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    Categories: 2021

How is Iran trying to intensify its involvement in geopolitics of S. Caucasus

JAM News
June 14 2021

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    Gayane Mkrtchyan, Yerevan

After the second Karabakh war, Iran is trying to intensify its involvement in the geopolitical processes of the South Caucasus. A country with thousands of kilometers of sea and land borders with over a dozen of countries, Iran, nevertheless, considers it important to preserve 42 kilometers of its border with Armenia.

Iran made this statement after May 12, when the Azerbaijani Armed Forces crossed the southern border of Armenia in the Syunik region. Azerbaijan has advanced its positions several kilometers deep into the territory of Armenia and refused to retreat, despite Armenia’s repeated demands.

Azerbaijan declares these territories its own citing Soviet maps as evidence, however, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan stated later that the maps are fake. The Armenian media then published a map of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, proving that these territories belong to Armenia.

It was this situation that became the reason for Iran to declare that it stands for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Armenia. Tehran used the _expression_ “red lines”, in case of violation of which it would be ready to intervene in the conflict.

Iranians in Armenia are actively discussing and commenting on Iran’s position in the ongoing crisis.


  • The road to Nakhichevan: is Armenia surrendering its territories to Azerbaijan or emerging from blockade?
  • What Armenia lost to Azerbaijan after the war

Iran’s statement on the red lines concerns the ongoing crisis in the Syunik region, as well as Azerbaijan’s statements in regards to the Zangezur corridor, Iranianist Garik Miskaryan says. In particular, this concerns the reopening of the communications in the region under the trilateral agreement signed on November 9, 2020, by the heads of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia:

“Iran is concerned about the rumors that the corridor will not be controlled by Armenia. In Iran, this is regarded as an attempt to interrupt the Armenian-Iranian land border and expand the border with Turkey. This situation might be the source of geopolitical risks for Iran. The border with Azerbaijan has already expanded significantly. At the same time, the influence of such countries as Turkey and Israel has increased in the region, one of which competes with Iran, the other is openly hostile to it”.

“Armenia is an alternative to Turkish-Azerbaijani partnership, and the Iranians do not want this alternative to disappear or be threatened”, says Iranian scholar Vardan Voskanyan.

Armenia is important to Iran as much as Iran is important to Armenia, says Iranian scholar Gohar Iskandaryan.

She explains that Armenia is the only Christian country bordering Iran and a large Armenian community is residing there. Every time Iran is accused of radical Islamism or terrorism, they convincingly refer to their warm relations with Christian Armenia and Armenians.

“Secondly, for Iran, Armenia is an alternative route to Europe. Thirdly, given Iran’s great desire to deepen relations with the Eurasian Economic Union, it needs a land border with the EAEU countries [Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia] and Armenia is the only EAEU country that Iran borders.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Iran and Armenia are natural allies. Although separated by religion, the current national identity of the countries is very similar at the moment as both are struggling to resist the unification and further strengthening of the Turkic world, which would be destructive for both countries”, says Gohar Iskandaryan.

The South Caucasus is not the most important region for Iran from the point of view of its vital interests, political scientist Beniamin Poghosyan believes.

According to him, Iran is trying to maintain good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, in the best traditions of eastern diplomacy. Beniamin Poghosyan believes the statements of Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif in Baku and Yerevan served a very specific purpose:

“In Baku, he announced the historical role of Aliyev in the liberation of the territories [of Karabakh], and this flattered the pride of both Aliyev himself and the entire Azerbaijani people. In turn, in Armenia, he made a statement about the country’s territorial integrity and ‘red lines’ which should not be crossed, realizing that we are all concerned about the territorial integrity of Armenia.

There is one more issue to consider. I practically rule out the possibility of Iran taking any concrete actions if the situation in Syunik escalates. Iran knows that Armenia is considered a zone of influence of Russia, where Russia is making decisions and taking steps”.

Referring to the statements from Iran on the implementation of various communication projects with Armenia, the political scientist assumes that they are merely statements and messages aimed at creating a positive image:

“The Artashat-Meghri road, according to various estimates, will cost on average about one and a half billion. It is obvious that Iran is now unable to invest even several hundred million in this project. These words are designed to arouse sympathy in Armenia and maintain a balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan”.

Despite realizing that Armenia is in the zone of influence of Russia, Iran is still trying to keep up with the processes taking place in the region, Iranianist Georgy Mirzabekyan believes. This is especially noticeable after the signing of a trilateral Russia-mediated agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Karabakh:

“Iran is trying in every possible way to restore its influence by offering alternative geopolitical solutions. A vivid confirmation of this is the statement of the Minister of Roads and Urban Development Mohammad Eslami, made in Armenia. He said that the road connecting the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea should pass through Armenia via the Nakhichevan road.

Iran is discussing this route in order to reduce its losses from the process of unblocking regional communication [outlined in a trilateral statement signed by the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia]. Iran wants to maintain its influence in Nakhichevan.

Also, one should not forget that Azerbaijan carries out its land communication via the territory of Iran. But now Iran has found itself in the position of ‘closing the race’ and, whenever possible, it is trying to protect its state interests. Therefore, Iran is currently negotiating with the countries of the region”.

Iranians believe that the upset in the Caucasus balance is not in Iran’s favor, and Armenia’s southern neighbor is making efforts to rectify the state of affairs.

During the last Karabakh war, Iran also tried to take on the role of mediator, says Gohar Iskandaryan. according to her, simultaneously, #Turkey, one of its main competitors, provided direct material, military, military-technical assistance to one of the belligerent parties – Azerbaijan and Russia, being a strategic ally of Armenia, tried to maintain neutrality.

“Thus, because of the unprecedented, large-scale assistance from Turkey to Azerbaijan, the fragile balance that had been preserved for 30 years in the Caucasus between three countries – Russia, Iran, and Turkey, was disturbed. Iran did not have and does not have the fulcrum that it had in Armenia neither in Azerbaijan nor in Georgia.

However, the passive position of Iran during the war caused disappointment in the Armenian society, and its congratulations on Azerbaijan’s victory and ‘liberation of the lands’ after the war caused bewilderment”, Gohar Iskandaryan said.

Iran is still trying to stay in the game, she said:

“The country understands that the opening of communication lines has become a priority, therefore, they come up with similar proposals. It must be said that Iran has repeatedly offered Turkey and Russia to apply the same model in the Caucasus as in Syria. In this case, we are talking about the 3 + 3 principle: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan + Russia, Turkey and Iran.

However, this proposal from Iran seems to be losing its meaning. Firstly, since Georgia has no desire to enter into any process in which Russia is involved, and secondly, Armenia is categorically against the participation of Turkey”.

Zhanna Nahapetian: