X
    Categories: 2021

Israeli Press: Iran’s intimidation of Azerbaijan must be answered

Jewish News Syndicate


By Eran Lerman
Oct. 21, 2021

[The implications of Iranian pressure on Baku extend well beyond the
southern Caucasus, but Israel must tread carefully in this complex
region.]

October 21, 2021 / Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security) The
extensive Iranian military maneuvers near Azerbaijan’s borders at the
end of September were designed to intimidate the leadership in Baku,
to deter it from curbing Iran’s illegal trade with Armenia and to
force Azerbaijan to downgrade the country’s strategic relationship
with Israel. In response, Israel should be careful not to make any
commitments that cannot be fulfilled. However, Israel should alert
Russia and others of the consequences to Iran of such threatening
behavior.

The roots of Azeri-Iranian tensions

Iran’s hostility towards Azerbaijan began long before the latest
crisis erupted. The tensions go back to the latter’s emergence as an
independent nation (after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in
1991) and the fear in Tehran that this might revive Azeri nationalism
within Iran’s borders. This fear was (and to some extent still is) fed
by memories of the period during and immediately after World War Two,
when Iran was carved into British and Soviet occupation zones.

The Soviets turned Iran’s northern regions into two autonomous Marxist
national republics—one Azeri and the other Kurdish. The Soviet Union
hoped to enshrine their independence (as Soviet dependencies) even
after the war ended. It was only when the Truman administration
sternly warned Stalin (backed by its nuclear monopoly, at the time) of
the consequences that Stalin backed down and retreated from Iran.

A significant part of Iran’s population (often estimated at above 20
percent) has Azeri roots (as does Iranian Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei). In northwestern Iran there are still occasional expressions
of separatist sentiment, salient enough to warrant close surveillance
and repression by the Iranian authorities. Moreover, in the first
round of the war over the Nagorno Karabakh province (or Artzach, as
the Armenians call it), Tehran supported Armenian Christian forces
against the Azeris. The latter are Muslims, and indeed some 60 percent
or more of them are Shi’ites. However, their tolerant and liberal
interpretation of Islam does not sit well with that of the
mullah-based regime in Iran.

The Azeris lost a significant part of their territory in the first
Nagorno-Karabakh war against Armenia. This was a war for control of a
province largely populated by Armenians but annexed in the Soviet era
to Azerbaijan. The struggle began even before the Soviet collapse and
escalated into full-scale confrontation in 1993-1994. Following their
defeat, Azeri leadership under Gaidar Aliev (father of the current
president) turned to Israel for help. This resulted in a
well-established relationship (although Azerbaijan has yet to open an
embassy in Israel).

After the second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, in which the tables
were turned, much was made of Israel’s role (alongside that of Turkey)
in changing the balance of power. This, in turn, fed Iranian suspicion
and resentment, which also is based on Iran’s interpretation of the
Israeli operational intelligence presence in Azerbaijan in recent
years.

Iran’s campaign of intimidation

The Iranian military’s large-scale exercise last month near the border
with Azerbaijan was perceived in Baku as an act of intimidation, and
this was confirmed by the statements coming out of Iran. Tehran cast
doubt on Aliyev’s political maturity (as compared with his late,
highly experienced father); muttered darkly about “foreign influences”
in Baku; and openly threatened to attack if such “influences” (i.e.,
the Israeli presence in Azerbaijan) persist.

Adding to the sense of crisis was the recent decision by Azerbaijan to
end the smuggling of oil from Iran to Armenia in falsely identified
vehicles, activity which violates Western sanctions against Iran. This
may well have been interpreted in Tehran as a provocation, possibly
instigated by “external influences”—and thus as one more reason to
bring pressure to bear on Baku. However, this alone is insufficient
reason for such dramatic measures by Iran.

The overt flexing of Iran’s muscles is indeed part of a broader
pattern. Iran engages widely in violence by proxy, via the Houthis in
Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza.
Occasionally it also acts directly, as in this case.

As tensions rise over Iran’s nuclear program, Tehran apparently hopes
to intimidate countries in the region and warn them against offering
any assistance to Israel and other forces aligned against the Iranian
regime. Ultimately, Iran seeks to frustrate what they suspect to be
Israel’s plans and to deter Israeli leadership from acting against
Iran.

Thus, the implications of Iranian pressure on Azerbaijan extend well
beyond the confines of the southern Caucasus. It adds to a growing
list of points of friction where the Iranian regime is overtly seeking
to test the limits of international, Western and ultimately Israeli
(and Arab) responses.

What can be done?

Israel must tread carefully in this complex region, where ancient
hatreds often dominate. Overt statements should be avoided. While the
existing understandings with the Azeri government should be upheld and
discreet intelligence sharing should continue, it would be unwise for
Israel to make any commitments that cannot be realized, and which may
exacerbate regional tensions.

At the same time, at the diplomatic level and as part of a broader
discussion on Iran’s intentions and actions, Israel cannot ignore the
Iranian pattern of intimidation. This should be one of the focal
points in Israel’s ongoing effort to alert the U.S. administration and
its Western allies to the escalating danger inherent in leaving
Iranian actions unanswered.

Moreover, the West is not the only relevant interlocutor. Russia, with
which Israel has open and effective channels of communication, may
have its own issues with the Azeri leadership. Russia is not likely to
view with equanimity a foreign power threatening military action
against any part of what the Russians refer to as the “near abroad”
(meaning, the former Soviet space). Nor will Turkey, which offered
Azerbaijan active support in the war of 2020, accept Iranian
aggressive behavior. With all necessary caution, this is a point to be
raised in the context of Turkey’s attempt to patch up relations with
key Arab players who share Israel’s concerns about Iran.

Ultimately, Iran is unlikely to risk a confrontation with a well-armed
neighbor, in difficult terrain and with unforeseeable consequences.
But the way Tehran now uses military intimidation, as well as terror
by proxy and other means of threatening regional players, must become
a factor in the formulation of Western policy towards Iran in this
decisive period.

*
IDF Col. (res) Eram Lerman is vice president of the Jerusalem
Institute for Strategic Studies. He was deputy director for foreign
policy and international affairs at the National Security Council in
the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. He held senior posts in IDF
Military Intelligence for more than 20 years and teaches in the Middle
East Studies program at Shalem College in Jerusalem.

This article was first published by the Jerusalem Institute for
Strategic Studies.


 

George Mamian: