey’s status as a key European LNG-hub will crucially depend on the stability of its neighbours. A lasting settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would open up new diplomatic opportunities for Brussels to strike climate partnerships in the Caspian Sea region.
An agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to jointly-develop a natural gas field in the Caspian Sea means that Europe could have access to an area holding nearly 10% of the world’s natural gas reserves. Extending Southern Gas Corridor transit sources to Turkmenistan would enable Ashgabat to access the European Internal Market as well as help replace the 30-40% coal-based electricity generation in Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania.
Prospects for a revitalised transatlantic alliance may also be strengthened out of EU engagement with Turkey in this policy area. US president Joe Biden has expressed interest in working with Brussels to wean off Europe’s gas dependence on Russia and confront Chinese presence in the European energy sector. Washington signalled its support for the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) in November, which aims to deepen cross-border energy in Central and Eastern Europe. Turkish collaboration with the EU on 3SI will be crucial to the initiative’s success.
The Turkish intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh on the side of Azerbaijan cemented close diplomatic links between Ankara and Baku. Erdoğan is as a result well-placed to help coordinate gas market integration and free natural gas flows with the Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (GUAM) grouping. Deeper cooperation within the EU eastern neighbourhood in the energy sector will enhance EU capabilities to drive economic growth and limit the influence of Moscow and Beijing.
Thus, energy diversification and the renewable energy transition are areas in which an EU-Turkey strategic partnership would help advance EU interests. If Europe underestimates the significance of the new geopolitical landscape in the South Caucasus as a result of the Turkish intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh, it may have profound implications for the success of its energy policy and its relationship with the Biden presidency.