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    Categories: 2020

Turkey, Ukraine forging strategic depth in the Black Sea

Asia Times



[Turkey and Ukraine are deepening technological cooperation with
strategic implications for Russia, EU and the wider region]

By MK Bhadrakumar
December 24, 2020

Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been variously accused
of “neo-Ottomanism,” revanchism or radical Islamism. But the meeting
of the foreign and defense ministers of Turkey and Ukraine in the
“2+2” format in Kiev on December 18 did not fit into any of these
narratives.

The event throws light on the moorings of Turkish regional policies
that seldom get discussed. The “2+2” format is generally regarded as a
level of diplomatic and political interaction by two countries that
have vital stakes in the relationship.

The Turkish-Ukrainian relationship has gained gravitas since 2014
following the pro-Western regime change in Kiev, and palpably so after
Volodymyr Zelensky became president in May last year.

More recently, Azerbaijan’s dramatic success in recovering lost
territory in Nagorno-Karabakh, thanks to Turkey’s robust support,
captivated the Ukrainian elite. Zelensky’s visit to Turkey on October
16 turned out to be a turning point in bilateral relations. During
Zelensky’s visit, a framework agreement on military cooperation was
signed.

Zelensky was much impressed by Erdogan’s affirmation that Turkey
considers Ukraine to be “the key to the establishment of stability,
security, peace and prosperity in the region” and his reiteration that
“Turkey has not recognized Crimea’s illegal annexation [by Russia] and
it never will.”

Zelensky later announced the construction of two naval bases “for the
protection of the Black Sea region” and emphasized his intention to
develop an army that will not allow the loss of national territory.

Ukraine has emerged as Turkey’s main partner in a number of military
technologies such as turboprop and diesel engines, avionics, drones,
anti-ship and cruise missiles, radar and surveillance systems, space
and satellite technologies and active and passive robotic systems.
It’s a match made in heaven, as Ukraine also has a strong base for the
defense industry dating back to the Soviet era.

Thus Turkey is funding the research and development work in Ukraine to
develop advanced engine technologies; Turkish companies have acquired
a quarter of the shares of Ukrainian engine manufacturer Motor Sich,
along with terms related to the transfer of know-how; Turkey is open
to co-production of its famed combat drones in Ukraine.


Ukraine has agreed to transfer know-how to Turkey to boost its
fledgling space agency and a satellite R&D laboratory in Roketsan,
Turkey’s leading manufacturer of rocket and missile engines and
satellites, and will give assistance for the development of jet
engines in Turkey’s TFX fighter project, and the two countries will
jointly develop and produce military satellites.

The technology that Turkey is offering ranges from the Bayraktar TB2
surveillance and combat drones and Atmaca anti-ship missiles (with a
range of 200 kilometers) to advanced corvettes. All in all, the two
countries are now working on 50 joint defense projects.

Analysts speculate that Ukraine might repeat the Karabakh example to
win back territories it lost to Russia-backed separatists in 2014 in
Donbas and could use drones to undertake surveillance over Crimea and
the Kerch Strait linking the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

During a visit to Turkey on December 2, Ukrainian Foreign Minister
Kuleba Dmytro openly voiced the hope, while invoking the heritage of
the Ottoman Empire until the 18th century, that Ankara would assume a
“leadership role” on the Crimean question.

Indeed, the joint statement issued after last Friday’s “2+2” meeting
“noted the existence of threats and their implications for the
stability and security of the broader Black Sea region that needs to
be strengthened on the basis of international law and respect for
territorial integrity and sovereignty of states within their
internationally recognized borders.”

It flagged Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s “integration with European
and trans-Atlantic structures, including the EU and NATO,” as well as
its “sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally
recognized borders including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the
city of Sevastopol.”

After the 2+2 meeting, Foreign Minister Kuleba estimated at a joint
press conference that the format “will become an important driving
force not only for Ukraine-Turkey relations, but also for the
development of the situation in our region in general” and will be
“useful for Turkey’s support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.”

Compared with such hype, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu
responded that the impasse in the Donbas “should be solved within the
territorial integrity and we are happy that the ceasefire continues,
despite some small breaches.” Çavuşoğlu said Turkey does not recognize
the “unlawful annexation of Crimea” and it is a known position voiced
at the United Nations.

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar also told the press conference
that Ankara is aware of the importance of peace and stability in the
Black Sea region, adding: “We would like everyone to know that we are
very cautious and sensitive about this. We are taking all measures not
to let any provocations, tension [in the region].” Akar also flagged
that Turkey is seeking a broad-based relationship with Ukraine.

Surely, the Turkish ministers cautioned against over-interpretation.
The Crimean Tatars form an important lobby in Turkey’s domestic
politics, and Ankara has also been pursuing a pan-Turkic agenda
regionally.

However, the deepening technological cooperation between Turkey and
Ukraine has far-reaching implications for the power dynamic in the
Black Sea basin where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is
now establishing a presence to rival Russia. The big question is about
Turkey’s intentions.

Does it aim to counterbalance Russian supremacy in the Black Sea? Some
analysts estimate that this is Ankara’s way of pressuring Moscow in
its own back yard as retaliation for Russian efforts undermining
Turkey’s agenda in Libya and Syria.

Some Russian experts have also expressed apprehension that the
Ukrainian generals might copy the Azeri tactics in Karabakh to launch
a military operation in Donbas. There has been a buildup on the Donbas
front recently with Ukraine deploying tanks, armored vehicles,
anti-aircraft systems and rocket-propelled grenades. The Turkish TB2
drones could easily hit pro-Russian separatist positions.

But Erdogan is a hardcore realist who knows that Moscow wouldn’t
tolerate a Ukrainian military offensive in Donbas, and that neither
NATO nor the US and the European Union wants a war. Erdogan has no
reason to confront Russia, either. Moscow has gone the extra mile to
accommodate Ankara’s interests in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh.

To be sure, Erdogan is conscious of the West’s machinations to create
a rift between Turkey and Russia. The entente with Russia creates
space for Turkey to negotiate more optimally with the EU and the US,
while it is in Russia’s interest, too, to create such space for
Turkey. Arguably, it is a variant of the new type of inter-state
relationship that exists between Russia and China.

Turkey instantaneously reacted to the recent US sanctions by
reaffirming that there is no going back on the S-400 missile deal with
Russia. Defense Minister Akar’s reaction was that Turkey will turn to
“other nations” (read Russia) to source its weaponry.

Surely, Erdogan’s independent foreign policies won’t be sustainable
without a resilient “Russia option.” President Vladimir Putin
appreciates that, as evident from Moscow’s willingness to have an
equal relationship with Turkey based on mutual respect and mutual
interest, be it in Nagorno-Karabakh or in Syria. (Libya falls in an
altogether different category.)

On the contrary, Turkey’s strained relations with the EU stem from
substantial and opposing interests that are virtually impossible to
reconcile any time soon. Equally, Turkey’s tensions with the US go far
beyond its acquisition of the S-400 missile defense system from
Russia.

US President Donald Trump kept tensions with Turkey under check, but
Erdogan can expect a more adverse situation in the Joe Biden
presidency. As vice-president, Biden witnessed the failed coup attempt
of July 2016 against Erdogan in which the latter narrowly escaped
assassination.

More important, the United States’ dalliance with Syrian Kurdish
groups (affiliated with the terrorist group PKK) dates back to 2014
during Barack Obama’s presidency.

It is no coincidence that  Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu has pointedly
reverted to Ankara’s demand for the extradition of Islamist preacher
Fetullah Gulen as a necessary condition for the improvement of
relations with Washington. Turkey suspects that Gulen is a CIA “asset”
and the 2016 coup attempt aimed at a Gulenist takeover with US
backing.

Turkey faces a phalanx of hostile regional states; the EU and the US
are in adversarial mode; and NATO is of no help. Suffice to say,
Turkey’s efforts to create “strategic depth” in the Black Sea must be
put in perspective.

*

M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.


 

Emma Jilavian: